劳动保护对高管薪酬业绩敏感性的影响:基于中国上市公司样本的DID检验
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摘要
随着公司治理的关注从高管和股东转移到更多元的利益相关者视角,员工参与公司治理开始成为一个新的研究议题。本文采用双重差分法(DID)以2003-2017年中国A股上市公司为研究样本,结合2008年《劳动合同法》颁布和实施的制度背景,就劳动保护对公司治理可能产生的优化效应进行实证检验。本文发现,劳动保护加强后,企业高管的薪酬业绩敏感性得到提升,并且这种正向提升作用还受到代理成本、董事会独立性和管理层持股的调节作用。在代理成本较高、董事会独立性较低或管理层持股较低的企业,劳动保护对企业的高管薪酬业绩敏感性提升更加显著。本文拓展了员工参与公司治理及高管薪酬业绩敏感性领域的文献,为上市企业的公司治理机制规范与完善提供了全新的角度与思路,也为评价2008年《劳动合同法》的政策后果提供了重要的微观证据。
As the focus of corporate governance shifts from executives and shareholders to the perspective of more diverse stakeholders, employee participation in corporate governance has become a new research topic. This paper employs the difference-in-difference(DID) method and uses the data from China A shares of listed companies between 2003 and 2017 as the research sample, and makes empirical tests on the possible promotion effect of labor protection on corporate governance with the institutional context of promulgation and implementation of the Labor Contract Law in 2008. We find that the executive compensation performance sensitivity improves after labor protection is enhanced. Moreover, the positive promotion effect is also adjusted by agency cost, board independence and management shareholding. In the enterprises with high agency cost, low board independence or low management shareholding, the promotion effect of labor protection on executive compensation performance sensitivity is more significant. This paper expands the literature on employee participation in corporate governance and executive compensation performance sensitivity, and provides a new perspective and thought for the standardization and improvement of corporate governance mechanism of listed enterprises, and provides important microeconomic evidence for the evaluation of the policy consequences of the Labor Contract Law in 2008.
As the focus of corporate governance shifts from executives and shareholders to the perspective of more diverse stakeholders, employee participation in corporate governance has become a new research topic. This paper employs the difference-in-difference(DID) method and uses the data from China A shares of listed companies between 2003 and 2017 as the research sample, and makes empirical tests on the possible promotion effect of labor protection on corporate governance with the institutional context of promulgation and implementation of the Labor Contract Law in 2008. We find that the executive compensation performance sensitivity improves after labor protection is enhanced. Moreover, the positive promotion effect is also adjusted by agency cost, board independence and management shareholding. In the enterprises with high agency cost, low board independence or low management shareholding, the promotion effect of labor protection on executive compensation performance sensitivity is more significant. This paper expands the literature on employee participation in corporate governance and executive compensation performance sensitivity, and provides a new perspective and thought for the standardization and improvement of corporate governance mechanism of listed enterprises, and provides important microeconomic evidence for the evaluation of the policy consequences of the Labor Contract Law in 2008.
引文
1.常凯.(2008).论劳动合同法的立法依据和法律定位.法学论坛,23(2),5-14.
2.陈勇.(2007).员工在公司治理中的地位与作用探析.江西社会科学,(6),135-139.
3.楚金桥.(2007).构建商务关系网络背景下知识型员工激励体系.经济导刊,(2),108-110.
4.杜兴强,王丽华.(2007).高层管理当局薪酬与上市公司业绩的相关性实证研究.会计研究,(1),58-65.
5.方军雄.(2009).我国上市公司高管的薪酬存在粘性吗?.经济研究,(3),110-124.
6.方军雄.(2012).高管超额薪酬与公司治理决策.管理世界,(11),144-155.
7.高雷,宋顺林.(2007).治理环境、治理结构与代理成本--来自国有上市公司面板数据的经验证据.经济评论,(3),35-40.
8.高明华,谭玥宁.(2014).董事会治理、产权性质与代理成本--基于中国上市公司的实证研究.经济与管理研究,(2),5-13.
9.黄平.(2012).解雇成本、就业与产业转型升级--基于《劳动合同法》和来自中国上市公司的证据.南开经济研究,(3),79-94.
10.李晓创,高文书.(2013).高管薪酬影响因素的实证分析--兼论资本密集度的薪酬效应.云南财经大学学报,(2),96-105.
11.李燕明.(2009).农民工劳动权保护问题研究(博士学位论文).金华:浙江师范大学.
12.李增泉.(2000).激励机制与企业绩效--一项基于上市公司的实证研究.会计研究,(1),24-30.
13.廖冠民,陈燕.(2014).劳动保护、劳动密集度与经营弹性:基于2008年《劳动合同法》的实证检验.经济科学,36(2),91-103.
14.刘绍娓,万大艳.(2013).高管薪酬与公司绩效:国有与非国有上市公司的实证比较研究.中国软科学,(2),90-101.
15.卢锐.(2007).管理层权力、薪酬差距与绩效.南方经济,(7),60-70.
16.罗宏,曾永良,刘宝华.(2015).国有企业高管薪酬、公司治理与费用粘性.经济经纬,32(2),99-104.
17.倪骁然,朱玉杰.(2016).劳动保护、劳动密集度与企业创新--来自2008年《劳动合同法》实施的证据.管理世界,(7),154-167.
18.宁向东.(2005).公司治理理论.北京:中国发展出版社.
19.庞金勇,杨延村.(2007).上市公司高管职务经济犯罪与公司治理相关性研究.科学·经济·社会,25(2),118-122.
20.权小锋,吴世农,文芳.(2010).管理层权力、私有收益与薪酬操纵.经济研究,(11),73-87.
21.沈红波,潘飞,高新梓.(2012).制度环境与管理层持股的激励效应.中国工业经济,(8),96-108.
22.盛启伟,罗翠莲,王金顺.(2009).新劳动法对企业人力资源管理的影响及对策研究.科技管理研究,29(2),209-210.
23.苏卫东.(2005).上市公司董事会与经营者腐败.金融与经济,(3),47-49.
24.王克敏,王志超.(2007).高管控制权、报酬与盈余管理--基于中国上市公司的实证研究.管理世界,(7),111-119.
25.王跃堂,赵子夜,魏晓雁.(2006).董事会的独立性是否影响公司绩效?.经济研究,(5),62-73.
26.魏刚,杨乃鸽.(2000).高级管理层激励与经营绩效关系的实证研究.证券市场导报,(3),19-29.
27.张冬萍.(2013).员工参与公司治理问题的研究(硕士学位论文).成都:西华大学.
28.赵晶,王明.(2016).利益相关者、非正式参与和公司治理--基于雷士照明的案例研究.管理世界,(4),138-149.
29.周仁俊,杨战兵,李礼.(2010).管理层激励与企业经营业绩的相关性--国有与非国有控股上市公司的比较.会计研究,(12),69-75.
30.周禹.(2016).新合伙主义管理论:共生共享时代的企业制度升级.中国人力资源开发,(24),30-38.
31.Ang,J.S.,Cole,R.A.,&Lin,J.W.(2000).Agency costs and ownership structure.The Journal of Finance,55(1),81-106.
32.Allen,M.P.(1983).Corporate profits and cooptation:networks of market constraints and directorate ties in the American economy.Social Forces,64(2),526.
33.Ansoff,H.I.(1965).Corporate Strategy:An Analytical Approach to Business Policy for Growth and Expansion.New York:McGraw Hill.
34.Barkema,H.G.,&Gomez-Mejia,L.R.(1998).Managerial compensation and firm performance:A general research framework.The Academy of Management Journal,41(2),135-145.
35.Bebchuk,L.A.,&Fried,J.M.(2003).Executive compensation as an agency problem.Journal of Economic Perspectives,17(3),71-92.
36.Berle,A.A.,&Means,G.C.(1968).The Modern Corporation and Private Property,Revised Edition.New York:Harcourt,Brace and World.
37.Belot,M.,Boone,J.,&Ours,J.V.(2007).Welfareimproving employment protection.Economica,74(295),381-396.
38.Bertrand,M.,&Mullainathan,S.(2001).Are CEOs rewarded for luck?The ones without principals are.The Quarterly Journal of Economics,116(3),901-932.
39.Cowherd,D.M.,&Levine,D.I.(1992).Erratum:product quality and pay equity between lower-level employees and top management:an investigation of distributive justice theory.Administrative Science Quarterly,37(3),524.
40.Frederick,W.C.,Davis.K.,&Post,J.E.(1988).Business and society:Corporate strategy,public policy,ethics.New York:Mc Graw-Hill.
41.Freeman,R.E.(1984)Strategic management:Astakeholder approach.Boston:Pitman.
42.Freeman,R.E.(2010).Strategic management:Astakeholder approach.Cambridge:Cambridge University Press.
43.Girma,S.,&G?rg,H.(2006).Evaluating the foreign ownership wage premium using a difference-in-differences matching approach.Journal of International Economics,72(1),97-112.
44.Greenberg,J.,&Cropanzano,R.(1993).The social side of fairness:Interpersonal and informational classes of organizational justice.Justice in the workplace:Approaching fairness in human resource management.Hillsdale,NJ:Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
45.Grubb,D.,&Wells,W.(1993).Employment regulation and patterns of work in EC countries.OECD Economic Studies,21(Winter),7-39.
46.H?lmstrom,B.(1979).Moral hazard and observability.Bell Journal of Economics,10(1),74-91.
47.Jensen,M.C.,&Meckling,W.H.(1976).Theory of the firm:managerial behavior,agency costs and ownership structure.Social Science Electronic Publishing,3(4),305-360.
48.Johnson,J.L.,Daily,C.M.,&Ellstrand,A.E.(1996).Boards of directors:A review and research agenda.Journal of management,22(3),409-438.
49.Jones,Derek,C.,Kato,&Takao.(1995).The productivity effects of employee stock-ownership plans and bonuses:evidence from Japanese panel data.American Economic Review,85(3),391-414.
50.Kim,H.(2011).Does human capital specificity affect employer capital structure?Evidence from a natural experiment(Unpublished working paper).Durham:Duke University.
51.Michel,B.J.G.(2002).The relationships among organizational context,pay dispersion,and managerial turnover.The Academy of Management Journal,45(1),33-42.
52.Mitchell,R.K.,Agle,B.R.,&Wood,D.J.(1997).Toward a theory of stakeholder identification and salience:Defining the principle of who and what really counts.Academy of Management Review,22(4),853-886.
53.Murphy,K.J.,&Jensen,M.C.(1990).Performance pay and top management incentives.Journal of Political Economy,98(2),225-264.
54.Palia,D.,&Lichtenberg,F.(1999).Managerial ownership and firm performance:a re-examination using productivity measurement.Journal of Corporate Finance,5(4),323-339.
55.Pfeffer,J.,&Salancik,G.R.(2003).The external control of organizations:A resource dependence perspective.Social Science Electronic Publishing,23(2),123-133.
56.Piskorski,C.M.J..(2005).Power imbalance,mutual dependence,and constraint absorption:a closer look at resource dependence theory.Administrative Science Quarterly,50(2),167-199.
57.Rajan,R.G.,&Zingales,L.(1998).Power in a theory of the firm.Social Science Electronic Publishing,113(2),387-432.
58.Scott,W.R.(1995).Institutions and organizations:Theory and research.Thousand Oaks,CA:Sage.
59.Tosi,H.L.,&Gomez-Mejia,L.R.(1989).The decoupling of CEO pay and performance:an agency theory perspective.Administrative Science Quarterly,34(2),169-189.
60.Tosi,H.L.,&Gomez-Mejia,L.R.(1994).CEOcompensation monitoring and firm performance.Academy of Management Journal,37(4),1002-1016.
61.Wheeler,D.,Sillanpaa,M.,Barichello,L.B.,&Siewert,C.E.(1998).Including the stakeholders:the business case.Long Range Planning,31(2),201-210.
62.Wright,P.M.,Coff,R.,&Moliterno,T.P.(2014).Strategic human capital:Crossing the great divide.Journal of Management,40(2),353-370.
2.陈勇.(2007).员工在公司治理中的地位与作用探析.江西社会科学,(6),135-139.
3.楚金桥.(2007).构建商务关系网络背景下知识型员工激励体系.经济导刊,(2),108-110.
4.杜兴强,王丽华.(2007).高层管理当局薪酬与上市公司业绩的相关性实证研究.会计研究,(1),58-65.
5.方军雄.(2009).我国上市公司高管的薪酬存在粘性吗?.经济研究,(3),110-124.
6.方军雄.(2012).高管超额薪酬与公司治理决策.管理世界,(11),144-155.
7.高雷,宋顺林.(2007).治理环境、治理结构与代理成本--来自国有上市公司面板数据的经验证据.经济评论,(3),35-40.
8.高明华,谭玥宁.(2014).董事会治理、产权性质与代理成本--基于中国上市公司的实证研究.经济与管理研究,(2),5-13.
9.黄平.(2012).解雇成本、就业与产业转型升级--基于《劳动合同法》和来自中国上市公司的证据.南开经济研究,(3),79-94.
10.李晓创,高文书.(2013).高管薪酬影响因素的实证分析--兼论资本密集度的薪酬效应.云南财经大学学报,(2),96-105.
11.李燕明.(2009).农民工劳动权保护问题研究(博士学位论文).金华:浙江师范大学.
12.李增泉.(2000).激励机制与企业绩效--一项基于上市公司的实证研究.会计研究,(1),24-30.
13.廖冠民,陈燕.(2014).劳动保护、劳动密集度与经营弹性:基于2008年《劳动合同法》的实证检验.经济科学,36(2),91-103.
14.刘绍娓,万大艳.(2013).高管薪酬与公司绩效:国有与非国有上市公司的实证比较研究.中国软科学,(2),90-101.
15.卢锐.(2007).管理层权力、薪酬差距与绩效.南方经济,(7),60-70.
16.罗宏,曾永良,刘宝华.(2015).国有企业高管薪酬、公司治理与费用粘性.经济经纬,32(2),99-104.
17.倪骁然,朱玉杰.(2016).劳动保护、劳动密集度与企业创新--来自2008年《劳动合同法》实施的证据.管理世界,(7),154-167.
18.宁向东.(2005).公司治理理论.北京:中国发展出版社.
19.庞金勇,杨延村.(2007).上市公司高管职务经济犯罪与公司治理相关性研究.科学·经济·社会,25(2),118-122.
20.权小锋,吴世农,文芳.(2010).管理层权力、私有收益与薪酬操纵.经济研究,(11),73-87.
21.沈红波,潘飞,高新梓.(2012).制度环境与管理层持股的激励效应.中国工业经济,(8),96-108.
22.盛启伟,罗翠莲,王金顺.(2009).新劳动法对企业人力资源管理的影响及对策研究.科技管理研究,29(2),209-210.
23.苏卫东.(2005).上市公司董事会与经营者腐败.金融与经济,(3),47-49.
24.王克敏,王志超.(2007).高管控制权、报酬与盈余管理--基于中国上市公司的实证研究.管理世界,(7),111-119.
25.王跃堂,赵子夜,魏晓雁.(2006).董事会的独立性是否影响公司绩效?.经济研究,(5),62-73.
26.魏刚,杨乃鸽.(2000).高级管理层激励与经营绩效关系的实证研究.证券市场导报,(3),19-29.
27.张冬萍.(2013).员工参与公司治理问题的研究(硕士学位论文).成都:西华大学.
28.赵晶,王明.(2016).利益相关者、非正式参与和公司治理--基于雷士照明的案例研究.管理世界,(4),138-149.
29.周仁俊,杨战兵,李礼.(2010).管理层激励与企业经营业绩的相关性--国有与非国有控股上市公司的比较.会计研究,(12),69-75.
30.周禹.(2016).新合伙主义管理论:共生共享时代的企业制度升级.中国人力资源开发,(24),30-38.
31.Ang,J.S.,Cole,R.A.,&Lin,J.W.(2000).Agency costs and ownership structure.The Journal of Finance,55(1),81-106.
32.Allen,M.P.(1983).Corporate profits and cooptation:networks of market constraints and directorate ties in the American economy.Social Forces,64(2),526.
33.Ansoff,H.I.(1965).Corporate Strategy:An Analytical Approach to Business Policy for Growth and Expansion.New York:McGraw Hill.
34.Barkema,H.G.,&Gomez-Mejia,L.R.(1998).Managerial compensation and firm performance:A general research framework.The Academy of Management Journal,41(2),135-145.
35.Bebchuk,L.A.,&Fried,J.M.(2003).Executive compensation as an agency problem.Journal of Economic Perspectives,17(3),71-92.
36.Berle,A.A.,&Means,G.C.(1968).The Modern Corporation and Private Property,Revised Edition.New York:Harcourt,Brace and World.
37.Belot,M.,Boone,J.,&Ours,J.V.(2007).Welfareimproving employment protection.Economica,74(295),381-396.
38.Bertrand,M.,&Mullainathan,S.(2001).Are CEOs rewarded for luck?The ones without principals are.The Quarterly Journal of Economics,116(3),901-932.
39.Cowherd,D.M.,&Levine,D.I.(1992).Erratum:product quality and pay equity between lower-level employees and top management:an investigation of distributive justice theory.Administrative Science Quarterly,37(3),524.
40.Frederick,W.C.,Davis.K.,&Post,J.E.(1988).Business and society:Corporate strategy,public policy,ethics.New York:Mc Graw-Hill.
41.Freeman,R.E.(1984)Strategic management:Astakeholder approach.Boston:Pitman.
42.Freeman,R.E.(2010).Strategic management:Astakeholder approach.Cambridge:Cambridge University Press.
43.Girma,S.,&G?rg,H.(2006).Evaluating the foreign ownership wage premium using a difference-in-differences matching approach.Journal of International Economics,72(1),97-112.
44.Greenberg,J.,&Cropanzano,R.(1993).The social side of fairness:Interpersonal and informational classes of organizational justice.Justice in the workplace:Approaching fairness in human resource management.Hillsdale,NJ:Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
45.Grubb,D.,&Wells,W.(1993).Employment regulation and patterns of work in EC countries.OECD Economic Studies,21(Winter),7-39.
46.H?lmstrom,B.(1979).Moral hazard and observability.Bell Journal of Economics,10(1),74-91.
47.Jensen,M.C.,&Meckling,W.H.(1976).Theory of the firm:managerial behavior,agency costs and ownership structure.Social Science Electronic Publishing,3(4),305-360.
48.Johnson,J.L.,Daily,C.M.,&Ellstrand,A.E.(1996).Boards of directors:A review and research agenda.Journal of management,22(3),409-438.
49.Jones,Derek,C.,Kato,&Takao.(1995).The productivity effects of employee stock-ownership plans and bonuses:evidence from Japanese panel data.American Economic Review,85(3),391-414.
50.Kim,H.(2011).Does human capital specificity affect employer capital structure?Evidence from a natural experiment(Unpublished working paper).Durham:Duke University.
51.Michel,B.J.G.(2002).The relationships among organizational context,pay dispersion,and managerial turnover.The Academy of Management Journal,45(1),33-42.
52.Mitchell,R.K.,Agle,B.R.,&Wood,D.J.(1997).Toward a theory of stakeholder identification and salience:Defining the principle of who and what really counts.Academy of Management Review,22(4),853-886.
53.Murphy,K.J.,&Jensen,M.C.(1990).Performance pay and top management incentives.Journal of Political Economy,98(2),225-264.
54.Palia,D.,&Lichtenberg,F.(1999).Managerial ownership and firm performance:a re-examination using productivity measurement.Journal of Corporate Finance,5(4),323-339.
55.Pfeffer,J.,&Salancik,G.R.(2003).The external control of organizations:A resource dependence perspective.Social Science Electronic Publishing,23(2),123-133.
56.Piskorski,C.M.J..(2005).Power imbalance,mutual dependence,and constraint absorption:a closer look at resource dependence theory.Administrative Science Quarterly,50(2),167-199.
57.Rajan,R.G.,&Zingales,L.(1998).Power in a theory of the firm.Social Science Electronic Publishing,113(2),387-432.
58.Scott,W.R.(1995).Institutions and organizations:Theory and research.Thousand Oaks,CA:Sage.
59.Tosi,H.L.,&Gomez-Mejia,L.R.(1989).The decoupling of CEO pay and performance:an agency theory perspective.Administrative Science Quarterly,34(2),169-189.
60.Tosi,H.L.,&Gomez-Mejia,L.R.(1994).CEOcompensation monitoring and firm performance.Academy of Management Journal,37(4),1002-1016.
61.Wheeler,D.,Sillanpaa,M.,Barichello,L.B.,&Siewert,C.E.(1998).Including the stakeholders:the business case.Long Range Planning,31(2),201-210.
62.Wright,P.M.,Coff,R.,&Moliterno,T.P.(2014).Strategic human capital:Crossing the great divide.Journal of Management,40(2),353-370.