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股权分置改革过程中非流通股股东对流通股股东的利益侵占行为研究
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摘要
本文建立数学模型从理论上研究中国股票市场股权分置改革过程中非流通股股东对流通股股东的利益侵占行为机理,并以此为基础对中国股票市场在股权分置改革过程中存在的"金融异常现象"进行合理解释。研究结果表明,在股权分置改革过程中,原非流通股股东的资本利得收益将增加,原流通股股东的资本利得收益将减少,原非流通股股东增加的资本利得收益正好等于原流通股股东减少的资本利得收益;原非流通股股东对流通股股东的利益侵占量与原非流通股股东的持股数量和原流通股股东的持股成本正相关,与股权分置改革对价支付率负相关。本文研究结果能对中国股票市场股权分置过程中存在的"金融异常现象"作出合理解释。
An appropriate mathematical model is constructed to research the behavior mechanism of original non-tradable shareholders expropriating tradable shareholders' interest in the process of split-share structure reform of Chinese Stock Market theoretically.The financial anomalies of the Chinese stock market in the process of split-share structure reform are reasonably explained based on the theoretical model.The main research results are as follows.During the reduction of original non-tradable shares,the capital gains of original non-tradable shareholders will be increased and that of tradable shareholders will be reduced.The increased capital gains of original non-tradable shareholders are just equal to the reduced capital gains of tradable shareholders.The amount of original non-tradable shareholders expropriating tradable shareholders' interest is positively related to the shares held by original non-tradable shareholders and the holding cost of tradable shares,and negatively related to the consideration payment rate of equity division reform.The above-mentioned research results can reasonably explain the financial anomalies during the reduction process of original non-tradable shares in China's stock market to a certain extent.
引文
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