基于比较静力学模型的初创企业分阶段股权投资研究
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- 英文论文题名：Research on the Staged Equity Investment in Start-Up Enterprises Based on Comparative Statics
- 论文作者：赵袁军 ; 吴慧 ; 刘峥 ; 许桂萃 ; 余红心
- 英文论文作者：ZHAO Yuan-jun ; WU Hui ; LIU Zheng ; XU Gui-ping ; YU Hong-xin ; Glorious Sun School of Business Management ; Donghua University ; School of Management ; Shanghai University of Engineering Science ; School of Media and Design ; Shanghai JiaoTong University ; International School of Business Management ; Shanghai University of Finance and Economics
- 年：2016
- 作者机构：东华大学旭日工商管理学院;上海工程技术大学管理学院;上海交通大学媒体与设计学院;上海财经大学国际工商管理学院;
- 论文关键词：风险投资 ; 阶段性投资 ; 绩效评估 ; 金融合约
- 英文论文关键词：venture capital ; staged financing ; performance evaluation ; financial contracting
- 会议召开时间：2016-11-12
- 会议录名称：第十八届中国管理科学学术年会论文集
- 英文会议录名称：Proceedings of the 18th Chinese Annual Conference on Management Science
- 语种：中文
- 分类号：F275;F830.91
- 学会代码：ZHYJ
- 会议名称：第十八届中国管理科学学术年会
- 会议地点：中国陕西西安
- 主办单位：中国优选法统筹法与经济数学研究会、西安交通大学、中国科学院科技战略咨询研究院、《中国管理科学》编辑部
- 学会名称：中国优选法统筹法与经济数学研究会
- 页数：7
- 文件大小：552k
- 原文格式：O
- 会议级别：全国
摘要
本文通过构建前期融资模型和分阶段投资模型,将二者进行对比,验证了风险资本家更倾向于分阶段对创业企业进行投资,在此基础上进一步建立分阶段投资的代理模型,得出了分阶段融资各阶段的效率性。最后利用比较静力学模型研究了内生变量是如何受到外生变量的影响,并研究这种次生影响对各阶段的投资比例所产生的影响。最终的研究表明,分阶段融资会更有效率。分阶段融资会让投资者放弃早期投资回报较低的项目,从而可以通过排序舍弃投资回报率低的项目而选择投资回报率较高的好项目。但是次生影响会对投资比例产生影响,越多的次生影响会让风险投资家更倾向于早期投资。
In this paper,by constructing upfront financing model and phased investment model,then compare the two,we verify the venture capitalists prefer to invest in a startup in stages.Based on this,Investment in stages agent model is set up,it is concluded that the financing efficiency at each stage in stages.Finally,comparative statics model was used to study the exogenous variables how to affect the endogenous variable,and study the impact of the secondary effect to the each stage of the investment ratio.The final study showed that phased financing will be more efficient.Staged financing will allow investors to give up early low return on investment projects,thus can sort through the part with low return on investment projects and choose the higher return on investment project.But secondary influence affect investment ratio,the more the secondary impact will let venture capitalists tend to be more early investment.
In this paper,by constructing upfront financing model and phased investment model,then compare the two,we verify the venture capitalists prefer to invest in a startup in stages.Based on this,Investment in stages agent model is set up,it is concluded that the financing efficiency at each stage in stages.Finally,comparative statics model was used to study the exogenous variables how to affect the endogenous variable,and study the impact of the secondary effect to the each stage of the investment ratio.The final study showed that phased financing will be more efficient.Staged financing will allow investors to give up early low return on investment projects,thus can sort through the part with low return on investment projects and choose the higher return on investment project.But secondary influence affect investment ratio,the more the secondary impact will let venture capitalists tend to be more early investment.
引文
[I]Sahlman W A.The structure and governance of venturecapital organizations[J].Journal of financial economics,1990,27(2):473-521.
[2]Gompers P A,Lerner J.The venture capital cycle[M].MIT press,2004.
[3]Neher D V.Staged financing:an agency perspective[J].The Review of Economic Studies,1999,66(2):255-274.
[4]Landier A.Start-up financing:From banks to venture capital[R].Working paper University of Chicago,2002.
[5]Bergemann D,Hege U.The financing of innovation;Learning and stopping[J].RAND Journal of Economics,2005:719-752.
[6]McCahery J,Renneboog L.Venture capital contracting and the valuation of high technology firms[M].Oxford University Press,2004.
[7]Cornelli F,Yosha O.Stage financing and the role of convertible securities[J].The Review of Economic Studies,2003,70(1):1-32.
[8]Wang Susheng,Zhou Hailan.Staged financing in venture capital:moral hazard and risks[J].Journal of Corporate Finance,2004,10(1).131-155.
[9]Yerramilli V.Staging of investments:Flexibility vs incentives[J]Social Seience Electronic Publishing,2006,42(4):705-728.Working paper,2006.
[10]Admati A R,Pfleiderer P.Robust financial contracting and the role of venture capitalists[J].The Journal of Finance,1994,49(2):371-402.
[11]Gompers P A.Optimal investment,monitoring,and the staging of venture capital[J].The journal of finance,1995,50(5):1461-1489.
[12]Hsu Y.Staging of venture capital investment:A real options analysis[J].Small Bujiness Economics,2012,35(3)s265-281.
[13]Krohmer P,Lauterbach R,Lauterbach R.Private equity post-investment phases-the bright and dark side of staging[R].Working paper,JW Goethe-Universitat Frankfurt,Frankfurt,Germany,2005.
[14]Giat Y,Hackman S.Subramanian A.Venture capital investment under uncertainty and asymmetric beliefs:A continuous-time,stochastic principal-agent model[J].Stochastic Principal-Agent Model,2009.
[15]Lazear E P,Rosen S.Rank-Order Tournaments as Optmum Labor Contracts[J].Journal of Political Economy,1981.8(9Volume 89,Number 5):841-64.
[2]Gompers P A,Lerner J.The venture capital cycle[M].MIT press,2004.
[3]Neher D V.Staged financing:an agency perspective[J].The Review of Economic Studies,1999,66(2):255-274.
[4]Landier A.Start-up financing:From banks to venture capital[R].Working paper University of Chicago,2002.
[5]Bergemann D,Hege U.The financing of innovation;Learning and stopping[J].RAND Journal of Economics,2005:719-752.
[6]McCahery J,Renneboog L.Venture capital contracting and the valuation of high technology firms[M].Oxford University Press,2004.
[7]Cornelli F,Yosha O.Stage financing and the role of convertible securities[J].The Review of Economic Studies,2003,70(1):1-32.
[8]Wang Susheng,Zhou Hailan.Staged financing in venture capital:moral hazard and risks[J].Journal of Corporate Finance,2004,10(1).131-155.
[9]Yerramilli V.Staging of investments:Flexibility vs incentives[J]Social Seience Electronic Publishing,2006,42(4):705-728.Working paper,2006.
[10]Admati A R,Pfleiderer P.Robust financial contracting and the role of venture capitalists[J].The Journal of Finance,1994,49(2):371-402.
[11]Gompers P A.Optimal investment,monitoring,and the staging of venture capital[J].The journal of finance,1995,50(5):1461-1489.
[12]Hsu Y.Staging of venture capital investment:A real options analysis[J].Small Bujiness Economics,2012,35(3)s265-281.
[13]Krohmer P,Lauterbach R,Lauterbach R.Private equity post-investment phases-the bright and dark side of staging[R].Working paper,JW Goethe-Universitat Frankfurt,Frankfurt,Germany,2005.
[14]Giat Y,Hackman S.Subramanian A.Venture capital investment under uncertainty and asymmetric beliefs:A continuous-time,stochastic principal-agent model[J].Stochastic Principal-Agent Model,2009.
[15]Lazear E P,Rosen S.Rank-Order Tournaments as Optmum Labor Contracts[J].Journal of Political Economy,1981.8(9Volume 89,Number 5):841-64.