基于地方政府异质性的污染联控机制研究
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- 英文论文题名：The Research of Joint Control Mechanism of Pollution Based on the Heterogeneity of Local Government
- 论文作者：张雪峰 ; 吴振信 ; 王书平
- 英文论文作者：ZHANG Xue-feng ; WU Zhen-xin ; WANG Shu-ping ; School of Economics & Business Administration ; North China University of Technology
- 年：2016
- 作者机构：北方工业大学经济管理学院;
- 论文关键词：污染 ; 子博弈精炼纳什均衡 ; 机制设计
- 英文论文关键词：heterogeneity ; joint control of pollution ; mechanism design
- 会议召开时间：2016-11-12
- 会议录名称：第十八届中国管理科学学术年会论文集
- 英文会议录名称：Proceedings of the 18th Chinese Annual Conference on Management Science
- 语种：中文
- 分类号：X321
- 学会代码：ZHYJ
- 会议名称：第十八届中国管理科学学术年会
- 会议地点：中国陕西西安
- 主办单位：中国优选法统筹法与经济数学研究会、西安交通大学、中国科学院科技战略咨询研究院、《中国管理科学》编辑部
- 学会名称：中国优选法统筹法与经济数学研究会
- 页数：7
- 文件大小：439k
- 原文格式：O
- 会议级别：全国
摘要
本文从中央政府的角度出发,分析了污染治理的外部性会带来市场的非效率,研究了地方政府污染联控机制在占优均衡与子博弈精炼纳什均衡下的执行问题。研究发现:市场效率损失来源于私有信息与机制设计者的监管力度不够,得到了纳什均衡下机制执行的充分必要条件,并构建了一个动态机制来实现污染联控问题,同时通过非对称信息的引入,给出了占优均衡下机制实现目标的方式。
From the perspective of the central government,linear and nonlinear joint control mechanisms of pollution under the complete and incomplete information are designed based on the heterogeneity of local government.It is found that;incomplete information will affect the the optimal penalties of joint control mechanism,and the linear punishment of pollution emission does not achieve the market efficiency;In joint control mechanism design of pollution,the central government should increase the penalties of low type of local government,and properly reduce the penalties of high type local government.Also,the central government in order to obtain high type local government's private information,and the information cost of payment is mainly undertaken by low type of local government.
From the perspective of the central government,linear and nonlinear joint control mechanisms of pollution under the complete and incomplete information are designed based on the heterogeneity of local government.It is found that;incomplete information will affect the the optimal penalties of joint control mechanism,and the linear punishment of pollution emission does not achieve the market efficiency;In joint control mechanism design of pollution,the central government should increase the penalties of low type of local government,and properly reduce the penalties of high type local government.Also,the central government in order to obtain high type local government's private information,and the information cost of payment is mainly undertaken by low type of local government.
引文
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[23]李雪.我国碳排放与产业结构关联的分析与对策[J].工业技术经济,2014,(1):154-160.
[2]欧元明,周少甫.基于空间面板STIRPAT模型的省域碳排放研究[J].工业技术经济,2015,(3):58-65.
[3]薛俭,谢婉林,李常敏.京津冀大气污染治理省际合作博弈模型[J].系统工程理论与实践,2014,34(3):810-816.
[4]Glachant M.The use of regulatory mechanism design in environmental policy:A theoretical critique[J].Firms and Sustainability,1998:2-12.
[5]Abreu D.Sen A.Virtual implementation in Nash Equilibrium[J].Econometrica,2008,59(4).997-1021.
[6]Hovi J.Areklett I.Enforcing the climate regime;Game theory and the marrakesh accords[J].International.Environmental Agreements;Politics,Law and Economics,2004,4(1):1-26.
[7]Baliga S,Maskin E.Mechanism design for the environment[J],Handbook of Environmental Economics,2002,1:305-324.
[8]Finus M.Game theory and international environmental cooperation:A survey with an application to the KyotoProtocol[M].Cheltenham:Edward Elgar,2001.
[9]高红贵.中国绿色经济发展中的诸方博弈研究[J].中国人口·资源与环境,2012,22(4):13-18.
[10]刘传江,赵晓梦.新型城镇化背景下环境污染的博弈分析[J].经济问题,2014,(7):1-5.
[11]姜博,童心田,郭家秀.我国环境污染中政府、企业与公众的博弈分析[J].统计与决策,2013,(12):71-74.
[12]刘倩,丁慧平,侯海玮.供应链环境成本内部化利益相关者行为抉择博弈探析[J].中国人口·资源与环境,2014,24(6):71-76.
[13]杨博文,王勇军.中央与地方在城市污染治理中的非均衡博弈分析[J].统计与决策,2014,(3):52-56.
[14]Palestini A,Poggio I.A Bayesian potential game to illustrate heterogeneity in cost/benefit characteristics[J].International Review of Economics,2015,62(1):23-39.
[15]Cherry T L,Cotlen S J,Krdl S.Heterogeneity,coordination and the provision of best-shot public goods[J].Experimental Economics,2013,16(4):497-510.
[16]Fischbacher U,Schudy S,Teyssier S.Heterogeneous reactions to heterogeneity in returns from public goods[J].Social Choice Welfare,2014,43(1):195-217.
[17]de Oliveira A C M.Croson R T A,Eckel C.One bad apple?Heterogeneity and information in public good provision[J].Experimental Economics,2015,18(1):116-135.
[18]Gachter S,Herrmann B.Reciprocity,culture and human cooperation:Previous insights and a new cross-cultural experiment.[J].Philosophical Transactions:Biological Sciences,2009,364(1518):791-806.
[19]Oprea R.Charness G,Friedman D.Continuous time and communication in a public-goods experiment[J].Journal of Economic Behavior&Organization,2014,108:212-223.
[20]Brick K,Visser W,der Hoven Z V.Cooperation and climate change:Can communication facilitate the provision of public goods in heterogeneous settings?[J].Environmental and Resource Economics,2016,64(3):421-443.
[21]张宏娟,范如国.基于复杂网络演化博弈的传统产业集群低碳演化模型研究[J].中国管理科学,2014,22(12):41-47.
[22]段文斌,刘大勇,余泳泽.异质性产业节能减排的技术路径与比较优势—理论模型及实证检验[J].中国工业经济,2013,(4):69-81.
[23]李雪.我国碳排放与产业结构关联的分析与对策[J].工业技术经济,2014,(1):154-160.