境内人民币银行卡清算组织的发展及其产业政策研究
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摘要
银行卡作为重要的非现金支付工具之一,已成为我国公众零售消费使用最频繁的支付工具。银行卡清算组织是银行卡产业的重要组成部分,处于整个银行卡产业链条的核心和枢纽地位,在银行卡产业的发展史上发挥了举足轻重的作用。可以说,现代国家银行卡产业的健康发展,高度依赖于银行卡清算组织提供的跨行交易转接清算服务的质量和效率。然而,伴随着境内银行卡产业规模的持续扩张和中国银联网络业务规模的迅猛增长,与中国银联有关的各种争议事件不绝于耳。这些事件均直接或间接地牵涉到了中国银联的垄断地位,因而使中国银联的垄断地位受到公众的广泛质疑和指责。因此,有必要对境内人民币银行卡清算组织的产业政策进行系统地研究,这一方面有助于各界对中国银联的垄断问题形成科学的认识,另一方面有助于监管层对境内人民币银行卡清算组织制定和施行科学合理的产业政策。
论文将幼稚产业保护理论、规制经济理论、反垄断理论、双边市场理论和世贸组织规则有机融合起来,基于银行卡POS跨行交易转接清算业务的技术经济特性和国际竞争格局,运用逻辑演绎和综合分析、实证分析与规范分析、计量分析和案例分析等研究方法,从较为宏观的高度构建了由产业扶持政策、反垄断政策和市场开放政策有机组成的适应中国实际的境内人民币银行卡清算组织的产业政策体系。
论文的主要观点可以归纳为以下几个方面：
(1)对银行卡清算组织发展历史的研究表明,银行卡清算组织最早是出于发展银行卡业务的需要而自发地在银行间创造出来的一种全新的竞合性的商业模式,其开放式的结构使银行发行信用卡和借记卡变得非常容易,对于推动银行卡更大广度和深度的使用发挥了至关重要的作用,从而在与封闭式组织的竞争中最终占据了主导地位。
(2)银行卡的普遍使用并不仅仅是对现金支付的替代,其对消费增长从而对经济增长有促进作用；中国银联成立以来,推动了境内银行卡产业规模的快速扩张。境内银行卡产业三个主要业务环节的市场结构具有以下特征。第一,境内人民币银行卡跨行交易转接清算业务一直由中国银联独家垄断,中国银联的垄断地位既有自然垄断因素,又有行政垄断色彩。第二,银行卡发卡业务的市场集中度自2000年以来总体呈下降趋势,市场结构的垄断性越来越弱而竞争性越来越强,目前不存在具有市场支配地位的发卡银行。依据贝恩的竞争结构分类法,当前发卡业务的市场结构位于中(上)集中寡占型与中(下)集中寡占型的分界附近。第三,银行卡收单业务的市场集中度自2000年以来总体呈下降趋势,市场结构的垄断性越来越弱而竞争性越来越强,从全国来看,银联商务己不再具有显著的市场支配地位。依据贝恩的竞争结构分类法,当前收单业务的市场结构大致为中(上)集中寡占型。境内人民币银行卡清算组织的发展存在三个突出问题,即：国际竞争力比较薄弱,滥用市场支配地位,国际化进程面临不确定性。
(3)以幼稚产业保护论和规制经济学为主要理论依据,基于经验分析结果,形成以下三点基本的政策取向：一是中国应该有自己的自主品牌银行卡清算组织；二是自主品牌银行卡清算组织在幼稚阶段确需政策扶持；三是需要维持自主品牌银行卡清算组织一定时期内的垄断地位。对己实行的扶持性政策的分析表明,在外资准入法规层面上的模糊和操作层面上的限制,构成了对境内人民币银行卡跨行交易转接清算业务事实上的保护,给自主品牌银行卡清算组织中国银联提供了发展壮大的宝贵时间。因此,对境内人民币银行卡清算组织的产业扶持政策提出两点建议：第一,短期内继续维持中国银联的垄断地位。主要原因在于：如果取消产业政策的保护,在短期内放开境内人民币银行卡跨行交易转接清算的外资准入,维萨等国际银行卡组织必将大规模进入市场,凭借预先发展的大量双标卡持卡人和强大的境外受理网络优势,强势夺取中国银联在境内的市场份额；银行卡跨行交易转接清算业务在很高的业务量范围内仍具成本弱增性,在境内银行卡跨行交易的整体规模扩张的相当长的一段范围内,不应急于打破垄断而引入第二家银行卡清算组织。第二,慎用外资出资比例上限规定扶持自主品牌。这是因为：在银联的国际业务量达到一定水平,从而具备与维萨等国际银行卡组织在国际业务上展开竞争的基本能力之前,如果放开外资准入,则即便规定外资的出资比例上限,也无法对自主品牌银行卡清算组织(无论是银联还是新生品牌)提供有效的保护。
(4)我国《反垄断法》一般适用于对中国银联的监管,但该法第七条对特殊行业的规定和有关行政垄断行为的规定并不适用；监管对象主要是中国银联可能实施的垄断行为。中国银联可能滥用其在基础网络业务领域的市场支配地位,排除、限制竞争性业务领域的竞争。对“强推POS直联”这一案例的分析表明,中国银联涉嫌违反了我国《反垄断法》第十七条关于滥用市场支配地位进行不合理的拒绝交易和搭配销售的规定。因此,对境内人民币银行卡清算组织的反垄断政策提出两点建议：第一,理清反垄断法监管与中国人民银行监管的关系。采取反垄断法与行业规制的双重监管模式,同时,为了避免由于中国人民银行与中国银联之间的密切关系而导致“规制俘获”问题,应确定行业规制制度不得与反垄断法主旨相抵触的原则。反垄断执法机构拥有对中国银联涉嫌垄断行为案件的管辖权,而中国人民银行只在行业立法明确规定的情况下,对中国银联涉嫌垄断行为(不包括经营者集中)的案件拥有管辖权,并且中国人民银行的管辖权对反垄断执法机构的管辖权并无排除性,而是作为对反垄断执法机构管辖权的补充。第二,剥离纵向一体化企业“银联商务”。反垄断执法机构应该依据对中国银联“强推POS直联”一案的裁定,联合行业规制机构,将银联商务从中国银联体系中剥离出去。关于剥离的具体方案,可以考虑按照中国银联增资扩股之前的股权结构,将银联商务的股权由中国银联划转至各商业银行等股东名下,由商业银行等股东或银行业协会选派董事和高管层。
(5)随着银行卡产业的不断发展,在境内人民币银行卡跨行交易转接清算领域,实施市场开放政策,放松进入规制,放开外资准入,重构境内人民币银行卡清算组织的市场结构是大势所趋。因此,对境内人民币银行卡清算组织的市场开放政策提出两点建议：第一,主动释放“适时放开外资准入”的信号,使各方(尤其是境外资本)形成比较积极的预期。这不仅有利于维萨等国际银行卡组织保持和增强对境内人民币银行卡跨行交易转接清算市场开放的信心,以免其频繁采取不合作的行动而使持卡人和成员行的利益受损,进而给境内银行卡产业的健康发展造成负面干扰；同时也有助于给中国银联施加压力,推动其提高效率,改进服务,尽快提升核心竞争力,为应对国际银行卡组织在境内市场的挑战做好更为充分的准备。第二,适时放松境内资本的进入规制。如果中方在“中国电子支付服务措施案”中胜诉,从而将放开外资准入的主动权掌握在自己手中,那么可以考虑在放开外资准入前,通过适当方式适时放松对境内资本的进入规制,使境内人民币银行卡跨行交易转接清算市场形成和保持可竞争的状态,给中国银联以潜在竞争压力,约束中国银联的市场行为。
As one important type of non-cash payment instruments, bank cards have been used most frequently in the retail consumption. The bank card clearing scheme is an important part of the bank card industry, which is the core of the entire bank card industry chain and played a pivotal role in the development history of the bank card industry. Namely, the healthy development of the bank card industry highly depends on the quality and efficiency of the interbank transaction's transfer and clearing service provided by bank card clearing schemes. Nevertheless, with the continued expansion of the domestic bank card industry's size and the rapid growth of China UnionPay's network business scale, some controversial events associated with China UnionPay has happened. These events were directly or indirectly involved in the monopoly position of China UnionPay, which made China UnionPay's monopoly position to be widely questioned and criticized by the public. Therefore, it is necessary to systematically research the industrial policy for domestic RMB bank card clearing schemes, which not only helps the public to form a scientific understanding of the monopoly issue of China UnionPay, but also assists supervisors to make and implement scientific and rational industrial policies for the business of domestic RMB bank card clearing.
This paper organically integrates infant industry protection theory, regulatory economics, antitrust economics, two-sided market economics and WTO rules. Based on the technical and economic character and the global competitive landscape of bank cards'POS interbank transaction's transfer and clearing business, using logical deduction and synthesis analysis, empirical analysis and normative analysis, econometric analysis and case studies, the paper constructs an industrial policy system for domestic RMB bank card clearing schemes, which consists organically of the industry support policy, the anti-monopoly policy and the structure reconstruction policy, and adapts to the realities in China.
The main points of the paper can be summarized as the following aspects:
(1) The study on the development history of bank card clearing schemes shows that their nature is a new co-opetition business model. Bank card clearing schemes were initially created spontaneously among banks for the need of the development of bank card business. Their open structures made it very easy for banks to issue credit cards and debit card, which promoted bank cards to be used in greater breadth and depth. In competition with closed schemes, bank card clearing schemes ultimately occupied a dominant position.
(2) The widespread use of bank cards is not just an alternative to cash payment, which plays an important role in promoting the consumption and economic growth. The establishment of China UnionPay has promoted the rapid expansion of the scale of the domestic bank card industry. The market structure of the domestic bank card industry has the following features. First, the domestic RMB bank card interbank transaction's transfer and clearing business has been exclusively monopolized by China UnionPay. China UnionPay's monopoly has both natural monopoly element and administrative monopoly color. Second, the market concentration of bank cards'issuing business has demonstrated an overall downward trend since2000, namely the monopoly degree of the market structure was increasingly weak. There is not an issuing bank with a dominant market position currently. According to Bain's competition structure classification, the current structure of issuing business locates near the boundary between medium (upper) concentrated oligopoly type and medium (lower) concentrated oligopoly type. Third, the market concentration of bank cards'acquiring business has also demonstrated an overall downward trend since2000, namely the monopoly degree of the market structure was increasingly weak. Chinaums no longer has significant market dominance across the country. According to Bain's competition structure classification, the current structure of acquiring business approximately belongs to medium (upper) concentrated oligopoly type. The development of the domestic RMB bank card clearing scheme is facing three major problems:the international competitiveness is relatively weak; the dominant market position is abused; the internationalization process is facing uncertainty.
(3) Mainly in the theoretical basis of infant industry protection theory and regulatory economics, based on the empirical analysis, the paper forms the following three basic policy orientations. First, China should have its own bank card clearing schemes with independent brands. Second, bank card clearing schemes with independent brands really need the policy support in the infant stage. Third, the monopoly position of one bank card clearing scheme with its independent brand should be maintained during a certain period of time. The analysis of the support policy implemented showed that both the fuzziness of foreign investment access regulations and the restriction on the operational level together constitute a de facto protection to the domestic RMB bank card interbank transaction's transfer and clearing business, and the protection has provided valuable time for China UnionPay to grow and develop. So, two proposals are provided for the support policy. First, the monopoly position of China UnionPay should be maintained in the short term. This is due to two reasons. On one hand, once the industrial policy protection is canceled, namely the restriction of foreign investment access is liberated, international bank card schemes such as Visa will certainly enter the domestic market aggressively. With a large number of double-labeled cardholders pre-developed and strong overseas acceptance network advantage, these international bank card schemes will be bound to capture the market share of China UnionPay in the territory. On the other hand, the bank card interbank transaction's transfer and clearing business still has the cost subadditivity in the high business volume range. So, the supervisors should not rush to break the monopoly and introduce the second bank card clearing scheme. Second, it should be recognized that the supervisors are unable to support independent brands through a ceiling limit to the proportion of foreign investment. Before China UnionPay's international business volume reaches a certain level so as to have the basic capability to compete with international bank card schemes such as Visa in international business, if the restriction of foreign investment access is liberated, it is impossible to effectively protect bank card clearing schemes with independent brands, whether it is China UnionPay or a new brand.
(4)"Anti-monopoly Law of the People's Republic of China" is generally applicable to supervise China UnionPay, but its relevant provisions on special industries and administrative monopolistic conducts is not applicable. It should be noted that the Anti-monopoly Law supervision is mainly targeted at possible monopolistic conducts implemented by China UnionPay. China UnionPay may abuse its dominant market position in the basic network business to eliminate or restrict competition in the competitive business. The case study of "Enforcing to implement POS direct access" shows that China UnionPay is suspected to violate the Anti-monopoly Law's relevant provision about abusing dominant market position. Therefore, two proposals are provided for the anti-monopoly policy. First, the relationship between the Anti-monopoly Law supervision and the supervision from The People's Bank of China should be straightened out. A dual supervision model integrating the Anti-monopoly Law and the industrial regulation should be implemented. At the same time, in order to avoid the regulation capture problem due to the close relationship between The People's Bank of China and China UnionPay, the principle needs to be confirmed that industrial regulatory institutions should not conflict with the keynote of the Anti-monopoly Law. The authority for enforcement of the Anti-monopoly Law has the jurisdiction of the cases on China UnionPay's monopolistic conducts suspected. The People's Bank of China has the jurisdiction only in the case of clearly defined industry legislation, and the jurisdiction does not exclude the jurisdiction of the authority for enforcement of the Anti-monopoly Law. In reality, The People's Bank of China's jurisdiction is just only the supplement to the jurisdiction of the authority for enforcement of the Anti-monopoly Law. Second, the vertically integrated company "Chinaums" should be divested. According to the ruling in the case of " Enforcing to implement POS direct access", the authority for enforcement of the Anti-monopoly Law should divest Chinaums from China UnionPay system in cooperation with the industrial regulatory authority. As to the special program, it may be considered to transfer the equity of Chinaums from China UnionPay to shareholders including commercial banks according to the initial shareholder structure of China UnionPay.
(5) With the continuous development of the bank card industry, it is an inevitable trend to implement market opening policy, relax the entry regulation, liberate the restriction of foreign investment access, and reconstruct the market structure of domestic RMB bank card clearing schemes. Therefore, two proposals are provided. First, it is necessary to take the initiative to transmit a signal that the restriction of foreign investment access will be liberated at the appropriate time, which will help stakeholders to form more positive expectations. On one hand, it is favorable for international bank card schemes such as Visa to maintain and enhance the belief that the market of domestic RMB bank card interbank transaction's transfer and clearing will be opened up, which can avoid them to implement uncooperative actions frequently so as to damage the interests of cardholders and member banks. On the other hand, the signaling can exert pressure to China UnionPay to increase the efficiency and improve the service so as to enhance the core competitiveness and get fully ready for the challenge from international bank card schemes for the domestic market. Second, it is better to relax the entry regulation for domestic capitals at the appropriate time. If China wins in the case of China electronic payment service measures, China will seize the initiative to liberate the restriction of foreign investment access. Then it is worth considering to relaxing the entry regulation for domestic capitals in an appropriate manner at the appropriate time before the restriction of foreign investment access is liberated. This will help the market of domestic RMB bank card interbank transaction's transfer and clearing to form and maintain a contestable state and exert the potential competitive pressure on China UnionPay to constrain its market conduct.
论文将幼稚产业保护理论、规制经济理论、反垄断理论、双边市场理论和世贸组织规则有机融合起来,基于银行卡POS跨行交易转接清算业务的技术经济特性和国际竞争格局,运用逻辑演绎和综合分析、实证分析与规范分析、计量分析和案例分析等研究方法,从较为宏观的高度构建了由产业扶持政策、反垄断政策和市场开放政策有机组成的适应中国实际的境内人民币银行卡清算组织的产业政策体系。
论文的主要观点可以归纳为以下几个方面：
(1)对银行卡清算组织发展历史的研究表明,银行卡清算组织最早是出于发展银行卡业务的需要而自发地在银行间创造出来的一种全新的竞合性的商业模式,其开放式的结构使银行发行信用卡和借记卡变得非常容易,对于推动银行卡更大广度和深度的使用发挥了至关重要的作用,从而在与封闭式组织的竞争中最终占据了主导地位。
(2)银行卡的普遍使用并不仅仅是对现金支付的替代,其对消费增长从而对经济增长有促进作用；中国银联成立以来,推动了境内银行卡产业规模的快速扩张。境内银行卡产业三个主要业务环节的市场结构具有以下特征。第一,境内人民币银行卡跨行交易转接清算业务一直由中国银联独家垄断,中国银联的垄断地位既有自然垄断因素,又有行政垄断色彩。第二,银行卡发卡业务的市场集中度自2000年以来总体呈下降趋势,市场结构的垄断性越来越弱而竞争性越来越强,目前不存在具有市场支配地位的发卡银行。依据贝恩的竞争结构分类法,当前发卡业务的市场结构位于中(上)集中寡占型与中(下)集中寡占型的分界附近。第三,银行卡收单业务的市场集中度自2000年以来总体呈下降趋势,市场结构的垄断性越来越弱而竞争性越来越强,从全国来看,银联商务己不再具有显著的市场支配地位。依据贝恩的竞争结构分类法,当前收单业务的市场结构大致为中(上)集中寡占型。境内人民币银行卡清算组织的发展存在三个突出问题,即：国际竞争力比较薄弱,滥用市场支配地位,国际化进程面临不确定性。
(3)以幼稚产业保护论和规制经济学为主要理论依据,基于经验分析结果,形成以下三点基本的政策取向：一是中国应该有自己的自主品牌银行卡清算组织；二是自主品牌银行卡清算组织在幼稚阶段确需政策扶持；三是需要维持自主品牌银行卡清算组织一定时期内的垄断地位。对己实行的扶持性政策的分析表明,在外资准入法规层面上的模糊和操作层面上的限制,构成了对境内人民币银行卡跨行交易转接清算业务事实上的保护,给自主品牌银行卡清算组织中国银联提供了发展壮大的宝贵时间。因此,对境内人民币银行卡清算组织的产业扶持政策提出两点建议：第一,短期内继续维持中国银联的垄断地位。主要原因在于：如果取消产业政策的保护,在短期内放开境内人民币银行卡跨行交易转接清算的外资准入,维萨等国际银行卡组织必将大规模进入市场,凭借预先发展的大量双标卡持卡人和强大的境外受理网络优势,强势夺取中国银联在境内的市场份额；银行卡跨行交易转接清算业务在很高的业务量范围内仍具成本弱增性,在境内银行卡跨行交易的整体规模扩张的相当长的一段范围内,不应急于打破垄断而引入第二家银行卡清算组织。第二,慎用外资出资比例上限规定扶持自主品牌。这是因为：在银联的国际业务量达到一定水平,从而具备与维萨等国际银行卡组织在国际业务上展开竞争的基本能力之前,如果放开外资准入,则即便规定外资的出资比例上限,也无法对自主品牌银行卡清算组织(无论是银联还是新生品牌)提供有效的保护。
(4)我国《反垄断法》一般适用于对中国银联的监管,但该法第七条对特殊行业的规定和有关行政垄断行为的规定并不适用；监管对象主要是中国银联可能实施的垄断行为。中国银联可能滥用其在基础网络业务领域的市场支配地位,排除、限制竞争性业务领域的竞争。对“强推POS直联”这一案例的分析表明,中国银联涉嫌违反了我国《反垄断法》第十七条关于滥用市场支配地位进行不合理的拒绝交易和搭配销售的规定。因此,对境内人民币银行卡清算组织的反垄断政策提出两点建议：第一,理清反垄断法监管与中国人民银行监管的关系。采取反垄断法与行业规制的双重监管模式,同时,为了避免由于中国人民银行与中国银联之间的密切关系而导致“规制俘获”问题,应确定行业规制制度不得与反垄断法主旨相抵触的原则。反垄断执法机构拥有对中国银联涉嫌垄断行为案件的管辖权,而中国人民银行只在行业立法明确规定的情况下,对中国银联涉嫌垄断行为(不包括经营者集中)的案件拥有管辖权,并且中国人民银行的管辖权对反垄断执法机构的管辖权并无排除性,而是作为对反垄断执法机构管辖权的补充。第二,剥离纵向一体化企业“银联商务”。反垄断执法机构应该依据对中国银联“强推POS直联”一案的裁定,联合行业规制机构,将银联商务从中国银联体系中剥离出去。关于剥离的具体方案,可以考虑按照中国银联增资扩股之前的股权结构,将银联商务的股权由中国银联划转至各商业银行等股东名下,由商业银行等股东或银行业协会选派董事和高管层。
(5)随着银行卡产业的不断发展,在境内人民币银行卡跨行交易转接清算领域,实施市场开放政策,放松进入规制,放开外资准入,重构境内人民币银行卡清算组织的市场结构是大势所趋。因此,对境内人民币银行卡清算组织的市场开放政策提出两点建议：第一,主动释放“适时放开外资准入”的信号,使各方(尤其是境外资本)形成比较积极的预期。这不仅有利于维萨等国际银行卡组织保持和增强对境内人民币银行卡跨行交易转接清算市场开放的信心,以免其频繁采取不合作的行动而使持卡人和成员行的利益受损,进而给境内银行卡产业的健康发展造成负面干扰；同时也有助于给中国银联施加压力,推动其提高效率,改进服务,尽快提升核心竞争力,为应对国际银行卡组织在境内市场的挑战做好更为充分的准备。第二,适时放松境内资本的进入规制。如果中方在“中国电子支付服务措施案”中胜诉,从而将放开外资准入的主动权掌握在自己手中,那么可以考虑在放开外资准入前,通过适当方式适时放松对境内资本的进入规制,使境内人民币银行卡跨行交易转接清算市场形成和保持可竞争的状态,给中国银联以潜在竞争压力,约束中国银联的市场行为。
As one important type of non-cash payment instruments, bank cards have been used most frequently in the retail consumption. The bank card clearing scheme is an important part of the bank card industry, which is the core of the entire bank card industry chain and played a pivotal role in the development history of the bank card industry. Namely, the healthy development of the bank card industry highly depends on the quality and efficiency of the interbank transaction's transfer and clearing service provided by bank card clearing schemes. Nevertheless, with the continued expansion of the domestic bank card industry's size and the rapid growth of China UnionPay's network business scale, some controversial events associated with China UnionPay has happened. These events were directly or indirectly involved in the monopoly position of China UnionPay, which made China UnionPay's monopoly position to be widely questioned and criticized by the public. Therefore, it is necessary to systematically research the industrial policy for domestic RMB bank card clearing schemes, which not only helps the public to form a scientific understanding of the monopoly issue of China UnionPay, but also assists supervisors to make and implement scientific and rational industrial policies for the business of domestic RMB bank card clearing.
This paper organically integrates infant industry protection theory, regulatory economics, antitrust economics, two-sided market economics and WTO rules. Based on the technical and economic character and the global competitive landscape of bank cards'POS interbank transaction's transfer and clearing business, using logical deduction and synthesis analysis, empirical analysis and normative analysis, econometric analysis and case studies, the paper constructs an industrial policy system for domestic RMB bank card clearing schemes, which consists organically of the industry support policy, the anti-monopoly policy and the structure reconstruction policy, and adapts to the realities in China.
The main points of the paper can be summarized as the following aspects:
(1) The study on the development history of bank card clearing schemes shows that their nature is a new co-opetition business model. Bank card clearing schemes were initially created spontaneously among banks for the need of the development of bank card business. Their open structures made it very easy for banks to issue credit cards and debit card, which promoted bank cards to be used in greater breadth and depth. In competition with closed schemes, bank card clearing schemes ultimately occupied a dominant position.
(2) The widespread use of bank cards is not just an alternative to cash payment, which plays an important role in promoting the consumption and economic growth. The establishment of China UnionPay has promoted the rapid expansion of the scale of the domestic bank card industry. The market structure of the domestic bank card industry has the following features. First, the domestic RMB bank card interbank transaction's transfer and clearing business has been exclusively monopolized by China UnionPay. China UnionPay's monopoly has both natural monopoly element and administrative monopoly color. Second, the market concentration of bank cards'issuing business has demonstrated an overall downward trend since2000, namely the monopoly degree of the market structure was increasingly weak. There is not an issuing bank with a dominant market position currently. According to Bain's competition structure classification, the current structure of issuing business locates near the boundary between medium (upper) concentrated oligopoly type and medium (lower) concentrated oligopoly type. Third, the market concentration of bank cards'acquiring business has also demonstrated an overall downward trend since2000, namely the monopoly degree of the market structure was increasingly weak. Chinaums no longer has significant market dominance across the country. According to Bain's competition structure classification, the current structure of acquiring business approximately belongs to medium (upper) concentrated oligopoly type. The development of the domestic RMB bank card clearing scheme is facing three major problems:the international competitiveness is relatively weak; the dominant market position is abused; the internationalization process is facing uncertainty.
(3) Mainly in the theoretical basis of infant industry protection theory and regulatory economics, based on the empirical analysis, the paper forms the following three basic policy orientations. First, China should have its own bank card clearing schemes with independent brands. Second, bank card clearing schemes with independent brands really need the policy support in the infant stage. Third, the monopoly position of one bank card clearing scheme with its independent brand should be maintained during a certain period of time. The analysis of the support policy implemented showed that both the fuzziness of foreign investment access regulations and the restriction on the operational level together constitute a de facto protection to the domestic RMB bank card interbank transaction's transfer and clearing business, and the protection has provided valuable time for China UnionPay to grow and develop. So, two proposals are provided for the support policy. First, the monopoly position of China UnionPay should be maintained in the short term. This is due to two reasons. On one hand, once the industrial policy protection is canceled, namely the restriction of foreign investment access is liberated, international bank card schemes such as Visa will certainly enter the domestic market aggressively. With a large number of double-labeled cardholders pre-developed and strong overseas acceptance network advantage, these international bank card schemes will be bound to capture the market share of China UnionPay in the territory. On the other hand, the bank card interbank transaction's transfer and clearing business still has the cost subadditivity in the high business volume range. So, the supervisors should not rush to break the monopoly and introduce the second bank card clearing scheme. Second, it should be recognized that the supervisors are unable to support independent brands through a ceiling limit to the proportion of foreign investment. Before China UnionPay's international business volume reaches a certain level so as to have the basic capability to compete with international bank card schemes such as Visa in international business, if the restriction of foreign investment access is liberated, it is impossible to effectively protect bank card clearing schemes with independent brands, whether it is China UnionPay or a new brand.
(4)"Anti-monopoly Law of the People's Republic of China" is generally applicable to supervise China UnionPay, but its relevant provisions on special industries and administrative monopolistic conducts is not applicable. It should be noted that the Anti-monopoly Law supervision is mainly targeted at possible monopolistic conducts implemented by China UnionPay. China UnionPay may abuse its dominant market position in the basic network business to eliminate or restrict competition in the competitive business. The case study of "Enforcing to implement POS direct access" shows that China UnionPay is suspected to violate the Anti-monopoly Law's relevant provision about abusing dominant market position. Therefore, two proposals are provided for the anti-monopoly policy. First, the relationship between the Anti-monopoly Law supervision and the supervision from The People's Bank of China should be straightened out. A dual supervision model integrating the Anti-monopoly Law and the industrial regulation should be implemented. At the same time, in order to avoid the regulation capture problem due to the close relationship between The People's Bank of China and China UnionPay, the principle needs to be confirmed that industrial regulatory institutions should not conflict with the keynote of the Anti-monopoly Law. The authority for enforcement of the Anti-monopoly Law has the jurisdiction of the cases on China UnionPay's monopolistic conducts suspected. The People's Bank of China has the jurisdiction only in the case of clearly defined industry legislation, and the jurisdiction does not exclude the jurisdiction of the authority for enforcement of the Anti-monopoly Law. In reality, The People's Bank of China's jurisdiction is just only the supplement to the jurisdiction of the authority for enforcement of the Anti-monopoly Law. Second, the vertically integrated company "Chinaums" should be divested. According to the ruling in the case of " Enforcing to implement POS direct access", the authority for enforcement of the Anti-monopoly Law should divest Chinaums from China UnionPay system in cooperation with the industrial regulatory authority. As to the special program, it may be considered to transfer the equity of Chinaums from China UnionPay to shareholders including commercial banks according to the initial shareholder structure of China UnionPay.
(5) With the continuous development of the bank card industry, it is an inevitable trend to implement market opening policy, relax the entry regulation, liberate the restriction of foreign investment access, and reconstruct the market structure of domestic RMB bank card clearing schemes. Therefore, two proposals are provided. First, it is necessary to take the initiative to transmit a signal that the restriction of foreign investment access will be liberated at the appropriate time, which will help stakeholders to form more positive expectations. On one hand, it is favorable for international bank card schemes such as Visa to maintain and enhance the belief that the market of domestic RMB bank card interbank transaction's transfer and clearing will be opened up, which can avoid them to implement uncooperative actions frequently so as to damage the interests of cardholders and member banks. On the other hand, the signaling can exert pressure to China UnionPay to increase the efficiency and improve the service so as to enhance the core competitiveness and get fully ready for the challenge from international bank card schemes for the domestic market. Second, it is better to relax the entry regulation for domestic capitals at the appropriate time. If China wins in the case of China electronic payment service measures, China will seize the initiative to liberate the restriction of foreign investment access. Then it is worth considering to relaxing the entry regulation for domestic capitals in an appropriate manner at the appropriate time before the restriction of foreign investment access is liberated. This will help the market of domestic RMB bank card interbank transaction's transfer and clearing to form and maintain a contestable state and exert the potential competitive pressure on China UnionPay to constrain its market conduct.
引文
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②刘吉发.产业政策学[M].北京：经济管理出版社,2004：51-52。
③李秀香.幼稚产业开放式保护问题研究[M].北京：中国财政经济出版社,2004：48。
④李孟刚.产业安全理论研究[M].第2版.北京：经济科学出版社,2010：240-241。
②任烈.贸易保护理论与政策[M].上海：立信会计出版社,1997：59。
①杨公朴,干春晖.产业经济学[M].上海：复旦大学出版社,2005：272。
②王俊豪.政府管制经济学导论[M].北京：商务印书馆,2001：32。
③ Sharkey, W. W. The Theory of Natural Monopoly[M]. New York:Cambridge University Press,1982:4-5; Baumol, W. J. On the Proper Cost Tests for Natural Monopoly in a Multiproduct Industry[J]. The American Economic Review,1977,67(5):809-822.
④杨公朴,干春晖.产业经济学[M].上海：复旦大学出版社,2005：281。
①王俊豪.政府管制经济学导论[M].北京：商务印书馆,2001：77。
②详见Baumol et al. (1977)、Panzarand Willig (1977)、Baumol and Willig (1981)和Baumol et al. (1982)。
①于立,吴绪亮.产业组织与反垄断法[M].大连：东北财经大学出版社,2008：13。
②王文祥.医院行业市场行为分析[D].上海：上海财经大学,2005：2-3。
②王俊豪.产业经济学[M].北京：高等教育出版社,2008：287-288.
①(美)埃文斯,(美)斯默兰.银行卡时代：消费支付的数字化革命[M].北京：中国金融出版社,2006：147。
② Caillaud, Bernard, and Bruno Jullien. Chicken & Egg: Competition among Intermediation Service Providers[J]. RAND Journal of Economics,2003,34(2):309-328.
③ Evans, D. S., and Richard Schmalensee. The Industrial Organization of Markets with Two-Sided Platforms[J]. Competition Policy International,2007,3(1):151-179.
①[法]泰勒尔.产业组织理论[M].北京：中国人民大学出版社,1997：538。
② Katz, M. L., and Carl Shapiro. Systems Competition and Network Effects[J]. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 1994,8(2):93-115.
③ Liebowitz, S. J., and S. E. Margolis. Network Externality: An Uncommon Tragedy[J]. The Journal of Economic Perspectives,1994,8(2):133-150.
①国内持相似观点的文献可参见闻中和陈剑(2000)、朱彤(2001,2003)等学者的研究。
② Katz, M. L., and Carl Shapiro. Network Externalities, Competition and Compatibility[J]. The American Economic Review,1985,75(3):424-440; Ecnomides, Nicholas. The Economics of Networks[J]. International Journal of Industrial Organization,1996,14(6):673-699.
① Schmalensee, Richard. Payment systems and interchange fees[J]. Journal of Industrial Economics,2002,50(2): 103-122.
②有关银行卡组织发展的脉络,主要参考了埃文斯(David S. Evans)和斯默兰(Richard Schmalensee)所著《银行卡时代——消费支付的数字化革命》2006年中译本。
③美国等国家允许非银行机构发卡,故称“支付卡(payment card)",但非银行机构发卡份额总体上较小。
①(美)埃文斯,(美)斯默兰.银行卡时代：消费支付的数字化革命[M].北京：中国金融出版社,2006：73。
①刘廷焕,万建华.中国银行卡产业发展报告(2004)[R].上海：文汇出版社,2004.
①Bain,J.S.Industrial Organization[M].New York: Johm Wiley & Sons Inc.,1968:7.
①夏大慰.产业组织学[M].上海：复旦大学出版社,1994。
① http://corporate.unionpay.com/infoComIntro/infoCompanyIntroduce/file_3945122.html,2012-2-29。
① http://corporate.unionpay.com/infoComIntro/infoCompanyIntroduce/file_3945122.html,2012-2-29。
③钟榕华,外地POS机构悄然入厦抢市[N].海峡导报,2010-05-31.
①史忠良.新编产业经济学[M].北京：中国社会科学出版社,2007：432-433.
②根据《中国支付体系发展报告(2010)》,各类支付系统包括中国人民银行大、小额支付系统,全国支票影像交换系统,同城票据交换系统,网上支付跨行清算系统,银行业金融机构行内支付系统,中国银联银行卡跨行交易清算系统,城市商业银行汇票处理系统和支付清算系统,农信银支付清算系统。
③《中国支付体系发展报告(2010)》。
④金融安全的表现形式是一国的金融制度、金融体系以及主体金融活动基本保持正常运行与稳定发展的状态,并且有能力抵御国内外来自金融领域的冲击,保护本国金融不受损害。(杨大光,2004)
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