中国政府治理结构与地方政府行为导向研究
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摘要
制度的重要功能是能够为政治或经济行为主体提供激励与约束。良好的制度对一个国家的发展尤为重要,处于制度转型期的中国更为如此。在缺乏诺思意义上的健全制度的情况下,中国经济却实现了高速增长。事实上,这种增长正源于中国另一项过渡性的制度安排。本文正是从制度的视角研究政府治理结构对地方政府行为导向的影响。
政治集权—经济分权的政府治理结构是中国一项独特的制度安排,其具有政治与经济双重激励,对地方政府行为导向产生了深远的影响。正是中国特有的政府治理结构塑造了地方政府的企业家精神,激发了地方政府狂热发展当地经济的积极性。也就是说,中国的政府治理结构塑造了地方政府“增长型”而非“发展型”的行为导向,即地方政府“为增长而竞争”,而不是“为民生而竞争”或“为和谐而竞争”。从激励角度看,地方政府的这种行为导向来源于其面临的政府组织内的激励强度与激励偏差。与此同时,在当前的政府治理结构下,公众话语权缺失,对地方政府行为的约束弱化。因此,地方政府“对上负责,对下不负责”。由此产生了“重增长,轻民生”的地方政府行为导向。这就不可避免的造成了中国经济在高速增长的同时,增长的代价也非常大。这种代价的表现为影响经济社会可持续发展的负面效应不断涌现,比如环境污染、公共产品供给不足等问题。基于此,本文沿着制度(institution)—结构(structure)—行为(conduct)—绩效(.performance)的研究逻辑,分析现行的政府治理结构对中国地方政府行为导向以及经济发展模式的具体影响。本文从理论与实证方面对政府治理结构与地方政府行为导向进行了深入探讨。研究结论表明,独特的政府治理结构所导致的地方政府竞争是造成当前地方政府行为取向的制度性根源,这种政府竞争来源于地方政府的混合动机,比如政治激励、经济激励甚至是声誉激励等。
除了导论与文献综述部分,本文其余的内容是如下安排的：
第三章为理论分析部分,主要研究了政府组织内部的激励问题。在该章探讨了政府组织内部激励的重要性；研究了政府组织激励与经济组织激励的特殊性并对其激励机制进行了扩展,然后利用数理方法推导出了政府最优激励合约的模型,并分析了上级政府考核权重的变化对地方政府行为的影响；对U型与M型的政府治理结构以及相应的信息协调、权利配置等方面的特征进行了研究,以此为研究政府分权提供了理论依据。第四章为研究地方政府行为的历史演进与回顾部分。本部分以1978年为界限,分析了不同体制下的政府分权以及对地方政府行为的影响,并进行了相应的评价。通过该部分的研究有助于加深对地方政府行为有关背景的了解,以能够更加透彻的认识主体的横向分权)。本文认为由政府分权引起的地方政府竞争是导致中国现行发展模式的重要制度性原因,而并非仅指财政分权本身。
The important function of institution is to form the incentives and constraints for the subject. A good institution is very important to the development of a country,especially China in transition. China has realized high growth being lack of perfect institution in the sense of North, but it depends on another transitional institution. The paper is to research the impact of governance on the behavior orientation of Chinese local government from the perspective of institution.
The governance of political centralization and economic decentralization is a unique institution arrangement in China. It provides political and economic incentive influencing the behavior of local government deeply. The unique governance in China shapes entrepreneurship of local government, stimulating their enthusiasm in developing local economy. It means that Chinese governance shapes growth-orientation rather than development-orientation government, local government competes for growth rather than development. The orientation is from the intensity and bias of incentive in political organization from the perspective of incentive. At the same time, the constraints from the public are weak in the current governance. Therefore the local government is responsible for the superior,,not the masses. So, the local government ignores the livelihood. It causes the high growth of economy at a great price. It shows some negative effects such as environment pollution and lack of public goods. So the paper is to research how the current governance influences the orientation of local government and the mode of economic development along the logic of institution-structure-behavior-performance, then the paper discusses it from the theoretical and empirical perspective deeply. The results show that local governmental competition from unique governance is the institutional source of the orientation of local government. The governmental competition is from the mixde motive of local government, such as political incentive, economic incentive and reputation incentive.
Except the part of introduction and literature review, the rest part is arranged as follows:
Chapter3is the part of theoretical analysis, discussing the incentive in political organization mainly. We discuss the importance of incentive in political organization, research the particularity of incentive in political and economic organization extending the incentive mechanism, then derive the mode of best incentive contract of government by mathematical methods, analyse the impact of change of assessment weight from higher levels of government on the behavior of local government; investigate the governance of U and M form and the feature in information coordination and rights allocation and so on. That provides the theoretical evidence for researching government decentralization. Chapter4is the part of historical evolution and review of behavior of local government. We analyze the government decentralization and its effect on behavior of local government in different system divided by1978, then remark it. That research is helpful to deepen the understanding of relevant background of local government behavior in order to realize the importance of institution to the behavior of local government.
Chapter3is the part of analytical framework. On the basis of Chapter3and4, the paper raise up the political and economic logic in the process of growth in China. The analytical logic is institution-structure-behavior-performance, discussing the behavior orientation of local government in the process of development in the current governance of political centralization and economic decentralization. Theoretical analysis shows that the high growth is the result of incentive to the local government and other subjects brought by economic decentralization. But political centralization and the evaluation system political achievements in which GDP is the center is the root of many social and economic problems.
Chapter6,7and8is the part of empirical analysis. On the basis of theoretical research, we use the econometric method and panel date mode(including the dynamic panel data mode)to test the negative effect of orientation of local government in the current governance of political centralization and economic decentralization. It includes3parts: firstly, the distortion of fiscal expenditure structure of local government realizes the short-term growth at the price of long-term growth; secondly, the distortion of environment policy by local government aggravates the pollution in the orientation of GDP; thirdly, the unequal factor preference policy of local government cause the unequal status of labor and capital, declining share of labor income and capital deepening seriously. So, Chinese governance influences the orientation of local government deeply. The empirical analysis supports it.
The last is the part of conclusions and suggestions. We raise up4conclusions:(1)the mode of incentive in Chinese political organization decides the road of development;(2)Chinese style governance shapes the growth-orienting of local government.(3)the competition between local governments distorts their behaviors.(4)the weak constraints from the third party aggravate the deviation of local government behavior. So, in order to change the mode of economic development in China and the distortion of growth-orienting, the paper raises up the suggestions:(1)change the evaluation mode to the local government, improve the mode of government incentive;(2)rationalize the division of financial authority and powers of local government, and optimize the structure of fiscal expenditure;(3)strengthen the importance of voting by feet mechanism in governance;(4)improve the decentralization from government to market, specify the order of competition between local government.
The innovation of the paper may be shown in3aspects:firstly,we research the behavior of local government in China from the beginning of the incentive in organization and gonvernance.Most of previous studies study the government function only, paying less attention to the external constraints and incentive compatibility condition of local government. Researching the preference of local government from the perspective of incentive intensity,incentive bias and governance may be a innovation. Secondly, the paper discusses the distortion of local government behavior from specific area and analyse it empirically. We test the specific effect of gonvernance on the behavior from the perspective of growth effect of distortion of fiscal expenditure structure of local government,the distortion of environment policy and unequal factor preference. Thirdly, being different from previos relevant studies,we focus on not only fiscal discentralizaiton(discentralization from central government to local government)but also other forms of discentralization(the discentralization from local government to other subjects). The paper argue that the local government competiton deriving from governmental discentralization is the institutional reason of current development mode,not fiscal decentralization only.
政治集权—经济分权的政府治理结构是中国一项独特的制度安排,其具有政治与经济双重激励,对地方政府行为导向产生了深远的影响。正是中国特有的政府治理结构塑造了地方政府的企业家精神,激发了地方政府狂热发展当地经济的积极性。也就是说,中国的政府治理结构塑造了地方政府“增长型”而非“发展型”的行为导向,即地方政府“为增长而竞争”,而不是“为民生而竞争”或“为和谐而竞争”。从激励角度看,地方政府的这种行为导向来源于其面临的政府组织内的激励强度与激励偏差。与此同时,在当前的政府治理结构下,公众话语权缺失,对地方政府行为的约束弱化。因此,地方政府“对上负责,对下不负责”。由此产生了“重增长,轻民生”的地方政府行为导向。这就不可避免的造成了中国经济在高速增长的同时,增长的代价也非常大。这种代价的表现为影响经济社会可持续发展的负面效应不断涌现,比如环境污染、公共产品供给不足等问题。基于此,本文沿着制度(institution)—结构(structure)—行为(conduct)—绩效(.performance)的研究逻辑,分析现行的政府治理结构对中国地方政府行为导向以及经济发展模式的具体影响。本文从理论与实证方面对政府治理结构与地方政府行为导向进行了深入探讨。研究结论表明,独特的政府治理结构所导致的地方政府竞争是造成当前地方政府行为取向的制度性根源,这种政府竞争来源于地方政府的混合动机,比如政治激励、经济激励甚至是声誉激励等。
除了导论与文献综述部分,本文其余的内容是如下安排的：
第三章为理论分析部分,主要研究了政府组织内部的激励问题。在该章探讨了政府组织内部激励的重要性；研究了政府组织激励与经济组织激励的特殊性并对其激励机制进行了扩展,然后利用数理方法推导出了政府最优激励合约的模型,并分析了上级政府考核权重的变化对地方政府行为的影响；对U型与M型的政府治理结构以及相应的信息协调、权利配置等方面的特征进行了研究,以此为研究政府分权提供了理论依据。第四章为研究地方政府行为的历史演进与回顾部分。本部分以1978年为界限,分析了不同体制下的政府分权以及对地方政府行为的影响,并进行了相应的评价。通过该部分的研究有助于加深对地方政府行为有关背景的了解,以能够更加透彻的认识主体的横向分权)。本文认为由政府分权引起的地方政府竞争是导致中国现行发展模式的重要制度性原因,而并非仅指财政分权本身。
The important function of institution is to form the incentives and constraints for the subject. A good institution is very important to the development of a country,especially China in transition. China has realized high growth being lack of perfect institution in the sense of North, but it depends on another transitional institution. The paper is to research the impact of governance on the behavior orientation of Chinese local government from the perspective of institution.
The governance of political centralization and economic decentralization is a unique institution arrangement in China. It provides political and economic incentive influencing the behavior of local government deeply. The unique governance in China shapes entrepreneurship of local government, stimulating their enthusiasm in developing local economy. It means that Chinese governance shapes growth-orientation rather than development-orientation government, local government competes for growth rather than development. The orientation is from the intensity and bias of incentive in political organization from the perspective of incentive. At the same time, the constraints from the public are weak in the current governance. Therefore the local government is responsible for the superior,,not the masses. So, the local government ignores the livelihood. It causes the high growth of economy at a great price. It shows some negative effects such as environment pollution and lack of public goods. So the paper is to research how the current governance influences the orientation of local government and the mode of economic development along the logic of institution-structure-behavior-performance, then the paper discusses it from the theoretical and empirical perspective deeply. The results show that local governmental competition from unique governance is the institutional source of the orientation of local government. The governmental competition is from the mixde motive of local government, such as political incentive, economic incentive and reputation incentive.
Except the part of introduction and literature review, the rest part is arranged as follows:
Chapter3is the part of theoretical analysis, discussing the incentive in political organization mainly. We discuss the importance of incentive in political organization, research the particularity of incentive in political and economic organization extending the incentive mechanism, then derive the mode of best incentive contract of government by mathematical methods, analyse the impact of change of assessment weight from higher levels of government on the behavior of local government; investigate the governance of U and M form and the feature in information coordination and rights allocation and so on. That provides the theoretical evidence for researching government decentralization. Chapter4is the part of historical evolution and review of behavior of local government. We analyze the government decentralization and its effect on behavior of local government in different system divided by1978, then remark it. That research is helpful to deepen the understanding of relevant background of local government behavior in order to realize the importance of institution to the behavior of local government.
Chapter3is the part of analytical framework. On the basis of Chapter3and4, the paper raise up the political and economic logic in the process of growth in China. The analytical logic is institution-structure-behavior-performance, discussing the behavior orientation of local government in the process of development in the current governance of political centralization and economic decentralization. Theoretical analysis shows that the high growth is the result of incentive to the local government and other subjects brought by economic decentralization. But political centralization and the evaluation system political achievements in which GDP is the center is the root of many social and economic problems.
Chapter6,7and8is the part of empirical analysis. On the basis of theoretical research, we use the econometric method and panel date mode(including the dynamic panel data mode)to test the negative effect of orientation of local government in the current governance of political centralization and economic decentralization. It includes3parts: firstly, the distortion of fiscal expenditure structure of local government realizes the short-term growth at the price of long-term growth; secondly, the distortion of environment policy by local government aggravates the pollution in the orientation of GDP; thirdly, the unequal factor preference policy of local government cause the unequal status of labor and capital, declining share of labor income and capital deepening seriously. So, Chinese governance influences the orientation of local government deeply. The empirical analysis supports it.
The last is the part of conclusions and suggestions. We raise up4conclusions:(1)the mode of incentive in Chinese political organization decides the road of development;(2)Chinese style governance shapes the growth-orienting of local government.(3)the competition between local governments distorts their behaviors.(4)the weak constraints from the third party aggravate the deviation of local government behavior. So, in order to change the mode of economic development in China and the distortion of growth-orienting, the paper raises up the suggestions:(1)change the evaluation mode to the local government, improve the mode of government incentive;(2)rationalize the division of financial authority and powers of local government, and optimize the structure of fiscal expenditure;(3)strengthen the importance of voting by feet mechanism in governance;(4)improve the decentralization from government to market, specify the order of competition between local government.
The innovation of the paper may be shown in3aspects:firstly,we research the behavior of local government in China from the beginning of the incentive in organization and gonvernance.Most of previous studies study the government function only, paying less attention to the external constraints and incentive compatibility condition of local government. Researching the preference of local government from the perspective of incentive intensity,incentive bias and governance may be a innovation. Secondly, the paper discusses the distortion of local government behavior from specific area and analyse it empirically. We test the specific effect of gonvernance on the behavior from the perspective of growth effect of distortion of fiscal expenditure structure of local government,the distortion of environment policy and unequal factor preference. Thirdly, being different from previos relevant studies,we focus on not only fiscal discentralizaiton(discentralization from central government to local government)but also other forms of discentralization(the discentralization from local government to other subjects). The paper argue that the local government competiton deriving from governmental discentralization is the institutional reason of current development mode,not fiscal decentralization only.
引文
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