低成本战略视角下信息不完全双寡头动态R&D竞争研究
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摘要
目前,技术创新对国民经济发展和社会进步具有越来越显著的促进作用。R&D活动作为企业开展技术创新的主要源动力,已经成为企业获取更大竞争优势的重要途径。现有对企业R&D竞争的研究文献虽已比较丰富,但主要以静态R&D竞争为主,考虑到企业的信息获取能力差异、R&D竞争环境的动态变化等因素,已有研究文献在研究方法、研究角度等方面还存在一些局限性,进一步研究仍有必要性。本文以双寡头动态R&D竞争问题为研究内容,运用博弈理论和非线性动力学理论,分别考虑成本信息、市场需求信息以及决策理性信息等三类信息不完全条件,深入研究了双寡头动态R&D竞争的稳定条件、均衡结果和演化趋势,并从低成本战略视角,为企业做出R&D决策提出建议。
本文的研究内容主要有如下几个方面:
第一,本文研究了成本信息不完全条件下的双寡头R&D竞争问题。研究结果发现,当双寡头成本信息完全但成本不对称时,双寡头静态R&D竞争存在唯一的Nash均衡解,并且低成本战略企业具有更大R&D投入倾向。当双寡头成本信息不完全时,双寡头静态R&D竞争存在唯一的Bayesian Nash均衡,并且在一定条件下,成本信息不完全条件下的双寡头静态R&D竞争可以实现向成本信息完全条件下的静态R&D竞争转化。在成本信息不完全条件下,双寡头动态R&D竞争存在一个稳定域,当系统参数满足稳定域条件时,双寡头动态R&D竞争随着时间推移将逐渐稳定于唯一的均衡解。
第二,本文分析了市场需求信息不完全条件下的双寡头动态R&D竞争问题。研究结果表明:在市场外生的需求信息不完全条件下,双寡头动态R&D竞争的均衡结果(均衡R&D投入水平、均衡利润)与新增市场需求、初始市场需求成正比;随着动态R&D竞争过程的不断持续,新增市场需求对双寡头均衡R&D投入水平和均衡产量的影响将越来越大,而市场初始需求对双寡头均衡R&D投入水平和均衡产量的影响却越来越小。在企业内生的市场需求信息不完全条件下,企业的市场需求影响因子对双寡头动态R&D竞争的稳定性有着重要影响,当市场需求影响因子处于系统稳定范围内时,动态R&D竞争将逐渐稳定于唯一的均衡解,一旦影响因子取值过大,则R&D竞争将失稳,双寡头陷入恶性R&D竞争。当动态R&D竞争处于稳定状态时,存在某一最优市场需求影响因子,可使得双寡头均衡利润最大,而双寡头均衡R&D投入水平和均衡产量则随市场需求影响因子的增大而增大。研究结果还表明,在市场需求信息不完全条件下,双寡头动态R&D竞争的均衡R&D投入水平随技术溢出率的增大而减小,而均衡产量、均衡利润均随技术溢出率的增大先增大后减小。
第三,本文研究了决策理性信息不完全条件下的双寡头动态R&D竞争问题。无论是决策理性层次相同或者层次不同的有限理性双寡头动态R&D竞争均可能出现混沌、倍岔等复杂的动力学现象。本文运用非线性动力学理论对上述两种情形有限理性双寡头动态R&D竞争的稳定性进行了研究,研究结果发现企业的R&D投入调整速度对动态R&D竞争的稳定性有着重要影响,过快的调整速度将使得R&D竞争陷入混沌或倍岔状态。然而,企业的前期R&D竞争利润却随着R&D投入调整速度的加快而增大。此外,R&D投入调整速度对双寡头动态R&D竞争到达均衡的时间也有着明显的影响。当R&D竞争陷入混沌状态后,企业任何决策的微小变化都会给R&D竞争的最终博弈结果产生巨大的影响。技术溢出率对动态R&D竞争均衡结果的影响会因系统所处的状态不同而不同。研究结果还表明,运用延迟反馈控制法可使陷入混沌状态的动态R&D竞争重新回到稳定状态并逐渐稳定于唯一的Nash均衡解。
第四,本文从低成本战略视角分析了企业R&D竞争决策问题。研究结果显示,企业实施低成本战略以降低企业边际成本,无论对单个企业或整个产业都是有益的。在成本信息不完全条件下,成本战略企业有着更大开展R&D活动的倾向并且能获取更高的均衡利润。在市场需求信息不完全条件下,实施低成本战略的企业能获得更高的均衡R&D投入水平、均衡产量和均衡利润。特别是市场需求信息外生条件下,低成本战略企业不仅能提高其在每一竞争周期中利润,还能有效地增加竞争持续的周期数,因而能显著提高其在整个动态R&D竞争过程中的总利润。在决策理性信息不完全条件下,企业在实施低成本战略时需兼顾到动态R&D竞争的稳定性。在稳定状态下,企业实施低成本战略是有利可图的,企业均衡R&D投入水平和均衡利润均随着边际成本的下降而增大。技术溢出率对低成本战略企业的影响因信息不完全类型的不同而不同,低成本战略企业需要依据R&D竞争实际选择合适的技术溢出率以保证自身的利益。
Nowadays, technical innovation makes more effects on the advancement of national economic development and social progress.As the driving force of technical innovation for companies, R&D activity has been an important approach for the companies to get more competitive advantages. It’s necessary to further our study for there are some differences in the companies’ability to get information, the dynamic changes of the R&D competitive environment,The article is doing research on the competition problem of the duopoly dynamic R&D. Making use of the Game Theory and the Nonlinear Dynamic Systems Theory, also taking into consideration of the three types of incomplete information of cost, market demands, rationality, this article is deeply looking into the stability conditions, equilibrium results, evolution tendency of the competition of the duopoly dynamic R&D competetion, and at the meantime, putting forward some advices for the company on R&D decision from the point of the low cost strategy.
The main aspects of the research are as follows.
First of all, the article is doing research on the competition problem of the duopoly R&D under the condition of not having the complete cost information. The outcome of the research reveals that, when the duopoly cost information is complete and the cost is not symmetrical, there exists only one Nash equilibrium results for the duopoly static R&D competetion. When the duopoly cost information is incomplete, there exists only one Bayesian Nash equilibrium results for the duopoly static R&D research, and in some situations, duopoly model in static state R&D competition under uncompleted costs information can turn to the static state under complete costs information. Under uncompleted costs information, R&D competition in dynamic state has a stable region.
Secondly, the article analyzes duopoly model in static state R&D competition under uncompleted market demand competition. The research results state that under uncompleted information about exdogenous market demand, duopoly model in dynamic R&D competition is proportional to the newly added and the original market demands; as the dynamic R&D procedure is continuing, the newly added market demands will have bigger and bigger influence on the level of effort and equilibrium quantity of duopoly balanced R&D while the influence of original market demands is getting smaller. Under the condition when the endogenous market demand information of the companies is incomplete, the market demand has big influence on dynamic R&D competition. When the market demand is stable, dynamic R&D competition will stay on a unique equilibrium. When dynamic R&D competition is in a stable state, there will be a optimal market demand factor which can make the duopoly equilibrium profit biggest while the input level and balanced output get lager with the demand factor getting bigger. The research result also states that when the market demand is incomplete, the equilibrium R&D input level under incompletely dynamic R&D duopoly competition decrease as the rate of technology spillovers increase while the equilibrium output, profits are increasing first and decreasing then with the technology spillovers rate increasing.
Thirdly, this article studies the dynamic R&D duopoly competition when rationality information is incomplete. Whether rationality made decision is in the same or different level, the bounded rational dynamic R&D duopoly competition is likely to cause chaos, bifurcation and other dynamics phenomena. It turns out that the adjusting speed of R&D input has important implications to the stability of dynamic R&D competition and over fast speed of adjustment will enable R&D competition into a state of chaos, or bifurcation. Yet, companies’early R&D competition profit increases as the speed of R&D input adjustment accelerates. Besides, adjustment speed of R&D input has obvious influence on the equilibrium time of the dynamic R&D competition. When R&D competition comes into chaos, any small changes in decision-making would give R&D competition an enormous impact in the final results of the game. The impact of technology spillovers on dynamic R&D competitive equilibrium results varies as the state of the system differs. The results also show that the use of delayed feedback control method can make a dynamic R&D competition which in a chaotic state return to steady-state.
Fourth, this atical analyses the decision-making issue of R&D competition from the perspective of low cost strategy. The results show that when companies implement low cost strategies to reduce corporate marginal costs, it is beneficial to either individual companies or entire industries. Under the condition of incomplete cost information, the cost strategic companies have a greater tendency of carrying out R&D activities and have access to gain a higher equilibrium profit,. Under the condition of incomplete market demand information, the implementation of low cost strategy of companies can achieve higher levels of a equilibrium results. In particular, under the conditions of exogenous market demand, low cost strategies can not only improve companies’profits in each cycle of competition, but also effectively increase competition in continuous cycles Under condition of incomplete information about decision-making, the companies in the implementation of low cost strategies need to take the stability of dynamic R D competition into account. In a stable state, the companies are profitable to implement low cost strategy. The equilibrium R&D level and the equilibrium profits increase along with the decline of the marginal cost.
本文的研究内容主要有如下几个方面:
第一,本文研究了成本信息不完全条件下的双寡头R&D竞争问题。研究结果发现,当双寡头成本信息完全但成本不对称时,双寡头静态R&D竞争存在唯一的Nash均衡解,并且低成本战略企业具有更大R&D投入倾向。当双寡头成本信息不完全时,双寡头静态R&D竞争存在唯一的Bayesian Nash均衡,并且在一定条件下,成本信息不完全条件下的双寡头静态R&D竞争可以实现向成本信息完全条件下的静态R&D竞争转化。在成本信息不完全条件下,双寡头动态R&D竞争存在一个稳定域,当系统参数满足稳定域条件时,双寡头动态R&D竞争随着时间推移将逐渐稳定于唯一的均衡解。
第二,本文分析了市场需求信息不完全条件下的双寡头动态R&D竞争问题。研究结果表明:在市场外生的需求信息不完全条件下,双寡头动态R&D竞争的均衡结果(均衡R&D投入水平、均衡利润)与新增市场需求、初始市场需求成正比;随着动态R&D竞争过程的不断持续,新增市场需求对双寡头均衡R&D投入水平和均衡产量的影响将越来越大,而市场初始需求对双寡头均衡R&D投入水平和均衡产量的影响却越来越小。在企业内生的市场需求信息不完全条件下,企业的市场需求影响因子对双寡头动态R&D竞争的稳定性有着重要影响,当市场需求影响因子处于系统稳定范围内时,动态R&D竞争将逐渐稳定于唯一的均衡解,一旦影响因子取值过大,则R&D竞争将失稳,双寡头陷入恶性R&D竞争。当动态R&D竞争处于稳定状态时,存在某一最优市场需求影响因子,可使得双寡头均衡利润最大,而双寡头均衡R&D投入水平和均衡产量则随市场需求影响因子的增大而增大。研究结果还表明,在市场需求信息不完全条件下,双寡头动态R&D竞争的均衡R&D投入水平随技术溢出率的增大而减小,而均衡产量、均衡利润均随技术溢出率的增大先增大后减小。
第三,本文研究了决策理性信息不完全条件下的双寡头动态R&D竞争问题。无论是决策理性层次相同或者层次不同的有限理性双寡头动态R&D竞争均可能出现混沌、倍岔等复杂的动力学现象。本文运用非线性动力学理论对上述两种情形有限理性双寡头动态R&D竞争的稳定性进行了研究,研究结果发现企业的R&D投入调整速度对动态R&D竞争的稳定性有着重要影响,过快的调整速度将使得R&D竞争陷入混沌或倍岔状态。然而,企业的前期R&D竞争利润却随着R&D投入调整速度的加快而增大。此外,R&D投入调整速度对双寡头动态R&D竞争到达均衡的时间也有着明显的影响。当R&D竞争陷入混沌状态后,企业任何决策的微小变化都会给R&D竞争的最终博弈结果产生巨大的影响。技术溢出率对动态R&D竞争均衡结果的影响会因系统所处的状态不同而不同。研究结果还表明,运用延迟反馈控制法可使陷入混沌状态的动态R&D竞争重新回到稳定状态并逐渐稳定于唯一的Nash均衡解。
第四,本文从低成本战略视角分析了企业R&D竞争决策问题。研究结果显示,企业实施低成本战略以降低企业边际成本,无论对单个企业或整个产业都是有益的。在成本信息不完全条件下,成本战略企业有着更大开展R&D活动的倾向并且能获取更高的均衡利润。在市场需求信息不完全条件下,实施低成本战略的企业能获得更高的均衡R&D投入水平、均衡产量和均衡利润。特别是市场需求信息外生条件下,低成本战略企业不仅能提高其在每一竞争周期中利润,还能有效地增加竞争持续的周期数,因而能显著提高其在整个动态R&D竞争过程中的总利润。在决策理性信息不完全条件下,企业在实施低成本战略时需兼顾到动态R&D竞争的稳定性。在稳定状态下,企业实施低成本战略是有利可图的,企业均衡R&D投入水平和均衡利润均随着边际成本的下降而增大。技术溢出率对低成本战略企业的影响因信息不完全类型的不同而不同,低成本战略企业需要依据R&D竞争实际选择合适的技术溢出率以保证自身的利益。
Nowadays, technical innovation makes more effects on the advancement of national economic development and social progress.As the driving force of technical innovation for companies, R&D activity has been an important approach for the companies to get more competitive advantages. It’s necessary to further our study for there are some differences in the companies’ability to get information, the dynamic changes of the R&D competitive environment,The article is doing research on the competition problem of the duopoly dynamic R&D. Making use of the Game Theory and the Nonlinear Dynamic Systems Theory, also taking into consideration of the three types of incomplete information of cost, market demands, rationality, this article is deeply looking into the stability conditions, equilibrium results, evolution tendency of the competition of the duopoly dynamic R&D competetion, and at the meantime, putting forward some advices for the company on R&D decision from the point of the low cost strategy.
The main aspects of the research are as follows.
First of all, the article is doing research on the competition problem of the duopoly R&D under the condition of not having the complete cost information. The outcome of the research reveals that, when the duopoly cost information is complete and the cost is not symmetrical, there exists only one Nash equilibrium results for the duopoly static R&D competetion. When the duopoly cost information is incomplete, there exists only one Bayesian Nash equilibrium results for the duopoly static R&D research, and in some situations, duopoly model in static state R&D competition under uncompleted costs information can turn to the static state under complete costs information. Under uncompleted costs information, R&D competition in dynamic state has a stable region.
Secondly, the article analyzes duopoly model in static state R&D competition under uncompleted market demand competition. The research results state that under uncompleted information about exdogenous market demand, duopoly model in dynamic R&D competition is proportional to the newly added and the original market demands; as the dynamic R&D procedure is continuing, the newly added market demands will have bigger and bigger influence on the level of effort and equilibrium quantity of duopoly balanced R&D while the influence of original market demands is getting smaller. Under the condition when the endogenous market demand information of the companies is incomplete, the market demand has big influence on dynamic R&D competition. When the market demand is stable, dynamic R&D competition will stay on a unique equilibrium. When dynamic R&D competition is in a stable state, there will be a optimal market demand factor which can make the duopoly equilibrium profit biggest while the input level and balanced output get lager with the demand factor getting bigger. The research result also states that when the market demand is incomplete, the equilibrium R&D input level under incompletely dynamic R&D duopoly competition decrease as the rate of technology spillovers increase while the equilibrium output, profits are increasing first and decreasing then with the technology spillovers rate increasing.
Thirdly, this article studies the dynamic R&D duopoly competition when rationality information is incomplete. Whether rationality made decision is in the same or different level, the bounded rational dynamic R&D duopoly competition is likely to cause chaos, bifurcation and other dynamics phenomena. It turns out that the adjusting speed of R&D input has important implications to the stability of dynamic R&D competition and over fast speed of adjustment will enable R&D competition into a state of chaos, or bifurcation. Yet, companies’early R&D competition profit increases as the speed of R&D input adjustment accelerates. Besides, adjustment speed of R&D input has obvious influence on the equilibrium time of the dynamic R&D competition. When R&D competition comes into chaos, any small changes in decision-making would give R&D competition an enormous impact in the final results of the game. The impact of technology spillovers on dynamic R&D competitive equilibrium results varies as the state of the system differs. The results also show that the use of delayed feedback control method can make a dynamic R&D competition which in a chaotic state return to steady-state.
Fourth, this atical analyses the decision-making issue of R&D competition from the perspective of low cost strategy. The results show that when companies implement low cost strategies to reduce corporate marginal costs, it is beneficial to either individual companies or entire industries. Under the condition of incomplete cost information, the cost strategic companies have a greater tendency of carrying out R&D activities and have access to gain a higher equilibrium profit,. Under the condition of incomplete market demand information, the implementation of low cost strategy of companies can achieve higher levels of a equilibrium results. In particular, under the conditions of exogenous market demand, low cost strategies can not only improve companies’profits in each cycle of competition, but also effectively increase competition in continuous cycles Under condition of incomplete information about decision-making, the companies in the implementation of low cost strategies need to take the stability of dynamic R D competition into account. In a stable state, the companies are profitable to implement low cost strategy. The equilibrium R&D level and the equilibrium profits increase along with the decline of the marginal cost.
引文
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