GHM模型的推论和扩展
摘要
GHM模型在事前有不可签约的投资,事后有再谈判,且假定再谈判有效率的环境中研究合约,其基本结论是投资不足,达不到最优。GHM模型是合约和企业理论研究中公认的重要模型。但该模型有一些缺陷：其一,忽略了外部性；其二,在对合作博弈的处理中,所使用的常规的纳什讨价还价解过于简单；其三,关于“事后再谈判是有效率的”的假设并不符合实际,这是它最大的不足,也是最值得扩展的地方。另外,该模型作为一个基准模型非常简洁,若引入一些其他变量,可以丰富该模型,增强其解释力；该模型与科斯定理和公地悲剧论断存在着紧密联系,而该模型的提出者及其他学者对此甚少涉及。当然以上这些并不是要否定该模型在合约研究中的里程碑式意义。
基于以上认识,本文进一步挖掘了GHM模型的意义,发现从GHM模型可以推导出科斯定理和公地悲剧论断,即后两者可以作为GHM模型的推论,通过这项分析也为科斯定理和公地悲剧结论提供了数理模型。本文还引入外部性和其他一些变量,其中包括合约的完全性、当事人的不可替代性、投资约束等,对GHM模型进行了扩展,由此使其假设更符合现实,补充和完善了该模型,增强了其解释力。本文还在该模型中引入一般的纳什讨价还价解代替原模型中的常规纳什讨价还价解进行了研究,并应用于企业股权结构的分析,发现企业的股权结构并不是可以任意变更的,而是体现了股东间相对生产力的大小。这一结论解释了我国中外合资企业股权结构的变化等若干经济现象。这些是本文最重要创新。最后两章讨论并评论了目前理论界对事后不可签约情形的前沿研究,可作为文献综述上的一个创新。另外本文还梳理了合约研究中频繁用到的重要基础理论：讨价还价博弈和机制设计理论,这些理论在关于合约的论文和专著中几乎都被忽略了,这部分可视为文献梳理上的创新。具体来说,本文包括以下内容。
本文发现,对GHM模型的假设作某些舍弃后,会得出一些经典的结论,如科斯定理和公地悲剧论断。
在GHM模型中舍弃事前投资而保留其他假设,模型就转化为科斯定理的情形,即在事后再谈判有效率的条件下研究产权问题。科斯认为产权问题的关键是通过产权配置解决外部性问题。本文认为,外部性可由两方面导致,一是一方对资产的使用对另一方产生外部性,即科斯定理(或科斯第一定理)的情形；二是一方的事前投资对另一方产生外部性,即GHM模型情形。在资产总量确定的前提下,前者实际上可由每方拥有的产权来描述。尤其是在产权可连续表示的情形中,所谓的外部性就体现在受影响一方的收益函数里了,而收益函数只有一个自变量,就是产权。这样,对科斯定理情形的分析,实际上与连续状态的商品在两个不同效用函数的参与人之间的分配没有什么不同,从数学上看就是非常简单的最大化总收益的问题。当然这里用到了一个论断,即双方总会合作以最大化总收益,这在合作博弈理论中体现为纳什讨价还价解的存在性。当然从最终的产权分配看,双方对产权的边际收益会相等,即边际收益大的一方会拥有较多的产权分配。
如果在GHM模型中舍弃事后再谈判而保留其他假设,模型就转化为公地悲剧的情形,公地悲剧论断指出,若土地是共有的,必然会出现土地损耗以致毁坏的悲剧。公地悲剧情形因包含了投资变量,因而比科斯定理情形复杂得多。最优要求双方最大化总收益,这不仅要求双方考虑自身收益,也要求双方考虑因自身投资而带给对方的外部性(即前面所说的第二种外部性),然而理性的参与人做不到这一点,由此可见在公地悲剧情形中达不到最优。当一方投资的外部性为正时,因其并不考虑自身投资带给对方的外部性,因而从最大化总收益的角度来看,其投资总是不足；而一方投资的外部性为负时,相应地因同样原因,其投资总是过度。后一种情形即为传统的公地悲剧情形,过度投资必然会给公地带来损耗以致毁坏。实际上从经济学的直觉立即可知,因为事后再谈判的缺失,双方必定得不到源于生产要素交易的利得,因此最优一般达不到。
本文在GHM模型框架下研究了企业股权结构的决定因素,发现企业的股权结构并非可以任意变更,而是体现了股东间相对生产力的大小。在两个股东组成的企业中,双方利润函数的性质决定了各自的谈判力,进而决定了利润分配；在公司法同股同权的要求下,利润分配决定了股权结构。若双方利润函数的性质发生相对变化,则股权结构将会相应变化。由此本文对特许经营中自营店与加盟店的相对比例变化、国企改革中经营者权力的增强、中国GDP及资本总量占全世界份额的提高等现象给出了解释。
本文引入其他一些变量和约束,对GHM模型进行了补充性扩展研究。其一,引入外部性。在GHM模型中对次优情形一阶条件进行处理时,Hart等人声称其应用包络定理消除了任意一方收益对另一方投资的交叉项偏导数,对此本文不敢苟同。本文认为他们实际上隐含地假定了上述偏导数为零,即投资不存在外部性。这当然是不恰当的,毕竟外部性是一个非常重要因而不应该被忽略的因素。本文在GHM模型中引入外部性进行了研究,结论是,此时达不到最优。当外部性为正时,投资较最优时不足；当外部性为负时,投资较最优时过度。
其二,引入合约的完全性。Hart等人曾指出,企业之间的合约并不是完全不可签约的,比如它们虽然不可以就规格和质量而签约,但它们起码可以就数量而签约。但为了模型的简洁,他们进一步假设交易双方对所有权外的任何事项都不可签约。实际上在现实中,每个合约都有一些条款是完全的,而另一些条款是不完全的。本文在GHM模型中引入合约的完全性进行了研究,结论是,若提高合约完全性,可以提高双方的投资,增进效率。当然在合约的完全性和签约成本间存在权衡。GHM模型中隐含地假定了合约是“完全地”不完全的,因而是前面扩展模型的特例。
其三,引入当事人的不可替换性。在当事人签约后的再谈判中,若一方有了一个改进质量和(或)减少成本的好想法,他需要与对方进行合作与否的再谈判。如果再谈判不成功,对方不必重新寻找这样的好想法,相反,对方已经知道了这个好想法,因此可以在再谈判破裂后,仍享有这个好想法的某些收益,实际上对方只需要与其他潜在的当事人谈判这个好想法即可,这就体现了当事人的不可替换性。本文在GHM模型中引入当事人的不可替换性进行了研究,结论是,若某方当事人的不可替换性提高,则可增加其投资。GHM模型中隐含地假定了当事人是完全不可替换的,因而是前面扩展模型的特例。
其四,引入投资约束。GHM模型隐含地假定了事前投资可以是无限的,这明显不合理。现实中,投资不可能是无限的,最简单地,一个人每天可用的时间不可能超过24个小时。故在所有权的选择中,投资的最大可能值即投资约束是非常重要的一个制约条件。本文在GHM模型中引入投资约束进行了研究,结论是,企业不能任意采取可以增进效率的所有权形式。在投资约束下,两个单位(或企业)间的关系必将停留在不交易、交易但非合并、合并的单一业主制、股份制中的某一种形式,而不能采取无投资约束时更有效率的所有权形式。
综合上面几项扩展研究,可以预言企业所有权的普遍形态是互相之间签订长期合约的股份制企业,这与对现实世界的观察是相符的。另外,在股份制企业里小股东的股份并不能代表其不可替换性,因此在现实世界中,若小股东的不可替换性较其所持股份比率更低,其权利必将受到大股东的侵害。
GHM模型假设事后再谈判是有效率的,这当然不能令人满意,许多学者引入事后不可签约性对该模型做了实质性的扩展,本文对此做了综述。Hart等人在2008年后,通过一系列行为经济学因素,比较成功地引入了事后不可签约性。他们认为合约的主要作用之一是作为参照点,为双方的心理感受提供了一个衡量标准。当一方得到合约可能提供的最大支付时,他会感到被赋权,因而提供精细的绩效；否则就会感到未被赋权,因而会觉得委屈,觉得被克扣,因而会报复,即通过敷衍,提供粗糙的绩效,从而产生无谓的损失。这样,若合约规定得很死板,虽然没有敷衍,从而不会产生无谓的损失,但会失去许多交易机会；若合约规定得很灵活,虽然会得到许多交易机会,但会导致大量的敷衍,产生无谓的损失。因此在合约的刚性与灵活性之间就有权衡的必要。通过对前述合约作为参照点基本模型的研究,以及先后引入套牢、资产所有权、事前投资而作的扩展研究,Hart等人得出了与GHM相似的结论。
Tirole于2009年也提出了一个事后不可签约的模型,他独辟蹊径地使用了认知的方法。当事人因为认知的成本,会故意将一些因素留待未来签约,因此产生了相应的权衡。
Segal和Whinston在信息不对称和联盟状态下(本文未涉及后者)研究了事后不可签约情形。SW模型证明了在信息不对称情形中,事后有效率的再谈判一般不存在,即最优一般不存在。特别地,他们证明了,若当事人都是逆向退出类型时,有效率的再谈判一定不存在；另一方面,他们又证明了,当初始的产权分配等于预期的有效率的产权分配时,有效率的再谈判可以达到,即最优可以达到。另外,当有效率的再谈判不存在即最优不存在时,一方面可以在保持有效率的产权分配的基础上最小化预算,即最小化第三方对机制的投入；另一方面当第三方不存在时,可以在预算平衡的基础上,最大化事后的总收益,即寻找次优的解决方案。
比较前面这些对事后不可签约情形的研究途径,Hart等人的合约作为参照点模型虽然通过引入一系列行为经济学因素,成功地构造了事后不可签约性,但同时也带来了众多行为经济学因素的未知问题,可以说为了打开一个黑箱子,而造成了众多的黑箱子,理论本身的成本很高。Tirole的认知模型虽然让人耳目一新,眼前一亮,但认知只是人类理性局限的一个角度、一个侧面而己。SW模型似乎更可取一些,从人类理性的局限来说,它是一个更一般性的模型,毕竟有限理性的重要来源就是信息的不对称及联盟问题。
另外,本文梳理了合约理论的基础问题。其一是讨价还价理论。涉及事后再谈判的合约理论必然会面对两个问题,一是为什么当事双方总会达成合作以提高总收益,二是总收益如何在当事人之间分配。GHM模型认为只要合作的总收益大于不合作的总收益,即存在合作利得时,当事人就一定会达成合作。但该模型并没有解释其中的原因。GHM进一步认为就合作利得,双方会按50%：50%的比例进行分配,并注明此处的依据是纳什讨价还价解,但未作进一步解释。与此相似,几乎所有关于事后再谈判的论文对这两个问题都如此说明,甚至根本不作说明。本文认为,为了厘清合约理论的基本脉络,有必要对此给一清晰交待。实际上讨价还价博弈理论对这两个问题已给出了严谨的结论。在合作博弈范畴,Nash在1950年代证明了,在很简单的5个公理组成的体系下,只要存在合作利得,当事人就一定能达成合作,即存在唯一的合作解,该结论又被称为纳什讨价还价解的存在性定理,该解又被称为常规的纳什讨价还价解。Roth在1979年放松纳什公理体系,提出了一般条件下的纳什讨价还价解。由于合作博弈是建立在公理体系上,而不像非合作博弈建立在个人理性上,因此合作博弈的基础是不牢固的。为此纳什提出了纳什规划,即对应每个合作博弈,相应地设计非合作博弈以检验合作博弈的公理及合作博弈解。纳什规划也体现了合作博弈与非合作博弈的关系。Rubinstein在1982年设计了非合作的轮流出价的讨价还价博弈,证明了该博弈的解在无限期时趋近于纳什讨价还价解,这恰好体现了纳什规划的精神。Binmore于1986年在Rubinstein模型基础上讨论了所谓讨价还价力的来源,也即Roth所提出来的一般纳什讨价还价解的系数的决定因素,他说明了讨价还价力的两类来源,一是反应时间,二是风险偏好。
其二是机制设计理论。机制设计理论研究讨价还价的效率问题,因此与合约理论存在着紧密联系,SW模型大量使用机制设计理论来研究事后不可签约的情形,因此有必要对机制设计理论作一番梳理。机制设计理论已经证明,在一般情况下,同时满足有效率的分配、个人理性、激励相容、预算平衡的机制是不存在的。因此从这个意义上讲,在事后不可签约时,有效率的再谈判一般是不存在的,即最优达不到。可行的机制要在有效率的分配和预算平衡之间权衡。
GHM model studies contracts in a setting with noncontracting investments, ex-post renegotiation, and the assumption of effectiveness of ex-post renegotiation. It's elemental conclusion is that investments is shortage, and the first-best can not be achieved in this setting. GHM model is very important in the study of contracts and firm theory, which is widely acknowledged. However, the model has some imperfections:A. it ignores externalities; B. it uses regular Nash bargaining solution in cooperation game, which is a little simpler; C. the assumption that ex-post renegotiation is effective is impractical, which is its most serious defect, where is most worth extending. In addition, while as a base model, it is very concise, by introducing some other variables, will enrich it and enhance its explanatory power; it is closely linked to Coasian Theorem and the Commons Tragedy, which is rarely mentioned by its proposers and others. Nevertheless, I will not deny the landmark significance of it.
Based on the above understanding, in this dissertation, I try to derive more implications from GHM model. I find that the Coasian theorem and common tragedy conclusion can be derived form the model, that is, they can be as corollaries of it. By doing so, I provide two mathematic models for them. I extend the GHM model through introducing some variables, such as externality, completeness, irreplaceability and restriction of the investment, making the assumptions of it more realistic, improving it, enhancing its explanatory power. I use general Nash Bargaining Solution instead of the regular one to explore determinants of the shareholding structure of a firm. I show that the shareholding structure can not be modified arbitrarily, rather, it embodies the relative productivities of the shareholders. Applying the conclusion, I give interpretations for some economic phenomena. All these are the most important innovations in the dissertation. I also discuss and give criticisms to the literatures of ex-post non-contracting cases conducted by some economists, which may be an innovation in literatures review. Moreover, I present a concise and systematic text of two important theories, including bargaining game and mechanism design theory, which are ignored in almost all literatures. Particularly the dissertation concludes:
1. Derive more implications from the GHM model:corollaries of the model.
Over the past30years since the proposing of the GHM model, it has been accepted by more and more economists, becoming the main stream model in the study of contracts, and applying in many economic fields. I show that it can derive some classical conclusions, such as Coasian theorem and commons tragedy conclusion, after some exchanges of its assumptions.
a. Coasian theorem situation.
The GHM model will be transformed to Coasian theorem situation where ex-post effective renegotiation is permitted if ex-ante investments are ruled out. Coase argued that the key of property rights issue is externality. I show that the externality imposed to one party is from ether the other party's use of assets, e.g., Coasian theorem situation, or from the one's ex-ante investment, e.g., GHM model situation. Given total amount of assets, the former can be denoted by the assets owned by each party. Particularly, the externality can be reflected in the imposed party's revenue function if property rights are continuous because the revenue function is of one variable, i.e., property rights. Thus, the analyses to Coasian theorem situation make no difference to the situations in which some continuous goods are distributed among some parties who have different utility functions. Of course, one paradigm is needed that parties always cooperate to maximize the total revenue, which was demonstrated by the existence of Nash Bargaining Solution in game theory.
The two parties'marginal revenue will be equal in the final property rights allocation, that is, the party with bigger marginal revenue will be allocated to more property rights.
b. Commons tragedy situation.
GHM model will be transformed to Commons tragedy situation if ex-post renegotiation is ruled out, when the depletion of commons is destined. This situation is much more complicated than the one of Coasian theorem because of elements of the investments. The first-best implies that parties maximize the total revenue, which demand parties not only take into account each own revenue, but also the effect of its investment to another (the second externality mentioned before) which the rational party will ignore, so the first-best will not be achieved. When the externality caused by one party's investment is positive, his investment is always insufficient as to maximizing the total revenue, because he dose not take into account the externality caused by his investment to another, while negative, his investment is always excessive for the same reasons. The latter is the commons tragedy which means that the commons will be depleted by the excessive investments.
Intuitively in fact, parties can not obtain the trading surplus because of the absence of renegotiation, and can not achieve the first-best.
2. The determinants of shareholding structure of a firm.
Following GHM model, I explore determinants of shareholding structure of a firm. I show that the shareholding structure can not be modified arbitrarily, rather, it embodies the relative productivities of the shareholders. In a two-shareholder firm, the natures of two parties'revenue functions, i.e., their productivities, determine the bargaining power of each one, and then the distribution of the profit, and according to the company law, the distribution of profit determines the shareholding structure. If natures of two parties change relatively, the shareholding structure will change too. Applying the conclusion, I give interpretations for some economic phenomena, such as the change of relative amount of franchised outlets and chain stores, the enhancement of managers of state-owned enterprises in the economic reform in China, the increase of the GDP and the capital amount of China relative to the world.
3. Extend GHM model complementally:introducing some new assumptions.
a. Externality.
In the treatment of the second-order condition in the GHM model, Hart et al. explain that the cross derivatives can be eliminated by applying the envelope theorem. But I do not agree with them. I think they implicitly suppose that the partial derivatives are zero, which means that there is no externalities resulted from investments. Yet the externality is too important to be ignored. I introduce the externality, and show that the first-best can not be achieved too. When the externality is positive, the investment is insufficient, while negative, the investment is excessive.
b. Completeness of the contract.
Hart et al. have recognized that a contract among firms is not completely non-contractible, e.g., though firms can not contract on quality, but they can contract on quantity. But to get a concise model, they simply suppose that parties can contract nothing but the ownership. Actually some items of a contract are complete, and the others are incomplete. I introduce the completeness as parameter into the GHM model, and show that the increase of completeness will increase parties'investments, and then effectiveness. I also show that GHM implicitly suppose that a contract is completely incomplete, and it is a special case of my model here.
c. Irreplaceability.
In renegotiating, if one party owns a good idea how to improve quality or reduce cost, he must bargain with the. If the bargaining fails, another need not to acquire the good idea once more, actually he can realize some of the benefit of it through negotiating with other potential one, which implies the irreplaceability. I introduce the irreplaceability as parameter into the GHM model, and show that if one party's irreplaceability increases, his investment will increase as a result. I also show that GHM implicitly suppose that all parties are completely irreplaceable, so it is a special case of my model here.
d. Investment constraint.
GHM model implicitly suppose that the investment is infinite, which is unreasonable obviously. Actually, the investment is finite, e.g., one's available time to work is no more than24hours. So, the maximum of investment, i.e.,the investment constraint, is one of the most important constraints. I introduce the investment constraint as parameter into the GHM model, and show that a firm can not select ownership structure to increase effectiveness. Subject to the investment constraint, the ownership between two units (or firm) will keep one status among not-trading, trading but non-integration, individual ownership with integration, shareholding.
4. Extend GHM model substantially:literatures introducing ex-post non-contractible property.
a. Research conducted by Hart et al..
Since2008, Hart et al. have introduced ex-post non-contractible property through a series of behavioral economics elements, which may be successful. One of roles of contract is to be as a reference point which provides a measure for feelings of entitlement to parties. When a party gets the most payoff from the trade, he will be entitled, so provide consummate performance; otherwise, he will feel shortchanged and aggrieved, and then retaliate with shading, providing perfunctory performance, leading deadweight loss. If the contract is rigid, there does not exist shading certainly, and no deadweight loss, but parties will lose many trading opportunities. If the contract is flexible, they will get many trading opportunities, but there will exist serious shading, leading deadweight loss. So, it is need to trade-off between flexibility and rigidity. Through researching the basic model of contract as reference point, and the subsequent extending by introducing hold-up, assets ownership and ex-ante investment, Hart et al. reach a conclusion similar to the GHM model.
b. Research conducted by Tirole.
Tirole also proposed an ex-post non-contractibleness model recently. He uses cognitive approach instinctively. Recognizing the cognitive cost, parties will deliberately leave some part of the contract to be renegotiated ex-post, resulting in the corresponding trade-off.
c. Research conducted by Segal and Whinston.
Segal and Whinston study the ex-post non-contractible case under information asymmetry and bilateral trade (the latter is not included in the dissertation). SW model show that the efficient renegotiation is not permitted generally, that is, the first-best can not be achieved. Nevertheless, they show that the initial property rights allocation equal to the expected efficient allocation permits efficient bargaining. Otherwise, when the first-best can not be achieved, we may minimize the subsidy to the mechanism with efficient allocation held, or maximize ex-post total payoff with budget balance held, i.e., finding a second-best solution.
Thus, we can compare these approaches to the ex-post non-contractible case. Although the model of contract as reference point successfully constructs ex-post inefficiency through introducing a series of behavioral elements, it leads a lot of unawareness, in other words, the opening of a black box leads much more black ones. So its theoretical cost is very high. Tirole's cognitive model makes us refreshing, but it must be recognized that the cognition restriction is only one of dimensions of human rational restriction. SW model seems to be more desirable, because it is a general model as to human rational restriction. After all, The major resource of bounded rationality is information asymmetry and union.
5. Foundations of contract theory:bargaining game and mechanism design theory.
a. Review of bargaining game literatures.
Contract theory evolving ex-post renegotiation must faces two problems inevitably:i. Why two parties will cooperate to increase total payoff? ii. how will total payoff be distributed between parties. The GHM model argues that parties will cooperate whenever total payoff from cooperation surpass the one from non-cooperation, that is, the cooperation gain is available. But it does not tell us why. It go further to state that the two parties will split the cooperation gain50%:50%, telling us this is a Nash bargaining solution, but giving no more explanations. Almost all literatures concerning contract do similarly as to the two problems, or give no account even. I argue that it is need to give a concise but clear account on the theory about the two problems in order to understand contract theory in detail. Bargaining game theory gives some desirable theorems as to the two problems, so I give a review of the development of the theory.
In1950's, Nash demonstrated in cooperative game that under a system of five axioms, parties would be sure to cooperate provided cooperation gain exists, that is, there exists a unique cooperative solution, which is referred to as Nash bargaining solution theorem. In1970's, Roth relaxed Nash's assumptions, and proposed the general Nash bargaining solution. Compared with that, the former is referred to as regular Nash bargaining solution as well. Established on the axiom system and differing from non-cooperative game theory that is established on individual ration, the foundation of cooperative theory is not stable, so Nash suggested that it is need to design a non-cooperative game as to any cooperative game to test cooperative axioms and cooperative solution, which is called Nash program. This embodies the relation between cooperative and non-cooperative games.In1980's, Rubinstein designed a non-cooperative alternating offers'bargaining game model, stating that in infinite periods, the solution of this model approaches to the Nash bargaining solution as in the spirit of Nash program. Binmore explored the sources of bargaining power in the model of Rubinstein, i.e., the determinants of coefficients of the general Nash solution proposed by Roth. He listed two sources of bargaining power, reactive time and risk preference.
b. Review of mechanism design literatures.
SW model uses mechanism design theory as basic instrument to analyze ex-post inefficiency, so it is needed to sort out relevant literatures. Mechanism design theory has demonstrated that in general, no efficient, incentive-compatible, interim individually rational, and budget-balanced mechanism exists. Therefore, in the ex-post non-contractible situation, no efficient renegotiation exists in general, that is, the first-best can not be achieved. An available mechanism must trade-offs between efficient allocation and budget-balance.
基于以上认识,本文进一步挖掘了GHM模型的意义,发现从GHM模型可以推导出科斯定理和公地悲剧论断,即后两者可以作为GHM模型的推论,通过这项分析也为科斯定理和公地悲剧结论提供了数理模型。本文还引入外部性和其他一些变量,其中包括合约的完全性、当事人的不可替代性、投资约束等,对GHM模型进行了扩展,由此使其假设更符合现实,补充和完善了该模型,增强了其解释力。本文还在该模型中引入一般的纳什讨价还价解代替原模型中的常规纳什讨价还价解进行了研究,并应用于企业股权结构的分析,发现企业的股权结构并不是可以任意变更的,而是体现了股东间相对生产力的大小。这一结论解释了我国中外合资企业股权结构的变化等若干经济现象。这些是本文最重要创新。最后两章讨论并评论了目前理论界对事后不可签约情形的前沿研究,可作为文献综述上的一个创新。另外本文还梳理了合约研究中频繁用到的重要基础理论：讨价还价博弈和机制设计理论,这些理论在关于合约的论文和专著中几乎都被忽略了,这部分可视为文献梳理上的创新。具体来说,本文包括以下内容。
本文发现,对GHM模型的假设作某些舍弃后,会得出一些经典的结论,如科斯定理和公地悲剧论断。
在GHM模型中舍弃事前投资而保留其他假设,模型就转化为科斯定理的情形,即在事后再谈判有效率的条件下研究产权问题。科斯认为产权问题的关键是通过产权配置解决外部性问题。本文认为,外部性可由两方面导致,一是一方对资产的使用对另一方产生外部性,即科斯定理(或科斯第一定理)的情形；二是一方的事前投资对另一方产生外部性,即GHM模型情形。在资产总量确定的前提下,前者实际上可由每方拥有的产权来描述。尤其是在产权可连续表示的情形中,所谓的外部性就体现在受影响一方的收益函数里了,而收益函数只有一个自变量,就是产权。这样,对科斯定理情形的分析,实际上与连续状态的商品在两个不同效用函数的参与人之间的分配没有什么不同,从数学上看就是非常简单的最大化总收益的问题。当然这里用到了一个论断,即双方总会合作以最大化总收益,这在合作博弈理论中体现为纳什讨价还价解的存在性。当然从最终的产权分配看,双方对产权的边际收益会相等,即边际收益大的一方会拥有较多的产权分配。
如果在GHM模型中舍弃事后再谈判而保留其他假设,模型就转化为公地悲剧的情形,公地悲剧论断指出,若土地是共有的,必然会出现土地损耗以致毁坏的悲剧。公地悲剧情形因包含了投资变量,因而比科斯定理情形复杂得多。最优要求双方最大化总收益,这不仅要求双方考虑自身收益,也要求双方考虑因自身投资而带给对方的外部性(即前面所说的第二种外部性),然而理性的参与人做不到这一点,由此可见在公地悲剧情形中达不到最优。当一方投资的外部性为正时,因其并不考虑自身投资带给对方的外部性,因而从最大化总收益的角度来看,其投资总是不足；而一方投资的外部性为负时,相应地因同样原因,其投资总是过度。后一种情形即为传统的公地悲剧情形,过度投资必然会给公地带来损耗以致毁坏。实际上从经济学的直觉立即可知,因为事后再谈判的缺失,双方必定得不到源于生产要素交易的利得,因此最优一般达不到。
本文在GHM模型框架下研究了企业股权结构的决定因素,发现企业的股权结构并非可以任意变更,而是体现了股东间相对生产力的大小。在两个股东组成的企业中,双方利润函数的性质决定了各自的谈判力,进而决定了利润分配；在公司法同股同权的要求下,利润分配决定了股权结构。若双方利润函数的性质发生相对变化,则股权结构将会相应变化。由此本文对特许经营中自营店与加盟店的相对比例变化、国企改革中经营者权力的增强、中国GDP及资本总量占全世界份额的提高等现象给出了解释。
本文引入其他一些变量和约束,对GHM模型进行了补充性扩展研究。其一,引入外部性。在GHM模型中对次优情形一阶条件进行处理时,Hart等人声称其应用包络定理消除了任意一方收益对另一方投资的交叉项偏导数,对此本文不敢苟同。本文认为他们实际上隐含地假定了上述偏导数为零,即投资不存在外部性。这当然是不恰当的,毕竟外部性是一个非常重要因而不应该被忽略的因素。本文在GHM模型中引入外部性进行了研究,结论是,此时达不到最优。当外部性为正时,投资较最优时不足；当外部性为负时,投资较最优时过度。
其二,引入合约的完全性。Hart等人曾指出,企业之间的合约并不是完全不可签约的,比如它们虽然不可以就规格和质量而签约,但它们起码可以就数量而签约。但为了模型的简洁,他们进一步假设交易双方对所有权外的任何事项都不可签约。实际上在现实中,每个合约都有一些条款是完全的,而另一些条款是不完全的。本文在GHM模型中引入合约的完全性进行了研究,结论是,若提高合约完全性,可以提高双方的投资,增进效率。当然在合约的完全性和签约成本间存在权衡。GHM模型中隐含地假定了合约是“完全地”不完全的,因而是前面扩展模型的特例。
其三,引入当事人的不可替换性。在当事人签约后的再谈判中,若一方有了一个改进质量和(或)减少成本的好想法,他需要与对方进行合作与否的再谈判。如果再谈判不成功,对方不必重新寻找这样的好想法,相反,对方已经知道了这个好想法,因此可以在再谈判破裂后,仍享有这个好想法的某些收益,实际上对方只需要与其他潜在的当事人谈判这个好想法即可,这就体现了当事人的不可替换性。本文在GHM模型中引入当事人的不可替换性进行了研究,结论是,若某方当事人的不可替换性提高,则可增加其投资。GHM模型中隐含地假定了当事人是完全不可替换的,因而是前面扩展模型的特例。
其四,引入投资约束。GHM模型隐含地假定了事前投资可以是无限的,这明显不合理。现实中,投资不可能是无限的,最简单地,一个人每天可用的时间不可能超过24个小时。故在所有权的选择中,投资的最大可能值即投资约束是非常重要的一个制约条件。本文在GHM模型中引入投资约束进行了研究,结论是,企业不能任意采取可以增进效率的所有权形式。在投资约束下,两个单位(或企业)间的关系必将停留在不交易、交易但非合并、合并的单一业主制、股份制中的某一种形式,而不能采取无投资约束时更有效率的所有权形式。
综合上面几项扩展研究,可以预言企业所有权的普遍形态是互相之间签订长期合约的股份制企业,这与对现实世界的观察是相符的。另外,在股份制企业里小股东的股份并不能代表其不可替换性,因此在现实世界中,若小股东的不可替换性较其所持股份比率更低,其权利必将受到大股东的侵害。
GHM模型假设事后再谈判是有效率的,这当然不能令人满意,许多学者引入事后不可签约性对该模型做了实质性的扩展,本文对此做了综述。Hart等人在2008年后,通过一系列行为经济学因素,比较成功地引入了事后不可签约性。他们认为合约的主要作用之一是作为参照点,为双方的心理感受提供了一个衡量标准。当一方得到合约可能提供的最大支付时,他会感到被赋权,因而提供精细的绩效；否则就会感到未被赋权,因而会觉得委屈,觉得被克扣,因而会报复,即通过敷衍,提供粗糙的绩效,从而产生无谓的损失。这样,若合约规定得很死板,虽然没有敷衍,从而不会产生无谓的损失,但会失去许多交易机会；若合约规定得很灵活,虽然会得到许多交易机会,但会导致大量的敷衍,产生无谓的损失。因此在合约的刚性与灵活性之间就有权衡的必要。通过对前述合约作为参照点基本模型的研究,以及先后引入套牢、资产所有权、事前投资而作的扩展研究,Hart等人得出了与GHM相似的结论。
Tirole于2009年也提出了一个事后不可签约的模型,他独辟蹊径地使用了认知的方法。当事人因为认知的成本,会故意将一些因素留待未来签约,因此产生了相应的权衡。
Segal和Whinston在信息不对称和联盟状态下(本文未涉及后者)研究了事后不可签约情形。SW模型证明了在信息不对称情形中,事后有效率的再谈判一般不存在,即最优一般不存在。特别地,他们证明了,若当事人都是逆向退出类型时,有效率的再谈判一定不存在；另一方面,他们又证明了,当初始的产权分配等于预期的有效率的产权分配时,有效率的再谈判可以达到,即最优可以达到。另外,当有效率的再谈判不存在即最优不存在时,一方面可以在保持有效率的产权分配的基础上最小化预算,即最小化第三方对机制的投入；另一方面当第三方不存在时,可以在预算平衡的基础上,最大化事后的总收益,即寻找次优的解决方案。
比较前面这些对事后不可签约情形的研究途径,Hart等人的合约作为参照点模型虽然通过引入一系列行为经济学因素,成功地构造了事后不可签约性,但同时也带来了众多行为经济学因素的未知问题,可以说为了打开一个黑箱子,而造成了众多的黑箱子,理论本身的成本很高。Tirole的认知模型虽然让人耳目一新,眼前一亮,但认知只是人类理性局限的一个角度、一个侧面而己。SW模型似乎更可取一些,从人类理性的局限来说,它是一个更一般性的模型,毕竟有限理性的重要来源就是信息的不对称及联盟问题。
另外,本文梳理了合约理论的基础问题。其一是讨价还价理论。涉及事后再谈判的合约理论必然会面对两个问题,一是为什么当事双方总会达成合作以提高总收益,二是总收益如何在当事人之间分配。GHM模型认为只要合作的总收益大于不合作的总收益,即存在合作利得时,当事人就一定会达成合作。但该模型并没有解释其中的原因。GHM进一步认为就合作利得,双方会按50%：50%的比例进行分配,并注明此处的依据是纳什讨价还价解,但未作进一步解释。与此相似,几乎所有关于事后再谈判的论文对这两个问题都如此说明,甚至根本不作说明。本文认为,为了厘清合约理论的基本脉络,有必要对此给一清晰交待。实际上讨价还价博弈理论对这两个问题已给出了严谨的结论。在合作博弈范畴,Nash在1950年代证明了,在很简单的5个公理组成的体系下,只要存在合作利得,当事人就一定能达成合作,即存在唯一的合作解,该结论又被称为纳什讨价还价解的存在性定理,该解又被称为常规的纳什讨价还价解。Roth在1979年放松纳什公理体系,提出了一般条件下的纳什讨价还价解。由于合作博弈是建立在公理体系上,而不像非合作博弈建立在个人理性上,因此合作博弈的基础是不牢固的。为此纳什提出了纳什规划,即对应每个合作博弈,相应地设计非合作博弈以检验合作博弈的公理及合作博弈解。纳什规划也体现了合作博弈与非合作博弈的关系。Rubinstein在1982年设计了非合作的轮流出价的讨价还价博弈,证明了该博弈的解在无限期时趋近于纳什讨价还价解,这恰好体现了纳什规划的精神。Binmore于1986年在Rubinstein模型基础上讨论了所谓讨价还价力的来源,也即Roth所提出来的一般纳什讨价还价解的系数的决定因素,他说明了讨价还价力的两类来源,一是反应时间,二是风险偏好。
其二是机制设计理论。机制设计理论研究讨价还价的效率问题,因此与合约理论存在着紧密联系,SW模型大量使用机制设计理论来研究事后不可签约的情形,因此有必要对机制设计理论作一番梳理。机制设计理论已经证明,在一般情况下,同时满足有效率的分配、个人理性、激励相容、预算平衡的机制是不存在的。因此从这个意义上讲,在事后不可签约时,有效率的再谈判一般是不存在的,即最优达不到。可行的机制要在有效率的分配和预算平衡之间权衡。
GHM model studies contracts in a setting with noncontracting investments, ex-post renegotiation, and the assumption of effectiveness of ex-post renegotiation. It's elemental conclusion is that investments is shortage, and the first-best can not be achieved in this setting. GHM model is very important in the study of contracts and firm theory, which is widely acknowledged. However, the model has some imperfections:A. it ignores externalities; B. it uses regular Nash bargaining solution in cooperation game, which is a little simpler; C. the assumption that ex-post renegotiation is effective is impractical, which is its most serious defect, where is most worth extending. In addition, while as a base model, it is very concise, by introducing some other variables, will enrich it and enhance its explanatory power; it is closely linked to Coasian Theorem and the Commons Tragedy, which is rarely mentioned by its proposers and others. Nevertheless, I will not deny the landmark significance of it.
Based on the above understanding, in this dissertation, I try to derive more implications from GHM model. I find that the Coasian theorem and common tragedy conclusion can be derived form the model, that is, they can be as corollaries of it. By doing so, I provide two mathematic models for them. I extend the GHM model through introducing some variables, such as externality, completeness, irreplaceability and restriction of the investment, making the assumptions of it more realistic, improving it, enhancing its explanatory power. I use general Nash Bargaining Solution instead of the regular one to explore determinants of the shareholding structure of a firm. I show that the shareholding structure can not be modified arbitrarily, rather, it embodies the relative productivities of the shareholders. Applying the conclusion, I give interpretations for some economic phenomena. All these are the most important innovations in the dissertation. I also discuss and give criticisms to the literatures of ex-post non-contracting cases conducted by some economists, which may be an innovation in literatures review. Moreover, I present a concise and systematic text of two important theories, including bargaining game and mechanism design theory, which are ignored in almost all literatures. Particularly the dissertation concludes:
1. Derive more implications from the GHM model:corollaries of the model.
Over the past30years since the proposing of the GHM model, it has been accepted by more and more economists, becoming the main stream model in the study of contracts, and applying in many economic fields. I show that it can derive some classical conclusions, such as Coasian theorem and commons tragedy conclusion, after some exchanges of its assumptions.
a. Coasian theorem situation.
The GHM model will be transformed to Coasian theorem situation where ex-post effective renegotiation is permitted if ex-ante investments are ruled out. Coase argued that the key of property rights issue is externality. I show that the externality imposed to one party is from ether the other party's use of assets, e.g., Coasian theorem situation, or from the one's ex-ante investment, e.g., GHM model situation. Given total amount of assets, the former can be denoted by the assets owned by each party. Particularly, the externality can be reflected in the imposed party's revenue function if property rights are continuous because the revenue function is of one variable, i.e., property rights. Thus, the analyses to Coasian theorem situation make no difference to the situations in which some continuous goods are distributed among some parties who have different utility functions. Of course, one paradigm is needed that parties always cooperate to maximize the total revenue, which was demonstrated by the existence of Nash Bargaining Solution in game theory.
The two parties'marginal revenue will be equal in the final property rights allocation, that is, the party with bigger marginal revenue will be allocated to more property rights.
b. Commons tragedy situation.
GHM model will be transformed to Commons tragedy situation if ex-post renegotiation is ruled out, when the depletion of commons is destined. This situation is much more complicated than the one of Coasian theorem because of elements of the investments. The first-best implies that parties maximize the total revenue, which demand parties not only take into account each own revenue, but also the effect of its investment to another (the second externality mentioned before) which the rational party will ignore, so the first-best will not be achieved. When the externality caused by one party's investment is positive, his investment is always insufficient as to maximizing the total revenue, because he dose not take into account the externality caused by his investment to another, while negative, his investment is always excessive for the same reasons. The latter is the commons tragedy which means that the commons will be depleted by the excessive investments.
Intuitively in fact, parties can not obtain the trading surplus because of the absence of renegotiation, and can not achieve the first-best.
2. The determinants of shareholding structure of a firm.
Following GHM model, I explore determinants of shareholding structure of a firm. I show that the shareholding structure can not be modified arbitrarily, rather, it embodies the relative productivities of the shareholders. In a two-shareholder firm, the natures of two parties'revenue functions, i.e., their productivities, determine the bargaining power of each one, and then the distribution of the profit, and according to the company law, the distribution of profit determines the shareholding structure. If natures of two parties change relatively, the shareholding structure will change too. Applying the conclusion, I give interpretations for some economic phenomena, such as the change of relative amount of franchised outlets and chain stores, the enhancement of managers of state-owned enterprises in the economic reform in China, the increase of the GDP and the capital amount of China relative to the world.
3. Extend GHM model complementally:introducing some new assumptions.
a. Externality.
In the treatment of the second-order condition in the GHM model, Hart et al. explain that the cross derivatives can be eliminated by applying the envelope theorem. But I do not agree with them. I think they implicitly suppose that the partial derivatives are zero, which means that there is no externalities resulted from investments. Yet the externality is too important to be ignored. I introduce the externality, and show that the first-best can not be achieved too. When the externality is positive, the investment is insufficient, while negative, the investment is excessive.
b. Completeness of the contract.
Hart et al. have recognized that a contract among firms is not completely non-contractible, e.g., though firms can not contract on quality, but they can contract on quantity. But to get a concise model, they simply suppose that parties can contract nothing but the ownership. Actually some items of a contract are complete, and the others are incomplete. I introduce the completeness as parameter into the GHM model, and show that the increase of completeness will increase parties'investments, and then effectiveness. I also show that GHM implicitly suppose that a contract is completely incomplete, and it is a special case of my model here.
c. Irreplaceability.
In renegotiating, if one party owns a good idea how to improve quality or reduce cost, he must bargain with the. If the bargaining fails, another need not to acquire the good idea once more, actually he can realize some of the benefit of it through negotiating with other potential one, which implies the irreplaceability. I introduce the irreplaceability as parameter into the GHM model, and show that if one party's irreplaceability increases, his investment will increase as a result. I also show that GHM implicitly suppose that all parties are completely irreplaceable, so it is a special case of my model here.
d. Investment constraint.
GHM model implicitly suppose that the investment is infinite, which is unreasonable obviously. Actually, the investment is finite, e.g., one's available time to work is no more than24hours. So, the maximum of investment, i.e.,the investment constraint, is one of the most important constraints. I introduce the investment constraint as parameter into the GHM model, and show that a firm can not select ownership structure to increase effectiveness. Subject to the investment constraint, the ownership between two units (or firm) will keep one status among not-trading, trading but non-integration, individual ownership with integration, shareholding.
4. Extend GHM model substantially:literatures introducing ex-post non-contractible property.
a. Research conducted by Hart et al..
Since2008, Hart et al. have introduced ex-post non-contractible property through a series of behavioral economics elements, which may be successful. One of roles of contract is to be as a reference point which provides a measure for feelings of entitlement to parties. When a party gets the most payoff from the trade, he will be entitled, so provide consummate performance; otherwise, he will feel shortchanged and aggrieved, and then retaliate with shading, providing perfunctory performance, leading deadweight loss. If the contract is rigid, there does not exist shading certainly, and no deadweight loss, but parties will lose many trading opportunities. If the contract is flexible, they will get many trading opportunities, but there will exist serious shading, leading deadweight loss. So, it is need to trade-off between flexibility and rigidity. Through researching the basic model of contract as reference point, and the subsequent extending by introducing hold-up, assets ownership and ex-ante investment, Hart et al. reach a conclusion similar to the GHM model.
b. Research conducted by Tirole.
Tirole also proposed an ex-post non-contractibleness model recently. He uses cognitive approach instinctively. Recognizing the cognitive cost, parties will deliberately leave some part of the contract to be renegotiated ex-post, resulting in the corresponding trade-off.
c. Research conducted by Segal and Whinston.
Segal and Whinston study the ex-post non-contractible case under information asymmetry and bilateral trade (the latter is not included in the dissertation). SW model show that the efficient renegotiation is not permitted generally, that is, the first-best can not be achieved. Nevertheless, they show that the initial property rights allocation equal to the expected efficient allocation permits efficient bargaining. Otherwise, when the first-best can not be achieved, we may minimize the subsidy to the mechanism with efficient allocation held, or maximize ex-post total payoff with budget balance held, i.e., finding a second-best solution.
Thus, we can compare these approaches to the ex-post non-contractible case. Although the model of contract as reference point successfully constructs ex-post inefficiency through introducing a series of behavioral elements, it leads a lot of unawareness, in other words, the opening of a black box leads much more black ones. So its theoretical cost is very high. Tirole's cognitive model makes us refreshing, but it must be recognized that the cognition restriction is only one of dimensions of human rational restriction. SW model seems to be more desirable, because it is a general model as to human rational restriction. After all, The major resource of bounded rationality is information asymmetry and union.
5. Foundations of contract theory:bargaining game and mechanism design theory.
a. Review of bargaining game literatures.
Contract theory evolving ex-post renegotiation must faces two problems inevitably:i. Why two parties will cooperate to increase total payoff? ii. how will total payoff be distributed between parties. The GHM model argues that parties will cooperate whenever total payoff from cooperation surpass the one from non-cooperation, that is, the cooperation gain is available. But it does not tell us why. It go further to state that the two parties will split the cooperation gain50%:50%, telling us this is a Nash bargaining solution, but giving no more explanations. Almost all literatures concerning contract do similarly as to the two problems, or give no account even. I argue that it is need to give a concise but clear account on the theory about the two problems in order to understand contract theory in detail. Bargaining game theory gives some desirable theorems as to the two problems, so I give a review of the development of the theory.
In1950's, Nash demonstrated in cooperative game that under a system of five axioms, parties would be sure to cooperate provided cooperation gain exists, that is, there exists a unique cooperative solution, which is referred to as Nash bargaining solution theorem. In1970's, Roth relaxed Nash's assumptions, and proposed the general Nash bargaining solution. Compared with that, the former is referred to as regular Nash bargaining solution as well. Established on the axiom system and differing from non-cooperative game theory that is established on individual ration, the foundation of cooperative theory is not stable, so Nash suggested that it is need to design a non-cooperative game as to any cooperative game to test cooperative axioms and cooperative solution, which is called Nash program. This embodies the relation between cooperative and non-cooperative games.In1980's, Rubinstein designed a non-cooperative alternating offers'bargaining game model, stating that in infinite periods, the solution of this model approaches to the Nash bargaining solution as in the spirit of Nash program. Binmore explored the sources of bargaining power in the model of Rubinstein, i.e., the determinants of coefficients of the general Nash solution proposed by Roth. He listed two sources of bargaining power, reactive time and risk preference.
b. Review of mechanism design literatures.
SW model uses mechanism design theory as basic instrument to analyze ex-post inefficiency, so it is needed to sort out relevant literatures. Mechanism design theory has demonstrated that in general, no efficient, incentive-compatible, interim individually rational, and budget-balanced mechanism exists. Therefore, in the ex-post non-contractible situation, no efficient renegotiation exists in general, that is, the first-best can not be achieved. An available mechanism must trade-offs between efficient allocation and budget-balance.
引文
① 本节内容首发于《不完全合约下企业股权结构的确定》,中国经贸导刊,2012年11月。
① 见伊特韦尔和米尔盖特.新帕尔格雷夫经济学大辞典(第一卷),第205页。
② 见伊特韦尔和米尔盖特.新帕尔格雷夫经济学大辞典(第二卷),第114页。
③ 见伊特韦尔和米尔盖特.新帕尔格雷夫经济学大辞典(第三卷),第1101页。
① 见伊特韦尔和米尔盖特.新帕尔格雷夫经济学大辞典(第四卷),第730页。
[1]费方域.企业的产权分析[M].1998.
[2]费方域、李靖.企业理论-合同论视角的回溯[J].系统工程理论方法应用,2005,(3)：280-287.
[3]蒋士成、费方域.从事前效率问题到事后效率问题-不完全合同理论的几类经典模型比较[J]经济研究,2008,(8)：145-156.
[4]李维安、李宝权.跨国公司在华独资倾向成因分析——基于股权结构战略的视角[J].管理世界,2003,(1)
[5]聂辉华.新制度经济学中不完全契约理论的分歧与融合-以威廉姆森和哈特为代表的两种进路[J].中国人民大学学报,2005,(1)：81-87.
[6]聂辉华.不完全契约理论的转变[J].教学与研究,2011,(1)：71-78.
[7]聂辉华、杨其静.产权理论遭遇的挑战及其演变-基于2000年以来的最新文献[J].南开经济研究,2007,(4)：3-13.
[8]茹玉骢、张利风.合资企业股权结构变迁的不完全合约分析[J].浙江学刊,2009,(5).
[9]田国强.经济机制理论：信息效率与激励机制设计[J].经济学(季刊),2003,(1)：271-308.
[10]杨瑞龙.企业理论：现代观点[M].北京：中国人民大学出版社,2005.
[11]杨瑞龙、聂辉华.不完全契约理论-一个综述[J].经济研究,2006,(2)：104-115.
[12]伊特韦尔、米尔盖特.新帕尔格雷夫经济学大辞典(第一卷)[M].北京：经济科学出版社,1996.P.205.
[13]伊特韦尔、米尔盖特.新帕尔格雷夫经济学大辞典(第二卷).[M].北京：经济科学出版社,1996.P.114.
[14]伊特韦尔、米尔盖特.新帕尔格雷夫经济学大辞典(第三卷)[M].北京：经济科学出版社,1996.P.1101.
[15]伊特韦尔、米尔盖特.新帕尔格雷夫经济学大辞典(第四卷)[M].北京：经济科学出版社,1996.P.730.
[16]袁庆明.新制度经济学教程[M].北京：中国发展出版社,2011.
[17]张维迎.西方企业理论的演进与最新发展[J].经济研究,1994,(11)：70-81.
[18]张五常.经济解释[M].花千树出版有限公司(香港),2002.
[19]Aghion, P., Holden, R.,2011, "Incomplete Contracts and the Theory of the Firm: What Have We Learned Over the Past 25 Years?", Journal of Economic Perspectives, 25 (2):181-197.
[20]Alchian, A., Demsetz, H.,1972, "Production, information costs, and economic organization", The American Economic Review, vol.62:777-795.
[21]American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees (AFSCME), Does Crime Pay? An Examination of Prisons for Profit,1985, Washington, DC:AFSCME.
[22]Antras, P.2005a. "Property Rights and the International Organization of Production", American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol.95(2), pp.25-32, May.
[23]Antras, P.,2005b, "Incomplete Contracts and the Product Cycle", American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol.95 (4), pp.1054-1073, September.
[24]Antras P., Helpman, E.,2004, "Global Sourcing", Journal of Political Economy,112 (3):552-580.
[25]Arrow, K.,1979, "The property rights doctrine and demand revelation under incomplete information", in M. Boskin (ed.), Economics and Human Welfare, Academic Press, New York.
[26]Ayres, I.,2005, Optional Law:The Structure of Legal Entitlements, University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
[27]Bai, CE., Tao, ZG, Wu, CQ.,2004, "Revenue Sharing and Control Rights in Team Production:Theories and Evidence from Joint Ventures", RAND Journal of Economics, Vol.35, No.2, Summer, pp.277 305.
[28]Baker, G, Gibbons, R., Murphy, K.,2002, "Relational Contracts and the Theory of the Firm," Quarterly Journal of Economics 117:39-84.
[29]Barzel, Y,1989, Economic Analysis of Property Rights, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
[30]Binmore, K., Rubinstein, A., Wolinsky, A.,1986, "The Nash bargaining solution in economic modeling". Rand Journal of Economics, Summer,17 (2):176-188.
[31]Bolton, P., Dewatripont, M.,2005, Contract theory. Cambridge (Ma.) and London, England:MIT Press.
[32]Bradach, J.,1997, "Using the Plural Form in the Management of Restaurant Chains", Administrative Science Quarterly,42 (2):276-303.
[33]Burkart, M., Lee, S.,2008, "One Share-One Vote:the Theory", Review of Finance, 12:1-49.
[34]Che, YK.,2006, "Beyond the Coasian Irrelevance:Asymmetric Information," Unpublished notes, Columbia University.[110,114],2006-http://www.columbia.edu/-yc2271/files/publications/Asymmetric%20Information.pdf
[35]Cheung, SNS.,1969, "Transaction Costs, Risk Aversion, and the Choice of Contractual Arrangements", Journal of Law & Economics,12 (1):23-42.
[36]Clarke, E.,1971, "Multipart pricing of public goods", Public Choice,11:17-33.
[37]Coase, R.,1937, "The nature of the firm", Eeonomica, November:386-405.
[38]Coase, R.,1959, "The Federal Communications Commission", Journal of Law and Economics, Vol.2, (Oct.), pp.1-40.
[39]Coase, R.1960, "The Problem of Social Cost", Journal of Law and Economics,3 (1):1-44.
[40]Cramton, P., Gibbons, R., Klemperer, P.,1987, "Dissolving a partnership efficiently", Econometrica,55:615-632.
[41]Dant, R., Kaufinann, P.,2003, "Structural and Strategic Dynamics in Franchising" Journal of Retailing,79:63-75 (13)
[42]d'Aspremont, C., G e rard-Varet, L.,1979, "Incentives and incomplete information", Journal of Public Economics,11,25-45.
[43]Demsetz, H.,1967, "Toward a Theory of Property Rights", The American Economic Review, Vol.57, No.2.
[44]Friedman, D.,2000, Law's Order, Princeton Paperbacks, pp.41-42.
[45]Gershkov, A., Schweinzer, P.,2010, "When Queuing is Better than Push and Shove", International Journal of Game Theory, July, Volume 39, Issue 3, pp.409-430.
[46]Gibbons,R.,2005, "Four Formal (izable) Theories of the Firm," Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 2:200-245.
[47]Gordon, H.,1954, "The Economic Theory of a Common-Property Resource:The Fishery", Journal of Political Economy, Vol.62, No.2, pp.124-142.
[48]Grossman J., and Hart, O.,1986, "The costs and benefits of ownership:A theory of vertical and lateral integration", Journal of Political Economy,94, no.4, pp.691-719.
[49]Groves, T.,1973, "Incentives in teams", Econometrica,41,617-663.
[50]Hahnel, R., Sheeran, K.,2009, "Misinterpreting the Coase theorem", Journal of Economic, Issues 43 (1),215-238.
[51]Hardin, G.,1968, "The tragedy of the commons", Science,162, pp.1243-1248.
[52]Hardin, G.,1966, Biology:Its Principles and Implications,2nd ed., Freeman, San Francisco.
[53]Hart, S., Mas-Colell, A.,2000, "A Simple Adaptive Procedure Leading to Correlated Equilibrium", Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol.68(5), pp.1127-1150, September.
[54]Hart, O.,1995, Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure, Clarendon Press, Oxford.
[55]Hart, O.,2003, "Incomplete Contracts and Public Ownership:Remarks, and an Application to Public-Private Partnerships", The Economic Journal, Volume 113, Issue 486, p. C69-C76, March.
[56]Hart, O.,2009, "Hold-up, Asset Ownership, and Reference Points", The Quarterly Journal of Economics,124 (1):267-300.
[57]Hart, O.,2011, "Noncontractible Investments and Reference Points", NBER Working Paper, No.16929. Issued in April 2011.
[58]Hart, O., Holmstrom, B.,2010, "A Theory of Firm Scope", The Quarterly Journal of Economics,125 (2):483-513.
[59]Hart, O., Moore, J.,1990, "Property rights and the nature of the firm", Journal of Political Economy,98, no.6, pp.119-58.
[60]Hart, O., Moore, J.,1999, "Foundations of Incomplete Contracts", Review of Economic Studies, (66):115-38.
[61]Hart, O., Moore, J.,2004, "Agreeing Now to Agree Later:Contracts that Rule Out but do not Rule In," Tech. Rep.10397, NBER, Cambridge, MA.
[62]Hart, O., Moore, J.,2008, "Contracts as Reference Points", The Quarterly Journal of Economics,123(1):1-48.Hart, O.,2009, "Hold-up, Asset Ownership, and Reference Points". The Quarterly Journal of Economics,124 (1):267-300.
[63]Hart, O., Shleifer, A., Vishny, R.,1997, "The proper scope of government:Theory and an application to prisons", Quarterly Journal of Economics 112.
[64]Hendrikse, G., Jiang, T.,2005, "Plural Form in Franchising:An Incomplete Contracting Approach", ERIM Report Series Research in Management December: 18-29, doi:10.1007/978-3-7908-1758-4_2.
[65]Holmstrom, B., Milgrom, P.,1991, "Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses:Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design", Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 7:24-52.
[66]Holmstrom, B., Milgrom, P.,1994, "The Firm as an Incentive System", American Economic Review Vol.84, No.4 (Sep.), pp.972-991.
[67]Johansson, P., Roumasset, J.,2002, "Apples, Bees and Contracts:A Coase-Cheung Theorem for Positive Spillover Effects", World Economic Forum, Shanghai:Dec..
[68]Johnson, D.,1973, "Meade, Bees and Externalities", The Journal of Law and Economics,16 (1):35-52.
[69]Kennedy, D.,1981, "Cost-Benefit Analysis of Entitlement Problems:A Critique", Stanford Law Review,33 (3):387-445.
[70]Klein B., Crawford R., Alchian, A.,1978, "Vertical integration, appropriable rents, and the competitive contracting process", Journal of Law and Economics,21, pp. 297-326.
[71]Kreps, D.,1990, A Course in Microeconomic Theory, London:Harvester Wheatsheaf, Chapter 15.
[72]Kreps, D., Wilson, R.,1982, "Reputation and imperfect information", Journal of Economic Theory,27, pp.253-279.
[73]Laffont, J., Tirole, J.,1993, A Theory of Incentives in Regulation and Procurement, Cambridge:MIT Press.
[74]Lloyd, W.,1977, "On the checks to population", In G. Hardin and J. Baden [Eds.] Managing the Commons, San Francisco:Freeman.
[75]Logan, C.,1990, Private Prisons:Cons and Pros, New York:Oxford University Press.
[76]Marinucci, M.,2009, "Optimal Ownership in Joint Ventures with Contributions of Asymmetric Partners", Journal of Economics, June, Volume 97, Issue 2, pp 141-163.
[77]Mas-Colell, A., Whinston, M., Green, J.,1995, Microeconomic Theory, Oxford University Press, New York.
[78]Maskin, E., Tirole, J.,1999a, "Two Remarks on the Property-Rights Literature", Review of Economic Studies,66 (1):139-49.
[79]Maskin, E., Tirole, J.,1999b, "Unforeseen Contingencies and Incomplete Contracts", Review of Economic Studies,66 (1):83-114.
[80]Meccheri, N., Morroni, M.,2010, "Incentive-Based and Knowledge-Based Theories of the Firm:Some Recent Developments", Economia e Politica Industriale-Journal of Industrial and Business Economics, vol.37 (3):69-91.
[81]Miceli, T.,2011, "Markets, Contracts, and Firms-A Unified Model of Organizational Choice", University of Connecticut, Working Paper,2011-08, April. http://www. econ.uconn.edu/working/2011-08.pdf.
[82]Morroni, M.,2011, "New insights on the interaction between transaction costs and capabilities considerations in shaping organisational boundaries"/Discussion Paper n.113;presentato:marzo, http://www.morroni.it/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/New-insights-on-the-interaction.p df.
[83]Myerson, R., Satterthwaite, M.,1983, "Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading", Journal of Economic Theory,28,265-281.
[84]Nash, J.,1950a, "Equilibrium Points in N-Person Games", Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, Vol.36, pp.48-49.
[85]Nash, J.,1950b, "The Bargaining Problem", Econometrica, Volume 18, Issue 2, 155-162.
[86]Nash, J.,1951, "Non-cooperative games", Annals of Mathematics,2 (54):286-295.
[87]Nash, J.,1953, "Two-Person Cooperative Games", Econometrica, Vol.21, pp. 128-140.
[88]Ostrom, E.,1990, Governing the Commons:The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action, New York:Cambridge University Press.
[89]Ostrom, E.,1992, "The rudiments of a theory of the origins, survival, and performance of common-property institutions", In D. W. Bromley [Ed.] Making the Commons Work:Theory, Practice and Policy, San Francisco:ICS Press.
[90]Pigou, A.,1932, The Economics of Welfare,4th edition. London:Macmillan and Co..
[91]Ricketts, M.,2002, The Economics of Business Enterprise:An Introduction to Economic Organisation and the Theory of the Firm, New York:Harvester Wheatsheaf.
[92]Roth, A.,1979, "Axiomatic Models of Bargaining", Berlin:Springer-Verlag.
[93]Rubinstein, A.,1982, "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model", Econometrica, Vol.50, No.1,97-110.
[94]Samuelson, P.,1947, Foundations of Economic Analysis; enlarged edition, Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA (1983).
[95]Savas, E.,1982, "Privatizing the Public Sector", How to Shrink Government, Chatham, NJ:Chatham House Publishing.
[96]Savas, E., Privatization:The Key to Better Government, Chatham, NJ:Chatham House Publishing,1987.
[97]Schmidt, K.., "The Costs and Benefits of Privatization:An Incomplete Contracts Approach", Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Ⅻ (1996),1-24.
[98]Schmitz, P.,2002, "Simple Contracts, Renegotiation under Asymmetric Information, and the Hold-up Problem", European Economic Review,46:169-188.
[99]Schweizer, U.,2006, "Universal Possibility and Impossibility Results", Games and Economic Behavior,57:73-85.
[100]Segal, I., Whinston, M.,2011, "A Simple Status Quo that Ensures Participation (with application to efficient bargaining)", Theoretical Economics,6,109-125
[101]Segal, I., Whinston, M.,2012a, "Property Rights", in R. Gibbons and J. Roberts, eds., Handbook of Organizational Economics, Princeton University Press.
[102]Segal, I., Whinston, M.,2012b, "Property Rights and the Efficiency of Bargaining", working paper, http://www.tse-fr.eu/images/doc/tnit/property_rights_rargaining_aug_2012_v2.pdf
[103]Shaked, A., Sutton, J.,1984, " Involuntary Unemployment as a P erfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model", Econometrica, Vol.52, No.6 (Nov.), pp.1351-1364.
[104]Shapiro, C., Willig, R.,1990, "Economic Rationales for the Scope of Privatization", in Ezra N. Suleiman and John Waterbury, eds., The Political Economy of Private Sector Reform and Privatization, Boulder, CO:Westview Press.
[105]Shapley, L.,1953, "A Value for n-Person Games", H. Kuhn, A. Tucker (Eds.), Contributions to the Theory of Games II, Princeton University Press, Princeton, pp. 307-317.
[106]Shleifer, A.,1998, "State versus private ownership", Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol.12 (4) (Fall), pp.133-150.
[107]Shichor, D.,1995, "Punishment for Profit", Thousand Oaks:Sage Publications.
[108]Stigler, G.,1987, The Theory of Price,4th edition, Macmillan, New York.
[109]Tirole, J.,1994, "The Internal Organization of Government", Oxford Economic Papers, XLVI,1-29.
[110]Tirole J.,2007, "Bounded Rationality and Incomplete Contracts", Working Paper IDEI, Universit e de Toulouse 1, May,37p.
[111]Tirole, J.2009, "Cognition and Incomplete Contracts." American Economic Review,99 (1):265-294.
[112]Varian, H.,1987, Intermediate Microeconomics:A Modern Approach, New York, W.W. Norton.
[113]Vickrey, W.,1961, "Counterspeculation, auctions and competitive sealed tenders" Journal of Finance,16,8-37.
[114]Wang, SS., Zhu, T.,2005, "Control Allocation, Revenue Sharing, and Joint Ownership", International Economic Review, August,46 (3):895-915.
[115]Williamson O.,1975, Markets and Hierarchies:Analysis and Antitrust Implications, Free Press, New York.
[116]Williamson O.,1985, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism, Free Press, New York, repr. [1987].
[117]Wilson, J.,1989, Bureaucracy:What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It, New York:Basic Books.
[118]Yenmez, M.,2007, "Dissolving Multi-Partnerships Efficiently", Journal of Mathematical Economics, Volume 48, Issue 2, March 2012, P.77-82.
① 见伊特韦尔和米尔盖特.新帕尔格雷夫经济学大辞典(第一卷),第205页。
② 见伊特韦尔和米尔盖特.新帕尔格雷夫经济学大辞典(第二卷),第114页。
③ 见伊特韦尔和米尔盖特.新帕尔格雷夫经济学大辞典(第三卷),第1101页。
① 见伊特韦尔和米尔盖特.新帕尔格雷夫经济学大辞典(第四卷),第730页。
[1]费方域.企业的产权分析[M].1998.
[2]费方域、李靖.企业理论-合同论视角的回溯[J].系统工程理论方法应用,2005,(3)：280-287.
[3]蒋士成、费方域.从事前效率问题到事后效率问题-不完全合同理论的几类经典模型比较[J]经济研究,2008,(8)：145-156.
[4]李维安、李宝权.跨国公司在华独资倾向成因分析——基于股权结构战略的视角[J].管理世界,2003,(1)
[5]聂辉华.新制度经济学中不完全契约理论的分歧与融合-以威廉姆森和哈特为代表的两种进路[J].中国人民大学学报,2005,(1)：81-87.
[6]聂辉华.不完全契约理论的转变[J].教学与研究,2011,(1)：71-78.
[7]聂辉华、杨其静.产权理论遭遇的挑战及其演变-基于2000年以来的最新文献[J].南开经济研究,2007,(4)：3-13.
[8]茹玉骢、张利风.合资企业股权结构变迁的不完全合约分析[J].浙江学刊,2009,(5).
[9]田国强.经济机制理论：信息效率与激励机制设计[J].经济学(季刊),2003,(1)：271-308.
[10]杨瑞龙.企业理论：现代观点[M].北京：中国人民大学出版社,2005.
[11]杨瑞龙、聂辉华.不完全契约理论-一个综述[J].经济研究,2006,(2)：104-115.
[12]伊特韦尔、米尔盖特.新帕尔格雷夫经济学大辞典(第一卷)[M].北京：经济科学出版社,1996.P.205.
[13]伊特韦尔、米尔盖特.新帕尔格雷夫经济学大辞典(第二卷).[M].北京：经济科学出版社,1996.P.114.
[14]伊特韦尔、米尔盖特.新帕尔格雷夫经济学大辞典(第三卷)[M].北京：经济科学出版社,1996.P.1101.
[15]伊特韦尔、米尔盖特.新帕尔格雷夫经济学大辞典(第四卷)[M].北京：经济科学出版社,1996.P.730.
[16]袁庆明.新制度经济学教程[M].北京：中国发展出版社,2011.
[17]张维迎.西方企业理论的演进与最新发展[J].经济研究,1994,(11)：70-81.
[18]张五常.经济解释[M].花千树出版有限公司(香港),2002.
[19]Aghion, P., Holden, R.,2011, "Incomplete Contracts and the Theory of the Firm: What Have We Learned Over the Past 25 Years?", Journal of Economic Perspectives, 25 (2):181-197.
[20]Alchian, A., Demsetz, H.,1972, "Production, information costs, and economic organization", The American Economic Review, vol.62:777-795.
[21]American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees (AFSCME), Does Crime Pay? An Examination of Prisons for Profit,1985, Washington, DC:AFSCME.
[22]Antras, P.2005a. "Property Rights and the International Organization of Production", American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol.95(2), pp.25-32, May.
[23]Antras, P.,2005b, "Incomplete Contracts and the Product Cycle", American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol.95 (4), pp.1054-1073, September.
[24]Antras P., Helpman, E.,2004, "Global Sourcing", Journal of Political Economy,112 (3):552-580.
[25]Arrow, K.,1979, "The property rights doctrine and demand revelation under incomplete information", in M. Boskin (ed.), Economics and Human Welfare, Academic Press, New York.
[26]Ayres, I.,2005, Optional Law:The Structure of Legal Entitlements, University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
[27]Bai, CE., Tao, ZG, Wu, CQ.,2004, "Revenue Sharing and Control Rights in Team Production:Theories and Evidence from Joint Ventures", RAND Journal of Economics, Vol.35, No.2, Summer, pp.277 305.
[28]Baker, G, Gibbons, R., Murphy, K.,2002, "Relational Contracts and the Theory of the Firm," Quarterly Journal of Economics 117:39-84.
[29]Barzel, Y,1989, Economic Analysis of Property Rights, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
[30]Binmore, K., Rubinstein, A., Wolinsky, A.,1986, "The Nash bargaining solution in economic modeling". Rand Journal of Economics, Summer,17 (2):176-188.
[31]Bolton, P., Dewatripont, M.,2005, Contract theory. Cambridge (Ma.) and London, England:MIT Press.
[32]Bradach, J.,1997, "Using the Plural Form in the Management of Restaurant Chains", Administrative Science Quarterly,42 (2):276-303.
[33]Burkart, M., Lee, S.,2008, "One Share-One Vote:the Theory", Review of Finance, 12:1-49.
[34]Che, YK.,2006, "Beyond the Coasian Irrelevance:Asymmetric Information," Unpublished notes, Columbia University.[110,114],2006-http://www.columbia.edu/-yc2271/files/publications/Asymmetric%20Information.pdf
[35]Cheung, SNS.,1969, "Transaction Costs, Risk Aversion, and the Choice of Contractual Arrangements", Journal of Law & Economics,12 (1):23-42.
[36]Clarke, E.,1971, "Multipart pricing of public goods", Public Choice,11:17-33.
[37]Coase, R.,1937, "The nature of the firm", Eeonomica, November:386-405.
[38]Coase, R.,1959, "The Federal Communications Commission", Journal of Law and Economics, Vol.2, (Oct.), pp.1-40.
[39]Coase, R.1960, "The Problem of Social Cost", Journal of Law and Economics,3 (1):1-44.
[40]Cramton, P., Gibbons, R., Klemperer, P.,1987, "Dissolving a partnership efficiently", Econometrica,55:615-632.
[41]Dant, R., Kaufinann, P.,2003, "Structural and Strategic Dynamics in Franchising" Journal of Retailing,79:63-75 (13)
[42]d'Aspremont, C., G e rard-Varet, L.,1979, "Incentives and incomplete information", Journal of Public Economics,11,25-45.
[43]Demsetz, H.,1967, "Toward a Theory of Property Rights", The American Economic Review, Vol.57, No.2.
[44]Friedman, D.,2000, Law's Order, Princeton Paperbacks, pp.41-42.
[45]Gershkov, A., Schweinzer, P.,2010, "When Queuing is Better than Push and Shove", International Journal of Game Theory, July, Volume 39, Issue 3, pp.409-430.
[46]Gibbons,R.,2005, "Four Formal (izable) Theories of the Firm," Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 2:200-245.
[47]Gordon, H.,1954, "The Economic Theory of a Common-Property Resource:The Fishery", Journal of Political Economy, Vol.62, No.2, pp.124-142.
[48]Grossman J., and Hart, O.,1986, "The costs and benefits of ownership:A theory of vertical and lateral integration", Journal of Political Economy,94, no.4, pp.691-719.
[49]Groves, T.,1973, "Incentives in teams", Econometrica,41,617-663.
[50]Hahnel, R., Sheeran, K.,2009, "Misinterpreting the Coase theorem", Journal of Economic, Issues 43 (1),215-238.
[51]Hardin, G.,1968, "The tragedy of the commons", Science,162, pp.1243-1248.
[52]Hardin, G.,1966, Biology:Its Principles and Implications,2nd ed., Freeman, San Francisco.
[53]Hart, S., Mas-Colell, A.,2000, "A Simple Adaptive Procedure Leading to Correlated Equilibrium", Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol.68(5), pp.1127-1150, September.
[54]Hart, O.,1995, Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure, Clarendon Press, Oxford.
[55]Hart, O.,2003, "Incomplete Contracts and Public Ownership:Remarks, and an Application to Public-Private Partnerships", The Economic Journal, Volume 113, Issue 486, p. C69-C76, March.
[56]Hart, O.,2009, "Hold-up, Asset Ownership, and Reference Points", The Quarterly Journal of Economics,124 (1):267-300.
[57]Hart, O.,2011, "Noncontractible Investments and Reference Points", NBER Working Paper, No.16929. Issued in April 2011.
[58]Hart, O., Holmstrom, B.,2010, "A Theory of Firm Scope", The Quarterly Journal of Economics,125 (2):483-513.
[59]Hart, O., Moore, J.,1990, "Property rights and the nature of the firm", Journal of Political Economy,98, no.6, pp.119-58.
[60]Hart, O., Moore, J.,1999, "Foundations of Incomplete Contracts", Review of Economic Studies, (66):115-38.
[61]Hart, O., Moore, J.,2004, "Agreeing Now to Agree Later:Contracts that Rule Out but do not Rule In," Tech. Rep.10397, NBER, Cambridge, MA.
[62]Hart, O., Moore, J.,2008, "Contracts as Reference Points", The Quarterly Journal of Economics,123(1):1-48.Hart, O.,2009, "Hold-up, Asset Ownership, and Reference Points". The Quarterly Journal of Economics,124 (1):267-300.
[63]Hart, O., Shleifer, A., Vishny, R.,1997, "The proper scope of government:Theory and an application to prisons", Quarterly Journal of Economics 112.
[64]Hendrikse, G., Jiang, T.,2005, "Plural Form in Franchising:An Incomplete Contracting Approach", ERIM Report Series Research in Management December: 18-29, doi:10.1007/978-3-7908-1758-4_2.
[65]Holmstrom, B., Milgrom, P.,1991, "Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses:Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design", Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 7:24-52.
[66]Holmstrom, B., Milgrom, P.,1994, "The Firm as an Incentive System", American Economic Review Vol.84, No.4 (Sep.), pp.972-991.
[67]Johansson, P., Roumasset, J.,2002, "Apples, Bees and Contracts:A Coase-Cheung Theorem for Positive Spillover Effects", World Economic Forum, Shanghai:Dec..
[68]Johnson, D.,1973, "Meade, Bees and Externalities", The Journal of Law and Economics,16 (1):35-52.
[69]Kennedy, D.,1981, "Cost-Benefit Analysis of Entitlement Problems:A Critique", Stanford Law Review,33 (3):387-445.
[70]Klein B., Crawford R., Alchian, A.,1978, "Vertical integration, appropriable rents, and the competitive contracting process", Journal of Law and Economics,21, pp. 297-326.
[71]Kreps, D.,1990, A Course in Microeconomic Theory, London:Harvester Wheatsheaf, Chapter 15.
[72]Kreps, D., Wilson, R.,1982, "Reputation and imperfect information", Journal of Economic Theory,27, pp.253-279.
[73]Laffont, J., Tirole, J.,1993, A Theory of Incentives in Regulation and Procurement, Cambridge:MIT Press.
[74]Lloyd, W.,1977, "On the checks to population", In G. Hardin and J. Baden [Eds.] Managing the Commons, San Francisco:Freeman.
[75]Logan, C.,1990, Private Prisons:Cons and Pros, New York:Oxford University Press.
[76]Marinucci, M.,2009, "Optimal Ownership in Joint Ventures with Contributions of Asymmetric Partners", Journal of Economics, June, Volume 97, Issue 2, pp 141-163.
[77]Mas-Colell, A., Whinston, M., Green, J.,1995, Microeconomic Theory, Oxford University Press, New York.
[78]Maskin, E., Tirole, J.,1999a, "Two Remarks on the Property-Rights Literature", Review of Economic Studies,66 (1):139-49.
[79]Maskin, E., Tirole, J.,1999b, "Unforeseen Contingencies and Incomplete Contracts", Review of Economic Studies,66 (1):83-114.
[80]Meccheri, N., Morroni, M.,2010, "Incentive-Based and Knowledge-Based Theories of the Firm:Some Recent Developments", Economia e Politica Industriale-Journal of Industrial and Business Economics, vol.37 (3):69-91.
[81]Miceli, T.,2011, "Markets, Contracts, and Firms-A Unified Model of Organizational Choice", University of Connecticut, Working Paper,2011-08, April. http://www. econ.uconn.edu/working/2011-08.pdf.
[82]Morroni, M.,2011, "New insights on the interaction between transaction costs and capabilities considerations in shaping organisational boundaries"/Discussion Paper n.113;presentato:marzo, http://www.morroni.it/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/New-insights-on-the-interaction.p df.
[83]Myerson, R., Satterthwaite, M.,1983, "Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading", Journal of Economic Theory,28,265-281.
[84]Nash, J.,1950a, "Equilibrium Points in N-Person Games", Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, Vol.36, pp.48-49.
[85]Nash, J.,1950b, "The Bargaining Problem", Econometrica, Volume 18, Issue 2, 155-162.
[86]Nash, J.,1951, "Non-cooperative games", Annals of Mathematics,2 (54):286-295.
[87]Nash, J.,1953, "Two-Person Cooperative Games", Econometrica, Vol.21, pp. 128-140.
[88]Ostrom, E.,1990, Governing the Commons:The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action, New York:Cambridge University Press.
[89]Ostrom, E.,1992, "The rudiments of a theory of the origins, survival, and performance of common-property institutions", In D. W. Bromley [Ed.] Making the Commons Work:Theory, Practice and Policy, San Francisco:ICS Press.
[90]Pigou, A.,1932, The Economics of Welfare,4th edition. London:Macmillan and Co..
[91]Ricketts, M.,2002, The Economics of Business Enterprise:An Introduction to Economic Organisation and the Theory of the Firm, New York:Harvester Wheatsheaf.
[92]Roth, A.,1979, "Axiomatic Models of Bargaining", Berlin:Springer-Verlag.
[93]Rubinstein, A.,1982, "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model", Econometrica, Vol.50, No.1,97-110.
[94]Samuelson, P.,1947, Foundations of Economic Analysis; enlarged edition, Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA (1983).
[95]Savas, E.,1982, "Privatizing the Public Sector", How to Shrink Government, Chatham, NJ:Chatham House Publishing.
[96]Savas, E., Privatization:The Key to Better Government, Chatham, NJ:Chatham House Publishing,1987.
[97]Schmidt, K.., "The Costs and Benefits of Privatization:An Incomplete Contracts Approach", Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Ⅻ (1996),1-24.
[98]Schmitz, P.,2002, "Simple Contracts, Renegotiation under Asymmetric Information, and the Hold-up Problem", European Economic Review,46:169-188.
[99]Schweizer, U.,2006, "Universal Possibility and Impossibility Results", Games and Economic Behavior,57:73-85.
[100]Segal, I., Whinston, M.,2011, "A Simple Status Quo that Ensures Participation (with application to efficient bargaining)", Theoretical Economics,6,109-125
[101]Segal, I., Whinston, M.,2012a, "Property Rights", in R. Gibbons and J. Roberts, eds., Handbook of Organizational Economics, Princeton University Press.
[102]Segal, I., Whinston, M.,2012b, "Property Rights and the Efficiency of Bargaining", working paper, http://www.tse-fr.eu/images/doc/tnit/property_rights_rargaining_aug_2012_v2.pdf
[103]Shaked, A., Sutton, J.,1984, " Involuntary Unemployment as a P erfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model", Econometrica, Vol.52, No.6 (Nov.), pp.1351-1364.
[104]Shapiro, C., Willig, R.,1990, "Economic Rationales for the Scope of Privatization", in Ezra N. Suleiman and John Waterbury, eds., The Political Economy of Private Sector Reform and Privatization, Boulder, CO:Westview Press.
[105]Shapley, L.,1953, "A Value for n-Person Games", H. Kuhn, A. Tucker (Eds.), Contributions to the Theory of Games II, Princeton University Press, Princeton, pp. 307-317.
[106]Shleifer, A.,1998, "State versus private ownership", Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol.12 (4) (Fall), pp.133-150.
[107]Shichor, D.,1995, "Punishment for Profit", Thousand Oaks:Sage Publications.
[108]Stigler, G.,1987, The Theory of Price,4th edition, Macmillan, New York.
[109]Tirole, J.,1994, "The Internal Organization of Government", Oxford Economic Papers, XLVI,1-29.
[110]Tirole J.,2007, "Bounded Rationality and Incomplete Contracts", Working Paper IDEI, Universit e de Toulouse 1, May,37p.
[111]Tirole, J.2009, "Cognition and Incomplete Contracts." American Economic Review,99 (1):265-294.
[112]Varian, H.,1987, Intermediate Microeconomics:A Modern Approach, New York, W.W. Norton.
[113]Vickrey, W.,1961, "Counterspeculation, auctions and competitive sealed tenders" Journal of Finance,16,8-37.
[114]Wang, SS., Zhu, T.,2005, "Control Allocation, Revenue Sharing, and Joint Ownership", International Economic Review, August,46 (3):895-915.
[115]Williamson O.,1975, Markets and Hierarchies:Analysis and Antitrust Implications, Free Press, New York.
[116]Williamson O.,1985, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism, Free Press, New York, repr. [1987].
[117]Wilson, J.,1989, Bureaucracy:What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It, New York:Basic Books.
[118]Yenmez, M.,2007, "Dissolving Multi-Partnerships Efficiently", Journal of Mathematical Economics, Volume 48, Issue 2, March 2012, P.77-82.