人力资本密集型企业的治理问题研究
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摘要
在知识经济背景下,人力资本与HCIF(人力资本密集型企业)的重要性日益凸现。本文首先从人力资本与产权的关系入手,阐述了人力资本不具备产权特性的原因,同时简单回顾和评述了国内学者的一些认识误区。在此基础上,文章进一步详细比较HCIF相对PCIF(物质资本密集型企业)的特性差异,并指出其在企业组织结构、自主权、薪酬安排、契约关系以及对品牌和声誉的依赖程度方面存在显著不同。
正因为有着不同于传统企业的特性,所以在企业本质问题上HCIF难以沿用传统理论的解释。通过借鉴全新的关键性资源理论,本文对HCIF本质等相关问题做了一个不同于传统的界定。HCIF的本质可以理解为关键性人力资本以及那些拥有关键性人力资本进入权的利益相关者的集合体,关键性的人力资本创造企业价值并参与价值分配。由于人力资本不具备产权特性,因此企业的经济边界相对法律边界更适合解释HCIF的边界问题。
HCIF本质的变化决定了企业治理目标的改变。HCIF不为物质资本服务,而是为人力资本服务。但人力资本的非产权特性使得其无法被控制,只能被协调。本文通过三个模型说明:人力资本可以被协调,而且只能被协调。治理目标的转变自然促使企业治理手段的变革。在产权控制失效的情况下,HCIF必须通过利润分享机制协调人力资本与企业合作,实现共赢局面。
基于HCIF特性及本质的差异,则可以容易理解为何HCIF中存在如此高比例的合伙制企业。文章从相关理论归纳出企业经营业务、资本规模、经营风险、企业规模、员工异质性五个方面是影响HCIF选择公司制还是合伙制作为治理模式的主要因素,并做了相关的实证检验。同时本文深入研究了合伙制作为一种有效的HCIF治理模式的原因,以及合伙制的内部治理特性。
本文最后给出结论以及研究展望。
In the background of the knowledge economy,the importance of human captial and human-capital-intensive firms stand out.This paper expounds the reasons why human capital doesn't have property right from the relationship between human capital and property right firstly,and commets on some mistake made by domestic scholars.Based on it,this paper compares human-capital-intensive firms with physical-capital-intensive firms in some detailed differences of its characters,that is to say,organizational structure,autonomy,arrangement of compesation,contract relationship and the dependence of brandname and reputation.
With the different characters,so human-capital-intensive firms are difficult to use traditional theories to explain the nature of the firm.Using novelly critical recources theory for referrence,this paper identifies some issues different from tradition,such as the nature of the firm.The nature of the firm can be understood as a set concluded by critical human capital and the stakeholders which have the access of the critical human capital,and the critical human capital creates the value of the firm and participates in distribution.Because the human capital doesn't have property right,the economic boundary is more suitable to explain the boundary of the firm than law boundary.
The change of the nature of the firm decides the change of the target of the firm governance.Human-capital-intensive firms do service for human capital,not for physical capital.Human capital can't be controlled,but be coordinated because of its non-property-right character.And the change of the target of the governance urges the the change of the instrument of the governance.In the case of the disuse of property right,human-capital-intensive firms must use the mechanism of profit-sharing to coordinate human capital to cooperate with the firms,so to realize the all-win state.
Based on the differrence of the characters and the nature of the human-capital-intensive firms,we can easily understand why there is so high proportional partnership firm in the human-capital-intensive firms.This paper use correlative theories to conclude that business,size of the capital,business risk,size of the firm and the heterogeneity of the employees are the main factors which influence human-capital-intensive firms to choose corporate or partnership as their pattern of governance.Meanwhile,this paper researchs the reasons why partnership is an effective pattern of the governance and researchs the internal governance characters of partnership.
Finally this paper ends with a simple conclusion and research perpective.
正因为有着不同于传统企业的特性,所以在企业本质问题上HCIF难以沿用传统理论的解释。通过借鉴全新的关键性资源理论,本文对HCIF本质等相关问题做了一个不同于传统的界定。HCIF的本质可以理解为关键性人力资本以及那些拥有关键性人力资本进入权的利益相关者的集合体,关键性的人力资本创造企业价值并参与价值分配。由于人力资本不具备产权特性,因此企业的经济边界相对法律边界更适合解释HCIF的边界问题。
HCIF本质的变化决定了企业治理目标的改变。HCIF不为物质资本服务,而是为人力资本服务。但人力资本的非产权特性使得其无法被控制,只能被协调。本文通过三个模型说明:人力资本可以被协调,而且只能被协调。治理目标的转变自然促使企业治理手段的变革。在产权控制失效的情况下,HCIF必须通过利润分享机制协调人力资本与企业合作,实现共赢局面。
基于HCIF特性及本质的差异,则可以容易理解为何HCIF中存在如此高比例的合伙制企业。文章从相关理论归纳出企业经营业务、资本规模、经营风险、企业规模、员工异质性五个方面是影响HCIF选择公司制还是合伙制作为治理模式的主要因素,并做了相关的实证检验。同时本文深入研究了合伙制作为一种有效的HCIF治理模式的原因,以及合伙制的内部治理特性。
本文最后给出结论以及研究展望。
In the background of the knowledge economy,the importance of human captial and human-capital-intensive firms stand out.This paper expounds the reasons why human capital doesn't have property right from the relationship between human capital and property right firstly,and commets on some mistake made by domestic scholars.Based on it,this paper compares human-capital-intensive firms with physical-capital-intensive firms in some detailed differences of its characters,that is to say,organizational structure,autonomy,arrangement of compesation,contract relationship and the dependence of brandname and reputation.
With the different characters,so human-capital-intensive firms are difficult to use traditional theories to explain the nature of the firm.Using novelly critical recources theory for referrence,this paper identifies some issues different from tradition,such as the nature of the firm.The nature of the firm can be understood as a set concluded by critical human capital and the stakeholders which have the access of the critical human capital,and the critical human capital creates the value of the firm and participates in distribution.Because the human capital doesn't have property right,the economic boundary is more suitable to explain the boundary of the firm than law boundary.
The change of the nature of the firm decides the change of the target of the firm governance.Human-capital-intensive firms do service for human capital,not for physical capital.Human capital can't be controlled,but be coordinated because of its non-property-right character.And the change of the target of the governance urges the the change of the instrument of the governance.In the case of the disuse of property right,human-capital-intensive firms must use the mechanism of profit-sharing to coordinate human capital to cooperate with the firms,so to realize the all-win state.
Based on the differrence of the characters and the nature of the human-capital-intensive firms,we can easily understand why there is so high proportional partnership firm in the human-capital-intensive firms.This paper use correlative theories to conclude that business,size of the capital,business risk,size of the firm and the heterogeneity of the employees are the main factors which influence human-capital-intensive firms to choose corporate or partnership as their pattern of governance.Meanwhile,this paper researchs the reasons why partnership is an effective pattern of the governance and researchs the internal governance characters of partnership.
Finally this paper ends with a simple conclusion and research perpective.
引文
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