我国证券公司报酬机制的研究
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摘要
证券公司是在市场为导向的环境中生存，随着WTO的加入，我国金融行业管制的放松，证券公司营运环境逐步市场化和国际化，中国的证券公司也面临着前所未有的挑战。为了迎接更为严峻的挑战，就必须努力提高自身的经营绩效。因此，从提高企业绩效的角度、保证公司持续经营的角度，对员工的报酬激励问题成为证券公司关注的重要问题之一。
员工报酬制度是现代企业管理制度的重要组成部分，证券公司必须结合自身的经营特点建立以企业效益和成本控制为主导的、具有内在激励和约束机制的现代企业报酬制度。证券公司的报酬制度是否规范、科学，直接关系着企业员工的工作积极性和公司竞争力的提高，对企业的生存和发展有着深刻的影响。因此，对证券公司员工报酬的研究就极为重要。
本文主要对证券公司员工报酬机制进行了研究。力求通过对证券公司员工报酬机制的深入分析，揭示如何通过建立符合其经营特点的、合理有效的报酬机制，以实现对员工的最优激励。最终提出对我国证券公司建立合理、有效报酬机制的建议。
尽管从证券市场形成开始，证券公司就一直在探求对员工的激励机制。但是，证券公司对报酬机制的探讨尚处于相当初级的阶段，对有意实施真正意义上的报酬激励安排的证券公司来说，还存在着许多问题。故本文在参阅国外激励资料的基础上，结合证券公司员工报酬机制建设的实践，对证券公司的经营特点进行了分析；探讨了适合证券公司经营特点的、合理、有效的员工报酬机制，包括非对称信息下员工薪酬的选择、福利政策、其它报酬形式等；同时以某证券公司的报酬机制建设作为案例进行研究。最后，针对我国证券公司在实施报酬激励时存在的问题，提出了证券公司报酬激励创新的建议。
With the entry into the world trade organization,the stock companies in China introduced by market will confront the great competition,which don't exist before. In the situation of the control in financial industry abates and the trade environments will be more internationalization,the stock companies have to improve their manage performance in order to succeed in future competition. The stock companies focus on how to spirit up interior employees to increase the management performance and sustain the management.
The reward institute for employees plays a great role in modern companies. The stock companies must set up a reward institution,which is accommodated with market and have cost-benefit characteristic. It is important for the stock companies to have a normative,scientific,reasonable reward institution,which contribute to the positive improvement of employees' and the increase of the enterprises' competition. So,the research of the reward institution for employees is of great importance.
This paper mainly does researches on the reward institution for employees. This paper wants to discover the approaches to set up a reasonable reward institution accommodated with market,in order to spirit up employees. Finally,this paper will give some advice for how to set up a reasonable,well-performed reward institution.
Although from the beginning of the stock market,the stock companies have explored the reasonable,well-performed reward institution,the researches on it are in primary stage. Also there are many problems existed in the stock companies,which bring the reward institution into effect. This paper accomplished some results in the basis of the analysis on inspirit and the practices of the stock companies. The paper analyzes the management characteristic of the stock companies;explore the reasonable and well-performed reward institution accommodated with market,including the researches on the options of pay for employee in unsymmetrical environments;the strategy of welfare;other rewards. Based on the practice of a stock company,this paper gives a example. At the last this paper put forward the innovations of the stock companies' reward institution,due to the practical problems in the course of the implement of the reward institution.
员工报酬制度是现代企业管理制度的重要组成部分，证券公司必须结合自身的经营特点建立以企业效益和成本控制为主导的、具有内在激励和约束机制的现代企业报酬制度。证券公司的报酬制度是否规范、科学，直接关系着企业员工的工作积极性和公司竞争力的提高，对企业的生存和发展有着深刻的影响。因此，对证券公司员工报酬的研究就极为重要。
本文主要对证券公司员工报酬机制进行了研究。力求通过对证券公司员工报酬机制的深入分析，揭示如何通过建立符合其经营特点的、合理有效的报酬机制，以实现对员工的最优激励。最终提出对我国证券公司建立合理、有效报酬机制的建议。
尽管从证券市场形成开始，证券公司就一直在探求对员工的激励机制。但是，证券公司对报酬机制的探讨尚处于相当初级的阶段，对有意实施真正意义上的报酬激励安排的证券公司来说，还存在着许多问题。故本文在参阅国外激励资料的基础上，结合证券公司员工报酬机制建设的实践，对证券公司的经营特点进行了分析；探讨了适合证券公司经营特点的、合理、有效的员工报酬机制，包括非对称信息下员工薪酬的选择、福利政策、其它报酬形式等；同时以某证券公司的报酬机制建设作为案例进行研究。最后，针对我国证券公司在实施报酬激励时存在的问题，提出了证券公司报酬激励创新的建议。
With the entry into the world trade organization,the stock companies in China introduced by market will confront the great competition,which don't exist before. In the situation of the control in financial industry abates and the trade environments will be more internationalization,the stock companies have to improve their manage performance in order to succeed in future competition. The stock companies focus on how to spirit up interior employees to increase the management performance and sustain the management.
The reward institute for employees plays a great role in modern companies. The stock companies must set up a reward institution,which is accommodated with market and have cost-benefit characteristic. It is important for the stock companies to have a normative,scientific,reasonable reward institution,which contribute to the positive improvement of employees' and the increase of the enterprises' competition. So,the research of the reward institution for employees is of great importance.
This paper mainly does researches on the reward institution for employees. This paper wants to discover the approaches to set up a reasonable reward institution accommodated with market,in order to spirit up employees. Finally,this paper will give some advice for how to set up a reasonable,well-performed reward institution.
Although from the beginning of the stock market,the stock companies have explored the reasonable,well-performed reward institution,the researches on it are in primary stage. Also there are many problems existed in the stock companies,which bring the reward institution into effect. This paper accomplished some results in the basis of the analysis on inspirit and the practices of the stock companies. The paper analyzes the management characteristic of the stock companies;explore the reasonable and well-performed reward institution accommodated with market,including the researches on the options of pay for employee in unsymmetrical environments;the strategy of welfare;other rewards. Based on the practice of a stock company,this paper gives a example. At the last this paper put forward the innovations of the stock companies' reward institution,due to the practical problems in the course of the implement of the reward institution.
引文
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[39] 张维、胡继连．论代理契约中决策方案的设计与选择．山东农业大学学报 (社会科学版)．2001 (6) 25-29
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[2] 迈克尔·比尔等．管理人力资本．1999年5月 华厦出版社施家珍．
[3] 罗布·戈菲．人员管理．2000年6月 中国人民大学出版社
[4] 加里·德斯勒．人力资源管理．1999年6月 中国人民大学出版社
[5] 谢筱栋、许庆瑞．激励理论新探．管理科学研究．1998年(4)10-14
[6] 周素芬．对中国证券业加入WTO面临问题的思考．2001(1)18-21
[7] 微观经济学：现代观点．1994上海 上海人民出版社
[8] 在不确定性下决策、模型和选择．1996北京 对外贸易出版社
[9] 黄亚钧、姜纬．微观经济学教程．1995年 上海 复旦大学出版社
[10] 郑绍濂、骆品亮．分成制与相对绩效评价机制及其效率研究．管理科学学报 1998(1)22-25
[11] 梁梁、张绳良．关于建立新型激励机制与综合应用激励手段的研究．运筹与管理，1994(6)18-24
[12] 朱亚、王云昌．论人力资源管理中员工的有效激励．河海大学学报(社会科学版)，1999(12)16-20
[13] 张维迎．博奕论与信息经济学．1996上海 上海三联书店
[14] 周惠中．微观经济学．1997年 上海 上海人民出版社
[15] 徐颂陶、徐理明．中国现代人事管理．1998中国人事出版社
[16] 黄津淳．现代企业组织与人力资源管理．1999人民日报出版社
[17] 庄强、王功明．以人为本—激励下属和员工．1998企业管理出版社
[18] 哈罗德·孙茨．管理学第九版．2000经济科学出版社
[19] 龚英辉、陈静．企业领导学．1999中国物价出版社
[20] 沈思．证券市场与投资．杭州：1992浙江大学出版社，
[21] 周弘．福利的解析．1996上海 上海远东出版社
[22] 赵海宽．中国证券市场发展现状及发展构想．1998北京 北京大学出版社
[23] 陈冬红、王敏．社会保障学．1996西南财经大学出版
[24] 陈共．海外证券市场．1997北京 中国人民大学出版社
[25] 王晨宁．从90年代日本证券公司的经营危机看我国证券业的发展．经济论坛 1998(7)15-18
[26] 乔为国、陈旭东．X-效率与企业内部的个体激励．浙江大学学报 (人文社会科学版) 1999(4)23-26
[27] 张伟兵．对我国企业福利制度改革的思考．华中师范大学学报 (人文社会科学版)．1998(2)34-36
[28] 谢晋宁、李新建．发达国家企业人力资源管理中的薪酬管理创新．技术经济与管理研究 1999 (2) 22-24
[29] 骆品亮．企业R&D的激励机制——理论与模型．复旦大学博士学位论文，1997 (5) 33-36
[30] 唐建英．谈如何提高奖金效用．经济管理．1989 (7) 19-22
[31] 苏同华．当今美国管理新潮流．管理现代化．1995 (3) 16-18
[32] 胡传清．劳动力的流动与激励之内在联系．管理现代化．1994 (2) 20-24
[33] 阮应国．关于企业经营者物质激励的几个问题．运筹与管理．1999 (3) 18-23
[34] 中国企业家调查系统．当前我国企业经营者对激励与约束问题看法的调查．管理世界 1997 (4) 16-19
[35] 胡汝银．国有企业的激励机制与劳动供给行为．经济研究 1992 (2) 25-28
[36] 高远洋、陈良猷、袁志陕．股份合作制下的委托—代理分析．北京航空航天大学学报，1999 (10) 33-38
[37] 朱建军．经营业绩考核方法谈．财会月刊．1997 (3) 10-13
[38] 张春良、何治中．略谈加入WTO后中国证券业的应对策略．广西政法管理干部学院学报．2001 (6) 15-19
[39] 张维、胡继连．论代理契约中决策方案的设计与选择．山东农业大学学报 (社会科学版)．2001 (6) 25-29
[40] 张春林．存在道德风险的委托代理关系．经济研究，1995 (8) 12-19
[41] 黄慧群．国有企业代理阶层的“激励空缺”问题初探．经济研究 1995 (8) 22-26
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