金融企业董事会特征与公司绩效的关系研究
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摘要
近年来，国际大型金融巨头正在战略性的逐渐进入国内金融市场，国内金融企业在与国外金融巨头竞争过程中已经逐步意识到，一个结构合理、客观独立和富有效率的公司董事会是不仅是获得和维持广大股东信任和投资的基础，而且也是企业完善内部管理、提升其自身经营绩效的关键所在。世界银行与IMF等有关机构组织对大量金融企业案例进行系统的分析后指出:有效、合理的董事会治理结构对该金融企业的良好发展是非常重要的。董事会承担着着解决委托代理问题、制约管理层产生不当行为、确保企业股东等利益相关者的权益不受损害以及采取各种方式强化对管理层的监督与控制等多种责任（现代公司董事会制度得以产生的现实基础），为了在日趋复杂的竞争环境中保持竞争优势，企业必须不断创新并完善其相关治理机制，以满足新的市场需求，无论是发展中国家还是发达国家，都把完善公司治理看作是提升企业绩效，增强其自身核心竞争力的必要手段。基于上述原因，WalterJ.salmon等著名的管理学家甚至得出“伟大的董事会是伟大的企业得以出现的前提”的结论。本文对该问题的研究具体如下：
在本文的开始（引言部分），笔者首先分析了本文的研究背景和研究意义；其次，给出了本文的基本思路与研究方法；再次，介绍了本文的研究内容和基本框架；在第一部分的最后笔者提出了本文几点可能的创新,具体如下：笔者以2008-2010年在沪深两市上市的金融类企业为研究对象，有效填补了国内外对于金融类上市企业董事会治理系统研究的空白，且通过与其他行业内企业董事会特征数据的横向比较，得到了金融企业董事会特征的差异性与研究的必要性；对金融企业的董事会特征均值与其他行业（包括钢铁行业、汽车业、有色金属行业、石化业和物流业）董事会相关特征均值进行了对比分析，指出与其他行业相比，我国金融企业较为明显的表现出了董事会规模偏大、董事会成员报酬过高、董事长变更程度较低以及董事年龄偏大等特征；在实证研究中，笔者在综合评价我国金融企业绩效的基础上，系统分析了董事会相关特征与不同的企业绩效指标之间的关系，摒弃了以往的以ROE或托宾Q的值等单一变量作为绩效变量进行实证分析的通用做法，从不同方面分析董事会特征和企业盈利能力、竞争能力以及抗风险能力等方面的关系，从而细化研究结论。
本文的文献综述主要包括四个方面的内容，首先是关于公司治理方面的国内外文献综述，对目前已有的研究成果进行梳理和总结；其次是国内外关于公司绩效方面内容的相关研究论述，在吸收、借鉴学者们现有研究成果的基础上得出可以全面衡量金融企业绩效的指标体系。再次是国内外关于董事会特征和公司绩效关系的文献综述，对当前已有研究成果进行分析和归纳，以期为后续的实证分析奠定基础；最后是总结关于金融企业董事会特征和公司绩效关系的已有研究成果，通过对这些现有成果的仔细梳理和分析，以期能够发现金融行业有别于其他行业的特殊性问题，并提出针对性的解决方案和建议。
在系统的梳理总结现有文献的基础上，本文对金融企业董事会特征与公司绩效的关系进行了理论分析，主要包括四个方面的内容，首先，对本研究中公司绩效、董事会特征等相关概念加以界定，并在上一章文献综述研究的基础上构建了公司绩效评价指标体系和董事会特征指标体系；其次，梳理和总结了董事会特征和公司绩效之间关系的理论基础，包括现代管家理论、现代组织理论、代理成本理论、内部人控制理论和资源依赖理论等，进而指出董事会治理的必要性和不可或缺性；在本章的最后，笔者详细分析了董事会特征影响企业绩效的机理与具体表现，为本文的后续相关实证研究和政策建议奠定了坚实的理论基础。
我国金融企业董事会相关特征的描述性统计分析部分包括四个方面的主要内容，首先，根据前文对国内外研究成果的梳理和总结，并考虑到数据的可得性等问题，对后续实证研究中需要用到的变量进行了选择、界定和归类；其次，利用SPSS17.0软件对这些变量进行了信度和效度检验；再次，确定了本文的研究对象和数据来源（笔者利用2008-2010年在深圳证券交易所和上海证券交易所上市的40家金融企业为样本来进行后续的实证分析）；最后，对董事会规模、两职合一、董事会成员薪酬、董事会成员学历和独立董事比例等董事会特征变量进行了描述性统计，并做出了相关分析和推断。
在前文研究的基础上，笔者利用主成分分析法对我国金融企业绩效进行了相关分析和评价，主要包括四个方面的内容，首先，为了确保本文后续实证分析的客观性和有效性，笔者给出了我国金融绩效评价体系构建的原则（全面性原则、代表性原则和数据可操作性与一致性原则）；其次，在上述原则的指导下，对我国金融企业绩效评价变量进行了选择和分析；再次，简要介绍了主成分分析方法的基本原理和相关约束条件；最后，利用主成分分析方法对我国金融企业绩效进行了实证分析，通过该方法提炼出3个主成分，分别命名为盈利能力因子、竞争能力因子和抗风险能力因子，并将其作为替代金融企业绩效的被解释变量，为本文后续研究的进一步分析提供了变量支持。
本文的核心章节（实证分析内容）主包括以下内容：首先，在遵循公司董事会治理问题研究的一般分析范式，结合金融类企业的行业特征，并简要分析金融企业董事会治理特征与其企业绩效之间的关系的基础上，通过前文对国内外学者相关研究成果总结和梳理、对金融企业董事会特征描述性统计分析以及对我国金融企业绩效变量评价指标体系的整合（把金融企业绩效分为三个维度，分别是盈利能力因子、竞争能力因子和抗风险能力因子），笔者给出了本文的相关研究假设；其次，介绍了本章的研究设计情况，包括变量说明、样本选择和数据来源等。再次，在第四章确定了我国金融企业董事会特征的描述变量和在上一章已经计算出的反应我国金融企业绩效的被解释变量的基础上，以企业盈利能力得分、抗风险能力得分和竞争能力得分为因变量，并以董事会相关特征为自变量，构建了我国金融企业董事会特征和公司绩效关系研究的数学模型并得到了相关分析结果；最后，对分析结果进行实证检验，并对最终结果进行总结和分析，并得到了我国金融企业董事会特征和公司绩效之间关系的相关结论。
在本文的最后，笔者给出了想干研究结论与建议，首先，笔者给出了本文的研究结论，一是建立了反应我国金融企业董事会特征的相关指标体系，二是对金融类企业上市公司的绩效进行了综合评价与整合，三是系统分析了金融类企业董事会特征和其绩效之间的关系。其次，在系统的归纳和总结相关结论的基础上，本文提出了适当提高金融企业独立董事比例、确定合理的董事会规模、设置并充分发挥各专业委员会的作用、提高董事会成员的激励水平（包括薪酬激励和股权激励）、总经理和董事长的两职适度分离设置、优化董事会会议次数和频率、提高董事会成员的素质等若干政策建议，为金融类企业董事会建设提供了思路和借鉴。
In recent years, large-scale international financial giants have been gradually entering thedomestic financial markets. In the course of competition with foreign financial giants, domesticfinancial enterprises realized a rational, objective, independent and efficient board of directors ofthe company is not only to obtain and maintain the trust and investment of our shareholders, butalso is the key to enhance their business performance and the internal management. The IMF,World Bank and other organizations did a systematic analysis of a large number of financialbusiness case and realized the effective board of directors governance structure is very importantto the sound development of financial enterprises. Board of directors undertakes to solve theprincipal-agent problem, constrained management misconduct to ensure that corporateshareholders and other stakeholders interest is not compromised and to take a variety of ways tostrengthen the supervision and control of the management. In order to maintain a competitiveadvantage in the increasingly complex competitive environment, companies must constantlyinnovate and improve its governance mechanisms to meet new market demands, both developingand developed countries regarded perfect corporate governance as is the necessary means toenhance business performance and its core competitiveness. Based on the above reasons, WalterJ. salmon(well-known management expert)even realized a great board of directors is a thepremise key to be a great company. This article consists of seven main, as follows:
The first part is an introduction, first of all, the research background and significance;Second, the basic ideas and research methods; again, describes the content and the basicframework of this study; Finally, the author Pointed out the possible innovation of the first part:the author take the financial enterprises listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen in 2008-2010 as theresearch object, effectively fill the blank for the board of directors of listed companies of the financial of governance research at home and abroad, and get the need to study by thecharacteristic data of the corporate board of directors and other industry comparedbeendifferences of the financial characteristics of corporate boards. The author believe that China'sfinancial enterprises are more obvious showed a large board size, board member compensation istoo high, the chairman of the board change the low level and the directors of older features by acomparative analysis on the characteristics of the mean of the Board and other industry financialenterprises (including the relevant characteristics of the board of directors of the steel industry, theautomotive industry, non-ferrous metal industry, petrochemical industry and logistics industry)that compared with other industries; In empirical research, the author analyzes the relationshipbetween the relevant characteristics of the board of directors with different corporate performanceindicators on the basis of the comprehensive evaluation of the performance of China's financialenterprises, and get rid of a single variable to ROE in the past or the value of Tobin's Qasperformance variables in the empirical analysis of common practice analysis from differentaspects of the relationship between board features and profitability, competitiveness andrisk-resisting ability, in order to refine the research findings.
The literature review of this paper include the four aspects: The first is a literature review oncorporate governance at home and abroad to collate and summarize the currently existing researchresults; The second is the discuss to corporate performance content at home and abroad, and thenabsorb and draw on existing research results of scholars to draw a comprehensive system ofindicators to measure the performance of financial enterprises. Once again, it is the domestic andinternational literature review on the relationship between board characteristics and corporateperformance on the current existing research results, and then analyzed and summarized in orderto lay the foundation for subsequent empirical analysis;
The author get an analysis result about the relationship between the characteristics andperformance of the board of directors of financial enterprises by the systematic review of thesummary of existing literature including four aspects: first of all corporate performance and boardcharacteristic and the related concepts of this study be defined, and build on corporate performance evaluation index system and index system of the board characteristics on the basis ofthe previous chapter literature review; secondly, to collate and summarize the theoretical basis ofthe relationship between board characteristics and corporate performance, including modernhousekeeper theory, modern organization theory, agency cost theory, the internal control theoryand resource dependency theory, and then pointed out the necessity and indispensability of thegovernance of the Board; at the end of this chapter, the author did a detailed analysis about theaffecting mechanism and performance to the performance of the board characteristics, and laid asolid theoretical foundation to the relevant empirical research and policy recommendations.
The descriptive statistical analysis section about China's financial characteristics of corporateboards includes four main elements: First, according to the previously research at home andabroad, it makes a selection, definition and classification by taking into account the availability ofdata and other issues variables used in subsequent empirical research; Second, makes a reliabilityand validity test to those variables with the use of SPSS17.0 software; Again, the object of thispaper and data sources are defined (the writer use the 40 financial companies(2008-2010) listedon the Shenzhen Stock Exchange and Shanghai Stock Exchange for subsequent empiricalanalysis); Finally, it is a descriptive statistics on the board size,two jobs - one, the remuneration ofboard members, members of the academic board of directors and independent directors of theproportion of the board characteristics variables, and made a correlation analysis and inference.
On the basis of the text of the former study, the author did an analysis and evaluation onChina's financial business performance with the use of principal component analysis, includingfour aspects:The first, in order to ensure the objectivity and validity of the empirical analysis ofthis article, the author gives our financial performance evaluation System Construction principle(the principle of comprehensiveness, the principle of representativity and data operability andconsistency principle); Second, under the guidance of these principles, the selection and analysisare made to the enterprises of China's financial performance evaluation variable; Again, it is abrief introduction and related constraints to the basic principles of principal component analysis;Finally, it is the empirical analysis of China's financial business performance with the use of principal component analysis, three principal components extracted by this method, named for theprofitability factor, factor of competitiveness and risk-resisting ability factor, as an alternativeexplanatory variables to the financial performance,and it is the variable support.for furtheranalysis of this article.
The core chapters of this article (Empirical Analysis of content) include the following: firstof all, it follow the general analysis of the governance research paradigm of the Board ofDirectors, combined with the industry characteristics of financial enterprises, and it makes a briefanalysis of the relationship between the board governance characteristics of its businessperformance of financial enterprises on the basis of previously scholars research summary, andcombing the descriptive statistical analysis on characteristics of the financial corporate boards andintegration on the index evaluation system of China's financial business performance variables(financial and business performance is divided into three dimensions: the profitablecapacity factor,the competitiveness factor and the resist risk factors), the author gives the assumptions of thisarticle; second, it is the introduce the research design of this chapter, including the description ofvariables, sample selection and data sources. Again,after determining the features of the Board ofChina's financial enterprises descriptive variables in the fourth chapter and the response of China'sfinancial business performance has been calculated in the previous chapter the basis of theexplanatory variables, it takes the profitability score, the competitiveness core and the anti-riskability score as the dependent variable and the relevant characteristics of the board of directors asindependent variables to construct the mathematical model of the board characteristics andcorporate performance of China's financial enterprises and obtain the research and related analysisresults; Finally, it is an empirical test results of the analysis, and the final results were summarizedand analyzed, and the relevant conclusions of the relationship between board characteristics andcorporate performance of China's financial enterprises.
The seventh part is the study conclusions and policy recommendations, First of all, theauthor gives the conclusions of this paper, first, to establish the index system of the responsecharacteristics of China's financial corporate boards, the second is the performance of listed companies in financial enterprises which were comprehensive evaluation and integration,and thenit is the systems analysis of the relationship between the financial characteristics of corporateboards and their performance. Secondly, on the basis of the systimacully summarization andconclusions, in this paper,the author gives a number of policy recommendations,including anappropriate increase in the proportion of independent directors of the financial enterprises, todetermine the reasonable size of the board of directors, set and give full play to the role of theProfessional Committee, and to improve the level of incentives (including pay incentives andequity incentives) of the board members, the general manager and chairman ofappropriateseparation settings, to optimize the number and frequency of Board meetings, to improve thequality of board members, and ideas and learn from the Directorate of financial enterprises. At theend of this article, the author proposes the limitations of this study and the future direction offurther research.
在本文的开始（引言部分），笔者首先分析了本文的研究背景和研究意义；其次，给出了本文的基本思路与研究方法；再次，介绍了本文的研究内容和基本框架；在第一部分的最后笔者提出了本文几点可能的创新,具体如下：笔者以2008-2010年在沪深两市上市的金融类企业为研究对象，有效填补了国内外对于金融类上市企业董事会治理系统研究的空白，且通过与其他行业内企业董事会特征数据的横向比较，得到了金融企业董事会特征的差异性与研究的必要性；对金融企业的董事会特征均值与其他行业（包括钢铁行业、汽车业、有色金属行业、石化业和物流业）董事会相关特征均值进行了对比分析，指出与其他行业相比，我国金融企业较为明显的表现出了董事会规模偏大、董事会成员报酬过高、董事长变更程度较低以及董事年龄偏大等特征；在实证研究中，笔者在综合评价我国金融企业绩效的基础上，系统分析了董事会相关特征与不同的企业绩效指标之间的关系，摒弃了以往的以ROE或托宾Q的值等单一变量作为绩效变量进行实证分析的通用做法，从不同方面分析董事会特征和企业盈利能力、竞争能力以及抗风险能力等方面的关系，从而细化研究结论。
本文的文献综述主要包括四个方面的内容，首先是关于公司治理方面的国内外文献综述，对目前已有的研究成果进行梳理和总结；其次是国内外关于公司绩效方面内容的相关研究论述，在吸收、借鉴学者们现有研究成果的基础上得出可以全面衡量金融企业绩效的指标体系。再次是国内外关于董事会特征和公司绩效关系的文献综述，对当前已有研究成果进行分析和归纳，以期为后续的实证分析奠定基础；最后是总结关于金融企业董事会特征和公司绩效关系的已有研究成果，通过对这些现有成果的仔细梳理和分析，以期能够发现金融行业有别于其他行业的特殊性问题，并提出针对性的解决方案和建议。
在系统的梳理总结现有文献的基础上，本文对金融企业董事会特征与公司绩效的关系进行了理论分析，主要包括四个方面的内容，首先，对本研究中公司绩效、董事会特征等相关概念加以界定，并在上一章文献综述研究的基础上构建了公司绩效评价指标体系和董事会特征指标体系；其次，梳理和总结了董事会特征和公司绩效之间关系的理论基础，包括现代管家理论、现代组织理论、代理成本理论、内部人控制理论和资源依赖理论等，进而指出董事会治理的必要性和不可或缺性；在本章的最后，笔者详细分析了董事会特征影响企业绩效的机理与具体表现，为本文的后续相关实证研究和政策建议奠定了坚实的理论基础。
我国金融企业董事会相关特征的描述性统计分析部分包括四个方面的主要内容，首先，根据前文对国内外研究成果的梳理和总结，并考虑到数据的可得性等问题，对后续实证研究中需要用到的变量进行了选择、界定和归类；其次，利用SPSS17.0软件对这些变量进行了信度和效度检验；再次，确定了本文的研究对象和数据来源（笔者利用2008-2010年在深圳证券交易所和上海证券交易所上市的40家金融企业为样本来进行后续的实证分析）；最后，对董事会规模、两职合一、董事会成员薪酬、董事会成员学历和独立董事比例等董事会特征变量进行了描述性统计，并做出了相关分析和推断。
在前文研究的基础上，笔者利用主成分分析法对我国金融企业绩效进行了相关分析和评价，主要包括四个方面的内容，首先，为了确保本文后续实证分析的客观性和有效性，笔者给出了我国金融绩效评价体系构建的原则（全面性原则、代表性原则和数据可操作性与一致性原则）；其次，在上述原则的指导下，对我国金融企业绩效评价变量进行了选择和分析；再次，简要介绍了主成分分析方法的基本原理和相关约束条件；最后，利用主成分分析方法对我国金融企业绩效进行了实证分析，通过该方法提炼出3个主成分，分别命名为盈利能力因子、竞争能力因子和抗风险能力因子，并将其作为替代金融企业绩效的被解释变量，为本文后续研究的进一步分析提供了变量支持。
本文的核心章节（实证分析内容）主包括以下内容：首先，在遵循公司董事会治理问题研究的一般分析范式，结合金融类企业的行业特征，并简要分析金融企业董事会治理特征与其企业绩效之间的关系的基础上，通过前文对国内外学者相关研究成果总结和梳理、对金融企业董事会特征描述性统计分析以及对我国金融企业绩效变量评价指标体系的整合（把金融企业绩效分为三个维度，分别是盈利能力因子、竞争能力因子和抗风险能力因子），笔者给出了本文的相关研究假设；其次，介绍了本章的研究设计情况，包括变量说明、样本选择和数据来源等。再次，在第四章确定了我国金融企业董事会特征的描述变量和在上一章已经计算出的反应我国金融企业绩效的被解释变量的基础上，以企业盈利能力得分、抗风险能力得分和竞争能力得分为因变量，并以董事会相关特征为自变量，构建了我国金融企业董事会特征和公司绩效关系研究的数学模型并得到了相关分析结果；最后，对分析结果进行实证检验，并对最终结果进行总结和分析，并得到了我国金融企业董事会特征和公司绩效之间关系的相关结论。
在本文的最后，笔者给出了想干研究结论与建议，首先，笔者给出了本文的研究结论，一是建立了反应我国金融企业董事会特征的相关指标体系，二是对金融类企业上市公司的绩效进行了综合评价与整合，三是系统分析了金融类企业董事会特征和其绩效之间的关系。其次，在系统的归纳和总结相关结论的基础上，本文提出了适当提高金融企业独立董事比例、确定合理的董事会规模、设置并充分发挥各专业委员会的作用、提高董事会成员的激励水平（包括薪酬激励和股权激励）、总经理和董事长的两职适度分离设置、优化董事会会议次数和频率、提高董事会成员的素质等若干政策建议，为金融类企业董事会建设提供了思路和借鉴。
In recent years, large-scale international financial giants have been gradually entering thedomestic financial markets. In the course of competition with foreign financial giants, domesticfinancial enterprises realized a rational, objective, independent and efficient board of directors ofthe company is not only to obtain and maintain the trust and investment of our shareholders, butalso is the key to enhance their business performance and the internal management. The IMF,World Bank and other organizations did a systematic analysis of a large number of financialbusiness case and realized the effective board of directors governance structure is very importantto the sound development of financial enterprises. Board of directors undertakes to solve theprincipal-agent problem, constrained management misconduct to ensure that corporateshareholders and other stakeholders interest is not compromised and to take a variety of ways tostrengthen the supervision and control of the management. In order to maintain a competitiveadvantage in the increasingly complex competitive environment, companies must constantlyinnovate and improve its governance mechanisms to meet new market demands, both developingand developed countries regarded perfect corporate governance as is the necessary means toenhance business performance and its core competitiveness. Based on the above reasons, WalterJ. salmon(well-known management expert)even realized a great board of directors is a thepremise key to be a great company. This article consists of seven main, as follows:
The first part is an introduction, first of all, the research background and significance;Second, the basic ideas and research methods; again, describes the content and the basicframework of this study; Finally, the author Pointed out the possible innovation of the first part:the author take the financial enterprises listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen in 2008-2010 as theresearch object, effectively fill the blank for the board of directors of listed companies of the financial of governance research at home and abroad, and get the need to study by thecharacteristic data of the corporate board of directors and other industry comparedbeendifferences of the financial characteristics of corporate boards. The author believe that China'sfinancial enterprises are more obvious showed a large board size, board member compensation istoo high, the chairman of the board change the low level and the directors of older features by acomparative analysis on the characteristics of the mean of the Board and other industry financialenterprises (including the relevant characteristics of the board of directors of the steel industry, theautomotive industry, non-ferrous metal industry, petrochemical industry and logistics industry)that compared with other industries; In empirical research, the author analyzes the relationshipbetween the relevant characteristics of the board of directors with different corporate performanceindicators on the basis of the comprehensive evaluation of the performance of China's financialenterprises, and get rid of a single variable to ROE in the past or the value of Tobin's Qasperformance variables in the empirical analysis of common practice analysis from differentaspects of the relationship between board features and profitability, competitiveness andrisk-resisting ability, in order to refine the research findings.
The literature review of this paper include the four aspects: The first is a literature review oncorporate governance at home and abroad to collate and summarize the currently existing researchresults; The second is the discuss to corporate performance content at home and abroad, and thenabsorb and draw on existing research results of scholars to draw a comprehensive system ofindicators to measure the performance of financial enterprises. Once again, it is the domestic andinternational literature review on the relationship between board characteristics and corporateperformance on the current existing research results, and then analyzed and summarized in orderto lay the foundation for subsequent empirical analysis;
The author get an analysis result about the relationship between the characteristics andperformance of the board of directors of financial enterprises by the systematic review of thesummary of existing literature including four aspects: first of all corporate performance and boardcharacteristic and the related concepts of this study be defined, and build on corporate performance evaluation index system and index system of the board characteristics on the basis ofthe previous chapter literature review; secondly, to collate and summarize the theoretical basis ofthe relationship between board characteristics and corporate performance, including modernhousekeeper theory, modern organization theory, agency cost theory, the internal control theoryand resource dependency theory, and then pointed out the necessity and indispensability of thegovernance of the Board; at the end of this chapter, the author did a detailed analysis about theaffecting mechanism and performance to the performance of the board characteristics, and laid asolid theoretical foundation to the relevant empirical research and policy recommendations.
The descriptive statistical analysis section about China's financial characteristics of corporateboards includes four main elements: First, according to the previously research at home andabroad, it makes a selection, definition and classification by taking into account the availability ofdata and other issues variables used in subsequent empirical research; Second, makes a reliabilityand validity test to those variables with the use of SPSS17.0 software; Again, the object of thispaper and data sources are defined (the writer use the 40 financial companies(2008-2010) listedon the Shenzhen Stock Exchange and Shanghai Stock Exchange for subsequent empiricalanalysis); Finally, it is a descriptive statistics on the board size,two jobs - one, the remuneration ofboard members, members of the academic board of directors and independent directors of theproportion of the board characteristics variables, and made a correlation analysis and inference.
On the basis of the text of the former study, the author did an analysis and evaluation onChina's financial business performance with the use of principal component analysis, includingfour aspects:The first, in order to ensure the objectivity and validity of the empirical analysis ofthis article, the author gives our financial performance evaluation System Construction principle(the principle of comprehensiveness, the principle of representativity and data operability andconsistency principle); Second, under the guidance of these principles, the selection and analysisare made to the enterprises of China's financial performance evaluation variable; Again, it is abrief introduction and related constraints to the basic principles of principal component analysis;Finally, it is the empirical analysis of China's financial business performance with the use of principal component analysis, three principal components extracted by this method, named for theprofitability factor, factor of competitiveness and risk-resisting ability factor, as an alternativeexplanatory variables to the financial performance,and it is the variable support.for furtheranalysis of this article.
The core chapters of this article (Empirical Analysis of content) include the following: firstof all, it follow the general analysis of the governance research paradigm of the Board ofDirectors, combined with the industry characteristics of financial enterprises, and it makes a briefanalysis of the relationship between the board governance characteristics of its businessperformance of financial enterprises on the basis of previously scholars research summary, andcombing the descriptive statistical analysis on characteristics of the financial corporate boards andintegration on the index evaluation system of China's financial business performance variables(financial and business performance is divided into three dimensions: the profitablecapacity factor,the competitiveness factor and the resist risk factors), the author gives the assumptions of thisarticle; second, it is the introduce the research design of this chapter, including the description ofvariables, sample selection and data sources. Again,after determining the features of the Board ofChina's financial enterprises descriptive variables in the fourth chapter and the response of China'sfinancial business performance has been calculated in the previous chapter the basis of theexplanatory variables, it takes the profitability score, the competitiveness core and the anti-riskability score as the dependent variable and the relevant characteristics of the board of directors asindependent variables to construct the mathematical model of the board characteristics andcorporate performance of China's financial enterprises and obtain the research and related analysisresults; Finally, it is an empirical test results of the analysis, and the final results were summarizedand analyzed, and the relevant conclusions of the relationship between board characteristics andcorporate performance of China's financial enterprises.
The seventh part is the study conclusions and policy recommendations, First of all, theauthor gives the conclusions of this paper, first, to establish the index system of the responsecharacteristics of China's financial corporate boards, the second is the performance of listed companies in financial enterprises which were comprehensive evaluation and integration,and thenit is the systems analysis of the relationship between the financial characteristics of corporateboards and their performance. Secondly, on the basis of the systimacully summarization andconclusions, in this paper,the author gives a number of policy recommendations,including anappropriate increase in the proportion of independent directors of the financial enterprises, todetermine the reasonable size of the board of directors, set and give full play to the role of theProfessional Committee, and to improve the level of incentives (including pay incentives andequity incentives) of the board members, the general manager and chairman ofappropriateseparation settings, to optimize the number and frequency of Board meetings, to improve thequality of board members, and ideas and learn from the Directorate of financial enterprises. At theend of this article, the author proposes the limitations of this study and the future direction offurther research.
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