住房保障税收政策研究
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摘要
住房保障是政府为了保障中低收入者的居住公平而实施的一项社会保障制度。中国的住房保障制度建设刚刚起步,在实施过程中,更多地偏重廉租房和经济适用房保障。但由于中国处在经济发展的初级阶段,再加上人口众多的因素,导致社会上需要政府保障的群体规模庞大,而有限的廉租房和经济适用房覆盖范围较窄,只能解决很小一部分低收入者的需要,大部分的中间收入阶层——夹心层被排除在保障范围之外。住房市场上形成这样一种格局,中高收入阶层可以凭借自身经济实力购买商品住房,最低收入者有政府的廉租房和经济适用房保障,而占社会人口较大比例的中低收入者,既不能满足保障性住房的申请条件,又没有足够的实力购买市场上的商品住房,他们成为住房保障忽略的群体。如果这部分社会“夹心层”的住房问题解决不好,实现居住公平的保障目标就无从谈起。
当前阶段,针对占人口绝大比例的中低收入阶层的住房问题,有些地区采取建设“限价房”的措施。但“限价房”供给规模有限,不能满足全部的中低收入阶层需要;即使供给充分,在住房市场化改革已全面实现的条件下,大规模的“限价房”供给会导致住房资源配置扭曲,与住房市场化改革趋势背道而驰。所以,要解决绝大部分中低收入阶层的住房问题,需要另寻他图。而税收政策和金融政策可以作为大部分中低阶层住房保障的可行举措。本文重点研究住房保障中的税收政策。
从住房保障税收政策的内容来看,住房保障税收政策包括税收优惠补贴政策和税收抑制政策,前者指政府通过减税,给住房的供给者和需求者优惠措施,包括税基的减免、税率的优惠和减免税等;通过对住房供给方和需求方的税收优惠补贴,促进住房市场上供给增长,同时也提高需求者的住房购买力。后者指政府通过税收手段,限制开发商屯地,减少住房空置,调节高房价,抑制炒房行为。本文重点研究的是住房税收优惠补贴政策。
从住房保障税收政策的目标来看,住房保障的目标是实现“居者有其屋”,对最低收入阶层来说,该目标是“居者有其屋住”的含义,即保障最低收入者能够住上住房,不管是购买的,还是租赁的;但住房保障税收政策主要是针对没有被纳入廉租房和经济适用房保障范围的,有部分住房购买力的中低收入阶层,即社会“夹心层”。所以,税收政策的目标应高于住房保障的最低目标,可以界定为实现“居者拥有其屋”,即提高居民的住房自有率。
从住房保障税收政策的作用机制来看,税收政策对住房保障发挥作用,其主要契合点就在于通过引入住宅过滤模型,根据住房梯度消费的理论来解决中低收入者的住房保障问题,而税收政策的作用就是促进住宅过滤模型的顺利运行。具体来说,税收政策实现住房保障,主要是通过影响住房价格和购房者收入实现的。对住房供给方征收过多的税收,可能会导致住房价格上涨,从而将税负转嫁给购房者,而影响住房供给方税收能否转嫁的因素是住房供求弹性。如果税收都通过提高价格方式转嫁给购房者,对广大的中低收入阶层说,获得住房的愿望就会因为高房价而落空,住房保障“居者有其屋”的目标就难以实现。如果给予住房供给方税收优惠,则在成本加成定价条件下,计入价格中的税费项目可以减少,同时也会促进住房供给量的增加。另一方面,政府为了提高中低收入者的住房支付能力,而给予的住房税收减免,相当于住房补贴,该优惠补贴能够提高接受者的住房购买力,增加他们的住房需求,有利于住房保障目标的实现。但是,在住房市场上供求局面没有大的改观时,住房优惠补贴往往实现不了政策的初衷,反而只会进一步加剧住房市场上供求紧张的局面。所以,税收政策对住房保障发挥作用,除了受市场上的供求弹性影响外,还与住房供给市场格局有密切关系。
中国当前的住房保障税收政策主要体现在对住房交易征收高税收以限制房价过快上涨和抑制住房投机行为上,也有一些针对低收入阶层的普通住房的优惠政策。通过对新房和二手房的市场结构和供求弹性的实证分析,本文得出结论,各级住房市场上,住房供给弹性对价格变化较敏感,而需求弹性为正,即随着价格上涨,购房者的住房需求递增,在这种供求弹性条件下,针对供给方的交易税收可以容易地转嫁到需求方身上,这导致住房价格的进一步上涨。
住房税收优惠补贴对住房需求的效应主要体现在对住房购买力的影响上,本文分别从宏观和微观的角度考察收入与住房需求的关系,得到的结论是在中国现阶段,中等收入户的住房需求收入弹性是最强的,低收入户的住房需求收入弹性较弱,高收入户的住房需求基本满足,再增加他们的可支配收入的话,他们不会继续用于住房支出,而是用于其它方面的消费。所以,现阶段,住房税收优惠补贴政策要想发挥作用的话,就应该定位好政策的实施对象,即中等收入阶层。
总体说来,中国现阶段的住房保障税收政策实施的效果并不十分理想,特别是以调控房价过快上涨为目的的住房交易税收政策,在某种程度上,这些政策非但没有解决中低收入者的住房问题,反而因为税负转嫁,加重了他们的住房负担。针对当前住房保障税收政策中存在的问题,借鉴美国、英国、日本等国家在住房保障税收政策中的先进经验,本文提出了今后改革的优化措施:降低住房交易税收,交易税收按房龄标准而不是持有期标准来征收;对第二套住房在持有环节征税,而不是在交易环节征税;对持有多套住房的家庭征收物业税,而物业税应以住房的空置面积,而不能仅以住房面积的大小为征税的依据;针对中低收入者实施一些专门的税收优惠补贴措施,对购买普通住房的家庭给予相应的税收优惠,特别是个人所得税方面,对中低收入家庭抵押贷款购房所发生的利息支出、每月的贷款还款支出等项目可以在个人所得税前进行扣除。
税收政策作为住房保障的重要措施,可以促进住宅梯度消费模式的实现,保障住宅过滤模型的平稳运行。但各种税收优惠补贴政策真正实施起来,也存在一些问题。首先,住房保障税收政策可能对政府的财政支付产生压力,会加重地方财政困难;其次,住房保障税收政策会使税制复杂化,大量的减免税规定融入各税种和税收制度中,一方面复杂了税制,另一方面加重了税收征管的难度;再次,住房保障税收政策的税负归宿不确定,税收优惠可能较多地被高收入阶层获得。这些问题的存在,为住房保障税收政策提供了进一步研究的空间。
归纳起来,文章研究的创新点主要体现在三个方面:从研究视角来看,本文立足于税收经济学的角度,来研究税收政策对住房保障的作用,把税收政策手段引入住宅过滤模型中来,税收对住房保障的贡献就在于促进住宅过滤模型的平稳运行;从住房保障税收政策的目标和对象选择来看,当前住房保障体系中,没有专门针对社会“夹心层”——中低收入群体的有效保障措施,而税收政策正好填补这一空白。通过税收政策手段解决中低收入群体的住房问题,其目标就是“居者拥有其屋”。从实证研究的结论来看,通过分析北京、上海、杭州、武汉、重庆、成都、兰州七个代表性城市的住房需求和价格之间的关系,得出结论,除北京、上海等个房价上涨很高的城市,居民对未来房价的预期并不十分乐观外,其他的中大城市居民住房需求价格弹性基本为正。在分析住房税收优惠补贴对居民住房需求的影响时,在宏观上,通过分析2005年城镇人均可支配收入前五名、中间五名和后五名的样本地区的情况,得出结论,人均可支配收入水平处于中游或中上游的地区居民住房需求较为旺盛。在微观上,分析北京、上海、武汉、重庆、成都六个样本城市在2000-2005年间,不同收入组别居民的住房消费情况,得出结论:中等收入户(包括中等偏下收入户和中等偏上收入户)的住房支出收入弹性比较大,中等收入户是目前住房需求的中坚力量。实证分析的结果表明,针对中低收入阶层的住房保障税收政策具有可行性。
Any country in the world has undergone the same problem that is the living equity of the low-middle income. Especially in the developing country, because of low income and high housing price, many low-middle income classes can't afford the house. The ratio of house price to income in most of cities of China is higher than the standard in the word. Now house price in most cities of China is rising all the way. The basic living right of the poor is challenged. In order to guarantee the basic living right of the poor, the government assistances are necessary. So housing security is built.
In China, housing security was built a short time ago, which relied on economic housing and low- price housing. But in the beginning of economy development, adding population factor, the limited security cann't meet the low-middle income's demand. And the middle income class is excluded from the security. The situation that high income class buy house in market, the lowest income class enjoy the housing security, but the low-middle income class cann't afford the house in market and also cann't enjoy the security housing is formed. If the situation cann't be resolved, the goal of housing equity cann't be obtained.
Now, "limit price housing" is built to resolve the housing problem of low-middle income class in some area. On one hand, the quantity of supply is scarce, and on the other hand, the large scale of "limit price housing" could bring up deviation of resourse allociation. So we have to look for another way to resolve the housing problem of low-middle income class, and tax policy is a feasible choice.
From the aspect of the content of tax policy in housing security, the policy includes tax preferential-subsidies policy and tax regulation policy. The front is that government lowers tax, giving housing supplyer and demander preferential measures on tax-base, tax-rate and taxation merit. These will stimulate supply and demand. The latter is that government restrains developer from stationing land, decrease free-housing and regulates high house price. This dissertation will focus on tax preferential-subsidies policy.
From the aspect of the goal of tax policy in housing security, "Residence has his house" is thought as the goal of housing security. For the lowest income class, the goal means that everyone has a house to live by renting or buying. Aiming to the low-middle income class, the goal in tax policy of housing security should be above the lowest one, which is "Residence has his own house" , and that is raising the rate of own housing.
On the mechanism of tax policy in housing security, it works on housing-filter model. How to help the model operate smoothly is the role of the policy on the base of housing elevator consume. Almost all housing security policies can play their roles, but the tax preferential-subsidy treatment in housing filter model, I think, should be a good choice to provide security in present situation. Lots of conditions of the model are met in China, and reducing second-hand house price and increasing the income of residents through tax policy can make the model operate more smoothly. Elavator consume theory of house has been accepted in China, and tax policy and subsidy in housing filter model help low - middle income class obtain their own houses with minimum government expense cost.
This mechanism is realized by affecting house price, determinable income and consumers' inclination. Imposing more duties on housing suppliers could bring about price going up, which will transfer tax burden to housing buyers. But how much will be transferred is determined by price elasticity of demand and supply. If the burden is easily transferred by raising price to the demanders, for the low-middle income class, the hope of owning house will come to nothing, and the goal of "Residence has his house" will not be realized. If there is tax preferential-subsidies on housing suppliers, the items in price will decrease on the situation of pricing on cost adding, which will increase the supply. The tax preference and mitigation are regarded as subsidies to the low-middle income class, which will improve demanders' purchasing power and demand inclination. When the great changes haven't taken place on the situation of demand and supply, housing preferencial-subsidies won't play its role, and it could make the situation more strained. So there is an important relation on the situationg of supply, besides of elasticity of demand and supply in the market.
In China, the tax policy focuses on levying highly on second-hand house to regulate housing price and speculation. By positive analysis on the market and elasticity of new house and second-hand house, the conclusion is made that housing supply elasticity is sensitive and demand elasticity is positive. When the housing price rises, the demand goes up. Then the tax on housing supply will easily transfer on the demand, which will lead to the price growing faster.
The tax preferential-subsidy plays the role on the housing demand by raising purchasing power. From macro-scopic and micro-scopic angle, this dissertation studies the relation of income and housing demand. The elasticity of middle and low-middle income class is strongest, lowest and high income classes are weak. For the high, the demand of housing is almost satisfied, and if more subsidies are provided, the adding income will be used in other things replacing in housing. So the scope of tax preferencial-subsidies should be restrained, then middle and low-middle income class should obtain more tax preferencial-subsidies.
Now, the tax policy doesn't play the role well. The heavy tax policy on second-hand house adds the low-middle income class more burden. We could use the experience of another countries for reference, such as American, England Japan and so on. The measures for reform are put forward: decreasing deal tax; levying heavily on the second house by real estate tax on the base of free area; carrying out tax preferencial-subsidies on common house for low-middle income class, especially on the aspect individual income tax.
Tax policy as an important housing security measure could make the housing filter model operate smoothly. But there are some problems rising when the preferencial-subsidies policy are carried out. The first, it will bring financial pressure on local government; the second, it will make tax system complicated; the third, the end of tax preferencial-subsidies is uncertain. These problems will make place for further research.
In this dissertation, the hot problem of housing is studied. There are many literatures on housing, a lot of which based on sociology, from the prospective of housing choice, housing developer and so on. Of course, many researchers studied tax subsidy to housing, and there are also researches of housing filter model. But this dissertation combines tax policy with housing filter model, and probe how to employ tax preferencial-subsidy to make the model operate smoothly. This is one of the innovations on research perspective of this dissertation.
The other innovation is the objective of tax policy in housing security, low-middle income class is the main objective of security; and "Residence has his own house" is the goal of tax policy in housing security.
Another innovation is refected on the conclusion of positive analysis. By studying housing demand and price in sample cities, such as Beijing, Shanghai, Hangzhou, Wuhan, Chongqing, Chengdu, Lanzhou, we draw a conclusion that price elasticity of housing demand in the most of middle-big cities is positive, except for Beijing and Shanghai. When the influence of housing tax preference-subsidies on housing demand is studied, on macro-scopic scale, the conclusion is drew that housing demand of the middle income class is vigorous by analysizing the situation in the front-five, middle-five and behind-five area of urban average allocatable income. On micro-scopic scale, by analysizing the consumption of housing in different income class in Beijing, Shanghai, Hangzhou, Wuhan, Chongqing, Chengdu from 2000 to 2005, the conclusion is drew that the income elasticity of housing demand in middle income class is big, and the middle income class is the backbone force of housing demand. The conclusions of positive analysis illustrate that tax policy in housing security is feasible.
当前阶段,针对占人口绝大比例的中低收入阶层的住房问题,有些地区采取建设“限价房”的措施。但“限价房”供给规模有限,不能满足全部的中低收入阶层需要;即使供给充分,在住房市场化改革已全面实现的条件下,大规模的“限价房”供给会导致住房资源配置扭曲,与住房市场化改革趋势背道而驰。所以,要解决绝大部分中低收入阶层的住房问题,需要另寻他图。而税收政策和金融政策可以作为大部分中低阶层住房保障的可行举措。本文重点研究住房保障中的税收政策。
从住房保障税收政策的内容来看,住房保障税收政策包括税收优惠补贴政策和税收抑制政策,前者指政府通过减税,给住房的供给者和需求者优惠措施,包括税基的减免、税率的优惠和减免税等;通过对住房供给方和需求方的税收优惠补贴,促进住房市场上供给增长,同时也提高需求者的住房购买力。后者指政府通过税收手段,限制开发商屯地,减少住房空置,调节高房价,抑制炒房行为。本文重点研究的是住房税收优惠补贴政策。
从住房保障税收政策的目标来看,住房保障的目标是实现“居者有其屋”,对最低收入阶层来说,该目标是“居者有其屋住”的含义,即保障最低收入者能够住上住房,不管是购买的,还是租赁的;但住房保障税收政策主要是针对没有被纳入廉租房和经济适用房保障范围的,有部分住房购买力的中低收入阶层,即社会“夹心层”。所以,税收政策的目标应高于住房保障的最低目标,可以界定为实现“居者拥有其屋”,即提高居民的住房自有率。
从住房保障税收政策的作用机制来看,税收政策对住房保障发挥作用,其主要契合点就在于通过引入住宅过滤模型,根据住房梯度消费的理论来解决中低收入者的住房保障问题,而税收政策的作用就是促进住宅过滤模型的顺利运行。具体来说,税收政策实现住房保障,主要是通过影响住房价格和购房者收入实现的。对住房供给方征收过多的税收,可能会导致住房价格上涨,从而将税负转嫁给购房者,而影响住房供给方税收能否转嫁的因素是住房供求弹性。如果税收都通过提高价格方式转嫁给购房者,对广大的中低收入阶层说,获得住房的愿望就会因为高房价而落空,住房保障“居者有其屋”的目标就难以实现。如果给予住房供给方税收优惠,则在成本加成定价条件下,计入价格中的税费项目可以减少,同时也会促进住房供给量的增加。另一方面,政府为了提高中低收入者的住房支付能力,而给予的住房税收减免,相当于住房补贴,该优惠补贴能够提高接受者的住房购买力,增加他们的住房需求,有利于住房保障目标的实现。但是,在住房市场上供求局面没有大的改观时,住房优惠补贴往往实现不了政策的初衷,反而只会进一步加剧住房市场上供求紧张的局面。所以,税收政策对住房保障发挥作用,除了受市场上的供求弹性影响外,还与住房供给市场格局有密切关系。
中国当前的住房保障税收政策主要体现在对住房交易征收高税收以限制房价过快上涨和抑制住房投机行为上,也有一些针对低收入阶层的普通住房的优惠政策。通过对新房和二手房的市场结构和供求弹性的实证分析,本文得出结论,各级住房市场上,住房供给弹性对价格变化较敏感,而需求弹性为正,即随着价格上涨,购房者的住房需求递增,在这种供求弹性条件下,针对供给方的交易税收可以容易地转嫁到需求方身上,这导致住房价格的进一步上涨。
住房税收优惠补贴对住房需求的效应主要体现在对住房购买力的影响上,本文分别从宏观和微观的角度考察收入与住房需求的关系,得到的结论是在中国现阶段,中等收入户的住房需求收入弹性是最强的,低收入户的住房需求收入弹性较弱,高收入户的住房需求基本满足,再增加他们的可支配收入的话,他们不会继续用于住房支出,而是用于其它方面的消费。所以,现阶段,住房税收优惠补贴政策要想发挥作用的话,就应该定位好政策的实施对象,即中等收入阶层。
总体说来,中国现阶段的住房保障税收政策实施的效果并不十分理想,特别是以调控房价过快上涨为目的的住房交易税收政策,在某种程度上,这些政策非但没有解决中低收入者的住房问题,反而因为税负转嫁,加重了他们的住房负担。针对当前住房保障税收政策中存在的问题,借鉴美国、英国、日本等国家在住房保障税收政策中的先进经验,本文提出了今后改革的优化措施:降低住房交易税收,交易税收按房龄标准而不是持有期标准来征收;对第二套住房在持有环节征税,而不是在交易环节征税;对持有多套住房的家庭征收物业税,而物业税应以住房的空置面积,而不能仅以住房面积的大小为征税的依据;针对中低收入者实施一些专门的税收优惠补贴措施,对购买普通住房的家庭给予相应的税收优惠,特别是个人所得税方面,对中低收入家庭抵押贷款购房所发生的利息支出、每月的贷款还款支出等项目可以在个人所得税前进行扣除。
税收政策作为住房保障的重要措施,可以促进住宅梯度消费模式的实现,保障住宅过滤模型的平稳运行。但各种税收优惠补贴政策真正实施起来,也存在一些问题。首先,住房保障税收政策可能对政府的财政支付产生压力,会加重地方财政困难;其次,住房保障税收政策会使税制复杂化,大量的减免税规定融入各税种和税收制度中,一方面复杂了税制,另一方面加重了税收征管的难度;再次,住房保障税收政策的税负归宿不确定,税收优惠可能较多地被高收入阶层获得。这些问题的存在,为住房保障税收政策提供了进一步研究的空间。
归纳起来,文章研究的创新点主要体现在三个方面:从研究视角来看,本文立足于税收经济学的角度,来研究税收政策对住房保障的作用,把税收政策手段引入住宅过滤模型中来,税收对住房保障的贡献就在于促进住宅过滤模型的平稳运行;从住房保障税收政策的目标和对象选择来看,当前住房保障体系中,没有专门针对社会“夹心层”——中低收入群体的有效保障措施,而税收政策正好填补这一空白。通过税收政策手段解决中低收入群体的住房问题,其目标就是“居者拥有其屋”。从实证研究的结论来看,通过分析北京、上海、杭州、武汉、重庆、成都、兰州七个代表性城市的住房需求和价格之间的关系,得出结论,除北京、上海等个房价上涨很高的城市,居民对未来房价的预期并不十分乐观外,其他的中大城市居民住房需求价格弹性基本为正。在分析住房税收优惠补贴对居民住房需求的影响时,在宏观上,通过分析2005年城镇人均可支配收入前五名、中间五名和后五名的样本地区的情况,得出结论,人均可支配收入水平处于中游或中上游的地区居民住房需求较为旺盛。在微观上,分析北京、上海、武汉、重庆、成都六个样本城市在2000-2005年间,不同收入组别居民的住房消费情况,得出结论:中等收入户(包括中等偏下收入户和中等偏上收入户)的住房支出收入弹性比较大,中等收入户是目前住房需求的中坚力量。实证分析的结果表明,针对中低收入阶层的住房保障税收政策具有可行性。
Any country in the world has undergone the same problem that is the living equity of the low-middle income. Especially in the developing country, because of low income and high housing price, many low-middle income classes can't afford the house. The ratio of house price to income in most of cities of China is higher than the standard in the word. Now house price in most cities of China is rising all the way. The basic living right of the poor is challenged. In order to guarantee the basic living right of the poor, the government assistances are necessary. So housing security is built.
In China, housing security was built a short time ago, which relied on economic housing and low- price housing. But in the beginning of economy development, adding population factor, the limited security cann't meet the low-middle income's demand. And the middle income class is excluded from the security. The situation that high income class buy house in market, the lowest income class enjoy the housing security, but the low-middle income class cann't afford the house in market and also cann't enjoy the security housing is formed. If the situation cann't be resolved, the goal of housing equity cann't be obtained.
Now, "limit price housing" is built to resolve the housing problem of low-middle income class in some area. On one hand, the quantity of supply is scarce, and on the other hand, the large scale of "limit price housing" could bring up deviation of resourse allociation. So we have to look for another way to resolve the housing problem of low-middle income class, and tax policy is a feasible choice.
From the aspect of the content of tax policy in housing security, the policy includes tax preferential-subsidies policy and tax regulation policy. The front is that government lowers tax, giving housing supplyer and demander preferential measures on tax-base, tax-rate and taxation merit. These will stimulate supply and demand. The latter is that government restrains developer from stationing land, decrease free-housing and regulates high house price. This dissertation will focus on tax preferential-subsidies policy.
From the aspect of the goal of tax policy in housing security, "Residence has his house" is thought as the goal of housing security. For the lowest income class, the goal means that everyone has a house to live by renting or buying. Aiming to the low-middle income class, the goal in tax policy of housing security should be above the lowest one, which is "Residence has his own house" , and that is raising the rate of own housing.
On the mechanism of tax policy in housing security, it works on housing-filter model. How to help the model operate smoothly is the role of the policy on the base of housing elevator consume. Almost all housing security policies can play their roles, but the tax preferential-subsidy treatment in housing filter model, I think, should be a good choice to provide security in present situation. Lots of conditions of the model are met in China, and reducing second-hand house price and increasing the income of residents through tax policy can make the model operate more smoothly. Elavator consume theory of house has been accepted in China, and tax policy and subsidy in housing filter model help low - middle income class obtain their own houses with minimum government expense cost.
This mechanism is realized by affecting house price, determinable income and consumers' inclination. Imposing more duties on housing suppliers could bring about price going up, which will transfer tax burden to housing buyers. But how much will be transferred is determined by price elasticity of demand and supply. If the burden is easily transferred by raising price to the demanders, for the low-middle income class, the hope of owning house will come to nothing, and the goal of "Residence has his house" will not be realized. If there is tax preferential-subsidies on housing suppliers, the items in price will decrease on the situation of pricing on cost adding, which will increase the supply. The tax preference and mitigation are regarded as subsidies to the low-middle income class, which will improve demanders' purchasing power and demand inclination. When the great changes haven't taken place on the situation of demand and supply, housing preferencial-subsidies won't play its role, and it could make the situation more strained. So there is an important relation on the situationg of supply, besides of elasticity of demand and supply in the market.
In China, the tax policy focuses on levying highly on second-hand house to regulate housing price and speculation. By positive analysis on the market and elasticity of new house and second-hand house, the conclusion is made that housing supply elasticity is sensitive and demand elasticity is positive. When the housing price rises, the demand goes up. Then the tax on housing supply will easily transfer on the demand, which will lead to the price growing faster.
The tax preferential-subsidy plays the role on the housing demand by raising purchasing power. From macro-scopic and micro-scopic angle, this dissertation studies the relation of income and housing demand. The elasticity of middle and low-middle income class is strongest, lowest and high income classes are weak. For the high, the demand of housing is almost satisfied, and if more subsidies are provided, the adding income will be used in other things replacing in housing. So the scope of tax preferencial-subsidies should be restrained, then middle and low-middle income class should obtain more tax preferencial-subsidies.
Now, the tax policy doesn't play the role well. The heavy tax policy on second-hand house adds the low-middle income class more burden. We could use the experience of another countries for reference, such as American, England Japan and so on. The measures for reform are put forward: decreasing deal tax; levying heavily on the second house by real estate tax on the base of free area; carrying out tax preferencial-subsidies on common house for low-middle income class, especially on the aspect individual income tax.
Tax policy as an important housing security measure could make the housing filter model operate smoothly. But there are some problems rising when the preferencial-subsidies policy are carried out. The first, it will bring financial pressure on local government; the second, it will make tax system complicated; the third, the end of tax preferencial-subsidies is uncertain. These problems will make place for further research.
In this dissertation, the hot problem of housing is studied. There are many literatures on housing, a lot of which based on sociology, from the prospective of housing choice, housing developer and so on. Of course, many researchers studied tax subsidy to housing, and there are also researches of housing filter model. But this dissertation combines tax policy with housing filter model, and probe how to employ tax preferencial-subsidy to make the model operate smoothly. This is one of the innovations on research perspective of this dissertation.
The other innovation is the objective of tax policy in housing security, low-middle income class is the main objective of security; and "Residence has his own house" is the goal of tax policy in housing security.
Another innovation is refected on the conclusion of positive analysis. By studying housing demand and price in sample cities, such as Beijing, Shanghai, Hangzhou, Wuhan, Chongqing, Chengdu, Lanzhou, we draw a conclusion that price elasticity of housing demand in the most of middle-big cities is positive, except for Beijing and Shanghai. When the influence of housing tax preference-subsidies on housing demand is studied, on macro-scopic scale, the conclusion is drew that housing demand of the middle income class is vigorous by analysizing the situation in the front-five, middle-five and behind-five area of urban average allocatable income. On micro-scopic scale, by analysizing the consumption of housing in different income class in Beijing, Shanghai, Hangzhou, Wuhan, Chongqing, Chengdu from 2000 to 2005, the conclusion is drew that the income elasticity of housing demand in middle income class is big, and the middle income class is the backbone force of housing demand. The conclusions of positive analysis illustrate that tax policy in housing security is feasible.
引文
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1 据焦点房地产网的一项调查显示,91%的被调查者认为自己属于社会“夹心层”。另有非官方的数据显示,中国目前中产阶层3500万户,2016年将达一亿户。
2 萨科奇曾经描述法国那些“被抛弃的中产阶层”:三十多年前,政府曾经废弃鼓励中产阶层的一批社会优待政策。结果是,法国的贫困者数目增加,大批中产阶层破产,以致于造成国家的僵化和发展难题。
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2 美国的公共住房计划在其住房保障体系中,并不占主要的地位,因为公共住房会降低住房供给和消费的效率,并且公共住房的供给和穷人的住房需求之间存在着数量上的不对称性,所以美国的公共住房政策是一种补充型的,公共住房只是在大城市建设,中小城市很少甚至没有公共住房。
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1 成思危主编,中国城镇住房制度改革——目标模式与实施难点,民主与建设出版社,1999年10月第一版第104页
1 引自李书田、匡敏,“经济适用房”建设缘何步履维艰?价格与市场,2005(3)
2 资料来源:中国统计年鉴(2006),北京:中国统计出版社,2006年版
1 阿瑟.赛斯尔.庇古,福利经济学,北京:中国社会科学出版社,1999年版,第10页
2 冈纳.缪尔达尔,亚洲的戏剧:一些国家贫穷的研究,北京经济学院出版社,1988年版
3 凯恩斯,就业、利息和货币通论,商务印书馆,1963年版
4 加尔布雷斯,丰裕社会,上海人民出版社,1965年版;经济学和社会公共目标,商务印书馆,1980年版
1 弗里德曼,自由选择:个人声明,商务印书馆。1982年版
2 詹姆斯.布坎南,自由、市场和国家,北京经济学院出版社,1988年版
3 参见马斯洛,激励与个人,中国社会科学出版社,1985年版
1 加雷斯.D.迈尔斯著,匡小平译,公共经济学,中国人民大学出版社,2001年9月第一版,第84页
2 Rowntree,B.S.and GR.Lavers,Poverty and the Welfare State,London:Longman,1951
3 加雷斯.D.迈尔斯著,匡小平译,公共经济学,中国人民大学出版社,2001年9月第一版,第84页
4 Townsend,Poverty in the United Kingdom,London:Penguin,1979
5 Sawhill,I.V.Poverty in the US:Why is it so persistent?,Journal of Economic Literature,26,1073-1119,1988
6 Callan,T.and B.Nolan,Concepts of Poverty and the Poverty Line,Journal of Economic Surveys,5,243-261,1991
1 Rowntree,B.S.Poverty:A Study of Town Life,London:Macmillan,1901.and Poverty and Progress,London:Longman,1941
2 我们在讨论社会保障和贫困关系时,是站在社会保障促进公平的角度说的,而没有考虑社会保障分散个人风险的方面,因为本文讨论的住房保障就是为了促进住房公平,解决贫困人口住房问题的。
3 阿马蒂亚.森,集体选择与社会福利,上海科学技术出版社,2004年4月第一版
4 加雷斯.D.迈尔斯著,匡小平译,公共经济学,中国人民大学出版社,2001年9月第一版,第84页
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2 伯纳德.萨拉尼著,陈新平、王瑞泽、陈宝明、周宗华译,税收经济学,北京:中国人民大学出版社,2005年9月第一版,第196页
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1 Michael Shea,Westat,Maryland,Housing Choice Voucher Tenant Accessibility Study:2001-2002,prepared for U.S.Department of Housing and Urban Development Office of Policy Development and Research,2004
1 戚名琛城镇住宅属性探讨中几个争论问题,1982,转引自杨鲁、王育琨著,住房改革:理论的反思和现实的选择,天津人民出版社,1992年12月第一版,第127-130页
2 自杨鲁、王育琨著,住房改革:理论的反思和现实的选择,天津人民出版社,1992年12月第一版,第140-141页
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2 姚玲珍,中国公共住房政策模式研究,上海财经大学出版社,2003年6月第一版
3 褚超孚,城镇住房保障模式研究,经济科学出版社,2005年8月第一版
1 印垄华、胡彬,关于经济适用房政策的探索[J],财经研究,1999(11)
2 住宅过滤模型是利用市场机制来解决社会各阶层的住房问题,在住房商品化的前提下,由于住房耐久性的特点,富人通过购买面积大的、配套设施好的新房,将旧房倒出,卖给穷人,穷人通过购买旧房来解决自身的居住问题。这是西方城市经济学派提出的解决低收入阶层住房问题的一个模型,详细的理论将会在本文的第四章介绍。
3 褚超孚、贾生华,试论“过滤”模型对于城镇住房市场分层供应体系的理论启示,[J],商业经济与管理,2005(5)
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2 赵海春,沈杰,住宅过滤模型在我国房地产市场上运用的可行性研究,[J],沿海企业与科技,2006(3)
1 李书田、匡敏,“经济适用房”建设缘何步履维艰?价格与市场,2005(3)
2 邱冬阳、王牧,廉租房——城镇住房弱势群体救助的现实选择,[J],重庆建筑大学学报,2003(6)
3 冯宗容,廉租房运作机制评析及创新,[J],经济体制改革,2002(3)
1 王颖,廉租住房保障的经济学分析,[J],经济管理,2006(1)
2 住房制度改革前的全面福利住房,并不是本文研究的住房保障。本文所指的住房保障就是在住房货币化和商品化的条件下,对中低收入阶层住房公平方面的保障。
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1 据焦点房地产网的一项调查显示,91%的被调查者认为自己属于社会“夹心层”。另有非官方的数据显示,中国目前中产阶层3500万户,2016年将达一亿户。
2 萨科奇曾经描述法国那些“被抛弃的中产阶层”:三十多年前,政府曾经废弃鼓励中产阶层的一批社会优待政策。结果是,法国的贫困者数目增加,大批中产阶层破产,以致于造成国家的僵化和发展难题。
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2 美国的公共住房计划在其住房保障体系中,并不占主要的地位,因为公共住房会降低住房供给和消费的效率,并且公共住房的供给和穷人的住房需求之间存在着数量上的不对称性,所以美国的公共住房政策是一种补充型的,公共住房只是在大城市建设,中小城市很少甚至没有公共住房。
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