地方政府融资及其风险分担机制研究
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摘要
随着我国市场经济建设的推进,地方政府成为独立的经济行为主体,因而财政体制的构建应该满足财权与事权匹配的基本要求。1994年分税制改革以来,中央事权下方而财权上收的趋势明显,这无疑造成地方政府财力紧张。此外,近年来,城市化的进程加速,地方政府基础设施投资迅速上升,这类资本性支出造成了地方政府财政压力越来越明显。
实际上,自改革开放以来,地方政府一直存在融资需求,这种需求在现行财政体制下受到了压抑,在地方政府财力压力不断强化下,往往通过变通的方式得到释放。金融市场的发展壮大,为政府融资提供了客观现实条件。另一方面分税制后产生的预算软约束使得上级政府默许了地方政府融资行为,于是地方政府纷纷成立融资平台来获得资金。随着地方政府资金缺口的增加,地方政府融资平台发挥了巨大的融资作用,对于基础设施的建设具有重要的现实意义,这种方式也体现了我国现行财政体制下的创新。然而融资平台方式属于一种隐性融资手段和一种权宜之计,上级政府部门很难有效监管,造成地方政府融资风险不断积累。特别是2008年末金融危机以来,在实施积极的财政政策下,中央政府需要地方政府资金配套进行大量投资,以保持经济增长,这样地方政府债务急剧上升,保守估计在8万亿以上。地方政府融资风险,本质上是隐性融资下各种风险向财政风险过度转化的结果。要化解这种风险,促使地方政府融资的可持续发展,本文有如下观点：
第一,融资制度上创新是解决地方政府融资风险积聚问题的根本途径。地方政府融资风险的产生于隐性融资制度的土壤,在这种制度下,地方政府融资难以监管,难以形成有效的管理制度。因而,单从风险管理制度上着手,只能治标很难达到治本的效果。目前,地方政府融资风险凸显的现象是制度演变过程中矛盾积累的结果,必须从制度上创新才能从根本上解决问题,由“暗”到“明”的制度转变是问题的突破口。
第二,融资制度的创新核心在于风险分担机制的建立。在市场化融资中要形成可持续的地方政府融资制度,必须避免风险向财政风险的过度转移。客观上需要一种分担机制来阻断本不应由财政承担的风险。在融资市场下,微观主体间存在的风险与收益匹配的机制,为构建政府融资提供了理论基础。因而通过这种微观的机制建立政府融资分担机制,把属于市场的风险交由其他市场主体承担,而地方政府仅仅承担政策性融资风险。
第三,通过构建财政可持续介入机制在政府融资领域引入风险分担机制,成为联通微观风险收益匹配机制与宏观财政融资的桥梁。地方政府基础设施属于准公共产品,投资风险大,如果单纯依靠市场机制很难获得资金,因而在财政资金(政策性资金)投入下或者税收优惠下达到投资主体的市场收益预期,同时微观主体也承担相应市场风险。
基于这些观点,本文从宏观制度层面和微观管理层面提出建立风险分担机制的对策。首先,要完善阳光融资的制度,比如建立地方债制度,在发行债券的同时,转移部分市场风险。在法律上清除《预算法》障碍。其次,构建地方政府政策性融资制度,同时引入市场约束机制。在微观管理层面,引入市场竞争机制,通过融资方式创新方式优化风险结构以及完善风险监管过程等。
With the advance of China's market economy, the local governments constitute as independent economic actors and for the construction of the fiscal system, responsibilities and taxes power should be matched to meet the basic requirements. Since tax system reform in 1994, the central government tends to have more taxes power and share fewer responsibilities under the current fiscal system, which will undoubtedly cause the local government's shortage of financial resources. In addition, in recent years, to accelerate the process of urbanization, local government's investments in infrastructure have increased rapidly. Consequently the tendency that capital expenditure results in financial pressure on local government is increasingly apparent.
In fact, since the reform and opening up, there has existed local government financing needs. However the demand under the existing financial system has been held up. Since the financial pressure continues to strengthen, the financing need of the local government often through alternative ways gets released. Development and growth of financial markets provides local governments with the objective conditions. On the other hand, the soft budget constraint resulting from the tax system makes the higher levels of government acquiescence of the local government's finance act. So, local governments have established financing platform to get the funds. This approach constitutes as innovation under our current financial system. With the local governments funding gap increasing, local government finance platforms have played a tremendous role in the financing for the construction of infrastructure and been of important practical significance. However, financing approach through the platform is a hidden means and it is difficult to effectively monitor and control by the higher-level governments and their departments. The financing risks of local government therefore continue to gather. Especially since the implementation of proactive fiscal policy during the financial crisis in late 2008, the central government requires that local governments match funds to invest heavily in order to maintain economic growth so that local government debt has risen sharply. As a resuit the total debt of local government is estimated at leat 8 trillion. The financing risks in essence result from that various risks of implicit financing transfer into the financial risk. To resolve this problem, and promote the sustainable development of local government financing, the paper has the following view:
Firstly, innovation of the financing system of local government is the fundamental way to solve the problem of risk accumulation. The outbreak of local government's financing risks is rooted in the implicit financing system. In this system, local government's financing is difficult to be controlled. It is difficult to come out with an effective management system. Thus, simply management system of risk from the start, can only act only as a symptomatic treatment and it is difficult to achieve radical results. Currently, the local government finance risks become highlighted, which is the result of the accumulation of contradictions during the evolution of institutional innovation. Further institutional innovation must be a fundamental solution to the problem and constitutes as a breakthrough for the transformation of the "dark" means into an "out" regime.
Secondly, the innovation of financing system lies in the establishment of risk-sharing mechanism. To form a sustainable finance system of local government in market we must avoid the excessive transfer of risk to the financial risk. Objectively we need a mechanism to block the sharing of all the financial risks by government. In the finance market, the existence of such risks-benefits matching mechanism provides for building a theoretical foundation for government financing. Thus the mechanism formed by micro-sharing mechanism has the micro participants bear the risk of market and the local governments just bear policy financing risks.
Thirdly, the building of sustainable financial mechanism for the local governments to introduce the risk-sharing mechanism acts as the bridge of the risk-return matching mechanism to e financing in a macro way. Local government infrastructure is quasi-public goods of big investment risks and is difficult to rely solely on market mechanisms for funding. But if financial support by local government (policy funded) or investment tax exemption guarantees the market returns of the investors as expected, the main micro participants can bear the market risk.
Based on these ideas, this paper proposes countermeasures from the macro level and micro-management aspects to establish risk-sharing mechanism. First of all, to improve the system of financing and have a transparent means of finance, such as the establishment of local bond system in the issuance of bonds while shifting some market risk make it clear in the law and smooth away "Budget Law" obstacles. Second, construct the local governments' policy financing system, while introducing market discipline mechanism. As for the micro-management level, the introduction of market competition, optimization of the risk financing structure through innovative ways and improvement of the risk control processes can be effective.
实际上,自改革开放以来,地方政府一直存在融资需求,这种需求在现行财政体制下受到了压抑,在地方政府财力压力不断强化下,往往通过变通的方式得到释放。金融市场的发展壮大,为政府融资提供了客观现实条件。另一方面分税制后产生的预算软约束使得上级政府默许了地方政府融资行为,于是地方政府纷纷成立融资平台来获得资金。随着地方政府资金缺口的增加,地方政府融资平台发挥了巨大的融资作用,对于基础设施的建设具有重要的现实意义,这种方式也体现了我国现行财政体制下的创新。然而融资平台方式属于一种隐性融资手段和一种权宜之计,上级政府部门很难有效监管,造成地方政府融资风险不断积累。特别是2008年末金融危机以来,在实施积极的财政政策下,中央政府需要地方政府资金配套进行大量投资,以保持经济增长,这样地方政府债务急剧上升,保守估计在8万亿以上。地方政府融资风险,本质上是隐性融资下各种风险向财政风险过度转化的结果。要化解这种风险,促使地方政府融资的可持续发展,本文有如下观点：
第一,融资制度上创新是解决地方政府融资风险积聚问题的根本途径。地方政府融资风险的产生于隐性融资制度的土壤,在这种制度下,地方政府融资难以监管,难以形成有效的管理制度。因而,单从风险管理制度上着手,只能治标很难达到治本的效果。目前,地方政府融资风险凸显的现象是制度演变过程中矛盾积累的结果,必须从制度上创新才能从根本上解决问题,由“暗”到“明”的制度转变是问题的突破口。
第二,融资制度的创新核心在于风险分担机制的建立。在市场化融资中要形成可持续的地方政府融资制度,必须避免风险向财政风险的过度转移。客观上需要一种分担机制来阻断本不应由财政承担的风险。在融资市场下,微观主体间存在的风险与收益匹配的机制,为构建政府融资提供了理论基础。因而通过这种微观的机制建立政府融资分担机制,把属于市场的风险交由其他市场主体承担,而地方政府仅仅承担政策性融资风险。
第三,通过构建财政可持续介入机制在政府融资领域引入风险分担机制,成为联通微观风险收益匹配机制与宏观财政融资的桥梁。地方政府基础设施属于准公共产品,投资风险大,如果单纯依靠市场机制很难获得资金,因而在财政资金(政策性资金)投入下或者税收优惠下达到投资主体的市场收益预期,同时微观主体也承担相应市场风险。
基于这些观点,本文从宏观制度层面和微观管理层面提出建立风险分担机制的对策。首先,要完善阳光融资的制度,比如建立地方债制度,在发行债券的同时,转移部分市场风险。在法律上清除《预算法》障碍。其次,构建地方政府政策性融资制度,同时引入市场约束机制。在微观管理层面,引入市场竞争机制,通过融资方式创新方式优化风险结构以及完善风险监管过程等。
With the advance of China's market economy, the local governments constitute as independent economic actors and for the construction of the fiscal system, responsibilities and taxes power should be matched to meet the basic requirements. Since tax system reform in 1994, the central government tends to have more taxes power and share fewer responsibilities under the current fiscal system, which will undoubtedly cause the local government's shortage of financial resources. In addition, in recent years, to accelerate the process of urbanization, local government's investments in infrastructure have increased rapidly. Consequently the tendency that capital expenditure results in financial pressure on local government is increasingly apparent.
In fact, since the reform and opening up, there has existed local government financing needs. However the demand under the existing financial system has been held up. Since the financial pressure continues to strengthen, the financing need of the local government often through alternative ways gets released. Development and growth of financial markets provides local governments with the objective conditions. On the other hand, the soft budget constraint resulting from the tax system makes the higher levels of government acquiescence of the local government's finance act. So, local governments have established financing platform to get the funds. This approach constitutes as innovation under our current financial system. With the local governments funding gap increasing, local government finance platforms have played a tremendous role in the financing for the construction of infrastructure and been of important practical significance. However, financing approach through the platform is a hidden means and it is difficult to effectively monitor and control by the higher-level governments and their departments. The financing risks of local government therefore continue to gather. Especially since the implementation of proactive fiscal policy during the financial crisis in late 2008, the central government requires that local governments match funds to invest heavily in order to maintain economic growth so that local government debt has risen sharply. As a resuit the total debt of local government is estimated at leat 8 trillion. The financing risks in essence result from that various risks of implicit financing transfer into the financial risk. To resolve this problem, and promote the sustainable development of local government financing, the paper has the following view:
Firstly, innovation of the financing system of local government is the fundamental way to solve the problem of risk accumulation. The outbreak of local government's financing risks is rooted in the implicit financing system. In this system, local government's financing is difficult to be controlled. It is difficult to come out with an effective management system. Thus, simply management system of risk from the start, can only act only as a symptomatic treatment and it is difficult to achieve radical results. Currently, the local government finance risks become highlighted, which is the result of the accumulation of contradictions during the evolution of institutional innovation. Further institutional innovation must be a fundamental solution to the problem and constitutes as a breakthrough for the transformation of the "dark" means into an "out" regime.
Secondly, the innovation of financing system lies in the establishment of risk-sharing mechanism. To form a sustainable finance system of local government in market we must avoid the excessive transfer of risk to the financial risk. Objectively we need a mechanism to block the sharing of all the financial risks by government. In the finance market, the existence of such risks-benefits matching mechanism provides for building a theoretical foundation for government financing. Thus the mechanism formed by micro-sharing mechanism has the micro participants bear the risk of market and the local governments just bear policy financing risks.
Thirdly, the building of sustainable financial mechanism for the local governments to introduce the risk-sharing mechanism acts as the bridge of the risk-return matching mechanism to e financing in a macro way. Local government infrastructure is quasi-public goods of big investment risks and is difficult to rely solely on market mechanisms for funding. But if financial support by local government (policy funded) or investment tax exemption guarantees the market returns of the investors as expected, the main micro participants can bear the market risk.
Based on these ideas, this paper proposes countermeasures from the macro level and micro-management aspects to establish risk-sharing mechanism. First of all, to improve the system of financing and have a transparent means of finance, such as the establishment of local bond system in the issuance of bonds while shifting some market risk make it clear in the law and smooth away "Budget Law" obstacles. Second, construct the local governments' policy financing system, while introducing market discipline mechanism. As for the micro-management level, the introduction of market competition, optimization of the risk financing structure through innovative ways and improvement of the risk control processes can be effective.
引文
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