会计信息质量与企业非效率投资研究
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摘要
企业非效率投资行为严重损害了股东利益和宏观经济的健康发展,一直是现代公司财务研究领域中的重要内容。学者们已经从不同角度分析了企业非效率投资产生的原因并提出了各种抑制企业非效率投资的方法。本文借鉴和发展了会计信息质量理论,在委托代理理论和信息不对称理论的框架内,探讨了会计信息质量治理企业非效率投资的机制,并用我国上市公司的数据实证检验了会计信息质量与企业非效率投资的关系,以期为治理企业非效率投资行为提供新的路径。
本文在分析我国企业投资及会计信息质量现状的基础上,运用信息不对称理论和委托代理理论分析了企业非效率投资行为产生的根源和会计信息质量治理企业非效率投资的机理,提出了会计信息质量治理企业非效率投资的路径为：(1)在资本市场上,高质量会计信息能够增加资本市场的流动性,降低投资者估计未来收益时考虑的风险水平,帮助资本市场上的投资者进行正确定价,从而减少企业在融资过程中产生的非效率投资行为；(2)在公司治理中,高质量会计信息有利于缓解企业中的信息不对称、降低契约的不完全、保证企业控制权优化配置和有效执行,有利于对董事会、经理人员和职工的行为进行监督和激励,从而引导代理人从事正确的投资行为,防止企业中的代理人采用非效率投资行为侵占委托人的利益。
在此基础上,本文采用2004—2006我国沪深制造业上市公司的经验数据,实证检验了会计信息质量与企业非效率投资的关系,研究发现：高质量会计信息既可以抑制企业投资过度也可以缓解企业投资不足；进一步,本文考察当企业投资资金来源不同和企业所处地区不同时,会计信息质量对企业非效率投资的不同治理效应,研究发现：(1)在自由现金流量较多企业中,高质量会计信息能更好地抑制企业投资过度；在面临融资约束较大的企业中,高质量会计信息能更好地缓解企业投资不足；(2)在投资者法律保护程度较高地区,高质量会计信息能更好地抑制企业投资过度；在金融发展水平较低地区,高质量会计信息能更好地缓解企业投资不足。
Inefficiency investment at the enterprise level severely damaged the interests of the shareholders and the sound development of macro-economy, has been a mainstream in the field of modern corporate finance research. Scholars have discussed the formation mechanism of inefficiency investment at the enterprise level from different perspectives and have brought forward methods to constrain the inefficiency investment of the enterprises from various angles. This paper tries to learn from and push forward the quality of accounting information research, and study mechanism of accounting information quality governing inefficiency investment of the enterprises within the framework of the principal-agent theory and information economics theory. Meanwhile, this paper also tests the relation between accounting information quality and inefficiency investment of the companies on a sample of listed corporations of manufacturing industry in china. The purpose is to provide clues for improving inefficient investment governance.
The paper first analyze the condition of enterprise investment efficient as well as accounting information quality in china, then this paper discuss the influence of information asymmetry and principal-agent conflict on behavior of enterprise investment. Final, this paper construct the channel of accounting information quality constraining inefficiency investment at the enterprise level through analysis of role of accounting information quality in capital markets and corporate governance:(1) High quality accounting information can add liquidity of capital markets, reduce risk level of future profit that investor expect, helps investors to make correct asset pricing, thus constrain inefficiency investment at the enterprise level in financing process; (2) High quality accounting information reduce information asymmetric and contractual incompleteness, ensure optimum allocation and effective implementation of corporate control rights, supervise and incentive of the managers, board of directors and staff in enterprise, thus constrain the inefficiency investment behavior of agents who intend to maximize their self-interest.
Based on the research in the above, this paper also test the relation between accounting information quality and inefficiency investment of the companies.First, this paper put forward hypothesis, then test these hypothesis on a sample of listed corporations of manufacturing industry in China from 2004 to 2006. The main findings are as follows: High quality of accounting information can reduce the overinvestment of company; High quality of accounting information can reduce the underinvestment of company. Then, this paper test the different effect of accounting information quality governing inefficiency investment of the enterprises. The main findings are as follows:(1) With other conditions unchanged, high quality of accounting information will reduce more the overinvestment of the listed companies with high free cash flow; With other conditions unchanged, high quality of accounting information will reduce more the underinvestment of the listed companies with more serious financial constraint; (2) With other conditions unchanged, high quality of accounting information will reduce more the overinvestment of the listed companies in higher level of legal areas; With other conditions unchanged, high quality of accounting information will reduce more the underinvestment of the listed companies in lower level of financial development areas.
本文在分析我国企业投资及会计信息质量现状的基础上,运用信息不对称理论和委托代理理论分析了企业非效率投资行为产生的根源和会计信息质量治理企业非效率投资的机理,提出了会计信息质量治理企业非效率投资的路径为：(1)在资本市场上,高质量会计信息能够增加资本市场的流动性,降低投资者估计未来收益时考虑的风险水平,帮助资本市场上的投资者进行正确定价,从而减少企业在融资过程中产生的非效率投资行为；(2)在公司治理中,高质量会计信息有利于缓解企业中的信息不对称、降低契约的不完全、保证企业控制权优化配置和有效执行,有利于对董事会、经理人员和职工的行为进行监督和激励,从而引导代理人从事正确的投资行为,防止企业中的代理人采用非效率投资行为侵占委托人的利益。
在此基础上,本文采用2004—2006我国沪深制造业上市公司的经验数据,实证检验了会计信息质量与企业非效率投资的关系,研究发现：高质量会计信息既可以抑制企业投资过度也可以缓解企业投资不足；进一步,本文考察当企业投资资金来源不同和企业所处地区不同时,会计信息质量对企业非效率投资的不同治理效应,研究发现：(1)在自由现金流量较多企业中,高质量会计信息能更好地抑制企业投资过度；在面临融资约束较大的企业中,高质量会计信息能更好地缓解企业投资不足；(2)在投资者法律保护程度较高地区,高质量会计信息能更好地抑制企业投资过度；在金融发展水平较低地区,高质量会计信息能更好地缓解企业投资不足。
Inefficiency investment at the enterprise level severely damaged the interests of the shareholders and the sound development of macro-economy, has been a mainstream in the field of modern corporate finance research. Scholars have discussed the formation mechanism of inefficiency investment at the enterprise level from different perspectives and have brought forward methods to constrain the inefficiency investment of the enterprises from various angles. This paper tries to learn from and push forward the quality of accounting information research, and study mechanism of accounting information quality governing inefficiency investment of the enterprises within the framework of the principal-agent theory and information economics theory. Meanwhile, this paper also tests the relation between accounting information quality and inefficiency investment of the companies on a sample of listed corporations of manufacturing industry in china. The purpose is to provide clues for improving inefficient investment governance.
The paper first analyze the condition of enterprise investment efficient as well as accounting information quality in china, then this paper discuss the influence of information asymmetry and principal-agent conflict on behavior of enterprise investment. Final, this paper construct the channel of accounting information quality constraining inefficiency investment at the enterprise level through analysis of role of accounting information quality in capital markets and corporate governance:(1) High quality accounting information can add liquidity of capital markets, reduce risk level of future profit that investor expect, helps investors to make correct asset pricing, thus constrain inefficiency investment at the enterprise level in financing process; (2) High quality accounting information reduce information asymmetric and contractual incompleteness, ensure optimum allocation and effective implementation of corporate control rights, supervise and incentive of the managers, board of directors and staff in enterprise, thus constrain the inefficiency investment behavior of agents who intend to maximize their self-interest.
Based on the research in the above, this paper also test the relation between accounting information quality and inefficiency investment of the companies.First, this paper put forward hypothesis, then test these hypothesis on a sample of listed corporations of manufacturing industry in China from 2004 to 2006. The main findings are as follows: High quality of accounting information can reduce the overinvestment of company; High quality of accounting information can reduce the underinvestment of company. Then, this paper test the different effect of accounting information quality governing inefficiency investment of the enterprises. The main findings are as follows:(1) With other conditions unchanged, high quality of accounting information will reduce more the overinvestment of the listed companies with high free cash flow; With other conditions unchanged, high quality of accounting information will reduce more the underinvestment of the listed companies with more serious financial constraint; (2) With other conditions unchanged, high quality of accounting information will reduce more the overinvestment of the listed companies in higher level of legal areas; With other conditions unchanged, high quality of accounting information will reduce more the underinvestment of the listed companies in lower level of financial development areas.
引文
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