上市公司股权结构对会计政策选择影响的研究
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摘要
股权结构是公司治理结构的基础,不同的股权结构决定不同的公司组织结构,从而决定不同的公司治理结构,最终决定企业的会计和财务行为以及企业的绩效。我国上市公司股权结构极其特殊,表现为国家股、法人股等非流通股比例过高、股权高度集中、股权持有者身份复杂等,这种特殊而复杂的股权结构导致了企业会计政策选择的动机亦很复杂。开展中国上市公司股权结构与企业会计政策选择行为关系的研究具有重大的理论和现实意义。本文针对我国上市公司利用会计政策选择操纵利润现象较为普遍的现实背景,从股权结构视角考察股权集中度、股权制衡度、股权流通性和股权持有者身份与上市公司会计政策选择行为之间的关系,并为规范企业会计政策选择行为提出了政策性建议。
首先,论文对国内外学者围绕企业会计政策选择的动机、经济后果、影响因素、选择立场等方面的研究内容进行了详细的综述,通过综述发现国内外研究的不足并提出本文的研究方向。在此基础上,阐述了契约理论、委托代理理论、利益相关者理论、信息经济学理论等理论的基本内涵,并在逐一分析每种理论与企业会计政策选择关系的同时,着重剖析了企业契约、企业各利益相关者对企业会计政策选择的影响,为下文的实证研究奠定了坚实的理论基础。
其次,结合我国上市公司产权制度背景,对我国上市公司股权结构和会计政策选择现状进行了分析,为研究上市公司股权结构对会计政策选择的影响奠定了坚实的制度背景。
再次,结合我国上市公司股权结构的特点,从上市公司股权集中度、股权制衡度、股权流通性、股权持有者身份四个维度提取反映股权结构的自变量指标,根据固定资产折旧方法、存货计价方法、低值易耗品摊销方法、资产减值等不同会计政策选择对企业利润的影响程度确立了ACA、ACB和ACC三个指标作为反映会计政策选择强度的因变量,选取2003年至2007年五年间共4713家上市公司为样本,运用有序Probit模型对影响会计政策选择的股权结构因素进行了实证分析。研究表明,第一大股东持股比例和股权制衡度与企业会计政策选择强度显著负相关,前五大股东持股比例和高管持股比例与企业会计政策选择强度显著正相关。
最后,在考察股权结构对上市公司会计政策选择影响一般规律的基础上,将生命周期阶段和最终控制人类型引入公司股权结构与会计政策选择行为的动因及规律的研究,考察在生命周期的不同阶段和不同最终控制人类型的公司中股权结构对会计政策选择的影响规律。研究发现,股权制衡度与会计政策选择强度显著负相关,其对总体样本、成长期公司和成熟期公司会计政策选择的影响程度大致相当,而对衰退期公司的影响显著增大;前五大股东持股比例与企业会计政策选择强度显著正相关,其对总体样本和国有控股公司会计政策选择的影响程度大致相当,而对民营控股公司的影响显著增大。
本文的主要创新点四个。一是研究视角新颖独特,表现在三方面:首先从理论和实证两方面分析并检验了不同股权结构对企业会计政策选择的影响程度;其次,基于生命周期理论研究了公司成长期、成熟期和衰退期三个不同阶段股权结构与企业会计政策选择的关系;第三,基于最终控制人类型研究了国有和民营两类最终控制人公司股权结构与企业会计政策选择的关系。二是构建了立体多角度的股权结构指标体系。本文结合我国上市公司股权结构的特点,重新界定了股权结构的概念,并从股权集中度、股权制衡度、股权持有者身份、股权流通性四个维度构建了12个指标组成的立体多角度的股权结构指标体系,较全面地反映了股权结构的各个层面,克服了以往研究多为单一层面股权结构指标的不足。三是采用组合会计政策加以研究。本文选择企业常用的固定资产折旧方法、存货计价方法等七项组合会计政策作为研究对象,并根据不同会计政策选择对利润影响程度不同,设置了会计政策选择强度指标,克服了以往研究多用单一会计政策的不足,增强了研究结论的可信度。四是研究方法科学。由于难以获得企业会计政策选择的连续性数据,本文针对反映企业会计政策选择的数据是以分类为主的离散数据,实证中采用Ordered Probit分析建模方法研究上市公司股权结构对会计政策选择的影响,克服了以往研究多采用多元和二元逻辑回归存在统计假设问题造成实证研究结果差异迥然且难以令人信服的不足。
论文立足于中国上市公司特殊的股权结构研究股权集中度、股权制衡度、股权流通性、股权持有者身份对企业会计政策选择行为的影响规律,为西方实证会计理论进行本土化研究提供了经验证据,为规范上市公司会计政策选择行为、抑制上市公司高管自利行为、提高上市公司会计信息质量提供了依据。
Corporate governance structure is based on the stock equity structure, which determines different corporate structure, decides different corporate governance structure, and finally decides the accounting and financial behavior as well as the performance of corporate. Stock equity structure of China's listed corporations is extremely special, which represents the non-tradable share’s high proportion such as state-owned shares and corporate shares, high concentration of stock equity, complexity identities of shareholders, etc. The special and complex shareholding structure leads to complex motivation of accounting policy selection of corporations. It is of great theoretic and realistic significance to research the relationship between stock equity structure and accounting policy selection behavior. In this paper, aiming at a background of complex stock equity structure and universal profit manipulation by using the selection of accounting policy, the stock equity concentration degree, stock equity balance degree, stock equity mobility and the relationship between the stockholders’identity and the accounting policy selection of the listed corporations were studied from the angle of shareholding structure, and finally policy-related suggestions were given with the purpose of normalizing the accounting policy selection behavior of corporations to standardization.
Firstly, the paper made a detailed review on the study of the motivation of accounting policy selection, economic effects, effects factors and the selection standpoint from the scholars at home and abroad. Through the review, deficiencies were found and research direction of this paper was proposed. Then, the influence on the accounting policy selection behavior from stock equity structure was discussed basing on contract theory, principal-agent theory, stakeholder theory and information economics theory.
Secondly, combining with the background of property right system of China’s listed corporations, the actuality of stock equity structure and accounting policy selection were analyzed, which established the foundation of applying western positive accounting theory into the practice of China’s listed corporations.
Thirdly, combining with the characteristics of China listed corporations’stock equity structure, this paper selected independent variables from four dimensionalities, which are stock equity concentration degree, stock equity balance degree, stock equity mobility and stock holders’identity, selected ACA, ACB and ACC , and which are based on the effect degree of profit under different selections of accounting policies, which are depreciation methods of fixed asset, pricing methods of inventory, amortization methods of low priced and easily worn article and assets impairment methods, etc, as dependent variables, which reflect the intensity of accounting policy selection. The paper selected 4, 713 listed corporations both in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock market as research sample from 2003 to 2007, by using ordered probit model to analyze the factors which influence the accounting policy selection. The study indicates that there was a significant negative correlation between the shareholding ratio of the first majority shareholder, stock equity balance and intensity of accounting policy selection, and there was a significant positive correlation between the shareholding ratio of the top five shareholders, the shareholding ratio of the managements and intensity of accounting policy selection.
Finally, basing on the general law of stock equity structure’s impact on the accounting policy selection, the paper inducted lifecycle phase and ultimate controller’s type into the research of motivation and law between stock equity structure and accounting policy selection, reviewed the influence law of stock equity structure and accounting policy selection in the different lifecycle phases and different types of ultimate controllers. The research indicated that, there is a significant negative correlation between the stock equity balance degree and accounting policy selection intensity, which has a broad comparability degree on the accounting policy selection intensity with total samples, as well as corporations in growth stage and maturity stage, however the influence is augmented significantly when it comes to the decline stage. There is a significant positive correlation between the shareholding ratio of the first five shareholders and accounting policy selection intensity, which has a broad comparability degree on the accounting policy selection intensity with total samples, state-owned and state-controlled corporations, however the influence is augmented significantly when it comes to the private corporations.
This paper based itself upon special stock equity structure of China, studied the influence law of stock equity concentration degree, stock equity balance degree, stock equity mobility and stock holders’identity on the accounting policy selection behavior. The paper provided experimental evidence for the western positive accounting theory in the application to the local research in China, and offered evidence to regulate accounting policy selection behavior, restrain the self-interest behavior of the management, and improve the accounting information quality of listed corporations.
首先,论文对国内外学者围绕企业会计政策选择的动机、经济后果、影响因素、选择立场等方面的研究内容进行了详细的综述,通过综述发现国内外研究的不足并提出本文的研究方向。在此基础上,阐述了契约理论、委托代理理论、利益相关者理论、信息经济学理论等理论的基本内涵,并在逐一分析每种理论与企业会计政策选择关系的同时,着重剖析了企业契约、企业各利益相关者对企业会计政策选择的影响,为下文的实证研究奠定了坚实的理论基础。
其次,结合我国上市公司产权制度背景,对我国上市公司股权结构和会计政策选择现状进行了分析,为研究上市公司股权结构对会计政策选择的影响奠定了坚实的制度背景。
再次,结合我国上市公司股权结构的特点,从上市公司股权集中度、股权制衡度、股权流通性、股权持有者身份四个维度提取反映股权结构的自变量指标,根据固定资产折旧方法、存货计价方法、低值易耗品摊销方法、资产减值等不同会计政策选择对企业利润的影响程度确立了ACA、ACB和ACC三个指标作为反映会计政策选择强度的因变量,选取2003年至2007年五年间共4713家上市公司为样本,运用有序Probit模型对影响会计政策选择的股权结构因素进行了实证分析。研究表明,第一大股东持股比例和股权制衡度与企业会计政策选择强度显著负相关,前五大股东持股比例和高管持股比例与企业会计政策选择强度显著正相关。
最后,在考察股权结构对上市公司会计政策选择影响一般规律的基础上,将生命周期阶段和最终控制人类型引入公司股权结构与会计政策选择行为的动因及规律的研究,考察在生命周期的不同阶段和不同最终控制人类型的公司中股权结构对会计政策选择的影响规律。研究发现,股权制衡度与会计政策选择强度显著负相关,其对总体样本、成长期公司和成熟期公司会计政策选择的影响程度大致相当,而对衰退期公司的影响显著增大;前五大股东持股比例与企业会计政策选择强度显著正相关,其对总体样本和国有控股公司会计政策选择的影响程度大致相当,而对民营控股公司的影响显著增大。
本文的主要创新点四个。一是研究视角新颖独特,表现在三方面:首先从理论和实证两方面分析并检验了不同股权结构对企业会计政策选择的影响程度;其次,基于生命周期理论研究了公司成长期、成熟期和衰退期三个不同阶段股权结构与企业会计政策选择的关系;第三,基于最终控制人类型研究了国有和民营两类最终控制人公司股权结构与企业会计政策选择的关系。二是构建了立体多角度的股权结构指标体系。本文结合我国上市公司股权结构的特点,重新界定了股权结构的概念,并从股权集中度、股权制衡度、股权持有者身份、股权流通性四个维度构建了12个指标组成的立体多角度的股权结构指标体系,较全面地反映了股权结构的各个层面,克服了以往研究多为单一层面股权结构指标的不足。三是采用组合会计政策加以研究。本文选择企业常用的固定资产折旧方法、存货计价方法等七项组合会计政策作为研究对象,并根据不同会计政策选择对利润影响程度不同,设置了会计政策选择强度指标,克服了以往研究多用单一会计政策的不足,增强了研究结论的可信度。四是研究方法科学。由于难以获得企业会计政策选择的连续性数据,本文针对反映企业会计政策选择的数据是以分类为主的离散数据,实证中采用Ordered Probit分析建模方法研究上市公司股权结构对会计政策选择的影响,克服了以往研究多采用多元和二元逻辑回归存在统计假设问题造成实证研究结果差异迥然且难以令人信服的不足。
论文立足于中国上市公司特殊的股权结构研究股权集中度、股权制衡度、股权流通性、股权持有者身份对企业会计政策选择行为的影响规律,为西方实证会计理论进行本土化研究提供了经验证据,为规范上市公司会计政策选择行为、抑制上市公司高管自利行为、提高上市公司会计信息质量提供了依据。
Corporate governance structure is based on the stock equity structure, which determines different corporate structure, decides different corporate governance structure, and finally decides the accounting and financial behavior as well as the performance of corporate. Stock equity structure of China's listed corporations is extremely special, which represents the non-tradable share’s high proportion such as state-owned shares and corporate shares, high concentration of stock equity, complexity identities of shareholders, etc. The special and complex shareholding structure leads to complex motivation of accounting policy selection of corporations. It is of great theoretic and realistic significance to research the relationship between stock equity structure and accounting policy selection behavior. In this paper, aiming at a background of complex stock equity structure and universal profit manipulation by using the selection of accounting policy, the stock equity concentration degree, stock equity balance degree, stock equity mobility and the relationship between the stockholders’identity and the accounting policy selection of the listed corporations were studied from the angle of shareholding structure, and finally policy-related suggestions were given with the purpose of normalizing the accounting policy selection behavior of corporations to standardization.
Firstly, the paper made a detailed review on the study of the motivation of accounting policy selection, economic effects, effects factors and the selection standpoint from the scholars at home and abroad. Through the review, deficiencies were found and research direction of this paper was proposed. Then, the influence on the accounting policy selection behavior from stock equity structure was discussed basing on contract theory, principal-agent theory, stakeholder theory and information economics theory.
Secondly, combining with the background of property right system of China’s listed corporations, the actuality of stock equity structure and accounting policy selection were analyzed, which established the foundation of applying western positive accounting theory into the practice of China’s listed corporations.
Thirdly, combining with the characteristics of China listed corporations’stock equity structure, this paper selected independent variables from four dimensionalities, which are stock equity concentration degree, stock equity balance degree, stock equity mobility and stock holders’identity, selected ACA, ACB and ACC , and which are based on the effect degree of profit under different selections of accounting policies, which are depreciation methods of fixed asset, pricing methods of inventory, amortization methods of low priced and easily worn article and assets impairment methods, etc, as dependent variables, which reflect the intensity of accounting policy selection. The paper selected 4, 713 listed corporations both in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock market as research sample from 2003 to 2007, by using ordered probit model to analyze the factors which influence the accounting policy selection. The study indicates that there was a significant negative correlation between the shareholding ratio of the first majority shareholder, stock equity balance and intensity of accounting policy selection, and there was a significant positive correlation between the shareholding ratio of the top five shareholders, the shareholding ratio of the managements and intensity of accounting policy selection.
Finally, basing on the general law of stock equity structure’s impact on the accounting policy selection, the paper inducted lifecycle phase and ultimate controller’s type into the research of motivation and law between stock equity structure and accounting policy selection, reviewed the influence law of stock equity structure and accounting policy selection in the different lifecycle phases and different types of ultimate controllers. The research indicated that, there is a significant negative correlation between the stock equity balance degree and accounting policy selection intensity, which has a broad comparability degree on the accounting policy selection intensity with total samples, as well as corporations in growth stage and maturity stage, however the influence is augmented significantly when it comes to the decline stage. There is a significant positive correlation between the shareholding ratio of the first five shareholders and accounting policy selection intensity, which has a broad comparability degree on the accounting policy selection intensity with total samples, state-owned and state-controlled corporations, however the influence is augmented significantly when it comes to the private corporations.
This paper based itself upon special stock equity structure of China, studied the influence law of stock equity concentration degree, stock equity balance degree, stock equity mobility and stock holders’identity on the accounting policy selection behavior. The paper provided experimental evidence for the western positive accounting theory in the application to the local research in China, and offered evidence to regulate accounting policy selection behavior, restrain the self-interest behavior of the management, and improve the accounting information quality of listed corporations.
引文
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