公司治理对归核化战略决策及其实施效率的影响研究
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摘要
自20世纪70-80年代随着多元化折价问题的凸显,“回归主业”的现象在西方国家的企业中出现。回应这一现象,相关学者提出了归核化战略的概念,并对其动因与结果展开研究。相关研究发现,归核化战略决策的制定通常是多元化战略实施后经营业绩不佳所采取的一种纠偏手段,因此,归核化也是防止企业败于多元化战略的有效途径。然而,巨人集团、德隆集团和三九集团等多元化战略的失败引发了一个值得研究的问题：是什么因素阻碍了企业及时制定归核化战略决策以防止多元化战略的失败?此外,尽管归核化战略的实施可以降低多元化折价程度从而有助于改善公司绩效,但关于归核化战略与公司绩效的关系尚没有形成一致的结论,甚至一些学者发现,二者并不存在显著的关系。对此,笔者提出了第二个值得探索的问题：是什么因素影响了归核化战略的实施效率,从而影响到归核化战略实施后的经济效果?而实践中,公司治理与公司战略之间协同演进的现象为笔者回答上述两个核心问题提供了现实的基础。
近几年,公司治理对战略决策的影响逐渐被学者重视,公司治理的基本职能也由传统的监督制衡转变为科学决策,因此,公司治理必然是引导公司归核化战略决策的关键变量之一。此外,相关学者还发现,公司战略本身没有优劣之分,只有当公司治理与公司战略相匹配时才能给企业带来最大的价值,循此逻辑,归核化战略的实施是否可以改善公司绩效取决于公司治理设计的科学性。因此,针对上述问题,利用理论推演与实证的研究方法,一方面,从战略纠偏和前瞻性战略变革推动作用的视角,分析与检验了公司治理对归核化战略决策制定的作用路径；另一方面,从战略实施保障机制的视角,分析与检验了公司治理对归核化战略实施效率的影响路径。
首先,论文分析了公司治理影响归核化战略决策的两条路径：第一,基于委托代理理论与行为理论,以机会主义行为的抑制以及认知偏差的纠正这两个方面的职能为视角,分析了公司治理对经营绩效与归核化战略决策关系的调节作用。第二,基于公司战略变革理论,以资源供给、企业家精神塑造以及学习能力提升三个方面的职能为视角,分析了公司治理对归核化战略决策制定的直接作用。最后,整合上述路径形成了公司治理影响归核化战略决策的基本模型。
其次,论文阐述了权变视角下公司治理研究的思路,并分析了公司战略作为公司治理权变因素的内在逻辑与现实存在性。在此基础上,推演了内生于归核化战略实施的公司治理机制与环境的变化,并基于公司治理机制间的替代效应与互补效应理论,分析了那些适应于公司归核化战略实施的治理职能,并据此构建了公司治理对归核化战略实施效率影响的理论模型。
第三,基于上述模型从董事会特征和股权特征两个维度九个指标提出研究假设,并利用实证的方法检验了公司治理对归核化战略决策及其实施效率的影响。总体检验结果表明,公司治理不仅是归核化战略决策的引导机制,而且是归核化战略实施的保障机制。其中,独立董事与领取报酬董事比例的提升、年度董事会会议次数以及第一大股东持股比例的降低可以显著地提高归核化战略决策制定的可能性对经营绩效的负向敏感性；董事会规模的收缩、独立董事比例和领取报酬董事比例的降低、年度董事会会议次数的增加、总经理股权激励措施的实施、股权制衡程度的强化以及自然人控股的股权性质可以推动多元化公司通过归核化战略进行前瞻性战略变革；独立董事比例、领取报酬董事比例和股权制衡程度的降低、年度董事会会议次数和第一大股东持股比例的上升以及非自然人控股的股权性质对归核化战略实施效率具有积极作用,董事会规模和总经理持股比例对归核化战略实施效率的影响呈现出显著的倒U型关系。
最后,论文分析了传统研究中“以价值为导向的公司治理优化逻辑”的缺陷,构建了以战略为导向的公司治理优化的基本思路,并以公司归核化战略为例,基于已形成的理论研究结论与实证检验结果,总结了基于公司归核化战略的董事会特征与股权特征的优化路径,其研究结论对于指导中国上市公司如何完善公司治理结构以保障高效实施归核化战略具有一定的现实意义。
论文的创新体现为三个方面：第一,突破了静态视角下公司多元化战略实施保障机制的研究思路,以归核化战略为手段,从战略纠偏和前瞻性战略变革两个方面,基于动态的视角提出了多元化战略实施后的公司治理优化问题；第二,突破了传统的归核化战略研究中“绩效——归核化——绩效”的线性关系,从公司治理的视角探讨了其对传统因果关系的调节作用,相对完整地构建了归核化战略的因果模型；第三,突破了仅将委托代理问题的抑制作为公司治理核心职能的局限,从公司治理职能的多个维度探索了公司治理的战略纠偏职能以及前瞻性战略变革推动职能,形成了战略导向的动态公司治理优化的思路。
Since diversification discount was found in the 1970s, the phenomenon of "returning to core businesses" began to arise in some western companies. Reaction to this phenomenon, some scholars proposed the concept of refocus and studied the driving forces and effects of refocusing strategy. Relative studies show that decision-making of refocus strategy is a corrective means taken by diversified companies due to poor performance, so refocus is also a mean by which to prevent companies from failing in diversification strategy. However, the fact that many companies such as Giant Group, Delong Group, and Sanjiu Group failed in diversified strategy inspired a question worthy of study:what factors hindered companies in making timely refocus strategy to prevent their failure in diversification strategy? Besides, the implementation of refocus strategy can reduce the diversification degree to resolve the problem of "diversification discount" which helps to improve corporate performance, but empirical results on the correlation between refocus strategy and corporate performance have not yet formed a consistent conclusion. Some literatures even demonstrate that no significant correlation exists between the two. Hence, this thesis proposes a second question worthy of probing:what factors influenced the efficiency of implementation of refocusing strategy which in turn influenced the economic effectiveness after the implementation of refocusing strategy? In reality, the coordinative evolution between corporate governance and strategy provides a realistic foundation on which to answer the above two core questions.
In recent years, the important role of corporate governance on corporate strategic decisions has gradually attracted concerns from academics. Basic functions of corporate governance have transformed from traditional monitor and control to scientific decision-making. Consequently, corporate governance becomes one of the critical variables in guiding the refocusing strategy decisions. Besides, it has been found that there is no best corporate strategy. Only if corporate governance fits corporate strategy, can corporate strategy bring maximal value to the company. Hence, whether the implementation of refocusing strategy can improve the company's performance depends on the design of corporate governance. Therefore, this thesis studied the above questions based on relative literatures with methods of theoretical reduction and empirical study. On one hand, this thesis analyzed and tested the functioning path of corporate governance to refocus strategy decisions from the perspectives of strategic correction and proactive strategic change. On the other hand, it analyzed and tested the influence direction of corporate governance on the implementation efficiency of refocus strategy from the perspective of the strategic guarantee role of corporate governance.
First of all, this thesis analyzed the two paths by which corporate governance affect refocusing strategy decisions. First, it analyzed the adjustment role of corporate governance on the relations between corporate performance and refocusing strategy decisions based on the principal-agent theory and the behavior theory by restraining opportunistic behaviors and correcting cognitive deviation. Second, it analyzed the direct role of corporate governance on the making of refocus strategy decisions based on the strategic change theory from the perspectives of resource supply, entrepreneurship nursing, and learning ability. An integration of the two paths forms the theoretical model about the role of corporate governance on the making of refocus strategy decisions.
Second, this thesis illustrated the idea of studying corporate governance from the contingency perspective, analyzed the intrinsic logic and realistic existence of corporate strategy as a contingent factor of corporate governance. Then, it reduced change of corporate governance mechanism and environment which is endogenous in the implementation refocus strategy, analyzed corporate governance functions matching the implementation of refocus strategy based on the supplement and compliment effects of corporate governance mechanisms, and finally constructed a theoretical model about the influence of corporate governance on the implementation efficiency of refocus strategy.
Thirdly, this thesis proposed research hypotheses based on nine indexes from two dimensions-board characteristics and equity characteristics and tested the path by which corporate governance influences the decision making and implemental efficiency of refocusing strategy with empirical methods. It generally concludes that corporate governance is not only an effective guiding mechanism of refocusing strategy decisions but also an important guarantee mechanism for implementing refocusing strategy. Specifically, conclusions are as follows:increase in percentages of independent directors and paid directors and reduction in the number of board meetings and in percentage of shares of the first biggest shareholder can significantly improve the negative sensibility of refocus strategy decisions to corporate performance; retrenchment of board scale, reduction in percentages of independent directors and paid directors, increase in the number of annual board meetings, implementation of the shareholding incentive scheme for CEO, intensification of equity supervision degree, and nature of equity held by natural persons have a facilitating role on forward-looking strategic change through refocusing strategy decisions; decline of the percentages of independent directors and paid directors and in equity supervision degree of the first biggest shareholder, increase in the number of annual board meetings and percentages of shares held by the first biggest shareholders and nature of the equity controlled by no-natural persons have a significantly positive role on the implementation efficiency of refocusing strategy, and board scale and percentage of shares held by CEO has a significantly reverse U-shaped role on the implementation efficiency of refocus strategy.
Finally, this thesis analyzed limitations of the traditionally value-oriented optimization logics of corporate governance, constructed a strategy-oriented basic optimization logic of corporate governance, and summarized the refocus-strategy-based paths by which to optimize board and equity characteristics on the basis of the existing conclusions, thus having important realistic implications for guiding Chinese listed companies to perfect their corporate governance structures and thus to guarantee the efficient implementation of refocus strategy.
The innovations of this thesis are embodied in three aspects. Firstly, this thesis breaks through the static method that ensures the diversified strategy effective and proposes the designing problem of corporate governance mechanism after the implement of diversified strategy based on the influence of corporate governance on the refocusing strategy in dynamic perspective, suggesting that the refocusing strategy is both the strategic corrective mean and direction of strategic change for the corporations which are implemting the diversified strategy. Second, this thesis breaks through the traditional research paradigm in the field of refocusing strategy that is the linear relationship of "performance-refocus-performance" and probes into the adjustment effect of corporate governance on the relationship between the performance and refocusing strategy, which extend the traditional model of cause and effect of refocusing strategy. Lastly, this thesis breaks through the function of corporate governance that only resolves the agency problem and anaylsis the function of correcting the strategic error and promoting the forward-looking strategic change, which forms the idea of dynamic optimization design of corporate governance based on corporate strategy.
近几年,公司治理对战略决策的影响逐渐被学者重视,公司治理的基本职能也由传统的监督制衡转变为科学决策,因此,公司治理必然是引导公司归核化战略决策的关键变量之一。此外,相关学者还发现,公司战略本身没有优劣之分,只有当公司治理与公司战略相匹配时才能给企业带来最大的价值,循此逻辑,归核化战略的实施是否可以改善公司绩效取决于公司治理设计的科学性。因此,针对上述问题,利用理论推演与实证的研究方法,一方面,从战略纠偏和前瞻性战略变革推动作用的视角,分析与检验了公司治理对归核化战略决策制定的作用路径；另一方面,从战略实施保障机制的视角,分析与检验了公司治理对归核化战略实施效率的影响路径。
首先,论文分析了公司治理影响归核化战略决策的两条路径：第一,基于委托代理理论与行为理论,以机会主义行为的抑制以及认知偏差的纠正这两个方面的职能为视角,分析了公司治理对经营绩效与归核化战略决策关系的调节作用。第二,基于公司战略变革理论,以资源供给、企业家精神塑造以及学习能力提升三个方面的职能为视角,分析了公司治理对归核化战略决策制定的直接作用。最后,整合上述路径形成了公司治理影响归核化战略决策的基本模型。
其次,论文阐述了权变视角下公司治理研究的思路,并分析了公司战略作为公司治理权变因素的内在逻辑与现实存在性。在此基础上,推演了内生于归核化战略实施的公司治理机制与环境的变化,并基于公司治理机制间的替代效应与互补效应理论,分析了那些适应于公司归核化战略实施的治理职能,并据此构建了公司治理对归核化战略实施效率影响的理论模型。
第三,基于上述模型从董事会特征和股权特征两个维度九个指标提出研究假设,并利用实证的方法检验了公司治理对归核化战略决策及其实施效率的影响。总体检验结果表明,公司治理不仅是归核化战略决策的引导机制,而且是归核化战略实施的保障机制。其中,独立董事与领取报酬董事比例的提升、年度董事会会议次数以及第一大股东持股比例的降低可以显著地提高归核化战略决策制定的可能性对经营绩效的负向敏感性；董事会规模的收缩、独立董事比例和领取报酬董事比例的降低、年度董事会会议次数的增加、总经理股权激励措施的实施、股权制衡程度的强化以及自然人控股的股权性质可以推动多元化公司通过归核化战略进行前瞻性战略变革；独立董事比例、领取报酬董事比例和股权制衡程度的降低、年度董事会会议次数和第一大股东持股比例的上升以及非自然人控股的股权性质对归核化战略实施效率具有积极作用,董事会规模和总经理持股比例对归核化战略实施效率的影响呈现出显著的倒U型关系。
最后,论文分析了传统研究中“以价值为导向的公司治理优化逻辑”的缺陷,构建了以战略为导向的公司治理优化的基本思路,并以公司归核化战略为例,基于已形成的理论研究结论与实证检验结果,总结了基于公司归核化战略的董事会特征与股权特征的优化路径,其研究结论对于指导中国上市公司如何完善公司治理结构以保障高效实施归核化战略具有一定的现实意义。
论文的创新体现为三个方面：第一,突破了静态视角下公司多元化战略实施保障机制的研究思路,以归核化战略为手段,从战略纠偏和前瞻性战略变革两个方面,基于动态的视角提出了多元化战略实施后的公司治理优化问题；第二,突破了传统的归核化战略研究中“绩效——归核化——绩效”的线性关系,从公司治理的视角探讨了其对传统因果关系的调节作用,相对完整地构建了归核化战略的因果模型；第三,突破了仅将委托代理问题的抑制作为公司治理核心职能的局限,从公司治理职能的多个维度探索了公司治理的战略纠偏职能以及前瞻性战略变革推动职能,形成了战略导向的动态公司治理优化的思路。
Since diversification discount was found in the 1970s, the phenomenon of "returning to core businesses" began to arise in some western companies. Reaction to this phenomenon, some scholars proposed the concept of refocus and studied the driving forces and effects of refocusing strategy. Relative studies show that decision-making of refocus strategy is a corrective means taken by diversified companies due to poor performance, so refocus is also a mean by which to prevent companies from failing in diversification strategy. However, the fact that many companies such as Giant Group, Delong Group, and Sanjiu Group failed in diversified strategy inspired a question worthy of study:what factors hindered companies in making timely refocus strategy to prevent their failure in diversification strategy? Besides, the implementation of refocus strategy can reduce the diversification degree to resolve the problem of "diversification discount" which helps to improve corporate performance, but empirical results on the correlation between refocus strategy and corporate performance have not yet formed a consistent conclusion. Some literatures even demonstrate that no significant correlation exists between the two. Hence, this thesis proposes a second question worthy of probing:what factors influenced the efficiency of implementation of refocusing strategy which in turn influenced the economic effectiveness after the implementation of refocusing strategy? In reality, the coordinative evolution between corporate governance and strategy provides a realistic foundation on which to answer the above two core questions.
In recent years, the important role of corporate governance on corporate strategic decisions has gradually attracted concerns from academics. Basic functions of corporate governance have transformed from traditional monitor and control to scientific decision-making. Consequently, corporate governance becomes one of the critical variables in guiding the refocusing strategy decisions. Besides, it has been found that there is no best corporate strategy. Only if corporate governance fits corporate strategy, can corporate strategy bring maximal value to the company. Hence, whether the implementation of refocusing strategy can improve the company's performance depends on the design of corporate governance. Therefore, this thesis studied the above questions based on relative literatures with methods of theoretical reduction and empirical study. On one hand, this thesis analyzed and tested the functioning path of corporate governance to refocus strategy decisions from the perspectives of strategic correction and proactive strategic change. On the other hand, it analyzed and tested the influence direction of corporate governance on the implementation efficiency of refocus strategy from the perspective of the strategic guarantee role of corporate governance.
First of all, this thesis analyzed the two paths by which corporate governance affect refocusing strategy decisions. First, it analyzed the adjustment role of corporate governance on the relations between corporate performance and refocusing strategy decisions based on the principal-agent theory and the behavior theory by restraining opportunistic behaviors and correcting cognitive deviation. Second, it analyzed the direct role of corporate governance on the making of refocus strategy decisions based on the strategic change theory from the perspectives of resource supply, entrepreneurship nursing, and learning ability. An integration of the two paths forms the theoretical model about the role of corporate governance on the making of refocus strategy decisions.
Second, this thesis illustrated the idea of studying corporate governance from the contingency perspective, analyzed the intrinsic logic and realistic existence of corporate strategy as a contingent factor of corporate governance. Then, it reduced change of corporate governance mechanism and environment which is endogenous in the implementation refocus strategy, analyzed corporate governance functions matching the implementation of refocus strategy based on the supplement and compliment effects of corporate governance mechanisms, and finally constructed a theoretical model about the influence of corporate governance on the implementation efficiency of refocus strategy.
Thirdly, this thesis proposed research hypotheses based on nine indexes from two dimensions-board characteristics and equity characteristics and tested the path by which corporate governance influences the decision making and implemental efficiency of refocusing strategy with empirical methods. It generally concludes that corporate governance is not only an effective guiding mechanism of refocusing strategy decisions but also an important guarantee mechanism for implementing refocusing strategy. Specifically, conclusions are as follows:increase in percentages of independent directors and paid directors and reduction in the number of board meetings and in percentage of shares of the first biggest shareholder can significantly improve the negative sensibility of refocus strategy decisions to corporate performance; retrenchment of board scale, reduction in percentages of independent directors and paid directors, increase in the number of annual board meetings, implementation of the shareholding incentive scheme for CEO, intensification of equity supervision degree, and nature of equity held by natural persons have a facilitating role on forward-looking strategic change through refocusing strategy decisions; decline of the percentages of independent directors and paid directors and in equity supervision degree of the first biggest shareholder, increase in the number of annual board meetings and percentages of shares held by the first biggest shareholders and nature of the equity controlled by no-natural persons have a significantly positive role on the implementation efficiency of refocusing strategy, and board scale and percentage of shares held by CEO has a significantly reverse U-shaped role on the implementation efficiency of refocus strategy.
Finally, this thesis analyzed limitations of the traditionally value-oriented optimization logics of corporate governance, constructed a strategy-oriented basic optimization logic of corporate governance, and summarized the refocus-strategy-based paths by which to optimize board and equity characteristics on the basis of the existing conclusions, thus having important realistic implications for guiding Chinese listed companies to perfect their corporate governance structures and thus to guarantee the efficient implementation of refocus strategy.
The innovations of this thesis are embodied in three aspects. Firstly, this thesis breaks through the static method that ensures the diversified strategy effective and proposes the designing problem of corporate governance mechanism after the implement of diversified strategy based on the influence of corporate governance on the refocusing strategy in dynamic perspective, suggesting that the refocusing strategy is both the strategic corrective mean and direction of strategic change for the corporations which are implemting the diversified strategy. Second, this thesis breaks through the traditional research paradigm in the field of refocusing strategy that is the linear relationship of "performance-refocus-performance" and probes into the adjustment effect of corporate governance on the relationship between the performance and refocusing strategy, which extend the traditional model of cause and effect of refocusing strategy. Lastly, this thesis breaks through the function of corporate governance that only resolves the agency problem and anaylsis the function of correcting the strategic error and promoting the forward-looking strategic change, which forms the idea of dynamic optimization design of corporate governance based on corporate strategy.
引文
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