腐败、银行信贷与治理方式研究
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摘要
作为配置金融资源的核心部门,银行业的腐败案件频发,使金融生态环境不断恶化,成为金融不稳定的重要诱因。现实不得不让我们审视什么原因造成了如此高的腐败发生率?银行信贷融资中会发生什么腐败?对项目信贷融资及经济绩效又会产生什么影响呢?如何在信贷腐败行为下确定最优的信贷合约激励?如何对金融腐败进行经济治理呢?这些都是亟需解决的问题。
本文对这些问题的研究集中在三个维度,即腐败、制度及经济绩效,银行信贷非规范融资和合谋腐败,金融腐败的经济治理方式。第一个维度通过提出的基于入门费的腐败生成模式实现,把腐败、金融市场和经济绩效统一在一个分析框架内。第二个维度是通过对行为主体非规范融资和银行内部及外部合谋的不同特质并考虑合约关系来研究的。第三个维度是在法经济学的框架下,通过分析金融监管与金融腐败的博弈过程,并设立有效的自我报告制度的反腐败机制来实现的。
本文在相应章节分别用独特的视角定义了腐败、金融腐败、合谋腐败。腐败,就是当事人用一种不被其他人所预期的方式违反游戏规则并能从中获取不合理收益的行为。金融腐败,则是一切不按照金融业的交易规则或权力规则办事,为自身谋取私利的非规范融资行为。合谋腐败,即两个及以上的作为金融业资源配置下的互补性腐败主体,通过一个可执行的和自我执行的私下合约滥用委托权利、以最大化非法收益总价值的金融腐败行为。这几个概念贯穿本文的研究。
关于腐败、制度和经济绩效这个维度,本文提出了基于入门费的腐败生成模式。通过研究,将腐败问题延伸到官僚体制的各层次之间,指出腐败以上层官员向下层官员收取入门费并以有利可图的职位为交换对象的“权钱交易”形式进行,论证了功能良好的金融制度的存在以及审查监督的有效性改变了公共部门的租金分配,可以降低腐败水平。据此入门费模式,利用一个关于生产个体项目选择、政府机构进入管制和不完善金融市场的模型,研究了官僚作风和腐败对创业企业融资和经济绩效的影响,研究了金融市场的功能在决定腐败的影响方面如何起到一个关键作用。进而利用三阶段最小二乘法将腐败、经济增长与公共投资三大问题纳入一个分析框架下从公共投资的角度实证分析了腐败对经济绩效的影响。
关于银行信贷非规范融资和合谋腐败这个维度,本文分别对这两大问题在不同的章节里展开论述。在第四章里,专门研究银行信贷非规范融资腐败。首先根据腐败的不同动机将企业家在向银行寻求信贷融资时遇到腐败区分为两类,即发生在负责信贷审批的高层人员中的审批腐败和发生在负责贷款发放的基层人员中的支付腐败。通过分析揭示两类腐败分别对信贷融资产生的影响,证明了基层支付腐败对信贷融资项目产生了逆向选择,阻止了低风险项目的信贷融资行为,造成了信贷市场的低效率和金融市场的脆弱性。而且高层审批腐败人员具有打击基层人员支付腐败的激励,他们因此会适度开展反腐败工作。其次,本文分析了执法的不完美和执法腐败对银行信贷存在的影响。在银行追偿信贷资金时,增加了执法腐败的信息,建构了一个不完美的执法体系影响银行信贷的博弈模型。研究指出,制度性不完美造成的腐败和银行信贷之间存在一个显著的负向关系,导致信贷市场压缩和配给问题,会引致更高的腐败。在第五章里,专门研究银行信贷活动中的合谋腐败。首先正式界定了金融合谋腐败,并分析了其具有的特质。然后,利用委托人/监管者/代理人三层级结构,研究了银行信贷审查的横向合谋腐败和总分行纵向合谋腐败问题,提出了相应的防合谋合约。接着,研究了银行信贷经理和借款企业之间的“内外勾结”的合谋腐败问题,并在合谋腐败情形下分析了最优激励合约设计。专门区分了部分诚实和完全诚实的代理人,设计一种激励机制使代理人揭示其私人信息,分析得到,只有当诚实代理人是部分诚实的时候,均衡合谋才能达到。
关于金融腐败的经济治理方式这个维度,本文首先考虑了机制设计思路,即制度性努力、成功的机制和看不见的脚机制。这是进行金融反腐败经济治理方式选择的出发点。然后,采用博弈论对金融监管及金融监管腐败进行研究,得出一些必要的结论,构建制度约束框架。在此基础上,运用法经济学思路,在金融监管执法活动中构建了一个具有腐败倾向特征的监管执法者对金融机构或其从业人员的违法行为监督执法的模型,证明了如果允许金融活动参与者在违法行为发生后可以实施具有恰当的惩罚激励措施的自我报告制度,政府就能够通过降低官僚作风、保持较少的监督执法官员、降低监管寻租以增加社会福利,防范监管者和被监管者之间合谋腐败的发生。
文章在最后总结了全文研究的主要内容和结论,并进一步指出本文尚未分析到但又可以作为研究视角的议题以及未来的研究方向,主要包括:社会声誉和金融腐败、分权与金融腐败、关于金融腐败更多的可选择的经济治理方式,以及关于银行信贷腐败实证研究的检验问题等。这些问题都与本文的研究主题密切相关。前两个涉及社会结构问题,也是研究腐败问题的一个重要视角。集权和分权的程度和社会结构密切相关,对社会规则有重要影响,金融腐败实质就是个体声誉和集体声誉之间的作用问题。我们有理由相信,从关注于问题的不同角度出发来建立起各种独立的模型,再用一些灵活的、有创意的解释将这些独立视角结合起来,将会最终形成最佳的办法,我们期待更多更优的相关研究及金融腐败治理方式。
The corruption cases are happening with increasing frequency in banking system which is a core sector to allocate the financial resource. These serious corruption problems deteriorate the financial environment, be the important inducement of financial instability. The reality makes us have to survey what cause the high corruption levels, what kinds of corruption can be encountered in bank credit financing, how does these corruption effect on the financial market and economic performance. We need to ponder how to confirm the optimal credit incentive contracts with the corruptible agents, how to governance the financial corruption.
As the basis of this research, corruption, financial corruption and collusion corruption are defined from particular angle of view in correlative chapters and prong along with the whole thesis. Corruption means that the agent violates regulations of the game in some manners not expected by others and then captures the irrational profit.
Financial corruption means all informal financing activities, through which the agent violates regulations of financial business. The collusion corruption happened among some complementary financial agents, who abuse the financial authority from the principal in order to maximize the total illegal income through an enforceable contract and self-executing contract.
The thesis focuses above problems on three aspects: corruption, institution and financial market; informal credit financing and collusion corruption; the economic governance of the financial corruption.
About the first important research subject, corruption, institution and financial market are put into one analysis framework through a special mechanism, namely entry-fees-mode put forward by the author. The thesis advances that corrupt officials have to pay entry fees to their superiors. Through the mode of financing the entry fee, the thesis studies on the relation between financial institution and corruption levels, on the functioning financial market and its valid screening change the rents distribute in public section. Well-functioning financial institutions can decrease the political economy corruption. Based on the entry fee, this thesis studies the effects of bureaucratism and corruption on the performance of society and economy in a model of occupational choice, in which corruption is the payment of bribes to public officials for the purpose of circumventing bureaucratism. Therefore the key role of financial institution to depend the effects of corruption is studied. Then, this thesis uses three-stage least squares method in a panel set up for a system of four equations to studiy public investment, corruption, growth and the effect of one on the other.
About the second subject, informal credit financing and collusion corruption in banking system are studied by analyzing the different idiosyncracy and contract relationship. Informal credit financing is specialized in chapter 4. According to the corruption motivation, two kinds of corruption faced to the entrepreneurs in the credit market, namely approval corruption and disbursement corruption, are distinguished. Disbursement corruption is mentioned to that entrepreneurs pay bribes to low-level disbursement officials in a credit disbursing bureaucracy before realization of project returns, and approval corruption has been associated with bribes that entrepreneurs are required to pay to high-level officials after the realization of project returns. The effects imposed by these two kinds of credit corruption to projects financing, and the relationship between credit corruption and projects financing are analyzed, discovers that low-level disbursement officials have adverse selection to financing projects, but high-level approval officials have incentives to cooperate and support in programs directed at eliminating corruption in lower-level credit disbursing bureaucracies. The imperfect rule of law is also analyzed in chapter 4. The author proposes a theoretical framework that analyses the mechanisms through which corruption may reduce the supply of credit, by affecting a lender’s expected reparation when a defaulting debtor is taken to court. So the aggregate level of credit should decline with the level of corruption prevailing in an economy. The collusion corruption in bank credit is specialized in chapter 5. This thesis analyses the horizontal collusion corruption with credit auditing and the vertical collusion corruption between head office and branches, using Principal/Supervisor/Agent (P-S-A) there hierarchies. Then, this thesis derives the optimal organizational response of a bank (the principal) which faces a risk of collusion between the credit manager (the agent) and the credit-seeking firms. This thesis defines the corruptible, partial honest and purely honest agent, and finds that if the probability that the agent is honest is sufficiently large, collusion occurs in equilibrium.
In order to governance the financial corruption, this thesis considers thought of mechanism design, i.e. institutional efforts, successful mechanism and invisible foot. Then the game between financial corruption and financial regulation is analyzed, some important results are induced to build the framework of supervising financial corruption. With the help of the framework of law and economics, this thesis considers a model of financial regulation and law enforcement where homogenous, risk neutral, and corruptible supervisors are responsible for monitoring financial actions, sets up the self-confession mechanism of criminal acts, in which with some appropriate incentive measures, can further benefits society through reducing supervisors’bureaucratism, keeping a leaner financial supervisory force, and eliminating regulation rents, can prompt the country to fully eliminate financial corruption.
The thesis makes a conclusion and provides some future research avenues at the end. These avenues include social reputation and financial corruption, decentralization and financial corruption, the more alternative modes of governance to financial corruption, and the empirical test of credit corruption, and so on. All these avenues are closely related to this thesis. The former two avenues relate to the social structure, which is an important angle of view to study the corruption. The degree of decentralization and centralization are closely related to social structure, impose a significant effects to social rules. Financial corruption virtually is interaction between individual reputation and collective reputation. We have sound reasons to believe judging that paying attention from different point, and building some independent models, together with making some flexible and original interpret, can form more correlative researches and optimal modes to governance the financial corruption.
本文对这些问题的研究集中在三个维度,即腐败、制度及经济绩效,银行信贷非规范融资和合谋腐败,金融腐败的经济治理方式。第一个维度通过提出的基于入门费的腐败生成模式实现,把腐败、金融市场和经济绩效统一在一个分析框架内。第二个维度是通过对行为主体非规范融资和银行内部及外部合谋的不同特质并考虑合约关系来研究的。第三个维度是在法经济学的框架下,通过分析金融监管与金融腐败的博弈过程,并设立有效的自我报告制度的反腐败机制来实现的。
本文在相应章节分别用独特的视角定义了腐败、金融腐败、合谋腐败。腐败,就是当事人用一种不被其他人所预期的方式违反游戏规则并能从中获取不合理收益的行为。金融腐败,则是一切不按照金融业的交易规则或权力规则办事,为自身谋取私利的非规范融资行为。合谋腐败,即两个及以上的作为金融业资源配置下的互补性腐败主体,通过一个可执行的和自我执行的私下合约滥用委托权利、以最大化非法收益总价值的金融腐败行为。这几个概念贯穿本文的研究。
关于腐败、制度和经济绩效这个维度,本文提出了基于入门费的腐败生成模式。通过研究,将腐败问题延伸到官僚体制的各层次之间,指出腐败以上层官员向下层官员收取入门费并以有利可图的职位为交换对象的“权钱交易”形式进行,论证了功能良好的金融制度的存在以及审查监督的有效性改变了公共部门的租金分配,可以降低腐败水平。据此入门费模式,利用一个关于生产个体项目选择、政府机构进入管制和不完善金融市场的模型,研究了官僚作风和腐败对创业企业融资和经济绩效的影响,研究了金融市场的功能在决定腐败的影响方面如何起到一个关键作用。进而利用三阶段最小二乘法将腐败、经济增长与公共投资三大问题纳入一个分析框架下从公共投资的角度实证分析了腐败对经济绩效的影响。
关于银行信贷非规范融资和合谋腐败这个维度,本文分别对这两大问题在不同的章节里展开论述。在第四章里,专门研究银行信贷非规范融资腐败。首先根据腐败的不同动机将企业家在向银行寻求信贷融资时遇到腐败区分为两类,即发生在负责信贷审批的高层人员中的审批腐败和发生在负责贷款发放的基层人员中的支付腐败。通过分析揭示两类腐败分别对信贷融资产生的影响,证明了基层支付腐败对信贷融资项目产生了逆向选择,阻止了低风险项目的信贷融资行为,造成了信贷市场的低效率和金融市场的脆弱性。而且高层审批腐败人员具有打击基层人员支付腐败的激励,他们因此会适度开展反腐败工作。其次,本文分析了执法的不完美和执法腐败对银行信贷存在的影响。在银行追偿信贷资金时,增加了执法腐败的信息,建构了一个不完美的执法体系影响银行信贷的博弈模型。研究指出,制度性不完美造成的腐败和银行信贷之间存在一个显著的负向关系,导致信贷市场压缩和配给问题,会引致更高的腐败。在第五章里,专门研究银行信贷活动中的合谋腐败。首先正式界定了金融合谋腐败,并分析了其具有的特质。然后,利用委托人/监管者/代理人三层级结构,研究了银行信贷审查的横向合谋腐败和总分行纵向合谋腐败问题,提出了相应的防合谋合约。接着,研究了银行信贷经理和借款企业之间的“内外勾结”的合谋腐败问题,并在合谋腐败情形下分析了最优激励合约设计。专门区分了部分诚实和完全诚实的代理人,设计一种激励机制使代理人揭示其私人信息,分析得到,只有当诚实代理人是部分诚实的时候,均衡合谋才能达到。
关于金融腐败的经济治理方式这个维度,本文首先考虑了机制设计思路,即制度性努力、成功的机制和看不见的脚机制。这是进行金融反腐败经济治理方式选择的出发点。然后,采用博弈论对金融监管及金融监管腐败进行研究,得出一些必要的结论,构建制度约束框架。在此基础上,运用法经济学思路,在金融监管执法活动中构建了一个具有腐败倾向特征的监管执法者对金融机构或其从业人员的违法行为监督执法的模型,证明了如果允许金融活动参与者在违法行为发生后可以实施具有恰当的惩罚激励措施的自我报告制度,政府就能够通过降低官僚作风、保持较少的监督执法官员、降低监管寻租以增加社会福利,防范监管者和被监管者之间合谋腐败的发生。
文章在最后总结了全文研究的主要内容和结论,并进一步指出本文尚未分析到但又可以作为研究视角的议题以及未来的研究方向,主要包括:社会声誉和金融腐败、分权与金融腐败、关于金融腐败更多的可选择的经济治理方式,以及关于银行信贷腐败实证研究的检验问题等。这些问题都与本文的研究主题密切相关。前两个涉及社会结构问题,也是研究腐败问题的一个重要视角。集权和分权的程度和社会结构密切相关,对社会规则有重要影响,金融腐败实质就是个体声誉和集体声誉之间的作用问题。我们有理由相信,从关注于问题的不同角度出发来建立起各种独立的模型,再用一些灵活的、有创意的解释将这些独立视角结合起来,将会最终形成最佳的办法,我们期待更多更优的相关研究及金融腐败治理方式。
The corruption cases are happening with increasing frequency in banking system which is a core sector to allocate the financial resource. These serious corruption problems deteriorate the financial environment, be the important inducement of financial instability. The reality makes us have to survey what cause the high corruption levels, what kinds of corruption can be encountered in bank credit financing, how does these corruption effect on the financial market and economic performance. We need to ponder how to confirm the optimal credit incentive contracts with the corruptible agents, how to governance the financial corruption.
As the basis of this research, corruption, financial corruption and collusion corruption are defined from particular angle of view in correlative chapters and prong along with the whole thesis. Corruption means that the agent violates regulations of the game in some manners not expected by others and then captures the irrational profit.
Financial corruption means all informal financing activities, through which the agent violates regulations of financial business. The collusion corruption happened among some complementary financial agents, who abuse the financial authority from the principal in order to maximize the total illegal income through an enforceable contract and self-executing contract.
The thesis focuses above problems on three aspects: corruption, institution and financial market; informal credit financing and collusion corruption; the economic governance of the financial corruption.
About the first important research subject, corruption, institution and financial market are put into one analysis framework through a special mechanism, namely entry-fees-mode put forward by the author. The thesis advances that corrupt officials have to pay entry fees to their superiors. Through the mode of financing the entry fee, the thesis studies on the relation between financial institution and corruption levels, on the functioning financial market and its valid screening change the rents distribute in public section. Well-functioning financial institutions can decrease the political economy corruption. Based on the entry fee, this thesis studies the effects of bureaucratism and corruption on the performance of society and economy in a model of occupational choice, in which corruption is the payment of bribes to public officials for the purpose of circumventing bureaucratism. Therefore the key role of financial institution to depend the effects of corruption is studied. Then, this thesis uses three-stage least squares method in a panel set up for a system of four equations to studiy public investment, corruption, growth and the effect of one on the other.
About the second subject, informal credit financing and collusion corruption in banking system are studied by analyzing the different idiosyncracy and contract relationship. Informal credit financing is specialized in chapter 4. According to the corruption motivation, two kinds of corruption faced to the entrepreneurs in the credit market, namely approval corruption and disbursement corruption, are distinguished. Disbursement corruption is mentioned to that entrepreneurs pay bribes to low-level disbursement officials in a credit disbursing bureaucracy before realization of project returns, and approval corruption has been associated with bribes that entrepreneurs are required to pay to high-level officials after the realization of project returns. The effects imposed by these two kinds of credit corruption to projects financing, and the relationship between credit corruption and projects financing are analyzed, discovers that low-level disbursement officials have adverse selection to financing projects, but high-level approval officials have incentives to cooperate and support in programs directed at eliminating corruption in lower-level credit disbursing bureaucracies. The imperfect rule of law is also analyzed in chapter 4. The author proposes a theoretical framework that analyses the mechanisms through which corruption may reduce the supply of credit, by affecting a lender’s expected reparation when a defaulting debtor is taken to court. So the aggregate level of credit should decline with the level of corruption prevailing in an economy. The collusion corruption in bank credit is specialized in chapter 5. This thesis analyses the horizontal collusion corruption with credit auditing and the vertical collusion corruption between head office and branches, using Principal/Supervisor/Agent (P-S-A) there hierarchies. Then, this thesis derives the optimal organizational response of a bank (the principal) which faces a risk of collusion between the credit manager (the agent) and the credit-seeking firms. This thesis defines the corruptible, partial honest and purely honest agent, and finds that if the probability that the agent is honest is sufficiently large, collusion occurs in equilibrium.
In order to governance the financial corruption, this thesis considers thought of mechanism design, i.e. institutional efforts, successful mechanism and invisible foot. Then the game between financial corruption and financial regulation is analyzed, some important results are induced to build the framework of supervising financial corruption. With the help of the framework of law and economics, this thesis considers a model of financial regulation and law enforcement where homogenous, risk neutral, and corruptible supervisors are responsible for monitoring financial actions, sets up the self-confession mechanism of criminal acts, in which with some appropriate incentive measures, can further benefits society through reducing supervisors’bureaucratism, keeping a leaner financial supervisory force, and eliminating regulation rents, can prompt the country to fully eliminate financial corruption.
The thesis makes a conclusion and provides some future research avenues at the end. These avenues include social reputation and financial corruption, decentralization and financial corruption, the more alternative modes of governance to financial corruption, and the empirical test of credit corruption, and so on. All these avenues are closely related to this thesis. The former two avenues relate to the social structure, which is an important angle of view to study the corruption. The degree of decentralization and centralization are closely related to social structure, impose a significant effects to social rules. Financial corruption virtually is interaction between individual reputation and collective reputation. We have sound reasons to believe judging that paying attention from different point, and building some independent models, together with making some flexible and original interpret, can form more correlative researches and optimal modes to governance the financial corruption.
引文
①关于这些理论,可以参阅Allen and Gale(2000)。
①引自卢现祥:《寻租经济学导论》,第70页,中国财政经济出版社2000年八月第一版。
②引自[日]青木昌彦,奥野一藤原正宽,[韩]金滢基.政府在东亚经济发展中的作用比较制度分析[M].北京:中国经济出版社1998年第一版,第16页。
①基于这个认识,本文不另将机制设计理论和合约理论等单独作为理论基础列出来,而是将其放在委托—代理理论的框架内进行解释和分析。
②关于该理论更详细的论述,请参见:张维迎《博弈论与信息经济学》,上海:上海人民出版社,1996。
①合谋在国有银行的典型表现形式是内部欺诈、内外勾结而产生的大量案件,这在商业银行损失事件中的比例约为60%,损失金额约为67%(田瑛,廖肈辉:2006)。
①对于这个问题,王永钦(2005)则认为,“法与金融”文献在经济学界产生了巨大的影响,现在几乎成为了一种范式。见王永钦,《声誉、承诺与组织形式——一个比较分析框架》,2005,pp.22。
①孟德斯鸠著.张雁深译.论法的精神[M].北京:商务印书馆,1998年版,上册,第153页。
②阿克顿著.冯克利译.自由与权力[M].北京:商务印书馆,2002年版,第342页。
③参见《马克思恩格斯选集》,中文版,第1卷,395页,北京:人民出版社,1975。
①参见曹红辉:《金融腐败大案的成因及治理对策》,经济管理出版社,2007年,pp.9-16。
①[美]Mark Twain著;张友松译.赤道环游记[M].南昌:百花洲文艺出版社,1992。
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①引自卢现祥:《寻租经济学导论》,第70页,中国财政经济出版社2000年八月第一版。
②引自[日]青木昌彦,奥野一藤原正宽,[韩]金滢基.政府在东亚经济发展中的作用比较制度分析[M].北京:中国经济出版社1998年第一版,第16页。
①基于这个认识,本文不另将机制设计理论和合约理论等单独作为理论基础列出来,而是将其放在委托—代理理论的框架内进行解释和分析。
②关于该理论更详细的论述,请参见:张维迎《博弈论与信息经济学》,上海:上海人民出版社,1996。
①合谋在国有银行的典型表现形式是内部欺诈、内外勾结而产生的大量案件,这在商业银行损失事件中的比例约为60%,损失金额约为67%(田瑛,廖肈辉:2006)。
①对于这个问题,王永钦(2005)则认为,“法与金融”文献在经济学界产生了巨大的影响,现在几乎成为了一种范式。见王永钦,《声誉、承诺与组织形式——一个比较分析框架》,2005,pp.22。
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②阿克顿著.冯克利译.自由与权力[M].北京:商务印书馆,2002年版,第342页。
③参见《马克思恩格斯选集》,中文版,第1卷,395页,北京:人民出版社,1975。
①参见曹红辉:《金融腐败大案的成因及治理对策》,经济管理出版社,2007年,pp.9-16。
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