中国铁路产业激励性规制改革研究
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摘要
规制经济学是一门新兴的经济学分支。它主要研究“市场失灵”情况下的政府干预问题:为什么要干预,如何进行干预,干预是否有效以及在干预失败情况下,政府如何通过对规制与放松规制的成本—收益比较分析,找到次优选择的过程。
铁路运输业是典型的网络性基础产业,在促进国民经济和社会发展中发挥着重要作用,铁路产业具有基础设施投资规模巨大、资产专用性强、进入壁垒高、日常运营成本相对较低的特点,属于自然垄断产业。各国政府对铁路运输业一般采取由政府独家经营或由政府特许经营的管理模式,铁路规制改革是许多国家都面临的重要课题,近年来世界各国在铁路运输业推行私有化和放松管制已成为探索铁路规制改革的一种趋势。
自建国以来,中国铁路运输业一直实行由政府直接投资、垄断经营及运输价格由政府制定的管理模式。由此造成了铁路投资渠道单一、投资规模小、运能严重不足、服务质量提高缓慢、运营成本高以及价外乱收费现象严重等诸多问题。从1986年起,中国政府开始尝试铁路管理体制改革,先后实行了让利放权、经济承包制和资产经营责任制,铁路建设资金也改由铁道部通过自身赢利来筹集等改革举措。铁路运价也经过一系列的改革和调整,铁路运能紧张情况有所缓解,服务质量也有了一定提高。然而,由于中国铁路改革的体制性问题并没有得到解决,铁路运输业的发展规模和速度都无法适应国民经济高速发展的要求,铁路运输能力依然不足,在节假日,特别是春运期间一票难求现象十分突出,铁路部门的服务意识不强,还存在许多霸王条款,一直为广大公众所诟病,由于铁路建设投资渠道不畅,2006年开始的高速铁路建设已经使铁道部负债高达2.09万亿,每年仅支付利息就达1000亿以上,而且高铁事故繁发,所有这些都说明铁路管理体制亟待改革。
目前,国内外关于铁路规制改革的研究文献很多,大多都从政企分开、引入竞争等角度来研究,但是政企分开、引入竞争只是解决铁路规制改革的方向性问题。实际上,政企分开、引入竞争必然涉及铁路产业重组模式选择,如何设定企业边界才能保证即要减少企业间的交易成本,又要保持有效竞争的市场环境则是一个更需要深入探讨的问题,同时,在渐进式的铁路改革过程中,铁路主管部门和国有铁路企业已经结成了休戚相关的利益共同体,双方在缓慢的、渐进的铁路改革过程中形成了对现有利益格局的维护,双方极力排斥地方、合资和民营铁路与国有铁路互联互通,路径依赖已经使铁路改革暂时进入一种“锁定”状态,即行政垄断状态。如果低估了现有利益集团对规制改革的销蚀和同化力量,铁路规制改革将不会取得实质上的突破,铁路运输市场的竞争格局就无法形成,铁路发展所面临的许多矛盾就无法得到解决。因此,本论文从分析铁路重组的合理企业边界入手,研究铁路产业结构重组的有效运营模式,并寻求破解当前铁路改革的路径依赖问题,即打破“行政垄断状态”的可行途径,构建了实行铁路激励性规制改革基本框架,建立了激励性铁路运价规制模型,并提出了中国铁路激励性规制改革的对策和建议,以解决铁路发展面临的主要问题,实现铁路运输业的可持续发展。
首先,分析了铁路运输业的自然垄断特征和经济特殊性,探讨了铁路运输的公益性、外部性以及特殊的技术特征。通常铁路运输是在平均成本最低点左侧区域生产,运输能力存在一定的闲置,铁路产业具有强自然垄断特征,而在运输高峰时期,铁路运输能力全部得到有效利用,此时铁路产业则表现为弱自然垄断Ⅰ型特征。同时,铁路运输所特有的网络特征和运输组织的复杂性更多表现为规模经济和范围经济的不可分性,这种特征是通过密度经济和幅员经济体现出来的。铁路运输在国民经济和社会发展的重要作用决定了铁路运输不仅具有自然垄断特征而且还具有社会公益性,正确认识铁路运输的经济技术特征是铁路规制改革的必要基础。
其次,在回顾了中国铁路发展改革的演变历程后,用经济学的视角分析了路径依赖对铁路规制变革的影响,着重分析了中国铁路规制改革所取得的成效,通过与其他自然垄断产业规制改革的对比分析,找出了中国铁路规制改革存在的巨大差距和当前铁路产业管理体制对推进激励性规制改革的影响。
再次,美国、英国等西方发达国家有两多百年的铁路发展史,拥有完备法律体系和有效市场监管制度,研究西方发达国家铁路规制改革的主要经验和做法,有助于我们吸取西方发达国家铁路规制改革的宝贵经验和失败教训,为中国铁路改革提供有益的借鉴。西方发达国家以减少政府规制成本和实现社会福利最大化为目标的规制改革,在铁路的产权制度安排,规制方式变革以及放松铁路规制等方面都取得有益的经验和启示。
通过上述分析,本文提出了中国铁路激励性规制改革的目标与重组模式。分析了实行激励性规制改革的必须具备体制基础,并在此基础上提出中国铁路激励性规制改革的主要目标,通过双因素模型分析,得出了铁路产业结构重组的有效运营模式和基本结构框架,并给出了中国铁路激励性规制改革的路径选择和对策建议。
最后,价格规制是政府对自然垄断产业规制的重要组成部分,中国铁路定价模式在计划经济体制下形成并一直延续下来的,是典型的政府定价模式,随着社会主义市场经济体制的确立,现有定价模式已经不能适应经济发展需要,僵化的铁路运价已使铁路企业缺乏必要的经营灵活性,“成本加成定价”的预算软约束对铁路企业缺乏必要的激励作用,导致铁路运输成本过高,企业赢利水平普遍比较差,投资规模无法满足日益增长的运输需求,造成社会福利净损失,目前放松铁路运价管制,实行激励性铁路定价的时机已经成熟,本文在分析了中国铁路运输价格规制现状的基础上,提出了运价改革的相关建议,建立了与相关物价指数联动的以行业平均报酬率作为运价上限的激励性运价规制模型,既保护了运输高峰时消费者的利益,又使运输企业可以依据市场需求变化实时调整运价,提高铁路运输企业经济效益。
总之,本论文综合运用了实证分析、博弈分析、比较分析和数理分析的方法对中国铁路渐进式改革进行实证研究,分析了中国铁路发展面临的主要困境和矛盾,提出了激励性铁路规制改革的主要目标和相应政策建议,构建了相关物价指数联动的以行业平均报酬率作为价格上限基础的激励性运价规制模型。
本文在以下几个方面对国内现场研究成果有所突破:一是通过对价格上限定价模型的改进,提出了与相关物价指数联动的以行业平均报酬率作为价格上限的激励性运价规制模型,这对铁路企业降低运营成本,提高运输效率具有较强激励作用。二是分析了铁路规制改革难以实现体制上突破的主要原因是路径依赖导致铁路改革暂时进入一种“锁定”状态,即行政垄断状态,阻碍了铁路管理体制改革的进程;三是通过双因素模型分析提出了铁路结构重组的第三种选择模式:即“区域公司+客运分离”为主的铁路运营新模式,形成适合中国国情的铁路运输竞争业态。
Regulation economics is a new branch of the economics. It mainly studies interventional problem under "market failure" by the government: why to intervene, how to intervene, whether intervention is effective or not, and to find the second best selection process under failure of regulation by cost-benefit analysis comparison between regulation and relaxed regulation.
Railway transportation is the typical network fundamental industry, which plays an important role in promoting national economic and social development. Railway industry which belongs to the natural monopoly industry has huge infrastructure investment scale, strong asset specificity, high barriers to entry and relatively low daily operation cost. Various countries’governments generally take the management mode which is exclusively operated or franchised by the government on railway transportation, railway regulation reform is an important topic that various countries’governments face. In recent years, privatization and relaxing regulation are a trend of regulation reform to railway industry in the world which various countries’governments have been exploring.
Since the foundation of the People's Republic of China, the Railway Industry has been invested and monopoly operated by the government, and that transport price is controlled by the government too. It leads to the single investment channel, smaller investment scale, a serious shortage of transport capacity, slower improvement of the service quality, disordered charges outside the price etc. Since 1986, the Chinese government began to reform the management system of railway, they have instituted management contract system and asset management responsibility system, railway construction funds had been raised through their own profit by the railway department etc. Railway freight rate have a series of reform and adjustment, railway transportation tensions status has an alleviation of certain degree, service quality has also been certainly improved. However, with the problems of the railway regulation’s institutional reform unsolved, the railway development in scale and speed could not adapt to requirements of the national economy development, railway transport capacity is still insufficient, it is very difficult to obtain a railway ticket during the holiday season above all the Spring Festival period, the service consciousness in railway is not always strong, people have criticized many inequality rules in railway, the development of the railway has made the debt as high as 2.09 trillion for high-speed railway construction since 2006, only the interest to pay is about 100 billion a year, and that high-speed railway accidents are frequently happen. Railways reform need to have a real breakthrough in management system.
At present, there are many literatures about regulatory reform at home and abroad, most of them are about separation of enterprise from administration, introducing competition etc. But the separation of enterprise from administration or introducing competition is only the direction of the railway regulatory reform. In fact, these reform will inevitably involve the restructuring of the railway industry, the way to set the enterprise boundary in order to reduce the transaction costs between enterprises, and keep effective market competition needs further discussion, meanwhile, in the gradual procession of the railway reform, railway departments and state-owned railway enterprise became closely related to the community of interests, they protect the existing interests in the procession, and reject joint ventures and the private enterprise coming into railway transportation field, reform path dependence has made the railway reform temporarily into a locked status, that is, administrative monopoly status. If the interest groups were underestimated on the power of assimilation and dissolving in regulatory reform, railway reform will not achieve real breakthrough, the competition in railway transportation won’t be formed the contradictions in railway industry development will not be solved. Therefore,this paper takes up from the effective mode of the railway reform and restructuring on the analyzing enterprise boundary of railway restructuring research, trying to solve the railway reform path dependence problem, break current administrative monopoly status, puts forward incentive suggestions on relaxing regulation reform cost,establish the railway freight rate model of the incentive mechanism, solve the main question of railway development, realize the sustainable development on railway transportation.
First of all, I have studied railroad transportation industry’s natural monopoly characteristics and economic particularity and the analyzed public welfare, externality and unique technical characteristics of Chinese railway transportation. Railway transportation usually produces in the left of average lowest cost. There is a certain idlness of transport capacity. Railway industry has natural monopoly characteristics, the capacity of Railway transportation will be fully utilized during transportation peak period. Railway industry has weak natural monopoly characteristics at the point. At the same time, railway transport unique characteristics network characteristics and complexity of transport operation show that economies of scale and scope can not be separated. This characteristic is embodied by transport economies of density and range. The important role of railway transportation in the national economy and social development determines that rail transport has not only the natural monopoly characteristics, but also the public benefits. Understanding correct economic and technical characteristics of railway industry is the indispensable foundations of the railway regulatory reform.
Secondly, after the review of the evolution processes of China railway development and reform, this paper analyses the influence of path dependence to railway regulation reform with an economic perspective. It emphasize analysis the achievements of the China railway regulation reform, through contrast analysis other natural monopoly industry regulation reform, found the huge disparity of China railway regulatory reform existing, the current railway management system bring about the influence to promote the incentive regulation reform.
Meanwhile, the United States, Britain and other western developed countries have a railway development history of more than two hundred years. And there is a perfect legal system and the effective market regulation system at the transport market. We research their main experience and practice of railway regulation reform. These can help us to absorb the experiences and lessons of their regulation reform and provide the beneficial reference for the China’s railway regulation. To reduce the cost of government regulation and make the maximization of social welfare come true, the western developed countries have obtained useful experience and enlightenment on the property rights system arrangement of railway industry, changing regulations pattern and relaxing regulation.
Through the above analysis, this paper put forward China's railway incentive regulation reform goal and pattern. It analyses the necessary system basis of the incentive regulation reform, And then on this system basis, It are put forward to the China railway incentive regulation reform main goal, through the double factors analysis model,It are put forward to the effective operation mode and basic structure framework of railway industry restructuring,gives the reform route choice, the countermeasures and proposals about the China railway incentive regulation reform.
Finally, the regulation price of natural monopoly industry is an important part of government regulation. China railway transport pricing model had formed under the planned economy system and it remains so, this is the typical government pricing model. With the socialist market economy system established, the existing pricing model cannot adapt to the economic development needs, the railway transport enterprises are lacked of management flexibility for fixed freight rate, and the soft budget constraint of the cost plus pricing model have made that the railway enterprises lacks the incentive of control cost. High cost of transport, the profit level low of railway enterprise have made that railway investment scale cannot satisfy the market demand, and causing the social welfare net loss. It’s the time to relax price control in the railway industry, carry out incentive regulation in transport freight rate. Having analyzed the present situation of railway transport price regulation, this paper raise the basis idea about railway price reform, an established Price-Cap model linkage with price index which can protect the interests of consumers in the transportation peak and ensure that the transportation enterprise can adjust freight rate according to the market needs flexibly and improve railway transport efficiency.
All in all, this paper comprehensively analysis China railway reform with empirical analysis, comparison analysis and mathematical analysis method, points out the the main contradiction and trouble of China's railway development, puts forward the five main target of railway regulatory reform and the corresponding countermeasure, establish a Price-Cap model linkage with price index.
This paper has made innovations in the following several aspects compared with the domestic research results. Such as analyzing that railway regulation reform’s difficulty in achieving institutional breakthrough mainly due to the locked status on account of the reform path dependence, putting forward restructuring reform mode of "regional company and passenger separation" with the double factors analysis model, and establish Price-Cap model linkage with price index which has incentive effect in improving transportation efficiency by lower operating costs.
铁路运输业是典型的网络性基础产业,在促进国民经济和社会发展中发挥着重要作用,铁路产业具有基础设施投资规模巨大、资产专用性强、进入壁垒高、日常运营成本相对较低的特点,属于自然垄断产业。各国政府对铁路运输业一般采取由政府独家经营或由政府特许经营的管理模式,铁路规制改革是许多国家都面临的重要课题,近年来世界各国在铁路运输业推行私有化和放松管制已成为探索铁路规制改革的一种趋势。
自建国以来,中国铁路运输业一直实行由政府直接投资、垄断经营及运输价格由政府制定的管理模式。由此造成了铁路投资渠道单一、投资规模小、运能严重不足、服务质量提高缓慢、运营成本高以及价外乱收费现象严重等诸多问题。从1986年起,中国政府开始尝试铁路管理体制改革,先后实行了让利放权、经济承包制和资产经营责任制,铁路建设资金也改由铁道部通过自身赢利来筹集等改革举措。铁路运价也经过一系列的改革和调整,铁路运能紧张情况有所缓解,服务质量也有了一定提高。然而,由于中国铁路改革的体制性问题并没有得到解决,铁路运输业的发展规模和速度都无法适应国民经济高速发展的要求,铁路运输能力依然不足,在节假日,特别是春运期间一票难求现象十分突出,铁路部门的服务意识不强,还存在许多霸王条款,一直为广大公众所诟病,由于铁路建设投资渠道不畅,2006年开始的高速铁路建设已经使铁道部负债高达2.09万亿,每年仅支付利息就达1000亿以上,而且高铁事故繁发,所有这些都说明铁路管理体制亟待改革。
目前,国内外关于铁路规制改革的研究文献很多,大多都从政企分开、引入竞争等角度来研究,但是政企分开、引入竞争只是解决铁路规制改革的方向性问题。实际上,政企分开、引入竞争必然涉及铁路产业重组模式选择,如何设定企业边界才能保证即要减少企业间的交易成本,又要保持有效竞争的市场环境则是一个更需要深入探讨的问题,同时,在渐进式的铁路改革过程中,铁路主管部门和国有铁路企业已经结成了休戚相关的利益共同体,双方在缓慢的、渐进的铁路改革过程中形成了对现有利益格局的维护,双方极力排斥地方、合资和民营铁路与国有铁路互联互通,路径依赖已经使铁路改革暂时进入一种“锁定”状态,即行政垄断状态。如果低估了现有利益集团对规制改革的销蚀和同化力量,铁路规制改革将不会取得实质上的突破,铁路运输市场的竞争格局就无法形成,铁路发展所面临的许多矛盾就无法得到解决。因此,本论文从分析铁路重组的合理企业边界入手,研究铁路产业结构重组的有效运营模式,并寻求破解当前铁路改革的路径依赖问题,即打破“行政垄断状态”的可行途径,构建了实行铁路激励性规制改革基本框架,建立了激励性铁路运价规制模型,并提出了中国铁路激励性规制改革的对策和建议,以解决铁路发展面临的主要问题,实现铁路运输业的可持续发展。
首先,分析了铁路运输业的自然垄断特征和经济特殊性,探讨了铁路运输的公益性、外部性以及特殊的技术特征。通常铁路运输是在平均成本最低点左侧区域生产,运输能力存在一定的闲置,铁路产业具有强自然垄断特征,而在运输高峰时期,铁路运输能力全部得到有效利用,此时铁路产业则表现为弱自然垄断Ⅰ型特征。同时,铁路运输所特有的网络特征和运输组织的复杂性更多表现为规模经济和范围经济的不可分性,这种特征是通过密度经济和幅员经济体现出来的。铁路运输在国民经济和社会发展的重要作用决定了铁路运输不仅具有自然垄断特征而且还具有社会公益性,正确认识铁路运输的经济技术特征是铁路规制改革的必要基础。
其次,在回顾了中国铁路发展改革的演变历程后,用经济学的视角分析了路径依赖对铁路规制变革的影响,着重分析了中国铁路规制改革所取得的成效,通过与其他自然垄断产业规制改革的对比分析,找出了中国铁路规制改革存在的巨大差距和当前铁路产业管理体制对推进激励性规制改革的影响。
再次,美国、英国等西方发达国家有两多百年的铁路发展史,拥有完备法律体系和有效市场监管制度,研究西方发达国家铁路规制改革的主要经验和做法,有助于我们吸取西方发达国家铁路规制改革的宝贵经验和失败教训,为中国铁路改革提供有益的借鉴。西方发达国家以减少政府规制成本和实现社会福利最大化为目标的规制改革,在铁路的产权制度安排,规制方式变革以及放松铁路规制等方面都取得有益的经验和启示。
通过上述分析,本文提出了中国铁路激励性规制改革的目标与重组模式。分析了实行激励性规制改革的必须具备体制基础,并在此基础上提出中国铁路激励性规制改革的主要目标,通过双因素模型分析,得出了铁路产业结构重组的有效运营模式和基本结构框架,并给出了中国铁路激励性规制改革的路径选择和对策建议。
最后,价格规制是政府对自然垄断产业规制的重要组成部分,中国铁路定价模式在计划经济体制下形成并一直延续下来的,是典型的政府定价模式,随着社会主义市场经济体制的确立,现有定价模式已经不能适应经济发展需要,僵化的铁路运价已使铁路企业缺乏必要的经营灵活性,“成本加成定价”的预算软约束对铁路企业缺乏必要的激励作用,导致铁路运输成本过高,企业赢利水平普遍比较差,投资规模无法满足日益增长的运输需求,造成社会福利净损失,目前放松铁路运价管制,实行激励性铁路定价的时机已经成熟,本文在分析了中国铁路运输价格规制现状的基础上,提出了运价改革的相关建议,建立了与相关物价指数联动的以行业平均报酬率作为运价上限的激励性运价规制模型,既保护了运输高峰时消费者的利益,又使运输企业可以依据市场需求变化实时调整运价,提高铁路运输企业经济效益。
总之,本论文综合运用了实证分析、博弈分析、比较分析和数理分析的方法对中国铁路渐进式改革进行实证研究,分析了中国铁路发展面临的主要困境和矛盾,提出了激励性铁路规制改革的主要目标和相应政策建议,构建了相关物价指数联动的以行业平均报酬率作为价格上限基础的激励性运价规制模型。
本文在以下几个方面对国内现场研究成果有所突破:一是通过对价格上限定价模型的改进,提出了与相关物价指数联动的以行业平均报酬率作为价格上限的激励性运价规制模型,这对铁路企业降低运营成本,提高运输效率具有较强激励作用。二是分析了铁路规制改革难以实现体制上突破的主要原因是路径依赖导致铁路改革暂时进入一种“锁定”状态,即行政垄断状态,阻碍了铁路管理体制改革的进程;三是通过双因素模型分析提出了铁路结构重组的第三种选择模式:即“区域公司+客运分离”为主的铁路运营新模式,形成适合中国国情的铁路运输竞争业态。
Regulation economics is a new branch of the economics. It mainly studies interventional problem under "market failure" by the government: why to intervene, how to intervene, whether intervention is effective or not, and to find the second best selection process under failure of regulation by cost-benefit analysis comparison between regulation and relaxed regulation.
Railway transportation is the typical network fundamental industry, which plays an important role in promoting national economic and social development. Railway industry which belongs to the natural monopoly industry has huge infrastructure investment scale, strong asset specificity, high barriers to entry and relatively low daily operation cost. Various countries’governments generally take the management mode which is exclusively operated or franchised by the government on railway transportation, railway regulation reform is an important topic that various countries’governments face. In recent years, privatization and relaxing regulation are a trend of regulation reform to railway industry in the world which various countries’governments have been exploring.
Since the foundation of the People's Republic of China, the Railway Industry has been invested and monopoly operated by the government, and that transport price is controlled by the government too. It leads to the single investment channel, smaller investment scale, a serious shortage of transport capacity, slower improvement of the service quality, disordered charges outside the price etc. Since 1986, the Chinese government began to reform the management system of railway, they have instituted management contract system and asset management responsibility system, railway construction funds had been raised through their own profit by the railway department etc. Railway freight rate have a series of reform and adjustment, railway transportation tensions status has an alleviation of certain degree, service quality has also been certainly improved. However, with the problems of the railway regulation’s institutional reform unsolved, the railway development in scale and speed could not adapt to requirements of the national economy development, railway transport capacity is still insufficient, it is very difficult to obtain a railway ticket during the holiday season above all the Spring Festival period, the service consciousness in railway is not always strong, people have criticized many inequality rules in railway, the development of the railway has made the debt as high as 2.09 trillion for high-speed railway construction since 2006, only the interest to pay is about 100 billion a year, and that high-speed railway accidents are frequently happen. Railways reform need to have a real breakthrough in management system.
At present, there are many literatures about regulatory reform at home and abroad, most of them are about separation of enterprise from administration, introducing competition etc. But the separation of enterprise from administration or introducing competition is only the direction of the railway regulatory reform. In fact, these reform will inevitably involve the restructuring of the railway industry, the way to set the enterprise boundary in order to reduce the transaction costs between enterprises, and keep effective market competition needs further discussion, meanwhile, in the gradual procession of the railway reform, railway departments and state-owned railway enterprise became closely related to the community of interests, they protect the existing interests in the procession, and reject joint ventures and the private enterprise coming into railway transportation field, reform path dependence has made the railway reform temporarily into a locked status, that is, administrative monopoly status. If the interest groups were underestimated on the power of assimilation and dissolving in regulatory reform, railway reform will not achieve real breakthrough, the competition in railway transportation won’t be formed the contradictions in railway industry development will not be solved. Therefore,this paper takes up from the effective mode of the railway reform and restructuring on the analyzing enterprise boundary of railway restructuring research, trying to solve the railway reform path dependence problem, break current administrative monopoly status, puts forward incentive suggestions on relaxing regulation reform cost,establish the railway freight rate model of the incentive mechanism, solve the main question of railway development, realize the sustainable development on railway transportation.
First of all, I have studied railroad transportation industry’s natural monopoly characteristics and economic particularity and the analyzed public welfare, externality and unique technical characteristics of Chinese railway transportation. Railway transportation usually produces in the left of average lowest cost. There is a certain idlness of transport capacity. Railway industry has natural monopoly characteristics, the capacity of Railway transportation will be fully utilized during transportation peak period. Railway industry has weak natural monopoly characteristics at the point. At the same time, railway transport unique characteristics network characteristics and complexity of transport operation show that economies of scale and scope can not be separated. This characteristic is embodied by transport economies of density and range. The important role of railway transportation in the national economy and social development determines that rail transport has not only the natural monopoly characteristics, but also the public benefits. Understanding correct economic and technical characteristics of railway industry is the indispensable foundations of the railway regulatory reform.
Secondly, after the review of the evolution processes of China railway development and reform, this paper analyses the influence of path dependence to railway regulation reform with an economic perspective. It emphasize analysis the achievements of the China railway regulation reform, through contrast analysis other natural monopoly industry regulation reform, found the huge disparity of China railway regulatory reform existing, the current railway management system bring about the influence to promote the incentive regulation reform.
Meanwhile, the United States, Britain and other western developed countries have a railway development history of more than two hundred years. And there is a perfect legal system and the effective market regulation system at the transport market. We research their main experience and practice of railway regulation reform. These can help us to absorb the experiences and lessons of their regulation reform and provide the beneficial reference for the China’s railway regulation. To reduce the cost of government regulation and make the maximization of social welfare come true, the western developed countries have obtained useful experience and enlightenment on the property rights system arrangement of railway industry, changing regulations pattern and relaxing regulation.
Through the above analysis, this paper put forward China's railway incentive regulation reform goal and pattern. It analyses the necessary system basis of the incentive regulation reform, And then on this system basis, It are put forward to the China railway incentive regulation reform main goal, through the double factors analysis model,It are put forward to the effective operation mode and basic structure framework of railway industry restructuring,gives the reform route choice, the countermeasures and proposals about the China railway incentive regulation reform.
Finally, the regulation price of natural monopoly industry is an important part of government regulation. China railway transport pricing model had formed under the planned economy system and it remains so, this is the typical government pricing model. With the socialist market economy system established, the existing pricing model cannot adapt to the economic development needs, the railway transport enterprises are lacked of management flexibility for fixed freight rate, and the soft budget constraint of the cost plus pricing model have made that the railway enterprises lacks the incentive of control cost. High cost of transport, the profit level low of railway enterprise have made that railway investment scale cannot satisfy the market demand, and causing the social welfare net loss. It’s the time to relax price control in the railway industry, carry out incentive regulation in transport freight rate. Having analyzed the present situation of railway transport price regulation, this paper raise the basis idea about railway price reform, an established Price-Cap model linkage with price index which can protect the interests of consumers in the transportation peak and ensure that the transportation enterprise can adjust freight rate according to the market needs flexibly and improve railway transport efficiency.
All in all, this paper comprehensively analysis China railway reform with empirical analysis, comparison analysis and mathematical analysis method, points out the the main contradiction and trouble of China's railway development, puts forward the five main target of railway regulatory reform and the corresponding countermeasure, establish a Price-Cap model linkage with price index.
This paper has made innovations in the following several aspects compared with the domestic research results. Such as analyzing that railway regulation reform’s difficulty in achieving institutional breakthrough mainly due to the locked status on account of the reform path dependence, putting forward restructuring reform mode of "regional company and passenger separation" with the double factors analysis model, and establish Price-Cap model linkage with price index which has incentive effect in improving transportation efficiency by lower operating costs.
引文
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①数据来源:依据《2010年中国铁路统计公报》计算整理,铁道部网站
②数据来源:《2010年中国统计年鉴》中国统计出版社
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①数据来源:依据《2010年中国铁路统计公报》计算整理,铁道部网站
②数据来源:《2010年中国统计年鉴》中国统计出版社
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