中国上市公司并购动因与绩效研究
|
摘要
本文在国内学者现有的研究基础之上，基于我国上市公司丰富多元的制度背景，更为全面地考察我国上市公司的并购动因与绩效。通过回顾我国上市公司与证券市场的发展历程，论文分别对国有控股上市公司和民营上市公司的基本治理特征进行梳理，即我国国有控股上司公司存在“政府干预”与“内部人控制”的双重治理特征，而民营上市公司集中体现了“大股东控制”的基本特征。
基于不同类型上市公司的治理机制，本文分别就“政府干预”、“大股东控制”对公司并购行为的影响机制进行理论分析，在此基础上提出了我国上市公司“掏空”和“支持”的并购动因，同时对不同类型上市公司的并购绩效差异提出了研究假设。
论文最后以1999-2004年我国上市公司收购非上市公司的613个大额并购事件为研究样本，采用“事件研究”和“财务指标(ROE)”两种方法，对上市公司并购绩效进行实证分析，并检验论文提出的研究假设。研究表明，上市公司并购之前年度的财务业绩与并购绩效显著负相关，这一证据支持了“掏空”和“支持”的并购动因假设。此外，在短期上，国有控股上市公司的并购绩效优于民营上市公司，中央控股上市公司的并购绩效优于地方政府控股上市公司，但从长期来看，并购未能提高公司的财务业绩。
通过对收购公司并购事件累计超额收益率的单因素和多元回归分析，本文还发现，我国证券市场对于上市公司并购事件存在明显的提前反应现象，同时，收购公司累计超额收益率与并购交易规模显著正相关。此外，投资者对于上市公司多元化的收购有更为积极的反应，这些证据综合反映了我国资本市场上的投资者对并购重组事件的炒作行为。
Against the background of diversified institutions of China's listed companies andbased on the current research conducted by Chinese researchers,this dissertation aimsto do a more comprehensive study on the motive and performance of mergers andacquisitions (M&As) by listed companies in China.By reviewing the course ofdevelopment of China's listed companies as well as the securities market,thisdissertation sorts out the basic governance characteristics of the state-owned holdinglisted companies and private listed companies.While the former exhibits dualgovernance characteristics of "government intervention" and "insider control",thelatter embodies the basic features of "large shareholder control".
Based on governance mechanisms of different types of listed companies,thisdissertation makes a theoretical analysis of the impact of "government intervention"and "majority shareholder control" on the company's M&As,puts forward "tunneling"and "propping" as the M&A motives for China's listed companies,and proposeshypotheses for the performance differences of M&As by varied listed companies.
With the 613 samples of China's listed companies acquiring non-listed companiesduring 1999 through 2004,this dissertation employs the methods of "event study" and"financial ratio (ROE)" to carry out an empirical study on the performance of M&Asof the listed companies and test the proposed hypotheses.The results show that thepre-acquisition annual financial results of the listed companies and the acquisitionperformance is negatively relative,which is in favor of the M & A motives hypothesisfor China's listed companies' "tunneling" and "propping".In addition,in the shortterm,the M&A performance of the state-owned holding listed companies is betterthan that of private listed companies,the M&A performance of the centralgovernment controlling listed companies is better than that of local governmentscontrolling listed companies,but in the long term,M&As fail to improve thecompany's financial performance.
Through the analysis of the single factor and multiple regression of the cumulativeabnormal return (CAR) in the event of company's M&A,this paper also finds that China's securities market apparently reacts before the listed companies' M&A,meanwhile,the acquiring company's cumulative excess return has a significantpositive correlation with the scale of M&A transactions.In addition,investors respondmore positively to the listed companies' diversified acquisition,which reflects theinvestors' speculation in China's capital market over the events of M&A.
基于不同类型上市公司的治理机制，本文分别就“政府干预”、“大股东控制”对公司并购行为的影响机制进行理论分析，在此基础上提出了我国上市公司“掏空”和“支持”的并购动因，同时对不同类型上市公司的并购绩效差异提出了研究假设。
论文最后以1999-2004年我国上市公司收购非上市公司的613个大额并购事件为研究样本，采用“事件研究”和“财务指标(ROE)”两种方法，对上市公司并购绩效进行实证分析，并检验论文提出的研究假设。研究表明，上市公司并购之前年度的财务业绩与并购绩效显著负相关，这一证据支持了“掏空”和“支持”的并购动因假设。此外，在短期上，国有控股上市公司的并购绩效优于民营上市公司，中央控股上市公司的并购绩效优于地方政府控股上市公司，但从长期来看，并购未能提高公司的财务业绩。
通过对收购公司并购事件累计超额收益率的单因素和多元回归分析，本文还发现，我国证券市场对于上市公司并购事件存在明显的提前反应现象，同时，收购公司累计超额收益率与并购交易规模显著正相关。此外，投资者对于上市公司多元化的收购有更为积极的反应，这些证据综合反映了我国资本市场上的投资者对并购重组事件的炒作行为。
Against the background of diversified institutions of China's listed companies andbased on the current research conducted by Chinese researchers,this dissertation aimsto do a more comprehensive study on the motive and performance of mergers andacquisitions (M&As) by listed companies in China.By reviewing the course ofdevelopment of China's listed companies as well as the securities market,thisdissertation sorts out the basic governance characteristics of the state-owned holdinglisted companies and private listed companies.While the former exhibits dualgovernance characteristics of "government intervention" and "insider control",thelatter embodies the basic features of "large shareholder control".
Based on governance mechanisms of different types of listed companies,thisdissertation makes a theoretical analysis of the impact of "government intervention"and "majority shareholder control" on the company's M&As,puts forward "tunneling"and "propping" as the M&A motives for China's listed companies,and proposeshypotheses for the performance differences of M&As by varied listed companies.
With the 613 samples of China's listed companies acquiring non-listed companiesduring 1999 through 2004,this dissertation employs the methods of "event study" and"financial ratio (ROE)" to carry out an empirical study on the performance of M&Asof the listed companies and test the proposed hypotheses.The results show that thepre-acquisition annual financial results of the listed companies and the acquisitionperformance is negatively relative,which is in favor of the M & A motives hypothesisfor China's listed companies' "tunneling" and "propping".In addition,in the shortterm,the M&A performance of the state-owned holding listed companies is betterthan that of private listed companies,the M&A performance of the centralgovernment controlling listed companies is better than that of local governmentscontrolling listed companies,but in the long term,M&As fail to improve thecompany's financial performance.
Through the analysis of the single factor and multiple regression of the cumulativeabnormal return (CAR) in the event of company's M&A,this paper also finds that China's securities market apparently reacts before the listed companies' M&A,meanwhile,the acquiring company's cumulative excess return has a significantpositive correlation with the scale of M&A transactions.In addition,investors respondmore positively to the listed companies' diversified acquisition,which reflects theinvestors' speculation in China's capital market over the events of M&A.
引文
[1]陆正飞，叶康涛．中国资本市场的公司财务研究：回顾与评论(下)[J]．财会通讯(综合版)，2004，(11)： 10-14．
[2]上海证券交易所研究中心．中国公司治理报告：国有控股上市公司治理[M]．上海：复旦大学出版社，2006．
[3]Qian，Y．i．Enterprise Reform in China： Agency Problems and Political Control[J]．Economics of Transition，1996，(4) ： 427-447．
[4]李稻葵．政府控制转型过程中的国有企业所引起的成本和收益：来自中国的证据．working paper，http：//ncer．tsinghua．edu．cn/lunwen/paper2/wp199904．doc，1999．
[5]李增泉．国家控股与公司治理的有效性[D]．上海财经大学博士学位论文，2002．
[6]上海证券交易所研究中心．中国公司治理报告(2005)：民营上市公司治理[M]．上海：复旦大学出版社，2005．
[7]唐宗明，蒋位．中国上市公司大股东侵害度实证分析[J]．经济研究，2002，(4)： 44-50．
[8]徐晓东，陈小悦．第一大股东对公司治理、企业业绩的影响分析[J]．经济研究，2003，(2)：64—74．
[9]刘峰，贺建刚，魏明海．控制权、业绩与利益输送[J]．管理世界，2004，(8)： 102—110．
[10]叶康涛，陆正飞．中国上市公司股权融资成本影响因素分析[J]．管理世界，2004，(5)： 127—131．
[11]阎大颖．中国上市公司控股股东价值取向对股利政策影响的实证研究[J]．南开经济研究，2004，(6)： 94—100．
[12]白重恩，刘俏，陆洲，宋敏，张俊喜．中国上市公司治理结构实证研究[J]．经济研究，2005，(2)：81—91．
[13]陈文斌，陈小悦．大股东代理问题与IPO募集资金的使用[J]．南开管理评论，2005，(3)：4—8．
[14]马曙光，黄志忠，薛云奎．股权分置、资金侵占与上市公司现金股利政策[J]．会计研究，2005，(9)： 44—50．
[15]王化成，胡国柳．股权结构与企业投资多元化关系：理论与实证分析[J]．会计研究， 2005，(8)：56—62．
[16]Lin Y．，F．Cai，and Z．Li．Competition，Policy Burdens，and State-owned Enterprise Reform[J]．American Economic Review，1998，(88)：422—427．
[17]Shleifer，A．and Vishny，R．A Survey of Corporate Governance[J]．Journal of Finane，1997，(52)： 737—783．
[18]La Porta，R．，Lopez-de-Silanes，F．and A．Shleifer．Corporate ownership around the world[J]．Journal of Finane，1999，(54)：471—517．
[19]La Porta，R．，F．Lopez-de-Silanes，A．Shleifer，and R．W．Vishny．Investor Protection and Corporate Governance[J]．Journal of Financial Economics，2000，(58)： 3—28．
[20]Baumol，W．Business Behavior，Value，and Growth[M]．New York： Macmillan，1959．
[21 ]Marris，R．The Economic Theory of Managerial Capitalism[M]．Glencoe IL： Free Press，1964．
[22]Donaldson，G．Managing Corporate Wealth[M]．New York： Praeger，1984．
[23]Jensen，M．C．Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow，Corporate Finance，and Takeovers[J]．American Economic Review，1986，(76)：323—329．
[24]Jensen，M．C．The Modern Industrial Revolution，Exit，and the Failure of Internal Control Systems[J]．Journal of Finance，1993，(48)：831—880．
[25]张小军．多元化掏空中国制药之王？——“三九”资本迷雾[J]．当代经理人，2004，(8)： 60-62．
[26]Shleifer，A．，and R．W．Vishny．Politicians and Firms[J]．Quarterly Journal of Economics，1994，(109)：995—1025．
[27]Shleifer，A．State versus Private Ownership[J]．Journal of Economic Perspective，1998，(12)：133—150．
[28]陈信元，黄俊．政府干预、多元化经营与公司业绩[J]．管理世界，2007，(1)．
[29]方军雄．政府干预、所有权性质与企业并购[J]．管理世界，2008，(9)： 118—123．
[30]Bae，K，Kang，J，Kim，J．Tunneling or Value Added? Evidence from Mergers by Korean Business Groups[J]．Journal of Finance，2002，(57)：2695-2740．
[31]郎咸平，纪丽琴等．在“国退民进”盛筵中狂欢的格林柯尔[N]．http：//finance．sina．com．cn/t/20040816/1202951523．shtml，2008-08-16．
[32]Manne，H．G．Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control[J]．The Journal of Political Economy，1965，(73)：110-120．
[33] Fama, E. F. Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm [J]. The Journal of Political Economy ,1980, (88): 288—307.
[34] Jensen, M. C. and R. S. Ruback. The Market For Corporate Control [J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 1983, (11): 5—50.
[35]Jensen, M. C. Takeovers: Their Causes and Consequences [J]. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 1988, (2): 21—48.
[36] Arrow, K.J. Vertical Integration and Communication [J]. Bell Journal of Economics, 1975,(6): 173—183.
[37]Weston, F.J., J.A. Siu and B.A. Johnson. Takeovers, Restructuring, and Corporate Governance [M]. Prentice Hall, 3rd edition, 2001.
[38] Roll, R. The Hubris Hypothesis of Corporate Takerovers [J]. Journal of Business, 1986,(59): 197—216.
[39] Shleifer, A. and R. Vishny. Stock Market Driven Acquisitions [J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 2003, (70): 295—311.
[40]Agrawal A., F.F. Jaffe. The Post-Merger Performance Puzzle [M]. In Cooper, C, and A.Gregory, Eds. Advances In Mergers and Acquisitions, Stamford, CT: JAI Press, 2000.
[41] Jarrel, G.A., J.A. Brickley and J.M. Netter. The Market for Corporate Control: The Empirical Evidence since 1980 [J]. Journal of Economics Perspective, 1998, (2): 49—68.
[42] Andrade,G, Mitchell,M., and Stafford,E.,2001,"New Evidence and Perspectives on Mergers",Journal of Economics Perspectives 15: 103-120.
[43]Holmstrom, B. and S. N. Kaplan. Corporate Governance and Merger Activity in the UnitedStates: Making Sense of the 1980s and 1990s [J]. The Journal of Economic Perspectives2001, (15): 121—144.
[44]Bruner, R. F. Does M&A Pay? A Survey of Evidence for the Decision-Maker [J]. Journal of Applied Finance, 2002, (12): 48—68.
[45]Stein, J.C. Agency, Information and Corporate Investment. Working paper, 2001,http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=273568.
[46]Servaes, H. Tobin's Q and the Gains from Takeovers [J]. Journal of Finance, 1991, (46): 409—419.
[47]Palepu, K.G. Predicting Takeover Targets: A Methodological and Empirical Analysis [J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 1986, (8): 3-35.
[48]DeLong, G Does Long-Term Performance of Mergers Match Market Expectations?Evidence from the US Banking Industry [J]. Financial Management ,2003, (32): 5—25.
[49]Lang, L. H. P., R. M. Stulz and R.A. Walkling. Managerial Performance, Tobin's Q, And The Gains From Successful Tender Offers [J]. Journal of Financial Economics ,1989, (24): 137—154.
[50]Klein, B. R. Crawford and A.Alchian. Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents and Competitive Contracting Process [J]. Journal of Law and Economics, 1978, (21): 297—326.
[51]Slusky, A.R. and R.E. Caves. Synergy, Agency and the Determinants of Premia Paid in Mergeers [J]. Journal of Industrial Economics, 1991, (39): 277—296.
[52]Myers, S. C. The Capital Structure Puzzle [J]. Journal of Finance, 1984, (39): 575—592.
[53]Auerbach, A.J. and D. Reishus. The Impace of Taxation on Mergers and Acquisitions [M].Chapter 4 in Mergers and Acquisitions , Alan J. Auerbach ed., Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1988.
[54]Hayn, C. Tax Attributes as Determinants of Shareholder Gains in Corporate Acquisitions [J].Journal of Financial Economics, 1989, (23): 121—153.
[55]Ghosh, A. and P.C. Jain. Financial Leverage Changes Associated with Corporate Mergers [J].Journal of Corporate Finance, 2000, (6): 377—402.
[56]Berle, A.,and G Means. The Modern Corporation and Private Property, New York : Mc-Millan,1932.
[57]Jensen, M. C. and W. H. Meckling .Theory of The Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs And Ownership Structure [J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 1976, (3): 305—360.
[58]Amihud, Y. and B. Lev. Risk Reduction as a Managerial Motive for Conglomerate Mergers [J].Bell Journal of Economics, 1981, (12): 605—617.
[59]Shleifer, A. and R.W. Vishny. Management Entrenchment: The Case of Manager-Specific Investments [J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 1989, (25): 123—139.
[60]Morck, R., A.Shleifer, and R.Vishny. Do Managerial Objectives Drive Bad Acquisitions? [J].Journal of Financial Economics, 1990, (13): 187—221.
[61]Miller, D.T. and M.Ross. Self-Serving Biases In The Attribution of Causality: Fact or Fiction? [J]. Psychological Bulletin, 1975, (82): 213—225.
[62]Weinstein, N. Unrealistic Optimism about Future Life Events [J]. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1980, (39): 806—820.
[63]March, J. G. and Z. Shapira . Managerial Perspectives on Risk and Risk Taking [J].Management Science, 1987, (33): 1404-1418.
[64]Gilson, S.C. Management Turnover and Financial Distress. Journal of Financial Economics, 1989, (25): 241—62.
[65]Lys, T. and L. Vincent. An Analysis of Value Destruction in AT&T's Acquisition of NCR [J].Journal of Financial Economics, 1995, (39): 353—378.
[66]Hayward, M. L. A. and D. C. Hambrick. Explaining the Premiums Paid for Large Acquisitions:Evidence of CEO Hubris [J] .Administrative Science Quarterly ,1997, (42): 103—127.
[67]Nelson, R.. Merger Movements in the American Industry [M]. New York: NBER, 1959.
[68]Friedman, J.N. Stock Market Driven Acquisitions: Theory and Evidence. Working paper,http://kuznets.fas.harvard.edu/～infriedm/papers/papers.html. 2006.
[69]Claessens, S., S. Djankov and H.P. Lang. The separation of ownership and control in East Asian Corporations [J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 2000, (58): 81—112.
[70]Holderness, C. A Survey of Blockholders and Corporate Control [J]. Economic Policy Review,2003, (9): 51—63.
[71]Johnson, S., R. La Porta, F.Lopez-de-Silanes and A.Shleifer. Tunneling [J]. American Economic Review ,2000, (90): 22—27.
[72]Claessens, S., D. Simeon, P.H.Fan, and H.P. Lang. Disentangling the Incentive and Entrenchment Effects of Large Shareholdings [J].The Journal of Finance ,2002, (57):2741-2771.
[73]Ball, R. and P. Brown. An Empirical Evaluation of Accounting Income Numbers [J]. Journal of Accounting Research, 1968, (6): 159—178.
[74]Fama, E. F., L. Fisher, M.C. Jensen and R. Roll. The Adjustment of Stock Prices to New Information [J]. International Economic Review ,1969 (10): 1—21.
[75]Schwert, G.W. Markup Pricing in Mergers and Acquisitions [J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 1996, (41): 153—162.
[76]Bradley, M., A. Desai, and E.H. Kim. The Rationale Behind Interfirm Tender Offers: Information or Synergy? [J]. Journal of Financial Economics , 1983, (11):
[77]Loughran, T. and A. Vijh. "Do Long-Term Shareholders Benefit From Corporate Acquisitions?" Journal of Finance, 52 (December 1997): 1765-1790.
[78]Dodd, P. and R. Ruback. Tender offers and stockholder returns: An empirical analysis [J].Journal of Financial Economics, 1977, (5): 351—374.
[79]Kummer D and R. Hoffmeister, "Valuation consequences of cash tender offers," Journal of Finance, 1978, (33): 505-516.
[80]Jarrell, G. and M. Bradley "The economic effects of federal and state regulations of cash tender offers," Journal ofLaw and Economics, 1980, (23): 371 -407.
[81]Loderer C. and K. Martin. Corporate Acquisitions by Listed Firms: The Experience of a Comprehensive Sample [J]. Financial Management, 1990, (19): 17—33.
[82]Eckbo, E. and K. Thorburn. Gains to Bidder Firms Revisited: Domestic and Foreign Acquisitions in Canada [J]. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 2000, (35): 1—25.
[83]Leeth, J. and J.R. Borg. The Impact of Takeovers on Shareholder Wealth During the 1920s Merger Wave [J]. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 2000, (35):217—238.
[84]Dodd, P. Merger Proposals, Management Discretion and Stockholder Wealth [J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 1980, (8): 105—138.
[85]Varaiya N. and K. Ferris. Overpaying in Corporate Takeover: The Winner's Curse [J].Financial Analysts Journal, 1987, (43): 64—70.
[86]Healy, P., K. Palepu and R. Ruback. Does Corporate Performance Improve After Mergers? [J].Journal of Financial Economics, 1992, (31): 135—175.
[87]Mitchell, M.L. and E. Stafford. Managerial Decisions and Long-Term Stock Price Performance[J]. Journal of Business, 2000, (73): 287—329.
[88]Walker, M. Corporate Takeovers, Strategic Objectives, and Acquiring-firm Shareholder Wealth [J]. Financial Management, 2000, (Spring): 53—66.
[89]Bradley, M. Interfirm Tender Offers and the Market for Corporate Control [J]. Journal of Business, 1980, (53): 345—376
[90]Franks, J., R. Harris and S. Titman. The Postmerger Share-Price Performance of Acquiring Firms [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,1991, (29): 81—96.
[91]Mulherin，J．H．and A．L．Boone．Comparing Acquisitions and Divestitures[J]．Journal of Corporate Finance，2000，(6) ： 117-139．
[92]Firth，M．Takeovers，Shareholder Returns，and the Theory of the Firm[J]．Quarterly Journal of Economics，1980 (3)：235-60．
[93]Kaplan，S．and M．Weisbach．The Success of Acquisitions： Evidence From Divestitures[J]．Journal of Finance，1992，(47)：107-138．
[94]Houston，J．，C．James，and M．Ryngaert．Where Do Merger Gains Come From?[J]．Journal of Financial Economics，2001 (60) ： 285-331．
[95]Meeks，G．Disappointing Marriage： A Study of the Gains From Merger[M]．Cambridge： Cambridge University Press，1977．
[96]Mueller，D．Mergers and Market Share[J]．Review of Economics and Statistics，1985，(67)： 259-267．
[97]Seth，A．Sources of Value Creation in Acquisitions： An Empirical Investigation[J]．Strategic Management Journal，1990，(11)：431-446．
[98]Parrino，J．D．，and R．S．Harris．Takeovers，Management Replacement，and Post-Acquisition Operating Performance： Some Evidence from the 1980s[J]．Journal of Applied Corporate Finance，1999，(11)：88-97．
[99]Herman，E．and L．Lowenstein．The Efficiency Effect of Hostile Takeovers[M]．In J．C．Coffee，Jr．； L．Lowenstein；and S．Rose-Ackerman； eds．，Knights，Raiders，and Targets，211-240．New York：Oxford University Press，1988．
[100]Ghosh，A．Does operating performance really improve following corporate acquisitions?[J]．Journal of Corporate Finance，2001，(7)： 151—178．
[101]陈信元、张田余．资产重组的市场反应—1997年沪市资产重组实证分析[J]．经济研究，1999，(9)： P47-55．
[102]梁岚雨．中国上市公司并购绩效的实证分析[J]．世界经济文汇，2002，(6)： 50—61．
[103]洪锡熙，沈艺峰．公司收购与目标公司股东收益的实证分析[J]．金融研究，2001，(3)： 26-33．
[104]李善民，陈玉罡．上市公司兼并与收购的财富效应[J]．经济研究，2002，(11)： 27-35．
[105]余光，杨荣．企业并购股价效应的理论分析和实证分析[J]．当代财经，2000，(7)： 70-74．
[106]张新．并购重组是否创造价值[J]．经济研究，2003，(6) ： 20-29．
[107]江斌．兼并收购和市场反应[J]．预测，2002，(6) ： 49-53．
[108]李善民，朱滔．中国上市公司并购的长期绩效——基于证券市场的研究[J]．中山大学学报(社会科学版)，2005，(05) ： 80—86．
[109]冯根福，吴林江．我国上市公司并购绩效的实证研究[J]．经济研究，2001，(1) ： 54—61．
[110]李善民，李珩．中国上市公司资产重组绩效研究[J]．管理世界，2003，(11)： 126—134．
[111]廖理，朱正芹．上市公司重大资产重组的业绩改善研究[J]．中国工业经济，2004，(10)： 97—104．
[112]陈信元，叶朋飞，陈冬华．机会主义资产重组与刚性管制[Jl．经济研究，2003，(5) ： 13-22．
[113]李增泉，余谦，王晓坤．掏空、支持与并购重组[J]．经济研究，2005 (1)： 95—105．
[114]Friedman，M．，S．Johnson and T．Mitton．Propping and Tunneling[J]．Journal of Comparative Economics，2003，(31)：732—750．
[115]黄兴孪，沈维涛．掏空或支持——来自我国上市公司关联并购的实证分析[J]．经济管理，2006，(12) ： 57—64．
[116]白津夫．国有企业制度变迁及改革[J]．学习与探索，2000，(6)： 10—16．
[117]Sun，Q．and W．H．S．Tong．China Share Issue Privatization： The Extent of Its Success[J]．Journal of Financial Economics，2003，(70) ： 183—222．
[118]汪彬．股份制改革与资本市场建设[M]．北京：新华出版社，2000．
[119]李东平．大股东控制、盈余管理与上市公司业绩滑坡[D]．上海财经大学博士学位论文，2001．
[120]王靖婧，白俊鹏．对中国股票市场发行制度的实证研究[J]．市场研究，2007，(12)： 23-25．
[121]周俊生．中国股市批判[M]．天津：天津教育出版社，2000．
[122]青木昌彦．对内部人控制的控制：转轨经济中公司治理的若干问题[J]．改革，1994，(6)： 11—24．
[123]钱颖一．企业的治理结构改革和融资结构改革[J]．经济研究，1995，(1)： 20—29．
[124]刘小玄．中国企业发展报告[M]．北京：社会科学文献出版社，2001．
[125]张春霖．从融资角度分析国有企业的治理结构改革[J]．改革，1995，(3)： 34—46．
[126]费方域，1996，控制内部人控制：国企改革中的治理机制研究，《经济研究》第6期： 31-38
[127]张维迎．企业理论与中国企业改革[M]．北京：北京大学出版社，1999．
[128]张承耀．“内部人控制”问题与中国企业改革[J]．改革，1995，(3)： 29—33
[129]吴敬琏、张军扩、刘世锦等．国有经济的战略性改组[M]．北京：中国发展出版社，1998．
[130]解建立．关于国有企业“内部人控制”问题研究综述[J]．理论与现代化，1999，(5)： 41-42．
[131]陈家琰，赵洪军，赵会．上市公司“内部人控制”问题研究——基于对山东上市公司的抽样调查[J]．西部金融，2008，(3)： 45-47．
[132]成思危．政府如何管理企业[D]．北京：民主与建设出版社，1998．
[133]余晖．政府与企业：从宏观管理到微观管制[M]．福州：福建人民出版社1997．
[134]李江．企业并购中政府干预的经济学分析[D]．复旦大学博士学位论文，2003．
[135]Vickers，J．and G．Yarrow．Privatization：An Economic Analysis[M]．Cambridge： MIT University Press，1989．
[136]Leibenstein，H．Allocative Efficiency vs．X-Efficiency[J]．American Economic Review，1966，(56)： 392—415．
[137]Machlup，F．Theories of The Firm： Marginalist，Behavioral，Managerial[J]．American Economic Review，1967，(57)： 1—33．
[138]Hart，O．D．The Market Mechanism As An Incentive Scheme[J]．The Bell Journal of Economics，1983，(14) ： 366—382．
[139]Sappington，D．and J．Stiglitz．Privatization，Information and Incentives[J]．Journal of Policy Analysis and Management，1987，(6)：567—582．
[140]Boycko，M．，A．Shleifer，and R．M．Vishny．A Theory of Privatization．The Economic Journal，1996，(106)：309—319．
[141]De Alessi Louis．Property Rights，Transaction Costs，and X-Efficiency： An Essay in Economic Theory[J]．America Economic Review，1983，(73)：64—81．
[142]Boardman，A．E．and A．R．Vining．Ownership and Performance in Competitive Environments A Comparison of the Performance of Private，Mixed and State-Owned Enterprises[J]．Journal of Law and Economics，1989，(32)：1—33．
[143]Kikeri，S．，J．Nellis and M．Shirley．Privatization： the Lessons of Experience[M]．Washington DC： World Bank，1992．
[144]Grossman，G．M．and A．B．Krugger．Economic Growth and the Environment[J]．Quarterly Journal of Economics，1995，(110)：353—377．
[145]夏立军，方秩强．政府控制、治理环境与公司价值[J]．经济研究，2005，(5) ： 40—51．
[146]Qian，Y．Y．，M．Gabriella and W．Barry．Federalism，Chinese Style： The Political Basis for Economic Success in China[J]．World Politics，1995，(48)：50-81．
[147]伍秉华．民营上市公司股权结构成因和公司治理研究[J]．市场论坛，2008，(9)： 21-22．
[148]于海涛．民营上市公司违规死灰复燃：公司治理形式化[N]．21世纪经济报道，1998年12月25日．
[149]天亮．推动我国并购市场发展[N]．商业周刊(中文版)，2008，(12)： 4-8．
[150]潘红波，夏新平，余明桂．政府干预、政治关联与地方国有企业并购[J]．经济研究，2008，(4)：41-52．
[151]曾庆生，陈信元．国家控股、超额雇员与劳动力成本[J]．经济研究2006，(5)： 74-86．
[152]Kornai，J．The Economics of Shortage[M]．Amsterdam： North-Holland，1980．
[153]Frye，T．and A．Shleifer．The Invisible Hand and the Grabbing Hand．The American Economic Review，1997，(87)： 354-358．
[154]白重恩、杜颖娟、陶志刚、仝月婷．地方保护主义及产业地区集中度的决定因素和变动趋势[J]．经济研究2004 (4) ： 29-40．
[155]Li，H．，and L．A．Zhou．Political Turnover and Economic Performance： The Incentive Role of Personnel Control in China[J]．Journal of Public Economics 2005，(89)： 1743—1762．
[156]周黎安．晋升博弈中政府官员的激励与合作——兼论我国地方保护主义和重复建设问题长期存在的原因[J]．经济研究，2004，(6) ： 33—40．
[157]Denis，D．K．and J．J．McConnell．International Corporate Governance[J]．Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis，2003，(38)： 1—36．
[158]陈信元，叶鹏飞，陈冬华．机会主义资产重组与刚性管制[J]．经济研究，2003，(5)： 13—22．
[159]Kornai，J．The Socialist System： The Political Economy of Communism[M]．Princeton，NJ： Princeton University Press，1992．
[160]高雷、何少华、仪垂林．国家控制、政府干预、银行债务与资金侵占[J]．金融研究，2006，(6)：90—98．
[161]沈艺峰．会计信息披露与我国股票市场半强式有效性的实证检验[J]．会计研究，1996 (1)：14—17
[162]吴世农，黄志功．上市公司盈利信息报告、股价变动与股市效率的实证研究[J]．会计研究，1997，(4)： 12—17．
[163]Berger，P．and E．Ofek．Diversification's Effect on Firm Value[J]．Journal of Financial Economics，1995，(37)：39—65．
[164]Comment，R．and G．A．Jarrell．Corporate Focus and Stock Returns[J]．Journal of Financial Economics 1995，(37) ： 67—87．
[165]Healy，P．，K．Palepu and R．Ruback．Which Takeovers are Profitable： Strategic of Financial?[J]．Sloan Management Review，1997，(38)： 45—57．
[166]Maquieria，C．，W．Megginson and L．Nail．Wealth Creation versus wealth redistributions in pure stock-for-stock mergers[J]．Journal of Financial Economics，1998，(48)：3—33．
[167]Jian，Ming，and TJ Wong．Tunneling and Earning Management through Related Party Transactions： Evidence from Chinese Corporate Groups．HKUST Working Paper，2003，http：//papers．ssrn．com/sol3/papers．cfm?abstract_id=424888．
[168]陈晓，陈小悦，刘钊．A股盈余报告的有用性研究[J]．经济研究，1999，(5)： 21—28．
[2]上海证券交易所研究中心．中国公司治理报告：国有控股上市公司治理[M]．上海：复旦大学出版社，2006．
[3]Qian，Y．i．Enterprise Reform in China： Agency Problems and Political Control[J]．Economics of Transition，1996，(4) ： 427-447．
[4]李稻葵．政府控制转型过程中的国有企业所引起的成本和收益：来自中国的证据．working paper，http：//ncer．tsinghua．edu．cn/lunwen/paper2/wp199904．doc，1999．
[5]李增泉．国家控股与公司治理的有效性[D]．上海财经大学博士学位论文，2002．
[6]上海证券交易所研究中心．中国公司治理报告(2005)：民营上市公司治理[M]．上海：复旦大学出版社，2005．
[7]唐宗明，蒋位．中国上市公司大股东侵害度实证分析[J]．经济研究，2002，(4)： 44-50．
[8]徐晓东，陈小悦．第一大股东对公司治理、企业业绩的影响分析[J]．经济研究，2003，(2)：64—74．
[9]刘峰，贺建刚，魏明海．控制权、业绩与利益输送[J]．管理世界，2004，(8)： 102—110．
[10]叶康涛，陆正飞．中国上市公司股权融资成本影响因素分析[J]．管理世界，2004，(5)： 127—131．
[11]阎大颖．中国上市公司控股股东价值取向对股利政策影响的实证研究[J]．南开经济研究，2004，(6)： 94—100．
[12]白重恩，刘俏，陆洲，宋敏，张俊喜．中国上市公司治理结构实证研究[J]．经济研究，2005，(2)：81—91．
[13]陈文斌，陈小悦．大股东代理问题与IPO募集资金的使用[J]．南开管理评论，2005，(3)：4—8．
[14]马曙光，黄志忠，薛云奎．股权分置、资金侵占与上市公司现金股利政策[J]．会计研究，2005，(9)： 44—50．
[15]王化成，胡国柳．股权结构与企业投资多元化关系：理论与实证分析[J]．会计研究， 2005，(8)：56—62．
[16]Lin Y．，F．Cai，and Z．Li．Competition，Policy Burdens，and State-owned Enterprise Reform[J]．American Economic Review，1998，(88)：422—427．
[17]Shleifer，A．and Vishny，R．A Survey of Corporate Governance[J]．Journal of Finane，1997，(52)： 737—783．
[18]La Porta，R．，Lopez-de-Silanes，F．and A．Shleifer．Corporate ownership around the world[J]．Journal of Finane，1999，(54)：471—517．
[19]La Porta，R．，F．Lopez-de-Silanes，A．Shleifer，and R．W．Vishny．Investor Protection and Corporate Governance[J]．Journal of Financial Economics，2000，(58)： 3—28．
[20]Baumol，W．Business Behavior，Value，and Growth[M]．New York： Macmillan，1959．
[21 ]Marris，R．The Economic Theory of Managerial Capitalism[M]．Glencoe IL： Free Press，1964．
[22]Donaldson，G．Managing Corporate Wealth[M]．New York： Praeger，1984．
[23]Jensen，M．C．Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow，Corporate Finance，and Takeovers[J]．American Economic Review，1986，(76)：323—329．
[24]Jensen，M．C．The Modern Industrial Revolution，Exit，and the Failure of Internal Control Systems[J]．Journal of Finance，1993，(48)：831—880．
[25]张小军．多元化掏空中国制药之王？——“三九”资本迷雾[J]．当代经理人，2004，(8)： 60-62．
[26]Shleifer，A．，and R．W．Vishny．Politicians and Firms[J]．Quarterly Journal of Economics，1994，(109)：995—1025．
[27]Shleifer，A．State versus Private Ownership[J]．Journal of Economic Perspective，1998，(12)：133—150．
[28]陈信元，黄俊．政府干预、多元化经营与公司业绩[J]．管理世界，2007，(1)．
[29]方军雄．政府干预、所有权性质与企业并购[J]．管理世界，2008，(9)： 118—123．
[30]Bae，K，Kang，J，Kim，J．Tunneling or Value Added? Evidence from Mergers by Korean Business Groups[J]．Journal of Finance，2002，(57)：2695-2740．
[31]郎咸平，纪丽琴等．在“国退民进”盛筵中狂欢的格林柯尔[N]．http：//finance．sina．com．cn/t/20040816/1202951523．shtml，2008-08-16．
[32]Manne，H．G．Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control[J]．The Journal of Political Economy，1965，(73)：110-120．
[33] Fama, E. F. Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm [J]. The Journal of Political Economy ,1980, (88): 288—307.
[34] Jensen, M. C. and R. S. Ruback. The Market For Corporate Control [J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 1983, (11): 5—50.
[35]Jensen, M. C. Takeovers: Their Causes and Consequences [J]. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 1988, (2): 21—48.
[36] Arrow, K.J. Vertical Integration and Communication [J]. Bell Journal of Economics, 1975,(6): 173—183.
[37]Weston, F.J., J.A. Siu and B.A. Johnson. Takeovers, Restructuring, and Corporate Governance [M]. Prentice Hall, 3rd edition, 2001.
[38] Roll, R. The Hubris Hypothesis of Corporate Takerovers [J]. Journal of Business, 1986,(59): 197—216.
[39] Shleifer, A. and R. Vishny. Stock Market Driven Acquisitions [J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 2003, (70): 295—311.
[40]Agrawal A., F.F. Jaffe. The Post-Merger Performance Puzzle [M]. In Cooper, C, and A.Gregory, Eds. Advances In Mergers and Acquisitions, Stamford, CT: JAI Press, 2000.
[41] Jarrel, G.A., J.A. Brickley and J.M. Netter. The Market for Corporate Control: The Empirical Evidence since 1980 [J]. Journal of Economics Perspective, 1998, (2): 49—68.
[42] Andrade,G, Mitchell,M., and Stafford,E.,2001,"New Evidence and Perspectives on Mergers",Journal of Economics Perspectives 15: 103-120.
[43]Holmstrom, B. and S. N. Kaplan. Corporate Governance and Merger Activity in the UnitedStates: Making Sense of the 1980s and 1990s [J]. The Journal of Economic Perspectives2001, (15): 121—144.
[44]Bruner, R. F. Does M&A Pay? A Survey of Evidence for the Decision-Maker [J]. Journal of Applied Finance, 2002, (12): 48—68.
[45]Stein, J.C. Agency, Information and Corporate Investment. Working paper, 2001,http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=273568.
[46]Servaes, H. Tobin's Q and the Gains from Takeovers [J]. Journal of Finance, 1991, (46): 409—419.
[47]Palepu, K.G. Predicting Takeover Targets: A Methodological and Empirical Analysis [J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 1986, (8): 3-35.
[48]DeLong, G Does Long-Term Performance of Mergers Match Market Expectations?Evidence from the US Banking Industry [J]. Financial Management ,2003, (32): 5—25.
[49]Lang, L. H. P., R. M. Stulz and R.A. Walkling. Managerial Performance, Tobin's Q, And The Gains From Successful Tender Offers [J]. Journal of Financial Economics ,1989, (24): 137—154.
[50]Klein, B. R. Crawford and A.Alchian. Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents and Competitive Contracting Process [J]. Journal of Law and Economics, 1978, (21): 297—326.
[51]Slusky, A.R. and R.E. Caves. Synergy, Agency and the Determinants of Premia Paid in Mergeers [J]. Journal of Industrial Economics, 1991, (39): 277—296.
[52]Myers, S. C. The Capital Structure Puzzle [J]. Journal of Finance, 1984, (39): 575—592.
[53]Auerbach, A.J. and D. Reishus. The Impace of Taxation on Mergers and Acquisitions [M].Chapter 4 in Mergers and Acquisitions , Alan J. Auerbach ed., Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1988.
[54]Hayn, C. Tax Attributes as Determinants of Shareholder Gains in Corporate Acquisitions [J].Journal of Financial Economics, 1989, (23): 121—153.
[55]Ghosh, A. and P.C. Jain. Financial Leverage Changes Associated with Corporate Mergers [J].Journal of Corporate Finance, 2000, (6): 377—402.
[56]Berle, A.,and G Means. The Modern Corporation and Private Property, New York : Mc-Millan,1932.
[57]Jensen, M. C. and W. H. Meckling .Theory of The Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs And Ownership Structure [J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 1976, (3): 305—360.
[58]Amihud, Y. and B. Lev. Risk Reduction as a Managerial Motive for Conglomerate Mergers [J].Bell Journal of Economics, 1981, (12): 605—617.
[59]Shleifer, A. and R.W. Vishny. Management Entrenchment: The Case of Manager-Specific Investments [J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 1989, (25): 123—139.
[60]Morck, R., A.Shleifer, and R.Vishny. Do Managerial Objectives Drive Bad Acquisitions? [J].Journal of Financial Economics, 1990, (13): 187—221.
[61]Miller, D.T. and M.Ross. Self-Serving Biases In The Attribution of Causality: Fact or Fiction? [J]. Psychological Bulletin, 1975, (82): 213—225.
[62]Weinstein, N. Unrealistic Optimism about Future Life Events [J]. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1980, (39): 806—820.
[63]March, J. G. and Z. Shapira . Managerial Perspectives on Risk and Risk Taking [J].Management Science, 1987, (33): 1404-1418.
[64]Gilson, S.C. Management Turnover and Financial Distress. Journal of Financial Economics, 1989, (25): 241—62.
[65]Lys, T. and L. Vincent. An Analysis of Value Destruction in AT&T's Acquisition of NCR [J].Journal of Financial Economics, 1995, (39): 353—378.
[66]Hayward, M. L. A. and D. C. Hambrick. Explaining the Premiums Paid for Large Acquisitions:Evidence of CEO Hubris [J] .Administrative Science Quarterly ,1997, (42): 103—127.
[67]Nelson, R.. Merger Movements in the American Industry [M]. New York: NBER, 1959.
[68]Friedman, J.N. Stock Market Driven Acquisitions: Theory and Evidence. Working paper,http://kuznets.fas.harvard.edu/～infriedm/papers/papers.html. 2006.
[69]Claessens, S., S. Djankov and H.P. Lang. The separation of ownership and control in East Asian Corporations [J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 2000, (58): 81—112.
[70]Holderness, C. A Survey of Blockholders and Corporate Control [J]. Economic Policy Review,2003, (9): 51—63.
[71]Johnson, S., R. La Porta, F.Lopez-de-Silanes and A.Shleifer. Tunneling [J]. American Economic Review ,2000, (90): 22—27.
[72]Claessens, S., D. Simeon, P.H.Fan, and H.P. Lang. Disentangling the Incentive and Entrenchment Effects of Large Shareholdings [J].The Journal of Finance ,2002, (57):2741-2771.
[73]Ball, R. and P. Brown. An Empirical Evaluation of Accounting Income Numbers [J]. Journal of Accounting Research, 1968, (6): 159—178.
[74]Fama, E. F., L. Fisher, M.C. Jensen and R. Roll. The Adjustment of Stock Prices to New Information [J]. International Economic Review ,1969 (10): 1—21.
[75]Schwert, G.W. Markup Pricing in Mergers and Acquisitions [J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 1996, (41): 153—162.
[76]Bradley, M., A. Desai, and E.H. Kim. The Rationale Behind Interfirm Tender Offers: Information or Synergy? [J]. Journal of Financial Economics , 1983, (11):
[77]Loughran, T. and A. Vijh. "Do Long-Term Shareholders Benefit From Corporate Acquisitions?" Journal of Finance, 52 (December 1997): 1765-1790.
[78]Dodd, P. and R. Ruback. Tender offers and stockholder returns: An empirical analysis [J].Journal of Financial Economics, 1977, (5): 351—374.
[79]Kummer D and R. Hoffmeister, "Valuation consequences of cash tender offers," Journal of Finance, 1978, (33): 505-516.
[80]Jarrell, G. and M. Bradley "The economic effects of federal and state regulations of cash tender offers," Journal ofLaw and Economics, 1980, (23): 371 -407.
[81]Loderer C. and K. Martin. Corporate Acquisitions by Listed Firms: The Experience of a Comprehensive Sample [J]. Financial Management, 1990, (19): 17—33.
[82]Eckbo, E. and K. Thorburn. Gains to Bidder Firms Revisited: Domestic and Foreign Acquisitions in Canada [J]. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 2000, (35): 1—25.
[83]Leeth, J. and J.R. Borg. The Impact of Takeovers on Shareholder Wealth During the 1920s Merger Wave [J]. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 2000, (35):217—238.
[84]Dodd, P. Merger Proposals, Management Discretion and Stockholder Wealth [J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 1980, (8): 105—138.
[85]Varaiya N. and K. Ferris. Overpaying in Corporate Takeover: The Winner's Curse [J].Financial Analysts Journal, 1987, (43): 64—70.
[86]Healy, P., K. Palepu and R. Ruback. Does Corporate Performance Improve After Mergers? [J].Journal of Financial Economics, 1992, (31): 135—175.
[87]Mitchell, M.L. and E. Stafford. Managerial Decisions and Long-Term Stock Price Performance[J]. Journal of Business, 2000, (73): 287—329.
[88]Walker, M. Corporate Takeovers, Strategic Objectives, and Acquiring-firm Shareholder Wealth [J]. Financial Management, 2000, (Spring): 53—66.
[89]Bradley, M. Interfirm Tender Offers and the Market for Corporate Control [J]. Journal of Business, 1980, (53): 345—376
[90]Franks, J., R. Harris and S. Titman. The Postmerger Share-Price Performance of Acquiring Firms [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,1991, (29): 81—96.
[91]Mulherin，J．H．and A．L．Boone．Comparing Acquisitions and Divestitures[J]．Journal of Corporate Finance，2000，(6) ： 117-139．
[92]Firth，M．Takeovers，Shareholder Returns，and the Theory of the Firm[J]．Quarterly Journal of Economics，1980 (3)：235-60．
[93]Kaplan，S．and M．Weisbach．The Success of Acquisitions： Evidence From Divestitures[J]．Journal of Finance，1992，(47)：107-138．
[94]Houston，J．，C．James，and M．Ryngaert．Where Do Merger Gains Come From?[J]．Journal of Financial Economics，2001 (60) ： 285-331．
[95]Meeks，G．Disappointing Marriage： A Study of the Gains From Merger[M]．Cambridge： Cambridge University Press，1977．
[96]Mueller，D．Mergers and Market Share[J]．Review of Economics and Statistics，1985，(67)： 259-267．
[97]Seth，A．Sources of Value Creation in Acquisitions： An Empirical Investigation[J]．Strategic Management Journal，1990，(11)：431-446．
[98]Parrino，J．D．，and R．S．Harris．Takeovers，Management Replacement，and Post-Acquisition Operating Performance： Some Evidence from the 1980s[J]．Journal of Applied Corporate Finance，1999，(11)：88-97．
[99]Herman，E．and L．Lowenstein．The Efficiency Effect of Hostile Takeovers[M]．In J．C．Coffee，Jr．； L．Lowenstein；and S．Rose-Ackerman； eds．，Knights，Raiders，and Targets，211-240．New York：Oxford University Press，1988．
[100]Ghosh，A．Does operating performance really improve following corporate acquisitions?[J]．Journal of Corporate Finance，2001，(7)： 151—178．
[101]陈信元、张田余．资产重组的市场反应—1997年沪市资产重组实证分析[J]．经济研究，1999，(9)： P47-55．
[102]梁岚雨．中国上市公司并购绩效的实证分析[J]．世界经济文汇，2002，(6)： 50—61．
[103]洪锡熙，沈艺峰．公司收购与目标公司股东收益的实证分析[J]．金融研究，2001，(3)： 26-33．
[104]李善民，陈玉罡．上市公司兼并与收购的财富效应[J]．经济研究，2002，(11)： 27-35．
[105]余光，杨荣．企业并购股价效应的理论分析和实证分析[J]．当代财经，2000，(7)： 70-74．
[106]张新．并购重组是否创造价值[J]．经济研究，2003，(6) ： 20-29．
[107]江斌．兼并收购和市场反应[J]．预测，2002，(6) ： 49-53．
[108]李善民，朱滔．中国上市公司并购的长期绩效——基于证券市场的研究[J]．中山大学学报(社会科学版)，2005，(05) ： 80—86．
[109]冯根福，吴林江．我国上市公司并购绩效的实证研究[J]．经济研究，2001，(1) ： 54—61．
[110]李善民，李珩．中国上市公司资产重组绩效研究[J]．管理世界，2003，(11)： 126—134．
[111]廖理，朱正芹．上市公司重大资产重组的业绩改善研究[J]．中国工业经济，2004，(10)： 97—104．
[112]陈信元，叶朋飞，陈冬华．机会主义资产重组与刚性管制[Jl．经济研究，2003，(5) ： 13-22．
[113]李增泉，余谦，王晓坤．掏空、支持与并购重组[J]．经济研究，2005 (1)： 95—105．
[114]Friedman，M．，S．Johnson and T．Mitton．Propping and Tunneling[J]．Journal of Comparative Economics，2003，(31)：732—750．
[115]黄兴孪，沈维涛．掏空或支持——来自我国上市公司关联并购的实证分析[J]．经济管理，2006，(12) ： 57—64．
[116]白津夫．国有企业制度变迁及改革[J]．学习与探索，2000，(6)： 10—16．
[117]Sun，Q．and W．H．S．Tong．China Share Issue Privatization： The Extent of Its Success[J]．Journal of Financial Economics，2003，(70) ： 183—222．
[118]汪彬．股份制改革与资本市场建设[M]．北京：新华出版社，2000．
[119]李东平．大股东控制、盈余管理与上市公司业绩滑坡[D]．上海财经大学博士学位论文，2001．
[120]王靖婧，白俊鹏．对中国股票市场发行制度的实证研究[J]．市场研究，2007，(12)： 23-25．
[121]周俊生．中国股市批判[M]．天津：天津教育出版社，2000．
[122]青木昌彦．对内部人控制的控制：转轨经济中公司治理的若干问题[J]．改革，1994，(6)： 11—24．
[123]钱颖一．企业的治理结构改革和融资结构改革[J]．经济研究，1995，(1)： 20—29．
[124]刘小玄．中国企业发展报告[M]．北京：社会科学文献出版社，2001．
[125]张春霖．从融资角度分析国有企业的治理结构改革[J]．改革，1995，(3)： 34—46．
[126]费方域，1996，控制内部人控制：国企改革中的治理机制研究，《经济研究》第6期： 31-38
[127]张维迎．企业理论与中国企业改革[M]．北京：北京大学出版社，1999．
[128]张承耀．“内部人控制”问题与中国企业改革[J]．改革，1995，(3)： 29—33
[129]吴敬琏、张军扩、刘世锦等．国有经济的战略性改组[M]．北京：中国发展出版社，1998．
[130]解建立．关于国有企业“内部人控制”问题研究综述[J]．理论与现代化，1999，(5)： 41-42．
[131]陈家琰，赵洪军，赵会．上市公司“内部人控制”问题研究——基于对山东上市公司的抽样调查[J]．西部金融，2008，(3)： 45-47．
[132]成思危．政府如何管理企业[D]．北京：民主与建设出版社，1998．
[133]余晖．政府与企业：从宏观管理到微观管制[M]．福州：福建人民出版社1997．
[134]李江．企业并购中政府干预的经济学分析[D]．复旦大学博士学位论文，2003．
[135]Vickers，J．and G．Yarrow．Privatization：An Economic Analysis[M]．Cambridge： MIT University Press，1989．
[136]Leibenstein，H．Allocative Efficiency vs．X-Efficiency[J]．American Economic Review，1966，(56)： 392—415．
[137]Machlup，F．Theories of The Firm： Marginalist，Behavioral，Managerial[J]．American Economic Review，1967，(57)： 1—33．
[138]Hart，O．D．The Market Mechanism As An Incentive Scheme[J]．The Bell Journal of Economics，1983，(14) ： 366—382．
[139]Sappington，D．and J．Stiglitz．Privatization，Information and Incentives[J]．Journal of Policy Analysis and Management，1987，(6)：567—582．
[140]Boycko，M．，A．Shleifer，and R．M．Vishny．A Theory of Privatization．The Economic Journal，1996，(106)：309—319．
[141]De Alessi Louis．Property Rights，Transaction Costs，and X-Efficiency： An Essay in Economic Theory[J]．America Economic Review，1983，(73)：64—81．
[142]Boardman，A．E．and A．R．Vining．Ownership and Performance in Competitive Environments A Comparison of the Performance of Private，Mixed and State-Owned Enterprises[J]．Journal of Law and Economics，1989，(32)：1—33．
[143]Kikeri，S．，J．Nellis and M．Shirley．Privatization： the Lessons of Experience[M]．Washington DC： World Bank，1992．
[144]Grossman，G．M．and A．B．Krugger．Economic Growth and the Environment[J]．Quarterly Journal of Economics，1995，(110)：353—377．
[145]夏立军，方秩强．政府控制、治理环境与公司价值[J]．经济研究，2005，(5) ： 40—51．
[146]Qian，Y．Y．，M．Gabriella and W．Barry．Federalism，Chinese Style： The Political Basis for Economic Success in China[J]．World Politics，1995，(48)：50-81．
[147]伍秉华．民营上市公司股权结构成因和公司治理研究[J]．市场论坛，2008，(9)： 21-22．
[148]于海涛．民营上市公司违规死灰复燃：公司治理形式化[N]．21世纪经济报道，1998年12月25日．
[149]天亮．推动我国并购市场发展[N]．商业周刊(中文版)，2008，(12)： 4-8．
[150]潘红波，夏新平，余明桂．政府干预、政治关联与地方国有企业并购[J]．经济研究，2008，(4)：41-52．
[151]曾庆生，陈信元．国家控股、超额雇员与劳动力成本[J]．经济研究2006，(5)： 74-86．
[152]Kornai，J．The Economics of Shortage[M]．Amsterdam： North-Holland，1980．
[153]Frye，T．and A．Shleifer．The Invisible Hand and the Grabbing Hand．The American Economic Review，1997，(87)： 354-358．
[154]白重恩、杜颖娟、陶志刚、仝月婷．地方保护主义及产业地区集中度的决定因素和变动趋势[J]．经济研究2004 (4) ： 29-40．
[155]Li，H．，and L．A．Zhou．Political Turnover and Economic Performance： The Incentive Role of Personnel Control in China[J]．Journal of Public Economics 2005，(89)： 1743—1762．
[156]周黎安．晋升博弈中政府官员的激励与合作——兼论我国地方保护主义和重复建设问题长期存在的原因[J]．经济研究，2004，(6) ： 33—40．
[157]Denis，D．K．and J．J．McConnell．International Corporate Governance[J]．Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis，2003，(38)： 1—36．
[158]陈信元，叶鹏飞，陈冬华．机会主义资产重组与刚性管制[J]．经济研究，2003，(5)： 13—22．
[159]Kornai，J．The Socialist System： The Political Economy of Communism[M]．Princeton，NJ： Princeton University Press，1992．
[160]高雷、何少华、仪垂林．国家控制、政府干预、银行债务与资金侵占[J]．金融研究，2006，(6)：90—98．
[161]沈艺峰．会计信息披露与我国股票市场半强式有效性的实证检验[J]．会计研究，1996 (1)：14—17
[162]吴世农，黄志功．上市公司盈利信息报告、股价变动与股市效率的实证研究[J]．会计研究，1997，(4)： 12—17．
[163]Berger，P．and E．Ofek．Diversification's Effect on Firm Value[J]．Journal of Financial Economics，1995，(37)：39—65．
[164]Comment，R．and G．A．Jarrell．Corporate Focus and Stock Returns[J]．Journal of Financial Economics 1995，(37) ： 67—87．
[165]Healy，P．，K．Palepu and R．Ruback．Which Takeovers are Profitable： Strategic of Financial?[J]．Sloan Management Review，1997，(38)： 45—57．
[166]Maquieria，C．，W．Megginson and L．Nail．Wealth Creation versus wealth redistributions in pure stock-for-stock mergers[J]．Journal of Financial Economics，1998，(48)：3—33．
[167]Jian，Ming，and TJ Wong．Tunneling and Earning Management through Related Party Transactions： Evidence from Chinese Corporate Groups．HKUST Working Paper，2003，http：//papers．ssrn．com/sol3/papers．cfm?abstract_id=424888．
[168]陈晓，陈小悦，刘钊．A股盈余报告的有用性研究[J]．经济研究，1999，(5)： 21—28．