财政扶持农业产业化龙头企业的农民增收效应研究
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摘要
龙头企业是中国农业产业化经营的主体之一,正呈现出蓬勃的生命力,已经成长为新农村建设和推进和谐社会坚实的微观基础。近年来,财政不断加大对农业产业化龙头企业的投入,并完善其扶持方式。对财政扶持龙头企业进行研究具有深刻的理论意义和现实意义,然而,现有研究成果从经济学角度进行深入分析的并不多见,更缺乏从带动农民增收的视角上对财政扶持龙头企业问题进行系统的研究。因此,本论文以计量经济学和博弈论为主要研究工具,对财政扶持农业产业化龙头企业所产生的农民增收效应进行研究,并对影响农民增收效应的主体行为进行博弈分析,旨在为更好地发挥财政扶持龙头企业对农民增收的牵动作用提供可供借鉴的政策建议。
本文按照“为什么进行扶持——扶持得怎么样——为什么会这样”的思路展开,首先论证了财政扶持龙头企业的依据和目的,在总结财政扶持龙头企业的历史演进和现行制度安排的基础上,从计量分析和个案分析两个层面分析财政扶持农业产业化龙头企业对农民增收的牵动作用,接下来选择从政府与企业行为的角度探讨影响财政扶持龙头企业的农民增收效应的因素,最终得出结论和建议。本文的主要研究结论如下:
第一,财政扶持农业产业化龙头企业是建立在经济理论和现实情况基础之上的。无论是从交易费用、制度变迁、增长极和公共物品等理论基础上看,还是从政府财力、企业自身发展及国际形势等现实依据上看,财政扶持产业化龙头企业是十分必要的。第二,财政扶持农业产业化龙头企业的最终目标是通过龙头企业的发展壮大带动农民增加收入,通过测度辽宁省财政扶持龙头企业的农民增收效应,实证结果显示这一目标在一定程度上得以实现。无论是应用通过财政和统计部门收集的宏观数据对财政扶持龙头企业的农民增收效应进行计量分析,还是应用通过实地调研收集的微观资料对财政扶持龙头企业的农民增收效应进行个案分析,研究结果都表明,财政扶持龙头企业在促进企业规模壮大、实力增强的同时发挥了带动农民增收的正效应。
第三,通过对FD果蔬公司的个案研究,我们发现,财政扶持龙头企业对农民增收确实起到了积极的作用,但财政扶持龙头企业中仍存在很多问题,尤其是地方财政资金未足额配套、企业未完全按照规定使用财政资金以及农民参与度低等问题对财政扶持龙头企业的农民增收效应产生了不利影响。
第四,对政府而言,扶持龙头企业能否实现所设定的带动农民增收的预期目标,实践中主要是通过博弈参与者进行相互作用与相互选择而得到,而并非制定者的“一厢情愿”。也就是说,政府在扶持龙头企业的过程中,必须要考虑到下级政府和龙头企业的可能反应,他们会通过不断调整自身的预期报酬来做出符合自身利益最大化的选择。
第五,在与中央政府的博弈中,由于博弈各方在利益选择上的不一致性,因而,地方政府有“完全执行”和“上有政策、下有对策”的“打折执行”两种策略可供选择,加大对地方政府“打折执行”中央政策行为的惩罚力度、降低地方政府“打折执行”的收益以及加重惩罚中央政府人员监管不力的失职,可以有效遏制地方政府的“打折执行”行为。
第六,政府在立项选择扶持的农业化经营龙头企业时,受到寻租行为、信息不对称和目标短期化的影响。由于寻租行为、信息不对称和目标短期化的存在,降低了财政扶持龙头企业的效率,即政府以某一概率选择了错误的扶持对象。因此,广辟途径,约束企业和政府相关部门的“合谋寻租”行为,加强政府对龙头企业信息的掌握程度,并将长期目标纳入考核政府绩效,有助于提升财政扶持龙头企业的农民增收效应。
第七,接受财政扶持的龙头企业,有带动农民增收的责任,然而,理性的龙头企业是否履行带动农民增收的责任,取决于其履行责任的预期收益与不履行责任预期收益的比较,只有当前者大于后者,企业才选择履行责任。当监管部门的查处概率越低、对龙头企业不履行责任的处罚越轻、龙头企业不履行责任而未被查处的收益越大以及龙头企业履行责任的收益越低时,龙头企业往往不履行带动农民增收的责任。
第八,现实中,龙头企业可能通过寻租的方式影响政府的监管行为,以获取不正当的收益,共同侵蚀财政资金。寻租行为的存在打破了原有政府与龙头企业的监管博弈均衡。博弈分析结果显示,降低寻租成功所获的租金、提高寻租失败承担的损失、提高寻租的成本、提高企业不寻租时的收益这几种方式都可以遏制龙头企业寻租行为,从而监管部门以较小的查处概率就可以防止企业的寻租行为;降低监管部门的查处成本、加大对企业寻租行为的处罚、提高对监管部门发现并拒绝寻租行为的奖励这几种方式可以提高监管部门的查处概率,从而遏制龙头企业不履行带动农民增收责任的行为倾向。
在理论与实证分析的基础上,本文提出了增强财政扶持龙头企业的农民增收效应的制度创新建议:即建立投入稳定增长的长效机制,健全财政扶持龙头企业的制度,加强产业化经营项目资金管理,充分发挥政府在龙头企业与农户利益联结机制中的作用。
In the course of the agricultural industrialization, the leading enterprises of agricultural industrialization, which is one of the main actors, has shown a great amount of vitality and laid a solid micro foundation of building new countries and promoting harmonious societies. In recent years, finance funds increased continuously on supporting the leading enterprises of agricultural industrialization, and also perfected on its means. An in-depth study of fiscal support on leading enterprises of agricultural industrialization carries great theoretical and practical significance, however, the existing researches done from an economic analysis point of view are rare, and also lack of the systematic study from the perspective of increasing farmers' incomes. As a result, this paper takes the game theory and econometric as its main tools, applying with the first-hand information, carries out an in-depth study on fiscal support for leading enterprises of agricultural industrialization—its effect on the growth of farmers' incomes and the behaviors of its main players, aiming to provide policy recommendations on how finance funds supported for leading enterprises of agricultural industrialization can play a better role in raising farmers' incomes.
In accordance with the idea of "Why support for - how to support - Why is so", this paper firstly demonstrates the argument and the purpose of fiscal support for leading enterprises of agricultural industrialization, and based on the summary of the history and the status quo, the effect of fiscal support for leading enterprises of agricultural industrialization on the growth of peasants' incomes is carries from econometric analysis and case analysis, and than the impacting factors from the perspective of the behavior of government and enterprise are analyzed, at last, conclusions and recommendations is derived. The main conclusion of the study is as follows:
First, the fiscal support for leading enterprises of agricultural industrialization is based on the foundation of economic theory and reality. It is necessary to support leading enterprises of agricultural industrialization from the view of the theory of the transaction costs, institutional change, growth pole and public goods, as well as the reality of the government's finance, enterprise's self-development and the international situation and so on.
Second, the ultimate goal of financial support for leading enterprises of agricultural industrialization is to increase the incomes of farmers through the development and expansion of leading enterprises, and this goal has achieved in some degree which is proved by the empirical study of the effect of fiscal support for leading enterprises of agricultural industrialization on the growth of peasants' incomes in Liaoning Province. The results show that financial support promotes the growth of the enterprises, and at the same time it plays a positive role in leading farmers to increase incomes at the same time, both through the econometric analysis that applies macro- data collected from financial and statistical system, and the case study that applies micro-data collected from the field research. In another word, the effect of fiscal support for Leading Enterprises of Agricultural Industrialization on the growth of peasants' incomes is positive.
Third, through the case study of FD fruit and vegetable company, we found that the effect of fiscal support for leading enterprises of agricultural industrialization on the growth of peasants' incomes is also positive. Despite the effect of fiscal support for leading enterprises of agricultural industrialization on the growth of peasants' incomes is positive, many problems still exist in the financial support for leading enterprises, especially those problems that local counterpart funds are not full, enterprises has not used the fiscal funds fully in accordance with the provisions, as well as the participation of farmers on the issue of fiscal support for Leading Enterprises of Agricultural Industrialization is low and so on have negative impacts on the effect of fiscal support for Leading Enterprises of Agricultural Industrialization on the growth of peasants' incomes.
Fourth, for the government to achieve the target goal of increasing farmers' incomes through fiscal support for leading enterprises of agricultural industrialization, it depends on the interaction and matchmaking among game players, rather than by the policy makers' "wishful thinking". In other words, when government supports leading enterprises, the possible reaction from the local government and leading enterprises must be taken into account, because they will continue to adjust its expected return so as to choose the behavior to maximize of their own interests.
Fifth, because of the interest inconsistency of all game parties, local governments have two strategies of "full implementation" and "discount implementation" to choose in the game with the central government. In order to curb the "discount implementation" of local government effectively, it is necessary to increase the punishment to the "discount implementation" players, reduce the earnings of the "discount implementation" of local government and aggravate the penalties to the staffs of the central government who neglect their duties.
Sixth, rent-seeking, asymmetric information and short-term goals are those factors that influence the government on its decisions of industrialization projects of fiscal support for agricultural enterprises. Because of the existence of rent-seeking, asymmetric information and short-term goal, the efficiency of fiscal support for Leading Enterprises of Agricultural Industrialization is cutting down, in other words, the government has chosen the wrong target to support with a certain probability. As a result, government should keep the rent-seeking with bounds, strengthen the government's grasp of the enterprises' information in various channels, and take long-term goals into the evaluation of the government's performance, therefore to enhance the effect of fiscal support for leading enterprises of agricultural industrialization on the growth of farmers' incomes.
Seventh, the leading enterprises who receive the financial support have the responsibility of the leading role to increase farmers' incomes, however, whether rational leading enterprises to fulfill the responsibility that increase farmers' incomes, depends on the comparison of the expected earnings of fulfilling the responsibility and the expected earnings of no-fulfilling the responsibility, only when the former is bigger than the latter, the enterprise could choose to meet its obligations. When the supervising probability of supervision department is lower, the penalty of no-fulfilling the responsibility of the leading enterprises is lighter, the earning of no-fulfilling the responsibility but not been investigated is larger and the earning of fulfilling obligations of enterprises is lower, the leading enterprises often choose not to carry out the responsibility of driving farmers' incomes to increase.
Eighth, in reality, leading enterprises may influence government's monitoring through rent-seeking, so as to obtain improper benefits and erode the financial funds jointly. The rent-seeking behavior broke the previous balance of monitor game between the government and enterprises. Game analysis revealed that the way of reducing the amount of rent obtaining from successful rent-seeking, increasing the loss of failure to rent-seeking, and raising the cost of rent-seeking and the earning of the enterprises when it do not seek rent, all these are contributive to restraining the rent-seeking and the supervision department will be able to prevent rent-seeking behavior with a smaller supervising probability; the way of reducing the cost of investigating of supervision department, increasing the penalties for rent-seeking enterprises, and improving the award of supervision department when it refused to rent-seeking behavior will be able to increase the supervising probability in order to contain the tendency of not fulfilling the responsibility of increasing farmers' incomes.
Based on the theoretical and empirical analyses, the policy suggestions to enhance the effect of fiscal support for leading enterprises of agricultural industrialization on the growth of farmers' incomes are given as: to establish stable growth mechanism of fiscal support for leading enterprises of agricultural industrialization; to improve the institution of fiscal support for leading enterprises of agricultural industrialization; to strengthen the management of the industrialization project funds; to display the important role of government in the benefit joint mechanism between leading enterprises and fanners.
本文按照“为什么进行扶持——扶持得怎么样——为什么会这样”的思路展开,首先论证了财政扶持龙头企业的依据和目的,在总结财政扶持龙头企业的历史演进和现行制度安排的基础上,从计量分析和个案分析两个层面分析财政扶持农业产业化龙头企业对农民增收的牵动作用,接下来选择从政府与企业行为的角度探讨影响财政扶持龙头企业的农民增收效应的因素,最终得出结论和建议。本文的主要研究结论如下:
第一,财政扶持农业产业化龙头企业是建立在经济理论和现实情况基础之上的。无论是从交易费用、制度变迁、增长极和公共物品等理论基础上看,还是从政府财力、企业自身发展及国际形势等现实依据上看,财政扶持产业化龙头企业是十分必要的。第二,财政扶持农业产业化龙头企业的最终目标是通过龙头企业的发展壮大带动农民增加收入,通过测度辽宁省财政扶持龙头企业的农民增收效应,实证结果显示这一目标在一定程度上得以实现。无论是应用通过财政和统计部门收集的宏观数据对财政扶持龙头企业的农民增收效应进行计量分析,还是应用通过实地调研收集的微观资料对财政扶持龙头企业的农民增收效应进行个案分析,研究结果都表明,财政扶持龙头企业在促进企业规模壮大、实力增强的同时发挥了带动农民增收的正效应。
第三,通过对FD果蔬公司的个案研究,我们发现,财政扶持龙头企业对农民增收确实起到了积极的作用,但财政扶持龙头企业中仍存在很多问题,尤其是地方财政资金未足额配套、企业未完全按照规定使用财政资金以及农民参与度低等问题对财政扶持龙头企业的农民增收效应产生了不利影响。
第四,对政府而言,扶持龙头企业能否实现所设定的带动农民增收的预期目标,实践中主要是通过博弈参与者进行相互作用与相互选择而得到,而并非制定者的“一厢情愿”。也就是说,政府在扶持龙头企业的过程中,必须要考虑到下级政府和龙头企业的可能反应,他们会通过不断调整自身的预期报酬来做出符合自身利益最大化的选择。
第五,在与中央政府的博弈中,由于博弈各方在利益选择上的不一致性,因而,地方政府有“完全执行”和“上有政策、下有对策”的“打折执行”两种策略可供选择,加大对地方政府“打折执行”中央政策行为的惩罚力度、降低地方政府“打折执行”的收益以及加重惩罚中央政府人员监管不力的失职,可以有效遏制地方政府的“打折执行”行为。
第六,政府在立项选择扶持的农业化经营龙头企业时,受到寻租行为、信息不对称和目标短期化的影响。由于寻租行为、信息不对称和目标短期化的存在,降低了财政扶持龙头企业的效率,即政府以某一概率选择了错误的扶持对象。因此,广辟途径,约束企业和政府相关部门的“合谋寻租”行为,加强政府对龙头企业信息的掌握程度,并将长期目标纳入考核政府绩效,有助于提升财政扶持龙头企业的农民增收效应。
第七,接受财政扶持的龙头企业,有带动农民增收的责任,然而,理性的龙头企业是否履行带动农民增收的责任,取决于其履行责任的预期收益与不履行责任预期收益的比较,只有当前者大于后者,企业才选择履行责任。当监管部门的查处概率越低、对龙头企业不履行责任的处罚越轻、龙头企业不履行责任而未被查处的收益越大以及龙头企业履行责任的收益越低时,龙头企业往往不履行带动农民增收的责任。
第八,现实中,龙头企业可能通过寻租的方式影响政府的监管行为,以获取不正当的收益,共同侵蚀财政资金。寻租行为的存在打破了原有政府与龙头企业的监管博弈均衡。博弈分析结果显示,降低寻租成功所获的租金、提高寻租失败承担的损失、提高寻租的成本、提高企业不寻租时的收益这几种方式都可以遏制龙头企业寻租行为,从而监管部门以较小的查处概率就可以防止企业的寻租行为;降低监管部门的查处成本、加大对企业寻租行为的处罚、提高对监管部门发现并拒绝寻租行为的奖励这几种方式可以提高监管部门的查处概率,从而遏制龙头企业不履行带动农民增收责任的行为倾向。
在理论与实证分析的基础上,本文提出了增强财政扶持龙头企业的农民增收效应的制度创新建议:即建立投入稳定增长的长效机制,健全财政扶持龙头企业的制度,加强产业化经营项目资金管理,充分发挥政府在龙头企业与农户利益联结机制中的作用。
In the course of the agricultural industrialization, the leading enterprises of agricultural industrialization, which is one of the main actors, has shown a great amount of vitality and laid a solid micro foundation of building new countries and promoting harmonious societies. In recent years, finance funds increased continuously on supporting the leading enterprises of agricultural industrialization, and also perfected on its means. An in-depth study of fiscal support on leading enterprises of agricultural industrialization carries great theoretical and practical significance, however, the existing researches done from an economic analysis point of view are rare, and also lack of the systematic study from the perspective of increasing farmers' incomes. As a result, this paper takes the game theory and econometric as its main tools, applying with the first-hand information, carries out an in-depth study on fiscal support for leading enterprises of agricultural industrialization—its effect on the growth of farmers' incomes and the behaviors of its main players, aiming to provide policy recommendations on how finance funds supported for leading enterprises of agricultural industrialization can play a better role in raising farmers' incomes.
In accordance with the idea of "Why support for - how to support - Why is so", this paper firstly demonstrates the argument and the purpose of fiscal support for leading enterprises of agricultural industrialization, and based on the summary of the history and the status quo, the effect of fiscal support for leading enterprises of agricultural industrialization on the growth of peasants' incomes is carries from econometric analysis and case analysis, and than the impacting factors from the perspective of the behavior of government and enterprise are analyzed, at last, conclusions and recommendations is derived. The main conclusion of the study is as follows:
First, the fiscal support for leading enterprises of agricultural industrialization is based on the foundation of economic theory and reality. It is necessary to support leading enterprises of agricultural industrialization from the view of the theory of the transaction costs, institutional change, growth pole and public goods, as well as the reality of the government's finance, enterprise's self-development and the international situation and so on.
Second, the ultimate goal of financial support for leading enterprises of agricultural industrialization is to increase the incomes of farmers through the development and expansion of leading enterprises, and this goal has achieved in some degree which is proved by the empirical study of the effect of fiscal support for leading enterprises of agricultural industrialization on the growth of peasants' incomes in Liaoning Province. The results show that financial support promotes the growth of the enterprises, and at the same time it plays a positive role in leading farmers to increase incomes at the same time, both through the econometric analysis that applies macro- data collected from financial and statistical system, and the case study that applies micro-data collected from the field research. In another word, the effect of fiscal support for Leading Enterprises of Agricultural Industrialization on the growth of peasants' incomes is positive.
Third, through the case study of FD fruit and vegetable company, we found that the effect of fiscal support for leading enterprises of agricultural industrialization on the growth of peasants' incomes is also positive. Despite the effect of fiscal support for leading enterprises of agricultural industrialization on the growth of peasants' incomes is positive, many problems still exist in the financial support for leading enterprises, especially those problems that local counterpart funds are not full, enterprises has not used the fiscal funds fully in accordance with the provisions, as well as the participation of farmers on the issue of fiscal support for Leading Enterprises of Agricultural Industrialization is low and so on have negative impacts on the effect of fiscal support for Leading Enterprises of Agricultural Industrialization on the growth of peasants' incomes.
Fourth, for the government to achieve the target goal of increasing farmers' incomes through fiscal support for leading enterprises of agricultural industrialization, it depends on the interaction and matchmaking among game players, rather than by the policy makers' "wishful thinking". In other words, when government supports leading enterprises, the possible reaction from the local government and leading enterprises must be taken into account, because they will continue to adjust its expected return so as to choose the behavior to maximize of their own interests.
Fifth, because of the interest inconsistency of all game parties, local governments have two strategies of "full implementation" and "discount implementation" to choose in the game with the central government. In order to curb the "discount implementation" of local government effectively, it is necessary to increase the punishment to the "discount implementation" players, reduce the earnings of the "discount implementation" of local government and aggravate the penalties to the staffs of the central government who neglect their duties.
Sixth, rent-seeking, asymmetric information and short-term goals are those factors that influence the government on its decisions of industrialization projects of fiscal support for agricultural enterprises. Because of the existence of rent-seeking, asymmetric information and short-term goal, the efficiency of fiscal support for Leading Enterprises of Agricultural Industrialization is cutting down, in other words, the government has chosen the wrong target to support with a certain probability. As a result, government should keep the rent-seeking with bounds, strengthen the government's grasp of the enterprises' information in various channels, and take long-term goals into the evaluation of the government's performance, therefore to enhance the effect of fiscal support for leading enterprises of agricultural industrialization on the growth of farmers' incomes.
Seventh, the leading enterprises who receive the financial support have the responsibility of the leading role to increase farmers' incomes, however, whether rational leading enterprises to fulfill the responsibility that increase farmers' incomes, depends on the comparison of the expected earnings of fulfilling the responsibility and the expected earnings of no-fulfilling the responsibility, only when the former is bigger than the latter, the enterprise could choose to meet its obligations. When the supervising probability of supervision department is lower, the penalty of no-fulfilling the responsibility of the leading enterprises is lighter, the earning of no-fulfilling the responsibility but not been investigated is larger and the earning of fulfilling obligations of enterprises is lower, the leading enterprises often choose not to carry out the responsibility of driving farmers' incomes to increase.
Eighth, in reality, leading enterprises may influence government's monitoring through rent-seeking, so as to obtain improper benefits and erode the financial funds jointly. The rent-seeking behavior broke the previous balance of monitor game between the government and enterprises. Game analysis revealed that the way of reducing the amount of rent obtaining from successful rent-seeking, increasing the loss of failure to rent-seeking, and raising the cost of rent-seeking and the earning of the enterprises when it do not seek rent, all these are contributive to restraining the rent-seeking and the supervision department will be able to prevent rent-seeking behavior with a smaller supervising probability; the way of reducing the cost of investigating of supervision department, increasing the penalties for rent-seeking enterprises, and improving the award of supervision department when it refused to rent-seeking behavior will be able to increase the supervising probability in order to contain the tendency of not fulfilling the responsibility of increasing farmers' incomes.
Based on the theoretical and empirical analyses, the policy suggestions to enhance the effect of fiscal support for leading enterprises of agricultural industrialization on the growth of farmers' incomes are given as: to establish stable growth mechanism of fiscal support for leading enterprises of agricultural industrialization; to improve the institution of fiscal support for leading enterprises of agricultural industrialization; to strengthen the management of the industrialization project funds; to display the important role of government in the benefit joint mechanism between leading enterprises and fanners.
引文
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