引进期权定价三因素的供应链协调机制研究
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摘要
由于供应链是由多个企业主体所构成,他们在利益分配、风险承担等方面存在不同程度的冲突;供应链成员企业的利益经常与供应链系统整体利益不是完全一致。这些都导致供应链出现双重边际化现象,降低供应链整体和成员个体的收益。协调供应链成员关系是供应链管理所面临的核心问题,供应链协调机制成为供应链合作关系的关键。协调机制可以细分为委托代理机制、价格协调机制、契约协调机制、库存控制机制等类型。供应链契约协调是目前广泛应用的一种供应链协调机制。
供应链期权契约将期权引进到供应链协作过程中,它能够有效地提高供应链协作的绩效,在实际运用中供应链期权契约对整个供应链系统的协调优化作用已经充分显现,在理论上供应链期权契约的协调优化能力也得到了定量的验证(Barnes等,2002)。国内外学者对供应链期权契约进行了大量的研究(Feng等(2003)、Wu和Kleindorfer(2005)、郭琼和杨德礼(2006)、Wang和Liu(2007)、Milner和Kouvelis(2007)、Wu,Kleindorfer和Zhang(2002)、Wang和Michel(2004)),这些研究深化了期权在供应链协调机制中的应用,拓展了我们对供应链期权契约的认识。但作者通过研究发现,前人所做的研究模型只考虑了下列因素:包括产品的成本、价格以及供应链上下游企业的协作关系等。对于供应链期权契约,涉及到的资金占用成本、能力预定形成的机会成本以及现货价格波动形成的不确定性风险,如果这些因素不加以考虑,这种供应链期权契约显然是不够完善的。本研究针对上述问题对传统供应链期权契约优化模型与B-S期权定价模型进行了有机结合,并在此基础上构建了供应商主导型、逆向主导型和电子市场下季节性商品的供应链期权协调机制模型,完善了上述传统供应链期权契约模型。同时也弥补了B-S期权定价模型(Black和Scholes,1973)解不收敛、不能实现供应链上下游企业利润优化功能的问题。
本文构建出更适合现代工业经济领域实际情况的供应链期权协调机制模型。并在此基础上重点解决如下问题:(1)传统的供应链期权契约研究已经计算出了供应链协调优化策略,形成了相对稳定的供应链期权契约模型,如何在该模型基础上增加市场利率、标的产品价格波动率和期权期限三个影响因素,需要对原模型进行深入研究和扩展改造;(2)当增加市场利率、标的产品价格波动率和期权期限三个因素后,供应链还能否实现协调优化,需要进行深入的模型推导和运算;(3)传统的供应链期权契约的优化结果不唯一,而是存在无穷多个解,不能有效的为企业制定期权契约提供直接参考。将市场利率、现货价格波动率和期权期限引进供应链期权契约模型中,能否实现供应链期权契约优化结果的进一步收敛或形成唯一解?(4)对于供应商主导型和零售商主导型两种不同的供应链结构类型,在引进市场利率、标的产品价格波动率和期权期限三个因素后,供应链的协调优化过程和结果有何异同?(5)当产品价格受市场经济状况影响时,包含市场利率、标的产品价格波动率和期权期限因素的期权契约如何实现供应链的协调优化?针对上述问题,本研究的主要研究工作和结论包括以下几点:
(1)对供应商主导型供应链在引进市场利率、标的产品价格波动率和期权期限三个因
素后的决策过程进行了深入研究,并得出如下研究结论:供应商主导型供应链在引进市场利率、标的产品价格波动率和期权期限三个因素后对传统的供应链期权契约模型产生了进一步的约束,期权价格组合作为供应商的决策变量,形成了唯一的协调优化解;零售商的期权定购量是调节变量,供应商使用期权价格组合来调节零售商的定购量,引导零售商达到使供应链整体优化的最优定购量;市场利率对供应商主导型供应链期权定价的影响结果是:利率提高时市场化定价曲线向右上方移动,引起最优期权定价点沿着供应商协调优化定价曲线向右下方移动,期权价格下降,同时期权执行价格提高,即当其它条件不变,市场利率提高时,供应商倾向于制定一个较低的期权价格和一个较高的期权执行价格;现货价格波动率对供应商主导型供应链期权定价的影响结果是:波动率减小会引起期权市场化定价曲线的顺时针旋转,引起最优期权定价点沿着供应商协调优化定价曲线向左上方移动,期权价格上升,同时期权执行价格降低,即当其它条件不变时,现货价格波动率减小,则会形成一个较高期权价格、较低期权执行价格的均衡期权定价组合;作者还运用Matlab软件编制出供应商主导型供应链的决策程序,该程序能够帮助供应商计算出其最优的期权定价组合,帮助零售商计算出其最优定购量组合;最后通过灵敏度分析发现利率变化对供应链的影响不大,但当现货价格波动率达到某个临界值时,其对供应链的影响会显著增大。以上研究结论可以帮助供应商主导型供应链中的企业科学决策,提高供应链的运作绩效,实现供应链的协调优化。
(2)对逆向主导型供应链在引进市场利率、标的产品价格波动率和期权期限三个因素后的决策过程进行了深入的研究,并运用供应链成员利润优化机制对模型进行了分析,得到研究结论如下:逆向主导型供应链中零售商拥有更多的决策变量,包括期权价格、期权执行价格、现货采购量和期权采购量,而供应商只对产量进行决策;供应商的产量是调节变量,下游企业通过期权价格组合激励供应商达到所需的产量,供应商为保证对下游企业的产品供应而进行产能安排形成机会成本,下游企业通过支付期权费用的方式进行补偿;逆向主导型供应链中,在期权定价市场化情况下期权价格组合必须遵循期权市场化定价规则;期权市场化定价规则与下游企业主导的供应链利润优化机制相结合,可以推导出期权定价市场化情况下实现供应链整体利润增加的协调优化解,且该解唯一;逆向主导型供应链的协调优化均衡解能够实现供应链总利润的优化,同时也为处于主导地位的下游企业分配了更多的利润,这也从模型分析上解释了电子产品零售业巨头(如国美、苏宁等)的行业地位和盈利能力;市场利率对逆向主导型供应链期权定价的影响结果是:市场利率下降时市场化定价曲线向左下方移动,引起最优期权定价点沿着下游企业协调优化定价曲线向左上方移动,期权价格上升,同时期权执行价格降低,即市场利率下降时,零售商倾向于制定一个较高的期权价格和一个较低的期权执行价格;现货价格波动率对供应商主导型供应链期权定价的影响结果是:波动率变化会引起期权市场化定价曲线的旋转,随着波动率的下降期权市场化定价曲线顺时针旋转,引起最优期权定价点沿着下游企业协调优化定价曲线向左上方移动,期权价格上升,同时期权执行价格降低。作者还运用Matlab软件编制出逆向主导型供应链的决策程序,该程序能够帮助零售商计算出其最优的期权定价组合和最优的产品定购量组合,以及供应商的最优产量决策。通过灵敏度分析发现利率与期权价格呈反向变动关系,与期权执行价格呈正向变动关系;利率与供应商利润呈正向变动关系,与零售商利润呈反向变动关系;利率变化对上述四个指标的影响都不是很大,变化比较平稳;现货波动率与期权价格呈反向变动关系,与期权执行价格呈正向变动关系;波动率与供应商利润呈正向变动关系,与零售商利润呈反向变动关系,当波动率增大到某值时,其对上述四个指标的影响也迅速增大,所以在制定供应链期权契约是需要特别注意现货价格波动率的影响。
(3)对以上供应商主导型供应链和逆向主导型供应链情形进行了比较研究,得到如下研究结论:逆向主导型供应链中,下游企业利润高于供应商主导型供应链,进一步验证了供应链主导权的作用。逆向主导型供应链总利润低于供应商主导型,这主要是由于下游企业在使用主导权时激励供应商提高产量,增加了供应商的风险,导致供应商产生可能的缺货成本或产品过剩的残值处理。
(4)构建了电子市场下季节性商品在引进市场利率、标的产品价格波动率和期权期限三个因素后的供应链期权契约决策模型,并运用供应链成员利润优化机制对模型进行了分析。在需求为外生变量时通常表现为行业的周期性波动,供应链期权契约中需要充分考虑这种情况对期权定价和期权采购的作用;零售商的期权采购量是供应链协调优化的调节变量,供应商期权定价的直接目的是调节零售商的期权采购量,通过它能够实现供应链利润的优化;模型的最优解存在且唯一;市场利率对供应链期权定价的影响结果是:市场利率下降时市场化定价曲线向左下方移动,引起最优期权定价点沿着下游企业协调优化定价曲线向左上方移动,期权价格上升,同时期权执行价格降低,即市场利率下降时,供应商倾向于制定一个较高的期权价格和一个较低的期权执行价格;现货价格波动率对供应商主导型供应链期权定价的影响结果是:波动率变化会引起期权市场化定价曲线的旋转,随着波动率的下降期权市场化定价曲线顺时针旋转,引起最优期权定价点沿着下游企业协调优化定价曲线向左上方移动,期权价格上升,同时期权执行价格降低。作者还运用Matlab软件编制出供应商主导型供应链的决策程序,该程序能够帮助供应商计算出其最优产量和最优期权定价组合,帮助零售商计算出其最优定购量组合。通过灵敏度分析发现市场利率与期权价格呈反向变动关系,与期权执行价格呈正向变动关系,与供应商利润呈正向变动关系,与零售商利润呈反向变动关系,利率变化对上述指标的影响也不大;现货价格波动率与期权价格呈反向变动关系,与期权执行价格呈正向变动关系,与供应商利润呈正向变动关系,与零售商利润呈反向变动关系,当波动率增大到某临界值时,对上述指标的影响迅速增大。
本研究的创新点有以下四个:
(1)引进了期权定价三因素,改进了供应商主导型供应链期权契约模型,找出了供应商主导型供应链期权契约协调优化的唯一解。本研究将市场利率、标的产品价格波动率和期权期限三个因素引进到供应商主导型供应链中,成功构建了基于期权定价的供应商主导型供应链期权契约模型。通过对模型的分析,得到了模型的唯一协调优化解。并对相关参数做了灵敏度分析。
(2)通过引进期权定价三因素,对逆向主导型供应链期权契约模型进行了改进,找到了逆向主导型供应链期权契约协调优化的唯一解。通过对逆向主导型供应链引进市场利率、标的产品价格波动率和期权期限三个因素得到了逆向主导型供应链的基于期权定价的供应链期权契约模型。计算得到了模型的唯一协调优化解;通过灵敏度分析,得到市场利率、现货价格波动率对供应商主导型供应链期权定价的影响结果。在逆向主导型供应链与供应商主导型供应链绩效对比中得到:逆向主导型供应链中下游企业利润高于供应商主导型供应链;进一步验证了供应链主导权的作用。
(3)通过引进期权定价三因素,对电子市场下季节性商品的供应链期权契约模型进行了改进,找到了电子市场下季节性商品供应链期权契约协调优化的唯一解。将市场利率、标的产品价格波动率和期权期限三个因素引进到周期性行业供应链期权协调机制中,构建了需求由市场经济状况决定,并影响现货市场价格情况下的供应链期权契约模型。在引进三因素的情况下,得到供应链期权契约的唯一的整体优化最优解。有效地解决了需求为外生变量时供应链期权契约的协调优化决策问题。
(4)编制出基于期权定价的供应链协调决策的数值运算程序。本文针对引进市场利率、标的产品价格波动率和期权期限三个因素后的供应商主导型供应链、逆向主导型供应链和电子市场下季节性商品的供应链,运用Matlab软件将以上三种模型决策过程编制成数值决策程序,有效地解决了供应链中的企业在期权契约实践中的决策问题,使该方面的决策科学化、程序化。
As the supply chain is composed of a number of enterprises, there are some conflicts at interest distribution and risk exposure. The business interest of the supply chain members is often not consistent with the total supply chain system. These lead to the supply chain double marginalization to reduce the overall supply chain profit and the individual members profit. Coordination between members of the supply chain is the core issue of supply chain management. The choice of the supply chain coordination mechanisms becomes the key problem. Transfer mechanisms can be broken down into principal-agent mechanisms, price coordination mechanisms, contract coordination mechanisms and inventory control mechanisms. Supply chain contract coordination is a widely used supply chain coordination mechanism.
Option is introduced into the supply chain collaborative process by Supply chain option contract. It can effectively improve the performance of supply-chain collaboration. In the practical application of the supply chain option contract on the entire supply chain optimization role in the coordination system has been fully manifested. And theoretically the optimization capability of option contract has been quantitatively verified (Barnes, 2002). Domestic and foreign scholars have done a large number of researches on the supply chain option contract. These researches deepened the usage of option in the supply chain coordination mechanism and expand our views of supply chain option contract(Feng etc.(2003)、Wu and Kleindorfer(2005)、Guoqiong and Yandel(i2006)、Wang and Liu(2007)、Milner and Kouvelis(2007)、Wu, Kleindorfer and Zhang(2002)、Wang and Michel(2004)). But through the author's research we can found that previous researches only take few factors into account including the cost of products, prices and the relationship between enterprises. But the option contract involved the amount of funds used cost, the opportunity cost of scheduled capacity and the uncertainty risk of the price fluctuations. If these factors are not considered, this supply chain option contract is clearly not enough sound. In this paper the author's main task is to introduce market interest rates, the price volatility and option deadline into supply chain option contract model to construct more suitable model for modern industrial economy. Meanwhile the new model provides B-S Model(Black and Scholes,1973)optimal function and only one solution.
Based on this model, this research focuses on solving the following problems:
(1) The traditional supply chain option contract has been calculated on the coordination of the supply chain optimization strategy, and formed a relatively stable supply chain option contract model. How to introduce market interest rates, the price volatility and option deadline into the traditional model is a hard work. It needs in-depth study of the original model and the expansion of transformation. (2) When increasing in market interest rates, the price volatility and option deadline for the three factors, the supply chain can also achieve coordination optimization or not, this needs in-depth model derivation and computation. (3) The traditional supply chain optimization option contract has many results. This can not provides direct reference for enterprises. Market interest rates, price volatility and option deadline for the introduction of supply chain option contract model. Whether we can achieve supply chain optimization option contract or the outcome of the further convergence formed only one solution? (4) For supplier-led and retailer-led supply chain as two different types of supply chain structure. The introduction of market interest rates, the price volatility and option deadline, supply chain optimization process and the coordination of results have similarities and differences? (5) When product prices are impacted by the market economic situation, how to achieve coordination of the supply chain optimization including market interest rate, price volatility and option deadline?
The main research work and conclusions include the following:
(1) Construction decision-making model of the supplier-led supply chain mechanism by introducing market interest rates, price volatility and option deadline. The introduction of market interest rates, price volatility and option deadline affects the traditional supply chain model with option contract. It is a further restriction on option pricing. The option price is the decision-making variables of supplier. This model has the only form of coordination optimization solution. Retailer's order of the options is the regulated variable. Supplier uses options prices portfolio to adjust retailer's ordering volume, and guides retailer to achieve overall supply chain optimal ordering. The interest rates impact on the option pricing: when interest rates increase the market pricing curve mobiles to the right and upward mobility, optimal option pricing from supplier coordination points mobile to the lower right pricing optimization along the curve. When the other conditions remain unchanged, the market interest rate increase, vendors tend to develop a lower option prices and a higher option exercise price. Price volatility impacts the option pricing: price volatility would cause the rotation of options pricing curves. There is a complicated relationship between price volatility and the rotation. The option-pricing curve swings around coordination point. The above conclusion of the study can help suppliers-led enterprises in the supply chain make scientific decision and improve operational performance of the supply chain and achieve the coordination of the supply chain optimization. Author uses Matlab software for producing market-leading program of supply chain decision-making process, the program can help suppliers calculate their optimal combination of option pricing, and help retailers calculate optimal ordering volumes.
(2) Construction decision-making model of the retailer-led supply chain mechanism by introducing market interest rates, price volatility and option deadline. Retailers in Retailer-Led supply chain have more decision-making variables, including options prices, the options exercise price, and procurement volume. The supplier makes decision only on it's yield. Supplier's production volume is the regulated variables. The downstream enterprise encourages supplier to achieve the required output through options price. Ensuring that the products of downstream enterprises for production and supply arrangements forms the opportunity cost to supplier, and the payment for option is downstream enterprise's compensation; In the retailer-led supply chain, option pricing must follow the rules of the market pricing. Options market pricing rules and supply chain optimization mechanisms combined profits can derived option pricing to achieve the overall increase in profit optimization solution. And it is the only solution; Retailer-led coordination solutions of the supply chain optimization achieve a balanced supply chain optimization of the total profits, but also in a dominant position distribute the downstream enterprises more profits. This model also explained the analysis of retail giant electronic products (such as Gome and Suning etc.) industry position and profitability. The interest rates impact on the option pricing: When market interest rates fall the pricing curve mobiles to the left and downward movement, and causes optimal option pricing points move to the top left along the downstream enterprises coordinate pricing curve, the option prices rise, at the same time the exercise price lowering. Retailers tend to a higher option price and a lower exercise price. Price volatility impacts the option pricing: fluctuations will cause the rotation of option pricing curve. With the decline in the volatility, the option-pricing curve rotates clockwise. Option prices rise, and the exercise price lowering. Author uses Matlab software for producing a leading program of supply chain decision-making process, the program can help suppliers calculate their optimal production volume, and help retailers calculate the combination of option pricing and optimal ordering volumes.
(3) In the comparative analysis of above two cases: in retailer-led supply chain downstream enterprise's profits is higher than the supplier-led supply chain. This further validates the role of the supply chain dominance. The total profit of retailer-led supply chain is lower than the total profit of supplier-led supply chain, mainly because that retailer uses the dominance to incentive suppliers increasing production. This would increase the risk of vendors. Suppliers have to face shortage cost or surplus products residuals processing.
(4) Construction of the decision-making model of supply chain mechanism in B2B electronic market by introducing market interest rates, price volatility and option deadline. And Author analyzes the model using of supply chain optimization mechanisms. B2B electronic market has an important influence on the contract of the supply chain. As electronic market presence, the spot market price of the electronic market economy status impacts the supply chain contract. So the option pricing and the option's role on procurement should be fully considered. Procurement volume of retailers is the regulated variables in supply chain optimization. The option pricing directly regulates the volume of procurement options. It can be achieved through the supply chain profit optimization model and there is only one solution exists. Interest rates impact on the option pricing: declining market interest rates cause market-oriented pricing curve move to the left and downward, and the movement causes optimal option pricing points move along the downstream enterprises coordinate pricing curve to the top left. Option prices rise while the option's exercise price reduces. That is, when market interest rates fall, the supplier preferred provider a higher option price and a lower exercise price. Price volatility impacts the option pricing: fluctuations will cause the rotation of option pricing curve. With the decline in the volatility, the option-pricing curve rotates clockwise. Option prices rise, and the exercise price lowering. Author uses Matlab software for producing a leading program of supply chain decision-making process, the program can help suppliers calculate their optimal production volume, and help retailers calculate the combination of option pricing and optimal ordering volumes.
The innovations of this study are the following four points:
(1) This study introduces market interest rates, the price volatility and option deadline to the supplier-led supply chain, and successfully constructs vendor-oriented supply chain options contracts model based on the option pricing. Retailer's ordering of the options is the regulated variable. Through the analysis of the model, the coordinated optimal solution was found. And a sensitivity analysis is done with relevant parameters.
(2) Construction of the decision-making model of the retailer-led supply chain mechanism by introducing market interest rates, price volatility and option deadline. Supplier's production volume is the regulatec variables. In the retailer-led supply chain, option pricing must follow the rules of the market pricing. Retailer-led coordination solutions of the supply chain optimization achieve a balanced supply chain optimization of the total profits. This model also explained the analysis of retail giant electronic products (such as Gome and Suning etc.) industry position and profitability.
(3)Construction decision-making model of supply chain mechanism in B2B electronic market by introducing market interest rates, price volatility and option deadline. And Author analyzes the model using of supply chain optimization mechanisms. B2B electronic market has an important influence on the contract of the supply chain. As electronic market presence, the spot market price of the electronic market economy status impacts the supply chain contract. So the option pricing and the role of options on procurement should be fully considered. Procurement volume of retailers is the regulated variable in supply chain optimization. The option pricing directly regulates the volume of options procurement. It can be achieved through the supply chain profit optimization model and there is only one solution exists.
(4) By introducing market interest rates, price volatility and option deadline, this study constructs three kinds of model for supplier-led supply chain, retailer-led supply chain and supply chain with B2B electronic market. Author uses Matlab software for producing a leading program of supply chain decision-making process. The program can help suppliers calculate the decision variables for both suppliers and retailers.
供应链期权契约将期权引进到供应链协作过程中,它能够有效地提高供应链协作的绩效,在实际运用中供应链期权契约对整个供应链系统的协调优化作用已经充分显现,在理论上供应链期权契约的协调优化能力也得到了定量的验证(Barnes等,2002)。国内外学者对供应链期权契约进行了大量的研究(Feng等(2003)、Wu和Kleindorfer(2005)、郭琼和杨德礼(2006)、Wang和Liu(2007)、Milner和Kouvelis(2007)、Wu,Kleindorfer和Zhang(2002)、Wang和Michel(2004)),这些研究深化了期权在供应链协调机制中的应用,拓展了我们对供应链期权契约的认识。但作者通过研究发现,前人所做的研究模型只考虑了下列因素:包括产品的成本、价格以及供应链上下游企业的协作关系等。对于供应链期权契约,涉及到的资金占用成本、能力预定形成的机会成本以及现货价格波动形成的不确定性风险,如果这些因素不加以考虑,这种供应链期权契约显然是不够完善的。本研究针对上述问题对传统供应链期权契约优化模型与B-S期权定价模型进行了有机结合,并在此基础上构建了供应商主导型、逆向主导型和电子市场下季节性商品的供应链期权协调机制模型,完善了上述传统供应链期权契约模型。同时也弥补了B-S期权定价模型(Black和Scholes,1973)解不收敛、不能实现供应链上下游企业利润优化功能的问题。
本文构建出更适合现代工业经济领域实际情况的供应链期权协调机制模型。并在此基础上重点解决如下问题:(1)传统的供应链期权契约研究已经计算出了供应链协调优化策略,形成了相对稳定的供应链期权契约模型,如何在该模型基础上增加市场利率、标的产品价格波动率和期权期限三个影响因素,需要对原模型进行深入研究和扩展改造;(2)当增加市场利率、标的产品价格波动率和期权期限三个因素后,供应链还能否实现协调优化,需要进行深入的模型推导和运算;(3)传统的供应链期权契约的优化结果不唯一,而是存在无穷多个解,不能有效的为企业制定期权契约提供直接参考。将市场利率、现货价格波动率和期权期限引进供应链期权契约模型中,能否实现供应链期权契约优化结果的进一步收敛或形成唯一解?(4)对于供应商主导型和零售商主导型两种不同的供应链结构类型,在引进市场利率、标的产品价格波动率和期权期限三个因素后,供应链的协调优化过程和结果有何异同?(5)当产品价格受市场经济状况影响时,包含市场利率、标的产品价格波动率和期权期限因素的期权契约如何实现供应链的协调优化?针对上述问题,本研究的主要研究工作和结论包括以下几点:
(1)对供应商主导型供应链在引进市场利率、标的产品价格波动率和期权期限三个因
素后的决策过程进行了深入研究,并得出如下研究结论:供应商主导型供应链在引进市场利率、标的产品价格波动率和期权期限三个因素后对传统的供应链期权契约模型产生了进一步的约束,期权价格组合作为供应商的决策变量,形成了唯一的协调优化解;零售商的期权定购量是调节变量,供应商使用期权价格组合来调节零售商的定购量,引导零售商达到使供应链整体优化的最优定购量;市场利率对供应商主导型供应链期权定价的影响结果是:利率提高时市场化定价曲线向右上方移动,引起最优期权定价点沿着供应商协调优化定价曲线向右下方移动,期权价格下降,同时期权执行价格提高,即当其它条件不变,市场利率提高时,供应商倾向于制定一个较低的期权价格和一个较高的期权执行价格;现货价格波动率对供应商主导型供应链期权定价的影响结果是:波动率减小会引起期权市场化定价曲线的顺时针旋转,引起最优期权定价点沿着供应商协调优化定价曲线向左上方移动,期权价格上升,同时期权执行价格降低,即当其它条件不变时,现货价格波动率减小,则会形成一个较高期权价格、较低期权执行价格的均衡期权定价组合;作者还运用Matlab软件编制出供应商主导型供应链的决策程序,该程序能够帮助供应商计算出其最优的期权定价组合,帮助零售商计算出其最优定购量组合;最后通过灵敏度分析发现利率变化对供应链的影响不大,但当现货价格波动率达到某个临界值时,其对供应链的影响会显著增大。以上研究结论可以帮助供应商主导型供应链中的企业科学决策,提高供应链的运作绩效,实现供应链的协调优化。
(2)对逆向主导型供应链在引进市场利率、标的产品价格波动率和期权期限三个因素后的决策过程进行了深入的研究,并运用供应链成员利润优化机制对模型进行了分析,得到研究结论如下:逆向主导型供应链中零售商拥有更多的决策变量,包括期权价格、期权执行价格、现货采购量和期权采购量,而供应商只对产量进行决策;供应商的产量是调节变量,下游企业通过期权价格组合激励供应商达到所需的产量,供应商为保证对下游企业的产品供应而进行产能安排形成机会成本,下游企业通过支付期权费用的方式进行补偿;逆向主导型供应链中,在期权定价市场化情况下期权价格组合必须遵循期权市场化定价规则;期权市场化定价规则与下游企业主导的供应链利润优化机制相结合,可以推导出期权定价市场化情况下实现供应链整体利润增加的协调优化解,且该解唯一;逆向主导型供应链的协调优化均衡解能够实现供应链总利润的优化,同时也为处于主导地位的下游企业分配了更多的利润,这也从模型分析上解释了电子产品零售业巨头(如国美、苏宁等)的行业地位和盈利能力;市场利率对逆向主导型供应链期权定价的影响结果是:市场利率下降时市场化定价曲线向左下方移动,引起最优期权定价点沿着下游企业协调优化定价曲线向左上方移动,期权价格上升,同时期权执行价格降低,即市场利率下降时,零售商倾向于制定一个较高的期权价格和一个较低的期权执行价格;现货价格波动率对供应商主导型供应链期权定价的影响结果是:波动率变化会引起期权市场化定价曲线的旋转,随着波动率的下降期权市场化定价曲线顺时针旋转,引起最优期权定价点沿着下游企业协调优化定价曲线向左上方移动,期权价格上升,同时期权执行价格降低。作者还运用Matlab软件编制出逆向主导型供应链的决策程序,该程序能够帮助零售商计算出其最优的期权定价组合和最优的产品定购量组合,以及供应商的最优产量决策。通过灵敏度分析发现利率与期权价格呈反向变动关系,与期权执行价格呈正向变动关系;利率与供应商利润呈正向变动关系,与零售商利润呈反向变动关系;利率变化对上述四个指标的影响都不是很大,变化比较平稳;现货波动率与期权价格呈反向变动关系,与期权执行价格呈正向变动关系;波动率与供应商利润呈正向变动关系,与零售商利润呈反向变动关系,当波动率增大到某值时,其对上述四个指标的影响也迅速增大,所以在制定供应链期权契约是需要特别注意现货价格波动率的影响。
(3)对以上供应商主导型供应链和逆向主导型供应链情形进行了比较研究,得到如下研究结论:逆向主导型供应链中,下游企业利润高于供应商主导型供应链,进一步验证了供应链主导权的作用。逆向主导型供应链总利润低于供应商主导型,这主要是由于下游企业在使用主导权时激励供应商提高产量,增加了供应商的风险,导致供应商产生可能的缺货成本或产品过剩的残值处理。
(4)构建了电子市场下季节性商品在引进市场利率、标的产品价格波动率和期权期限三个因素后的供应链期权契约决策模型,并运用供应链成员利润优化机制对模型进行了分析。在需求为外生变量时通常表现为行业的周期性波动,供应链期权契约中需要充分考虑这种情况对期权定价和期权采购的作用;零售商的期权采购量是供应链协调优化的调节变量,供应商期权定价的直接目的是调节零售商的期权采购量,通过它能够实现供应链利润的优化;模型的最优解存在且唯一;市场利率对供应链期权定价的影响结果是:市场利率下降时市场化定价曲线向左下方移动,引起最优期权定价点沿着下游企业协调优化定价曲线向左上方移动,期权价格上升,同时期权执行价格降低,即市场利率下降时,供应商倾向于制定一个较高的期权价格和一个较低的期权执行价格;现货价格波动率对供应商主导型供应链期权定价的影响结果是:波动率变化会引起期权市场化定价曲线的旋转,随着波动率的下降期权市场化定价曲线顺时针旋转,引起最优期权定价点沿着下游企业协调优化定价曲线向左上方移动,期权价格上升,同时期权执行价格降低。作者还运用Matlab软件编制出供应商主导型供应链的决策程序,该程序能够帮助供应商计算出其最优产量和最优期权定价组合,帮助零售商计算出其最优定购量组合。通过灵敏度分析发现市场利率与期权价格呈反向变动关系,与期权执行价格呈正向变动关系,与供应商利润呈正向变动关系,与零售商利润呈反向变动关系,利率变化对上述指标的影响也不大;现货价格波动率与期权价格呈反向变动关系,与期权执行价格呈正向变动关系,与供应商利润呈正向变动关系,与零售商利润呈反向变动关系,当波动率增大到某临界值时,对上述指标的影响迅速增大。
本研究的创新点有以下四个:
(1)引进了期权定价三因素,改进了供应商主导型供应链期权契约模型,找出了供应商主导型供应链期权契约协调优化的唯一解。本研究将市场利率、标的产品价格波动率和期权期限三个因素引进到供应商主导型供应链中,成功构建了基于期权定价的供应商主导型供应链期权契约模型。通过对模型的分析,得到了模型的唯一协调优化解。并对相关参数做了灵敏度分析。
(2)通过引进期权定价三因素,对逆向主导型供应链期权契约模型进行了改进,找到了逆向主导型供应链期权契约协调优化的唯一解。通过对逆向主导型供应链引进市场利率、标的产品价格波动率和期权期限三个因素得到了逆向主导型供应链的基于期权定价的供应链期权契约模型。计算得到了模型的唯一协调优化解;通过灵敏度分析,得到市场利率、现货价格波动率对供应商主导型供应链期权定价的影响结果。在逆向主导型供应链与供应商主导型供应链绩效对比中得到:逆向主导型供应链中下游企业利润高于供应商主导型供应链;进一步验证了供应链主导权的作用。
(3)通过引进期权定价三因素,对电子市场下季节性商品的供应链期权契约模型进行了改进,找到了电子市场下季节性商品供应链期权契约协调优化的唯一解。将市场利率、标的产品价格波动率和期权期限三个因素引进到周期性行业供应链期权协调机制中,构建了需求由市场经济状况决定,并影响现货市场价格情况下的供应链期权契约模型。在引进三因素的情况下,得到供应链期权契约的唯一的整体优化最优解。有效地解决了需求为外生变量时供应链期权契约的协调优化决策问题。
(4)编制出基于期权定价的供应链协调决策的数值运算程序。本文针对引进市场利率、标的产品价格波动率和期权期限三个因素后的供应商主导型供应链、逆向主导型供应链和电子市场下季节性商品的供应链,运用Matlab软件将以上三种模型决策过程编制成数值决策程序,有效地解决了供应链中的企业在期权契约实践中的决策问题,使该方面的决策科学化、程序化。
As the supply chain is composed of a number of enterprises, there are some conflicts at interest distribution and risk exposure. The business interest of the supply chain members is often not consistent with the total supply chain system. These lead to the supply chain double marginalization to reduce the overall supply chain profit and the individual members profit. Coordination between members of the supply chain is the core issue of supply chain management. The choice of the supply chain coordination mechanisms becomes the key problem. Transfer mechanisms can be broken down into principal-agent mechanisms, price coordination mechanisms, contract coordination mechanisms and inventory control mechanisms. Supply chain contract coordination is a widely used supply chain coordination mechanism.
Option is introduced into the supply chain collaborative process by Supply chain option contract. It can effectively improve the performance of supply-chain collaboration. In the practical application of the supply chain option contract on the entire supply chain optimization role in the coordination system has been fully manifested. And theoretically the optimization capability of option contract has been quantitatively verified (Barnes, 2002). Domestic and foreign scholars have done a large number of researches on the supply chain option contract. These researches deepened the usage of option in the supply chain coordination mechanism and expand our views of supply chain option contract(Feng etc.(2003)、Wu and Kleindorfer(2005)、Guoqiong and Yandel(i2006)、Wang and Liu(2007)、Milner and Kouvelis(2007)、Wu, Kleindorfer and Zhang(2002)、Wang and Michel(2004)). But through the author's research we can found that previous researches only take few factors into account including the cost of products, prices and the relationship between enterprises. But the option contract involved the amount of funds used cost, the opportunity cost of scheduled capacity and the uncertainty risk of the price fluctuations. If these factors are not considered, this supply chain option contract is clearly not enough sound. In this paper the author's main task is to introduce market interest rates, the price volatility and option deadline into supply chain option contract model to construct more suitable model for modern industrial economy. Meanwhile the new model provides B-S Model(Black and Scholes,1973)optimal function and only one solution.
Based on this model, this research focuses on solving the following problems:
(1) The traditional supply chain option contract has been calculated on the coordination of the supply chain optimization strategy, and formed a relatively stable supply chain option contract model. How to introduce market interest rates, the price volatility and option deadline into the traditional model is a hard work. It needs in-depth study of the original model and the expansion of transformation. (2) When increasing in market interest rates, the price volatility and option deadline for the three factors, the supply chain can also achieve coordination optimization or not, this needs in-depth model derivation and computation. (3) The traditional supply chain optimization option contract has many results. This can not provides direct reference for enterprises. Market interest rates, price volatility and option deadline for the introduction of supply chain option contract model. Whether we can achieve supply chain optimization option contract or the outcome of the further convergence formed only one solution? (4) For supplier-led and retailer-led supply chain as two different types of supply chain structure. The introduction of market interest rates, the price volatility and option deadline, supply chain optimization process and the coordination of results have similarities and differences? (5) When product prices are impacted by the market economic situation, how to achieve coordination of the supply chain optimization including market interest rate, price volatility and option deadline?
The main research work and conclusions include the following:
(1) Construction decision-making model of the supplier-led supply chain mechanism by introducing market interest rates, price volatility and option deadline. The introduction of market interest rates, price volatility and option deadline affects the traditional supply chain model with option contract. It is a further restriction on option pricing. The option price is the decision-making variables of supplier. This model has the only form of coordination optimization solution. Retailer's order of the options is the regulated variable. Supplier uses options prices portfolio to adjust retailer's ordering volume, and guides retailer to achieve overall supply chain optimal ordering. The interest rates impact on the option pricing: when interest rates increase the market pricing curve mobiles to the right and upward mobility, optimal option pricing from supplier coordination points mobile to the lower right pricing optimization along the curve. When the other conditions remain unchanged, the market interest rate increase, vendors tend to develop a lower option prices and a higher option exercise price. Price volatility impacts the option pricing: price volatility would cause the rotation of options pricing curves. There is a complicated relationship between price volatility and the rotation. The option-pricing curve swings around coordination point. The above conclusion of the study can help suppliers-led enterprises in the supply chain make scientific decision and improve operational performance of the supply chain and achieve the coordination of the supply chain optimization. Author uses Matlab software for producing market-leading program of supply chain decision-making process, the program can help suppliers calculate their optimal combination of option pricing, and help retailers calculate optimal ordering volumes.
(2) Construction decision-making model of the retailer-led supply chain mechanism by introducing market interest rates, price volatility and option deadline. Retailers in Retailer-Led supply chain have more decision-making variables, including options prices, the options exercise price, and procurement volume. The supplier makes decision only on it's yield. Supplier's production volume is the regulated variables. The downstream enterprise encourages supplier to achieve the required output through options price. Ensuring that the products of downstream enterprises for production and supply arrangements forms the opportunity cost to supplier, and the payment for option is downstream enterprise's compensation; In the retailer-led supply chain, option pricing must follow the rules of the market pricing. Options market pricing rules and supply chain optimization mechanisms combined profits can derived option pricing to achieve the overall increase in profit optimization solution. And it is the only solution; Retailer-led coordination solutions of the supply chain optimization achieve a balanced supply chain optimization of the total profits, but also in a dominant position distribute the downstream enterprises more profits. This model also explained the analysis of retail giant electronic products (such as Gome and Suning etc.) industry position and profitability. The interest rates impact on the option pricing: When market interest rates fall the pricing curve mobiles to the left and downward movement, and causes optimal option pricing points move to the top left along the downstream enterprises coordinate pricing curve, the option prices rise, at the same time the exercise price lowering. Retailers tend to a higher option price and a lower exercise price. Price volatility impacts the option pricing: fluctuations will cause the rotation of option pricing curve. With the decline in the volatility, the option-pricing curve rotates clockwise. Option prices rise, and the exercise price lowering. Author uses Matlab software for producing a leading program of supply chain decision-making process, the program can help suppliers calculate their optimal production volume, and help retailers calculate the combination of option pricing and optimal ordering volumes.
(3) In the comparative analysis of above two cases: in retailer-led supply chain downstream enterprise's profits is higher than the supplier-led supply chain. This further validates the role of the supply chain dominance. The total profit of retailer-led supply chain is lower than the total profit of supplier-led supply chain, mainly because that retailer uses the dominance to incentive suppliers increasing production. This would increase the risk of vendors. Suppliers have to face shortage cost or surplus products residuals processing.
(4) Construction of the decision-making model of supply chain mechanism in B2B electronic market by introducing market interest rates, price volatility and option deadline. And Author analyzes the model using of supply chain optimization mechanisms. B2B electronic market has an important influence on the contract of the supply chain. As electronic market presence, the spot market price of the electronic market economy status impacts the supply chain contract. So the option pricing and the option's role on procurement should be fully considered. Procurement volume of retailers is the regulated variables in supply chain optimization. The option pricing directly regulates the volume of procurement options. It can be achieved through the supply chain profit optimization model and there is only one solution exists. Interest rates impact on the option pricing: declining market interest rates cause market-oriented pricing curve move to the left and downward, and the movement causes optimal option pricing points move along the downstream enterprises coordinate pricing curve to the top left. Option prices rise while the option's exercise price reduces. That is, when market interest rates fall, the supplier preferred provider a higher option price and a lower exercise price. Price volatility impacts the option pricing: fluctuations will cause the rotation of option pricing curve. With the decline in the volatility, the option-pricing curve rotates clockwise. Option prices rise, and the exercise price lowering. Author uses Matlab software for producing a leading program of supply chain decision-making process, the program can help suppliers calculate their optimal production volume, and help retailers calculate the combination of option pricing and optimal ordering volumes.
The innovations of this study are the following four points:
(1) This study introduces market interest rates, the price volatility and option deadline to the supplier-led supply chain, and successfully constructs vendor-oriented supply chain options contracts model based on the option pricing. Retailer's ordering of the options is the regulated variable. Through the analysis of the model, the coordinated optimal solution was found. And a sensitivity analysis is done with relevant parameters.
(2) Construction of the decision-making model of the retailer-led supply chain mechanism by introducing market interest rates, price volatility and option deadline. Supplier's production volume is the regulatec variables. In the retailer-led supply chain, option pricing must follow the rules of the market pricing. Retailer-led coordination solutions of the supply chain optimization achieve a balanced supply chain optimization of the total profits. This model also explained the analysis of retail giant electronic products (such as Gome and Suning etc.) industry position and profitability.
(3)Construction decision-making model of supply chain mechanism in B2B electronic market by introducing market interest rates, price volatility and option deadline. And Author analyzes the model using of supply chain optimization mechanisms. B2B electronic market has an important influence on the contract of the supply chain. As electronic market presence, the spot market price of the electronic market economy status impacts the supply chain contract. So the option pricing and the role of options on procurement should be fully considered. Procurement volume of retailers is the regulated variable in supply chain optimization. The option pricing directly regulates the volume of options procurement. It can be achieved through the supply chain profit optimization model and there is only one solution exists.
(4) By introducing market interest rates, price volatility and option deadline, this study constructs three kinds of model for supplier-led supply chain, retailer-led supply chain and supply chain with B2B electronic market. Author uses Matlab software for producing a leading program of supply chain decision-making process. The program can help suppliers calculate the decision variables for both suppliers and retailers.
引文
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