汽车企业并购及其整合策略研究
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摘要
企业并购作为一种重要资源优化、配置手段,在经济活动中正发挥着越来越重要的作用。当前中国汽车企业的并购活动呈现出许多新的特点与问题,研究这些问题对于促进我国汽车工业发展具有重要而现实的意义。本文主要研究对象是在经济全球化与中国由计划经济转向市场经济的过程中我国汽车企业的并购活动。主要解决三方面问题:一是潜在目标企业评价与筛选;二是特定目标企业的并购竞价;三是并购后的整合。
本文指出,在汽车企业并购评价过程中模糊综合评价是进行目标企业评估对比的有效方法。通过应用多层次目标企业评价体系和评价方法,建立适合于我国汽车企业实际的评价体系,分析企业并购影响因素后,我们建立了相应的企业并购目标模糊综合评价模型。三家企业的实际应用表明,所设计的模糊综合评价模型能够有效评价与区分备选目标企业,为我国汽车企业综合评价提供了一种有效的解决方案。
用博弈论方法研究并购竞价过程中的双方出价策略。并购企业在面对目标企业所采取的各项措施时,如果能进行科学分析以消除不可信威胁,就可以去除纳什均衡中的不可信点。据此本文在进行研究后指出,无论目标企业采用哪一种反收购措施,并购企业都要对目标企业实施此项计划所要支付的实际成本进行分析,只有这个成本才能对目标企业的策略选择起到影响作用。在并购竞价过程中,并购企业要高度重视对方的反收购成本在竞价中的影响。
并购后的整合是关系着并购能否成功的重要问题,本文对汽车企业并购后的整合问题进行了研究。我国汽车企业并购整合问题的特殊之处在于企业大多数为国有企业,留存有相当的计划经济特征,因此要十分注重并购后的人力资源整合和企业文化整合,高度重视非正式群体与亚文化的存在,正确引导它们以形成有利于并购后整合的良好氛围,同时做好并购后的组织与人力资源整合,在目标企业内部形成共同的、正确的价值观,由此稳定目标企业原有的主要管理技术人员,并保持企业正常的并购整合过渡状态。
但是当前中国汽车工业处于一个极速发展时期,各种新的问题、现象层出不穷,因而任何关于这样一个动态、快速变化的巨大产业的研究与预测都将是暂时性的。相信随着未来统计数据和评价体系的不断进展,相关研究也会不断得到提高。
As an important way of optimizing and scheduling the resources, the Merger and Acquisitions (M&A) has become more and more effective in the social economic activities. At present, there are many problems and characteristics in the merger of automobile industry in China. The research into such problems is of great significance to promote the development of Chinese automobile industry. The main researching object for this paper is the automobile M&A activities in the globalization economy and Chinese transforming from planning economy to market economy. There are mainly three problems which need to be resolved in this paper. First, how to evaluate and select the object companies; Second, the bargaining strategies; Last, the integration problems for the specific M&A.
We have pointed out that during the automobile company M&A ,the fuzzy sets evaluation method is fit for the evaluation and selection of object company. The paper first established the evaluation system to the object enterprise with the multiple hierarchy evaluation system and evaluative method. The application of the model in three enterprises has shown that the Fuzzy Sets theory can effectively evaluate and separate the object enterprise, which provides an effective solution for the general evaluation of automobile industry in China.
In the complete information dynamic, Game Theory is useful in the mergering activities since the different parts has different amount information and the dynamic process is then make each of them can watch the opposite side’s strategies and then modify their justment. It tells us that accurately finding out the information and modifying the function during the Game is of great importance, if this can be used properly the opposite can be confused and we can exclude the unreliable result.
The acquisition after the merger is key to the success of merger. This paper has conducted a research into the acquisition problem. The uniqueness of the M&A in Chinese automobile industry lies in the fact that most of the enterprises are state-owned, which is characterized by the planning economy. Therefore, more attention should be paid to the integration of its human resources and culture as well as the existence of the informal group and sub-culture. They should be properly guided in order to create a good atmosphere. At the same, preparation is needed for the integration of organization and human resources to form a common and correct value inside the object enterprise. As a result, a stable team of management and technicians is established to ensure the smooth transition.
At presents, the automobile industry in China is developed at a fast speed with the emerging of various new problems. Consequently, any research and prediction for the fast-paced industry is only temporary. But in the future, the statistics and the evaluation system will keep changing with the research in such a field.
本文指出,在汽车企业并购评价过程中模糊综合评价是进行目标企业评估对比的有效方法。通过应用多层次目标企业评价体系和评价方法,建立适合于我国汽车企业实际的评价体系,分析企业并购影响因素后,我们建立了相应的企业并购目标模糊综合评价模型。三家企业的实际应用表明,所设计的模糊综合评价模型能够有效评价与区分备选目标企业,为我国汽车企业综合评价提供了一种有效的解决方案。
用博弈论方法研究并购竞价过程中的双方出价策略。并购企业在面对目标企业所采取的各项措施时,如果能进行科学分析以消除不可信威胁,就可以去除纳什均衡中的不可信点。据此本文在进行研究后指出,无论目标企业采用哪一种反收购措施,并购企业都要对目标企业实施此项计划所要支付的实际成本进行分析,只有这个成本才能对目标企业的策略选择起到影响作用。在并购竞价过程中,并购企业要高度重视对方的反收购成本在竞价中的影响。
并购后的整合是关系着并购能否成功的重要问题,本文对汽车企业并购后的整合问题进行了研究。我国汽车企业并购整合问题的特殊之处在于企业大多数为国有企业,留存有相当的计划经济特征,因此要十分注重并购后的人力资源整合和企业文化整合,高度重视非正式群体与亚文化的存在,正确引导它们以形成有利于并购后整合的良好氛围,同时做好并购后的组织与人力资源整合,在目标企业内部形成共同的、正确的价值观,由此稳定目标企业原有的主要管理技术人员,并保持企业正常的并购整合过渡状态。
但是当前中国汽车工业处于一个极速发展时期,各种新的问题、现象层出不穷,因而任何关于这样一个动态、快速变化的巨大产业的研究与预测都将是暂时性的。相信随着未来统计数据和评价体系的不断进展,相关研究也会不断得到提高。
As an important way of optimizing and scheduling the resources, the Merger and Acquisitions (M&A) has become more and more effective in the social economic activities. At present, there are many problems and characteristics in the merger of automobile industry in China. The research into such problems is of great significance to promote the development of Chinese automobile industry. The main researching object for this paper is the automobile M&A activities in the globalization economy and Chinese transforming from planning economy to market economy. There are mainly three problems which need to be resolved in this paper. First, how to evaluate and select the object companies; Second, the bargaining strategies; Last, the integration problems for the specific M&A.
We have pointed out that during the automobile company M&A ,the fuzzy sets evaluation method is fit for the evaluation and selection of object company. The paper first established the evaluation system to the object enterprise with the multiple hierarchy evaluation system and evaluative method. The application of the model in three enterprises has shown that the Fuzzy Sets theory can effectively evaluate and separate the object enterprise, which provides an effective solution for the general evaluation of automobile industry in China.
In the complete information dynamic, Game Theory is useful in the mergering activities since the different parts has different amount information and the dynamic process is then make each of them can watch the opposite side’s strategies and then modify their justment. It tells us that accurately finding out the information and modifying the function during the Game is of great importance, if this can be used properly the opposite can be confused and we can exclude the unreliable result.
The acquisition after the merger is key to the success of merger. This paper has conducted a research into the acquisition problem. The uniqueness of the M&A in Chinese automobile industry lies in the fact that most of the enterprises are state-owned, which is characterized by the planning economy. Therefore, more attention should be paid to the integration of its human resources and culture as well as the existence of the informal group and sub-culture. They should be properly guided in order to create a good atmosphere. At the same, preparation is needed for the integration of organization and human resources to form a common and correct value inside the object enterprise. As a result, a stable team of management and technicians is established to ensure the smooth transition.
At presents, the automobile industry in China is developed at a fast speed with the emerging of various new problems. Consequently, any research and prediction for the fast-paced industry is only temporary. But in the future, the statistics and the evaluation system will keep changing with the research in such a field.
引文
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