基于可信计算的安全操作系统研究
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摘要
安全操作系统作为主流的安全技术,需要有相对更加底层的安全支持,否则自身的安全容易遭到破坏,从而危及整个系统的安全。尤其是安全操作系统自身的完整性,包括敏感数据的完整性,安全策略、安全标签的完整性,以及策略实施系统的完整性等,极易遭受攻击。对于这些关键位置的保护,安全操作系统现有的机制或者存在很多安全漏洞,或者引用了极强的安全假设。
本文引入可信计算技术研究对操作系统的安全增强。首先分析了现有安全操作系统中完整性保护方法的不足,提出了一种动态完整性度量方法,实现了操作系统状态的可信验证；然后探讨了安全操作系统中标签自身的安全问题,给出了一套针对安全标签的保护方案；最后讨论了安全操作系统的边界扩展问题,利用可信计算,结合远程证明,封装存储等相关技术,‘扩展了安全操作系统的控制范围。本文主要取得以下几方面创新性成果：
1.针对安全操作系统中的完整性保护问题,提出了一种基于内存空间的动态度量方法,有效解决了基于文件系统的静态度量中存在的TOC-TOU(检验时刻与使用时刻不同步)问题,并通过算法分析和改进提高了动态度量的效率,增强了动态度量在复杂环境下的可用性,为操作系统的完整性提供了保障。
2.针对安全操作系统中带有属性的安全标签容易受到篡改的问题,提出了基于可信计算的策略标签保护架构,该架构使用加密文件系统、完整性度量等机制将可信的概念植入到安全操作系统的内部,将系统的安全标签置于可信计算芯片的保护范围内,保证其不会遭受篡改,从而增强了整个操作系统的安全性。
3.提出了安全操作系统边界扩展方法,利用可信计算,以虚拟边界的方式扩展了一台主机上安全操作系统的控制范围,使其能对虚拟边界内分发的数据进行有效的控制和管理(无论数据是否位于传统意义上的物理边界内),从而保护数据所有者的权利,增强安全操作系统的实用性。
总的来说,本文利用可信计算技术对操作系统进行了安全增强,同时也对安全操作系统保护范围进行了扩展,拓宽了安全操作系统的应用。本文的研究成果不仅为安全操作系统的研究提供了支撑,还为基于可信计算的安全技术的研究方向提供了一定的借鉴。
The compromising of the secure OS (operation system), one of the mainstream security technologies, could threaten the safety of the entire system. Therefore, it is crucial to have relatively low-level security supports for the secure OS itself. Among all the threats of being compromised, the compromising on the integrity of the secure OS happens most frequently. The integrity of the secure OS consists of the integrity of the sensitive data, the integrity of the secure policies, the integrity of the labels, and the integrity of the reference monitors. Existing integrity protection techniques provided by the secure OS either have much vulnerability or use inadequately strong security assumptions. It is desirable to have a more secure integrity protection technique for the secure OS.
This thesis leverages the trusted computing technique to enforce the security of the OS. The shortages of protection methods of the integrity are analyzed. By using trusted computing technique, this thesis proposes a dynamic measurement method which realizes the trusted verification of the OS state. A policy-label protection mechanism is proposed to address the safety problem of the security labels. This thesis also presents a method to extend the edge of the control area of the secure OS by adopting trusted computing techniques such as remote attestation and sealed storage. The main contributions of this thesis are listed as follows:
1. Dynamic measurement based on trusted computing. This thesis proposes a memory-based dynamic measurement method that solves the TOC-TOU (time of check with time of use) problem seen in the existing static file-system-based measurement method. The improvement on the dynamic measurement based on the algorithm analysis is also proposed to efficiency as well as the usability of the measurement under complicated environment.
2. Trusted computing based Policy-label protection. This thesis proposes TLPA (TPM-based Label Protection Architecture) to protect the easily compromised security policies and labels in the access control system. By using mechanisms of integrity measurement, encrypt file system, etc., security labels are protected in the trust zone which enhances the safety of the access control system as well as the secure OS.
3. Trusted virtual edge. This thesis proposes a method to extend the control area of secure OS by using a form of trusted virtual edge. In this approach, the dominating area of a secure OS is not constrained by its physical boundary. The data managed by the secure OS is thereby protected no matter it is stored locally or distributed to other physical machine.
In summary, this thesis enforces the security and enlarges the dominating area of secure OS by using trusted computing technique. The researches proposed by this thesis can not only support the secure OS research but also be used a reference of trusted computing-based work.
本文引入可信计算技术研究对操作系统的安全增强。首先分析了现有安全操作系统中完整性保护方法的不足,提出了一种动态完整性度量方法,实现了操作系统状态的可信验证；然后探讨了安全操作系统中标签自身的安全问题,给出了一套针对安全标签的保护方案；最后讨论了安全操作系统的边界扩展问题,利用可信计算,结合远程证明,封装存储等相关技术,‘扩展了安全操作系统的控制范围。本文主要取得以下几方面创新性成果：
1.针对安全操作系统中的完整性保护问题,提出了一种基于内存空间的动态度量方法,有效解决了基于文件系统的静态度量中存在的TOC-TOU(检验时刻与使用时刻不同步)问题,并通过算法分析和改进提高了动态度量的效率,增强了动态度量在复杂环境下的可用性,为操作系统的完整性提供了保障。
2.针对安全操作系统中带有属性的安全标签容易受到篡改的问题,提出了基于可信计算的策略标签保护架构,该架构使用加密文件系统、完整性度量等机制将可信的概念植入到安全操作系统的内部,将系统的安全标签置于可信计算芯片的保护范围内,保证其不会遭受篡改,从而增强了整个操作系统的安全性。
3.提出了安全操作系统边界扩展方法,利用可信计算,以虚拟边界的方式扩展了一台主机上安全操作系统的控制范围,使其能对虚拟边界内分发的数据进行有效的控制和管理(无论数据是否位于传统意义上的物理边界内),从而保护数据所有者的权利,增强安全操作系统的实用性。
总的来说,本文利用可信计算技术对操作系统进行了安全增强,同时也对安全操作系统保护范围进行了扩展,拓宽了安全操作系统的应用。本文的研究成果不仅为安全操作系统的研究提供了支撑,还为基于可信计算的安全技术的研究方向提供了一定的借鉴。
The compromising of the secure OS (operation system), one of the mainstream security technologies, could threaten the safety of the entire system. Therefore, it is crucial to have relatively low-level security supports for the secure OS itself. Among all the threats of being compromised, the compromising on the integrity of the secure OS happens most frequently. The integrity of the secure OS consists of the integrity of the sensitive data, the integrity of the secure policies, the integrity of the labels, and the integrity of the reference monitors. Existing integrity protection techniques provided by the secure OS either have much vulnerability or use inadequately strong security assumptions. It is desirable to have a more secure integrity protection technique for the secure OS.
This thesis leverages the trusted computing technique to enforce the security of the OS. The shortages of protection methods of the integrity are analyzed. By using trusted computing technique, this thesis proposes a dynamic measurement method which realizes the trusted verification of the OS state. A policy-label protection mechanism is proposed to address the safety problem of the security labels. This thesis also presents a method to extend the edge of the control area of the secure OS by adopting trusted computing techniques such as remote attestation and sealed storage. The main contributions of this thesis are listed as follows:
1. Dynamic measurement based on trusted computing. This thesis proposes a memory-based dynamic measurement method that solves the TOC-TOU (time of check with time of use) problem seen in the existing static file-system-based measurement method. The improvement on the dynamic measurement based on the algorithm analysis is also proposed to efficiency as well as the usability of the measurement under complicated environment.
2. Trusted computing based Policy-label protection. This thesis proposes TLPA (TPM-based Label Protection Architecture) to protect the easily compromised security policies and labels in the access control system. By using mechanisms of integrity measurement, encrypt file system, etc., security labels are protected in the trust zone which enhances the safety of the access control system as well as the secure OS.
3. Trusted virtual edge. This thesis proposes a method to extend the control area of secure OS by using a form of trusted virtual edge. In this approach, the dominating area of a secure OS is not constrained by its physical boundary. The data managed by the secure OS is thereby protected no matter it is stored locally or distributed to other physical machine.
In summary, this thesis enforces the security and enlarges the dominating area of secure OS by using trusted computing technique. The researches proposed by this thesis can not only support the secure OS research but also be used a reference of trusted computing-based work.
引文
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