供求特征、策略性行为对市场结构的作用机理研究
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摘要
市场结构一直以来都是产业组织理论研究的核心问题,无论是传统产业组织理论,还是新产业组织理论,都从多方面对此进行了大量的基础研究。本文将主要依照新产业组织理论关于市场结构内生性的观点,运用数量经济分析的理论与方法,在研究产业基本条件对市场结构的作用机理的基础上,从厂商策略性行为的角度对市场结构的决定因素进行深入细致的研究。于是,本文首先以决定市场结构的供给特征和需求特征为基本出发点,选择我国工业制造业各行业为研究对象,运用变系数的面板数据模型系统地研究不同行业市场结构的决定因素,揭示行业特定的市场供给特征和需求特征对市场结构的作用机理;其次,在理论上进一步探析厂商间价格竞争行为对市场结构影响的基础上,选择我国电信业发展的相关数据,应用动态面板数据模型研究价格竞争策略对主导厂商、从属厂商市场份额以及整个市场垄断程度的影响,定量揭示价格竞争行为对市场结构作用的动态效应;再次,针对基于产能调整的过剩生产能力策略性行为,以我国汽车产业发展的时间序列数据为基础,应用协整分析以及虑及结构突变的变结构协整模型和误差修正模型对市场集中度和过剩生产能力之间的关系进行实证研究,旨在揭示过剩生产能力策略性行为对市场结构影响的动态作用机理及过剩生产能力策略性行为的使用特征;最后,针对基于产品调整的差异化策略和研发策略,采用我国汽车产业企业集团的相关数据,在运用面板数据协整分析理论研究产品差异化策略和研发策略对厂商市场份额长期影响的基础上,采用基于面板数据误差修正模型的Granger因果关系检验研究产品差异化策略和研发策略与厂商市场份额之间的长短期作用关系,进而揭示市场结构与市场行为之间的双向作用关系。
The traditional industry organization theory of SCP shows that market structure determines market behavior, this is a fixed canonical form; But the new experienced industry organization has led the strategy behavior into the modern industry organization, this theory considers that besides the market structure influenced the market behavior, the market structure also affected the market structure, the firms adopt the certain the strategy behavior will be the same to be able to lead to the market structure changed obviously, so the effect of the strategy behavior to market structure has become to be the frontier and core problem of the modern industry organization. But the majority studies take the theoretical analysis as the basis, rarely the quantitative studies. Therefore, the main aim of this paper is to make use of the empirical studies to test the impact of market supply and demand characteristic as well as the effect mechanism of the strategy behavior to the market structure, so there will be certain theory and practical significance.
In view of this, this paper will take the SCP canonical form as the basis, and furthermore, expands the one-side effect mechanism of the SCP canonical form. First, we analyze the market supply and demand characteristic that determined market structure, the characteristic of market supply and demand refers to the characteristic of supply and the characteristic of demand, the characteristic of supply mainly includes firm’s supply of raw material, the technology, product serviceableness, value and judge, commercial customs and labor union, etc. The characteristic of demand mainly includes price elasticity, growth rate, replace, market type, buying way and characteristics such as cyclicity and seasonal characteristic. The empirical study of this paper of the determinant factors of the market structure is to reveal the effect mechanism of the market supply and demand characteristic to the market structure by quantitative analysis, and test the related theory by empirical method. Further, on the basis of this, the strategy behavior is also the key factor to affect the market structure, so this paper will studies the affection of the strategy behavior to market structure from the following respects, price competition strategy, excess capacity strategy, production differenciation strategy and R&D strategy. The result of this paper will supply the practical evidence for the theoretical studies of the strategy behavior of the firms.
Concretely, in 3rd chapter, the paper takes China’s 28 manufacturing industries as the fundamental object, and takes the average scale and capital-intensive degree of every industry to be the supply characteristic, and takes the growth rate as the demand characteristic, studied the effect mechanism of supply and demand characteristic to the market structure. And first, the paper introduces the methods of constructed market structure, and puts forward the Kalecki index. Second, the paper has tested the effect mechanism of supply and demand characteristic to the market structure by making use of the panel data model. The empirical study result shows that there is different effect mechanism of the market supply and demand characteristic to the market structure. Meanwhile, the empirical study result has also judged the industries determined by market supply characteristic and the industries determined by market demand characteristic.
In 4~(th) chapter, this paper takes the core price competition strategy of the traditional industry theory as the object, and on the basis of the related assumption of the theory of limited pricing and predatory pricing, expanded the theoretical train of thought, studying the effect of price competition strategy on the share of the dominant firm and the fringe firm, and the effect of price competition strategy on the whole market monopoly degree. Then, we choose the regions’telecommunication of China as the study object, after constructing the telecommunication comprehensive price index reflected the price level of the whole telecommunication market, the paper adopts the related data of the telecommunication from 2001 to 2005 and makes use of the dynamic panel data to study the effect of price competition strategy on the share of the dominant firm and the fringe firm, and the effect of price competition strategy on the whole market monopoly degree. The empirical study result shows that the effect of the market structure of preceding period on the present market structure is diverged, meanly, the dropped market structure of the preceding period will lead to the lower present market structure. But the result also indicates that there is no effect of the present price level on the present market structure, and there exists the effect of the price level of preceding period on the present market structure, it shows the dynamic effect of the price competition behavior on the market structure, and it also verifies the result of theoretical analysis basically.
In 5~(th) chapter, we find that nearly all the references studied for the relationship between excess capacity strategy and market structure are theoretical study by comparatively analyzing, so the aim of this chapter is to study the relationship between excess capacity strategy and market structure empirically. In view of this, we probe the effect mechanism of excess capacity on market structure further in theory according to the existed references firstly. And then, we choose the peak-to peak method to measure excess capacity, take the automobile market as the study object, and adopt the related data from 1985 to 2006, make use of the breaking structure cointegration model and the ECM based on the theory of the structural breaking to study the relationship between the automobile market concentration rate and the excess capacity, the aim is to reveal the dynamic effect mechanism of excess capacity strategy on market structure. The empirical study result shows that excess capacity is a short-term and instantaneous strategy, any rational firms will not be able to hold excess capacity. The result has verified the theoretical analysis, and on the other hand, it also indicates the application condition of the excess capacity.
In 6~(th) chapter, this paper takes effect of differenciation strategy behavior and R&D strategy behavior on the market structure as the mainline studying, choosing the automobile industries’data of 7 important Corp.s of China, adopts the econometric method of panel data cointegration test and the long-run and short-run Granger Causality test to study the effect mechanism of the differenciation strategy behavior and R&D strategy behavior on the market structure empirically, and analyze the double-sides effect relationship of the strategy of the firms on the market structure by using the long-run and short-run Granger Causality test based on the panel data. The empirical study result of panel data cointegration test shows that there are both positive effect of differenciation strategy behavior and R&D strategy behavior on the market structure, that is, the level of differenciation is higher and the R&D competition is fiercer, the market share of the firm is bigger, and that is to say the firm has the higher monopoly degree in the market. In addition, the empirical result of the long-run and short-run Granger Causality test based on PECM also shows that there both are long-run and short-run Granger Causality between differenciation strategy and market structure and between R&D strategy and market structure, this conclusion indicates that there is double-sides effect relationship between market structure and market behavior, it has verified the feedback effects of the related theory.
The traditional industry organization theory of SCP shows that market structure determines market behavior, this is a fixed canonical form; But the new experienced industry organization has led the strategy behavior into the modern industry organization, this theory considers that besides the market structure influenced the market behavior, the market structure also affected the market structure, the firms adopt the certain the strategy behavior will be the same to be able to lead to the market structure changed obviously, so the effect of the strategy behavior to market structure has become to be the frontier and core problem of the modern industry organization. But the majority studies take the theoretical analysis as the basis, rarely the quantitative studies. Therefore, the main aim of this paper is to make use of the empirical studies to test the impact of market supply and demand characteristic as well as the effect mechanism of the strategy behavior to the market structure, so there will be certain theory and practical significance.
In view of this, this paper will take the SCP canonical form as the basis, and furthermore, expands the one-side effect mechanism of the SCP canonical form. First, we analyze the market supply and demand characteristic that determined market structure, the characteristic of market supply and demand refers to the characteristic of supply and the characteristic of demand, the characteristic of supply mainly includes firm’s supply of raw material, the technology, product serviceableness, value and judge, commercial customs and labor union, etc. The characteristic of demand mainly includes price elasticity, growth rate, replace, market type, buying way and characteristics such as cyclicity and seasonal characteristic. The empirical study of this paper of the determinant factors of the market structure is to reveal the effect mechanism of the market supply and demand characteristic to the market structure by quantitative analysis, and test the related theory by empirical method. Further, on the basis of this, the strategy behavior is also the key factor to affect the market structure, so this paper will studies the affection of the strategy behavior to market structure from the following respects, price competition strategy, excess capacity strategy, production differenciation strategy and R&D strategy. The result of this paper will supply the practical evidence for the theoretical studies of the strategy behavior of the firms.
Concretely, in 3rd chapter, the paper takes China’s 28 manufacturing industries as the fundamental object, and takes the average scale and capital-intensive degree of every industry to be the supply characteristic, and takes the growth rate as the demand characteristic, studied the effect mechanism of supply and demand characteristic to the market structure. And first, the paper introduces the methods of constructed market structure, and puts forward the Kalecki index. Second, the paper has tested the effect mechanism of supply and demand characteristic to the market structure by making use of the panel data model. The empirical study result shows that there is different effect mechanism of the market supply and demand characteristic to the market structure. Meanwhile, the empirical study result has also judged the industries determined by market supply characteristic and the industries determined by market demand characteristic.
In 4~(th) chapter, this paper takes the core price competition strategy of the traditional industry theory as the object, and on the basis of the related assumption of the theory of limited pricing and predatory pricing, expanded the theoretical train of thought, studying the effect of price competition strategy on the share of the dominant firm and the fringe firm, and the effect of price competition strategy on the whole market monopoly degree. Then, we choose the regions’telecommunication of China as the study object, after constructing the telecommunication comprehensive price index reflected the price level of the whole telecommunication market, the paper adopts the related data of the telecommunication from 2001 to 2005 and makes use of the dynamic panel data to study the effect of price competition strategy on the share of the dominant firm and the fringe firm, and the effect of price competition strategy on the whole market monopoly degree. The empirical study result shows that the effect of the market structure of preceding period on the present market structure is diverged, meanly, the dropped market structure of the preceding period will lead to the lower present market structure. But the result also indicates that there is no effect of the present price level on the present market structure, and there exists the effect of the price level of preceding period on the present market structure, it shows the dynamic effect of the price competition behavior on the market structure, and it also verifies the result of theoretical analysis basically.
In 5~(th) chapter, we find that nearly all the references studied for the relationship between excess capacity strategy and market structure are theoretical study by comparatively analyzing, so the aim of this chapter is to study the relationship between excess capacity strategy and market structure empirically. In view of this, we probe the effect mechanism of excess capacity on market structure further in theory according to the existed references firstly. And then, we choose the peak-to peak method to measure excess capacity, take the automobile market as the study object, and adopt the related data from 1985 to 2006, make use of the breaking structure cointegration model and the ECM based on the theory of the structural breaking to study the relationship between the automobile market concentration rate and the excess capacity, the aim is to reveal the dynamic effect mechanism of excess capacity strategy on market structure. The empirical study result shows that excess capacity is a short-term and instantaneous strategy, any rational firms will not be able to hold excess capacity. The result has verified the theoretical analysis, and on the other hand, it also indicates the application condition of the excess capacity.
In 6~(th) chapter, this paper takes effect of differenciation strategy behavior and R&D strategy behavior on the market structure as the mainline studying, choosing the automobile industries’data of 7 important Corp.s of China, adopts the econometric method of panel data cointegration test and the long-run and short-run Granger Causality test to study the effect mechanism of the differenciation strategy behavior and R&D strategy behavior on the market structure empirically, and analyze the double-sides effect relationship of the strategy of the firms on the market structure by using the long-run and short-run Granger Causality test based on the panel data. The empirical study result of panel data cointegration test shows that there are both positive effect of differenciation strategy behavior and R&D strategy behavior on the market structure, that is, the level of differenciation is higher and the R&D competition is fiercer, the market share of the firm is bigger, and that is to say the firm has the higher monopoly degree in the market. In addition, the empirical result of the long-run and short-run Granger Causality test based on PECM also shows that there both are long-run and short-run Granger Causality between differenciation strategy and market structure and between R&D strategy and market structure, this conclusion indicates that there is double-sides effect relationship between market structure and market behavior, it has verified the feedback effects of the related theory.
引文
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