行业协会功能维度及其对企业信誉缺失治理效应的实证分析
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摘要
当前,我国的市场化改革成就获得了世界普遍的认同,但是我国企业的信誉问题并没有随着改革的深入而逐步改善,反而企业信誉缺失现象屡见报端,社会对企业诚信的质疑日渐增加。由此看来,对企业的信誉缺失行为治理,除了政府、法律、媒体等管理监督外,还需要其他治理方式的加入。
行业协会作为企业间的自律组织,承担规范企业经营,维护行业秩序的作用,其具有的信息功能、协调功能与企业信誉缺失治理所需要的信息等相关条件相得益彰,因此行业协会应该可以在我国日趋严峻的企业不诚信行为治理中发挥更为积极的作用。本文将以此为切入点,在探索验证我国企业视角的行业协会功能维度的基础上,运用实证分析方法探讨行业协会对企业信誉缺失的治理问题。
论文在对相关文献进行梳理的基础上,首先提出了企业视角的行业协会功能维度评价量表,探索性地提出了我国行业协会功能维度的三维模型,并采用探索性和验证性因素分析等方法探求该量表的信度和效度。接着以博弈论为理论分析工具,论证了行业协会这三项功能对企业信誉缺失治理的作用机理,提出了本文的研究假说。然后运用结构方程模型,验证了该假说,构建了行业协会三项功能对企业信誉缺失治理的影响效应模型。最后,在以上分析的基础上,论文提出了行业协会对企业信誉缺失的治理建议,
本文基于以上分析思路,得出以下基本结论：
(1)对于企业来说,行业协会功能包括信息、协调和管理三个维度,本文所开发的企业视角的行业协会功能量表具有较好的信度和效度。
(2)基于我国由计划经济向市场经济体制转换的特殊性,我国行业协会由于生成途径的不同,包括企业自发形成的行业协会和政府主导形成的行业协会两大类型。实证结果表明生成途径的不同并未对行业协会的功能维度产生显著性影响,两种不同生成途径的行业协会具有相同的功能维度。
(3)在不考虑行业协会生成模式不同的状况下,我国行业协会的信息功能、协调功能正向影响企业信誉缺失治理条件,可以有效实现企业信誉缺失治理；而管理功能负向影响企业信誉缺失治理条件,无法实现对企业信誉缺失的治理效果。
(4)对于企业自发形成的行业协会来说,其信息功能对企业信誉缺失治理产生正向影响,而协调功能对企业信誉缺失产生的影响则不显著。而对于政府引导产生的行业协会,其信息功能的影响不显著,但其协调功能的影响显著,且呈现正向影响。两类协会的管理功能都对企业信誉缺失的影响显著,但均呈现负向影响。
论文期望通过上述研究视角、研究内容和研究方法的拓宽,不仅从理论上能够进一步丰富企业信誉缺失治理的研究,而且能够在实践领域为企业信誉缺失的治理与行业协会的发展提供现实的指导建议。本文形成以下两个创新点：
第一,本文提炼并验证了基于企业视角的我国行业协会功能维度模型。
已有对于行业协会功能多以政府或行业协会本身为视角进行考察。本文以企业为研究视角,采用规范分析方法对行业协会功能进行理论分析的基础上,以因子分析为工具,采用实证方法提炼并验证了基于企业视角的我国行业协会功能维度模型,丰富和完善了我国行业协会功能的量化研究(3.2节)。同时本文以实证分析的方法,探讨并验证了不同生成模式行业协会的功能差异(3.3节),丰富了我国行业协会功能测度及其影响因素研究。
第二,本文探索并验证了行业协会功能对企业信誉缺失治理的影响效应模型,丰富了企业信誉缺失第三方治理的研究内容。
本文将结构方程运用于行业协会对企业信誉缺失治理的研究中,研究发现：在不讨论生成模式不同的状况下,我国行业协会的信息功能和协调功能对企业信誉缺失治理条件均产生了正向影响,而管理功能则是产生负向影响(5.2节)。考虑到不同生成途径的行业协会的状况下,信息、协调功能对企业信誉缺失治理存在着显著的差异,管理功能不存在显著的差异(5.3节)。
At present, the achievement of market-oriented reform in China has been the universal approval around the world. But the problem of enterprise reputation does not gradually improve with the deepening of the reform, instead, the lack of reputation phenomenon often appear in the media. The enterprise good faith is there to be questioned increasingly, so it seems that other way to reinforce credit-building need to join except for supervision of the government, laws and the media.
As a self-discipline organization, industry association should standardize enterprise management and safeguard the order of the industry. The information function and coordination function of industry association can complement the governance thesis of lack of corporation reputation. So the industry association can play a more active role in the governance of lack of reputation in our country enterprises. For this purpose, the paper makes the empirical study on the governance of lack of corporation reputation, based on exploring and verifying function of the industry association from the view of enterprises in China.
Based on literature research and field surveys, the paper firstly develops the survey scale of the industry association function. And then the paper finds the three dimensions of the industry association from the enterprise perspective with an exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis, which search for the reliability and validity of the Test. Secondly, the author uses the game theory to explore the mechanism which the three industry association functions affects corporation reputation mechanism, and then the paper puts forward the research hypothesis. Thirdly, the hypothesis is verified with structural equation model and the model is build that industry association can affect lack of credit in corporations. Finally, the paper puts forward to strengthen the role of the industry association on governing lack of reputation in corporations.
Based on the above analysis, this paper put forward the following basic conclusion:
(1) From the view of enterprises, the functions of industry association can be measured by three dimensions, such as the dimensions of information, the dimensions of coordination and the dimensions of administration. The empirical results show that the questionnaire has eligible reliability and validity.
(2) Compared to the association in the mature market economies, the industry association in China has been developed differently. Based on the enterprise perspective, industry associations which enterprises spontaneously formed and industry association from the government guidance go side by side. The empirical results indicate that the functions of two kinds of industry associations make no difference.
(3) Without considering the different generation way of industry association, information functions and coordination functions have the forward influence on the conditions of governing reputation loss in corporations, and it is useful for implementing a governance mechanism. Management functions have the negative influence and it is unable to realize the corporate governance effect of lack of credibility.
(4) Information functions of the industry associations which enterprises spontaneously formed have the forward influence on the conditions of governing reputation loss in corporations. But coordination functions have no differences. Meanwhile, information functions of the industry association from the government guidance have no effect on the conditions of governing reputation loss in corporations, but coordination functions have the forward influence significantly. Management functions of two kinds of association both have negative influence on the conditions of governing reputation loss.
The research expect it can enrich the viewpoints, content and method of research on reputation loss in corporations, also bring some practical instruction to the governess of reputation loss in corporations and the development of industry association. The dissertation has the following innovative points:
Firstly, the paper extracts the industry association function dimension model from the perspective of enterprises.
Other studies have shown industry association function from the perspective of government or industry association itself. This paper focuses on the angle of enterprises and builds the model of three dimension of industry association function with an exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis, which enrich the quantitative research of industry association function (section3.2). Then, based on the empirical analysis method, this paper discusses and validates the differences of two kinds of industry association, which enrich the research on influence factors to measure industry association function (section3.3).
Secondly, the author explores and validates the influencing effect model that industry association can affect lack of credit in corporations, which enrich the research of enterprise credit loss of third party governance mechanism.
In this paper, structural equation model is applied in order to help lack of reputation in enterprises through industry association. The research shows that information functions and coordination functions have the forward influence on the conditions of governing reputation loss in corporations, and management functions have the negative influence (section5.2). But considering the different generation way of industry association, there is significant difference for information function and coordination function, and there is no significant difference for management function (section5.3).
行业协会作为企业间的自律组织,承担规范企业经营,维护行业秩序的作用,其具有的信息功能、协调功能与企业信誉缺失治理所需要的信息等相关条件相得益彰,因此行业协会应该可以在我国日趋严峻的企业不诚信行为治理中发挥更为积极的作用。本文将以此为切入点,在探索验证我国企业视角的行业协会功能维度的基础上,运用实证分析方法探讨行业协会对企业信誉缺失的治理问题。
论文在对相关文献进行梳理的基础上,首先提出了企业视角的行业协会功能维度评价量表,探索性地提出了我国行业协会功能维度的三维模型,并采用探索性和验证性因素分析等方法探求该量表的信度和效度。接着以博弈论为理论分析工具,论证了行业协会这三项功能对企业信誉缺失治理的作用机理,提出了本文的研究假说。然后运用结构方程模型,验证了该假说,构建了行业协会三项功能对企业信誉缺失治理的影响效应模型。最后,在以上分析的基础上,论文提出了行业协会对企业信誉缺失的治理建议,
本文基于以上分析思路,得出以下基本结论：
(1)对于企业来说,行业协会功能包括信息、协调和管理三个维度,本文所开发的企业视角的行业协会功能量表具有较好的信度和效度。
(2)基于我国由计划经济向市场经济体制转换的特殊性,我国行业协会由于生成途径的不同,包括企业自发形成的行业协会和政府主导形成的行业协会两大类型。实证结果表明生成途径的不同并未对行业协会的功能维度产生显著性影响,两种不同生成途径的行业协会具有相同的功能维度。
(3)在不考虑行业协会生成模式不同的状况下,我国行业协会的信息功能、协调功能正向影响企业信誉缺失治理条件,可以有效实现企业信誉缺失治理；而管理功能负向影响企业信誉缺失治理条件,无法实现对企业信誉缺失的治理效果。
(4)对于企业自发形成的行业协会来说,其信息功能对企业信誉缺失治理产生正向影响,而协调功能对企业信誉缺失产生的影响则不显著。而对于政府引导产生的行业协会,其信息功能的影响不显著,但其协调功能的影响显著,且呈现正向影响。两类协会的管理功能都对企业信誉缺失的影响显著,但均呈现负向影响。
论文期望通过上述研究视角、研究内容和研究方法的拓宽,不仅从理论上能够进一步丰富企业信誉缺失治理的研究,而且能够在实践领域为企业信誉缺失的治理与行业协会的发展提供现实的指导建议。本文形成以下两个创新点：
第一,本文提炼并验证了基于企业视角的我国行业协会功能维度模型。
已有对于行业协会功能多以政府或行业协会本身为视角进行考察。本文以企业为研究视角,采用规范分析方法对行业协会功能进行理论分析的基础上,以因子分析为工具,采用实证方法提炼并验证了基于企业视角的我国行业协会功能维度模型,丰富和完善了我国行业协会功能的量化研究(3.2节)。同时本文以实证分析的方法,探讨并验证了不同生成模式行业协会的功能差异(3.3节),丰富了我国行业协会功能测度及其影响因素研究。
第二,本文探索并验证了行业协会功能对企业信誉缺失治理的影响效应模型,丰富了企业信誉缺失第三方治理的研究内容。
本文将结构方程运用于行业协会对企业信誉缺失治理的研究中,研究发现：在不讨论生成模式不同的状况下,我国行业协会的信息功能和协调功能对企业信誉缺失治理条件均产生了正向影响,而管理功能则是产生负向影响(5.2节)。考虑到不同生成途径的行业协会的状况下,信息、协调功能对企业信誉缺失治理存在着显著的差异,管理功能不存在显著的差异(5.3节)。
At present, the achievement of market-oriented reform in China has been the universal approval around the world. But the problem of enterprise reputation does not gradually improve with the deepening of the reform, instead, the lack of reputation phenomenon often appear in the media. The enterprise good faith is there to be questioned increasingly, so it seems that other way to reinforce credit-building need to join except for supervision of the government, laws and the media.
As a self-discipline organization, industry association should standardize enterprise management and safeguard the order of the industry. The information function and coordination function of industry association can complement the governance thesis of lack of corporation reputation. So the industry association can play a more active role in the governance of lack of reputation in our country enterprises. For this purpose, the paper makes the empirical study on the governance of lack of corporation reputation, based on exploring and verifying function of the industry association from the view of enterprises in China.
Based on literature research and field surveys, the paper firstly develops the survey scale of the industry association function. And then the paper finds the three dimensions of the industry association from the enterprise perspective with an exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis, which search for the reliability and validity of the Test. Secondly, the author uses the game theory to explore the mechanism which the three industry association functions affects corporation reputation mechanism, and then the paper puts forward the research hypothesis. Thirdly, the hypothesis is verified with structural equation model and the model is build that industry association can affect lack of credit in corporations. Finally, the paper puts forward to strengthen the role of the industry association on governing lack of reputation in corporations.
Based on the above analysis, this paper put forward the following basic conclusion:
(1) From the view of enterprises, the functions of industry association can be measured by three dimensions, such as the dimensions of information, the dimensions of coordination and the dimensions of administration. The empirical results show that the questionnaire has eligible reliability and validity.
(2) Compared to the association in the mature market economies, the industry association in China has been developed differently. Based on the enterprise perspective, industry associations which enterprises spontaneously formed and industry association from the government guidance go side by side. The empirical results indicate that the functions of two kinds of industry associations make no difference.
(3) Without considering the different generation way of industry association, information functions and coordination functions have the forward influence on the conditions of governing reputation loss in corporations, and it is useful for implementing a governance mechanism. Management functions have the negative influence and it is unable to realize the corporate governance effect of lack of credibility.
(4) Information functions of the industry associations which enterprises spontaneously formed have the forward influence on the conditions of governing reputation loss in corporations. But coordination functions have no differences. Meanwhile, information functions of the industry association from the government guidance have no effect on the conditions of governing reputation loss in corporations, but coordination functions have the forward influence significantly. Management functions of two kinds of association both have negative influence on the conditions of governing reputation loss.
The research expect it can enrich the viewpoints, content and method of research on reputation loss in corporations, also bring some practical instruction to the governess of reputation loss in corporations and the development of industry association. The dissertation has the following innovative points:
Firstly, the paper extracts the industry association function dimension model from the perspective of enterprises.
Other studies have shown industry association function from the perspective of government or industry association itself. This paper focuses on the angle of enterprises and builds the model of three dimension of industry association function with an exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis, which enrich the quantitative research of industry association function (section3.2). Then, based on the empirical analysis method, this paper discusses and validates the differences of two kinds of industry association, which enrich the research on influence factors to measure industry association function (section3.3).
Secondly, the author explores and validates the influencing effect model that industry association can affect lack of credit in corporations, which enrich the research of enterprise credit loss of third party governance mechanism.
In this paper, structural equation model is applied in order to help lack of reputation in enterprises through industry association. The research shows that information functions and coordination functions have the forward influence on the conditions of governing reputation loss in corporations, and management functions have the negative influence (section5.2). But considering the different generation way of industry association, there is significant difference for information function and coordination function, and there is no significant difference for management function (section5.3).
引文
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