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基于个人碳交易行为模型的电力消费选择研究
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摘要
低碳经济的发展不仅要转变传统的生产方式,也要转变人们的生活方式。加强消费者行为的引导和激励,构建低碳消费模式已经成为一个亟待解决的重大课题。然而,当前的减排政策主要针对生产者,缺乏针对消费者的有效手段。消费者所承担的减排责任不对等,对消费者的减排激励也不足。导致实际减排效果并没有达到预期目标,甚至产生了“反弹效应”。为此,近些年来学术界针对消费者的减排,提出了个人碳交易(Personal Carbon Trading, PCT)的概念,并开展了一系列的相关研究。但目前,鉴于尚未有国家实施个人碳交易机制,学术界对个人碳交易的研究还是以定性分析为主。缺乏基于数理模型的实证研究,特别是与个人碳交易相关的消费者行为的实证研究。个人碳交易的行为特征如何?个人碳交易如何影响消费者的产品选择行为?个人碳交易如何影响消费者的福利?这些问题的回答,对个人碳交易的实施具有重要的现实意义。
     本文主要研究内容如下:
     (1)构建了电力消费选择行为的概念模型,初步识别出个人碳交易机制下电力消费选择的影响因素和影响机制。基于产权交易理论和消费者行为理论,构建了个人碳交易机制下电力消费选择行为的概念模型,研究了个人碳配额、个人碳交易行为对电力消费选择的影响机制,以及电力消费选择对发电商行为的影响机制。这些研究为个人碳交易行为模型、以及相应的电力消费选择模型的构建提供了理论依据。
     (2)构建了个人碳交易行为的理论模型,揭示了个人碳交易行为特征及其影响机制。基于"Cap and Trade"机制和消费者效用理论,构建了个人碳交易行为的数理模型,研究了排放权价格高于、低于以及等于临界碳价三种情境下,消费者收入、排放权价格等因素对个人碳排放权供求行为的影响机制;基于超额需求函数,研究了个人碳交易的市场均衡问题。个人碳交易行为理论模型的构建,为研究个人碳交易情境下的电力消费选择提供了基础。
     (3)构建了个人碳交易情境下的电力消费选择模型和电力消费福利模型,进一步揭示了个人碳交易对消费者选择行为以及消费者福利的影响机制。在个人碳交易行为模型的基础上,构建了电力消费选择模型和电力消费福利模型,研究排放权价格高于、低于以及等于临界碳价三种情境下,排放权价格、消费者收入、个人碳配额等因素对电力消费选择以及电力消费福利的影响,揭示个人碳交易的分配效应。
     (4)运用实验经济学研究方法,检验了个人碳交易行为特征,验证了个人碳交易对消费者选择行为以及消费者福利的影响。设计了个人碳交易的实验环境、基础数据、定价机制和激励条件,实施了个人碳交易行为实验,对个人碳交易的均衡价格、以及排放权交易数量与消费者收入等因素之间的关系进行了检验。在个人碳交易行为实验的基础上,进行了后序的电力消费选择行为实验,检验了个人碳交易对电力消费选择以及电力消费福利的影响,揭示了个人碳交易的低碳行为激励效应,以及消费外部性内在化效应。
     本文主要研究发现,个人碳交易能够实现稳定的市场均衡,均衡价格为临界碳价;个人碳交易能够激励消费者选择低碳产品,实现低碳消费;个人碳交易体现了社会公平,实现了高排放者对低排放者的补贴。
     本文的创新点主要体现在:
     (1)基于需求侧管理,研究了市场化减排机制下的消费者低碳行为特征。个人碳交易的本质是构建了市场化的消费者减排机制,这种减排机制能否激励消费者产生低碳行为,将影响个人碳交易的实施效果。本文构建了个人碳交易行为模型、电力消费选择模型等,揭示了个人碳交易机制下的消费者行为特征和影响机制,对个人碳交易机制的低碳行为激励效应进行了评价。
     (2)运用实验经济学研究方法,研究了个人碳交易机制。个人碳交易是一种新的、未经实践检验的减排机制,难以运用传统的实证研究方法,揭示个人碳交易的运行机理和规律。本文基于规范的实验经济学研究方法,构建了个人碳交易实验环境,实施了个人碳交易实验,对个人碳交易机制进行了实证检验。
     总之,就理论价值而言,本文为个人碳交易机制下的消费者行为研究,提供了基本的数理模型和实验经济学研究示例;就实践启示而言,本文的研究结论,对当前中国的阶梯电价改革也具有一定的启示意义。
The transition to low-carbon economy not only means changing the traditional mode of production, but also changing the way of lifestyle. It has become a major issue to be solved to strengthen the guidance and encouragement of consumer behavior, and then build the low-carbon consumption patterns. However, the current emission reduction policy is primarily on producers, few effective means of regulation on consumers. The assume responsibility of consumers is unequal and the consumer's emission reduction incentive is also insufficient It caused that the actual emission reduction results did not achieve the desired goals, and even produced a "rebound effect". Therefore, the concept of Personal Carbon Trading (PCT) is proposed by researchers to reduce carbon emission of consumers. However, there is no country carrying out the mechanism of PCT; the study of PCT is based on qualitative analysis and lack of empirical research on mathematical model, especially, the study on consumer behavior. What is the behavior feature of PCT? How PCT influence production choice behavior of consumer? How PCT influence consumer welfare? These answers to these questions are important to the implement of PCT mechanism.
     The major works of this paper include the following aspects:
     (1) The conceptual model of electricity consumption choice behavior is constructed to identify the factors and mechanism that influence electricity consumption choice under the PCT. Based on the theory of property rights trading and consumer behavior, we build a conceptual model of electricity consumption choice behavior under the PCT to study the impact of personal carbon allowance and personal carbon trading behavior on electricity consumption choice, and the impact of electricity consumption choice on power generation behavior. These studies provide theoretical basis to the model of personal carbon trading behavior and electricity consumption choice behavior.
     (2) The theoretical model of personal carbon trading behavior is constructed to identify the characteristic of personal carbon trading behavior and its influence mechanism. Based on the mechanism of "Cap and Trade" and consumer utility theory, we build a mathematical model of personal carbon trading behavior. Then we study the influence of the consumer income and the emissions rights price on personal carbon trading behavior when the emissions rights price is above, below and equal to the critical carbon price. Based on the excess demand function, we discuss the market equilibrium of PCT. The construction of personal carbon trading behavior offers the basis of electricity consumption choice behavior under PCT.
     (3) The models of electricity consumption choice behavior and electricity consumption welfare are constructed to uncover the influence mechanism of PCT on consumer behavior choice and consumer welfare. Based on the model of personal carbon trading behavior, we build the model of electricity consumption choice behavior and electricity consumption welfare to analysis the impacts of emissions rights price, consumer's income and personal carbon allowance on electricity consumption choice behavior and electricity consumption welfare when the emissions rights price is above, below and equal to the critical carbon price.
     (4) The research methods of experimental economics are used to examine the feature of personal carbon trading behavior and the influence of PCT on consumer choice behavior and consumer welfare. We design the experimental environment, basic experimental data, the pricing mechanism and incentive conditions of PCT, and then we conduct the personal carbon trading experiment to test equilibrium price of PCT and the relationship between emissions trading quantity and the consumer income. On this basis, we conduct the electricity consumption choice behavior experiment to identify the influence of PCT on electricity consumption choice and electricity consumption welfare, and then we find out the encouragement effect of PCT and internalization effect of consumption externality.
     We find that PCT can realize the stable market equilibrium, and the equilibrium price is the critical carbon price; it can encourage consumers to choose low-carbon products to realize low-carbon consumption; it can also reflect the social fairness to realize subsidies from the consumer with high carbon emissions to low carbon emissions.
     The major innovative points are the following:
     (1) Based on the perspective of consumers, this paper studies the feature of consumer low-carbon behavior under the market-based reduction mechanism. The nature of PCT is to build a market-based reduction mechanism to encourage the consumers'low-carbon behavior, which will influence the implement of PCT. This paper constructs the models of personal carbon trading behavior and electricity consumption choice to identify the feature of consumer behavior and its influence mechanism, and then assesses the encouragement effects of PCT on low-carbon behavior.
     (2) The research methods of experimental economics are used to study the mechanism of PCT. As we all know PCT is a new and unpracticed reduction mechanism, therefore it is difficult to disclose its operation mechanism and discipline with traditional empirical research method. Based on the research methods of experimental economics, we design the experimental environment to test the mechanism of PCT.
     In a word, in terms of theoretical value, this paper provides a basis mathematical model and research example of experimental economics for the further study of PCT; In terms of practice enlightenment, it is meaningful to the reformation of electricity tiered pricing in China.
引文
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