中国国有企业党组织参与公司治理有效性研究
|
摘要
当今世界绝大多数国家的中央和地方政权由政党来掌握,并利用其执政地位,影响政治、经济、社会的方方面面。政党在现代社会政治生活中发挥着重要作用。我国的政党制度更是不同于西方国家竞争性政党制度,是马克思政党理论同中国实际国情相结合的产物,是独一无二的。国有企业是我国国民经济的支柱,国有企业改革和发展关系着国家的经济安全和中国特色社会主义制度的发展与完善。当前,伴随着现代企业制度的建立,国有企业的发展及其党组织发挥政治优势都面临着巨大的挑战。在建立现代企业制度的同时,要充分考虑我国的政治、经济、社会基本制度,其中,充分发挥党组织的政治核心作用,是我国国有企业最大的特色的优势,也是建立中国特色的现代企业制度的本质特征。因此,在充分借鉴国际公司治理经验的基础上,深入开展新时期背景下的党组织在现代公司治理中的有效性研究这一课题,对不断丰富中国特色社会主义的实践特色和理论特色,具有重大的理论价值和现实意义。
由于与其他国家典型的公司治理模式相比,我国国有企业的公司治理有着非常重要的一个特征——党组织参与公司治理。特别是我国的《宪法》、《公司法》和《中国共产党章程》的有关规定使得国有企业党组织具备了参与公司治理的主体资格,成为我国国有公司治理的一大特色,但也使得现代公司制企业治理结构的主体框架——董事会、监事会以及管理层与传统企业制度中的党委会关系更为复杂；同时,由于目前我国国有企业存在着“内部人控制”、外部治理机制缺失等问题,也为国有企业中党组织参与公司治理提供了现实基础。面对越来越突出的董事会与党委会职能定位模糊、权力和角色冲突等问题,本文以国有上市公司中党组织参与公司治理这一行为为研究对象,将政治干预主体区分为“政府”与“政党”,研究视角从外部政府部门扩展到企业内部的基层党组织,研究国有企业中基层党组织参与公司治理的制度背景、相关理论、参与方式以及对企业决策和行为的影响,构建了党组织参与公司治理有效性的理论模型。通过构建新的关于党组织参与公司治理程度的指标体系,依次检验了党组织参与公司治理这一行为对公司内部人控制导致的代理问题、高管薪酬契约以及公司冗余雇员的影响,并最终如何发挥治理效应和价值效应。根据实证分析结果,本研究的主要结论如下：
(一)我国国有上市公司中,党组织参与公司治理有助于对经理人行为产生制约,抑制内部人控制问题产生的代理成本；降低公司高管人员的绝对薪酬,抑制高管攫取超额薪酬的行为,同时缩小高管与普通员工之间的薪酬差距。本文的结果进一步支持了卢昌崇(1994)、李稻葵(1999)和Qian(2000)的观点,即党的人事任免权是国有企业内部人控制的最重要的平衡力量,党组织部门会对经理人员构成严重的制衡。在来自内部治理和外部市场的激励和约束机制都不能有效发挥作用之前,行政手段不会被市场手段取代,职位、仕途和社会目标等的激励和约束机制仍发挥重要的作用。
(二)党组织参与公司治理会为企业带来额外的政治成本——冗余雇员。随着党组织参与公司治理程度的增加,公司雇佣的员工数量增加,形成冗余雇员。这一结果证明了除国有股东、政府带来的政治干预以外的第三种干预途径——通过国有企业内部党组织对企业进行干预的存在。党组织形成的系统网络,覆盖了全部社会单位,包括我国的国有企业,并对国有企业的经营决策构成影响和制衡,本文验证了其对国有企业雇佣行为的影响。
(三)党组织在不同的参与程度下发挥的治理效应不尽相同,较高或较低的参与程度均不利于公司治理水平的提高。这是因为国有企业承担的代理成本、薪酬成本以及政治成本会随着党组织“双向进入”的程度呈现此消彼长的变化,最终企业的公司治理水平与党组织参与程度呈倒U型曲线关系。但党组织参与公司治理最终体现在公司价值上,表现为公司价值的降低。
本研究是基于党组织参与公司治理这一我国国有公司治理最大的特点而开展的探索性研究,其创新点就在于突破了以往对政治干预公司这一行为的研究,从公司内部基层党组织的视角考察了国有企业中党组织参与公司治理对公司行为和价值的影响。研究结果证明除政府部门、国有股东外,企业基层党组织也是政治干预的另一主体,通过企业内部基层党组织依然可以对公司进行干预,为政治干预相关研究提供了新的视角,丰富了相关领域的研究成果以及中国特色的公司治理理论。本文的研究意味着,在现阶段不断丰富和深化中国特色的现代企业制度的实践特色和理论特色的背景下,如何有效开展党组织参与公司治理的具体内容和方式,需要在实践上对这一行为进行制度化的设计,并进一步关注高管薪酬激励机制的有效性以及对“双向进入”人员的考评体系。
The central and local governments in most of countries in the world today are mastered by the political parties and use its ruling position to impact political, economic and social aspects. Parties play an important role in the modern social and political life. Party system in China is different from the competitive party system in western countries; it is the combination of Marxism political party theory with China's actual conditions and it is unique. State-owned enterprises are the backbone of our national economy, the reform and development of state-owned enterprises are related to the country's economic security and the development and perfection of Chinese characteristics socialist system. Currently, with the establishment of modern enterprise system, the development of state-owned enterprises and the political advantage of party organization are faced with great challenges. When establishing modern enterprise system, we must fully consider our country's political, economic, social basic system, and let the party play political role fully is the major features and the unique advantages of state-owned enterprises in our country, it is also a distinctive feature and the essential requirements of modern enterprise system with Chinese characteristics.2009national state-owned enterprise party construction work conference stressed that since the founding of new China, especially since the reform and opening up30years ago, the state-owned enterprise development process shows that the party construction work has always been the unique political resources of state-owned enterprises, is an organic part of enterprise core competitiveness, and the key factor to realize scientific development. It is also an essential feature of establishing a modern enterprise system with Chinese characteristics. Therefore, on the basis of fully using the experience of international corporate governance, the study of party organization's effectiveness in modern corporate governance in the new period has important theoretical value and practical significance in enriching the characteristics of the practice and theoretical of socialism with Chinese characteristics.
Comparing with the typical corporate governance models of foreign countries, the corporate governance structure of China's state-owned companies has a very important characteristic:party organization participated in corporate governance. Especially through the provisions of the Constitution, the Company Law and the Constitution of the Chinese Communist Party, the Communist Party Committees of China in state-owned enterprises are entitled the qualification in the corporate governance. This is the most prominent character in the corporate governance of our country, at the same time, it is also make the relationship between the main frame of the structure of modern corporate governance and the traditional enterprise system more complicated. At the same time, because there are problems such as insider control, lack of external governance mechanism in state-owned enterprise now, provides the realistic foundation for party organization to participate in corporate governance in state-owned enterprises. Facing the increasingly prominent problems of the duty of the board of directors and party committee are not clear, power and role conflict, this paper take the behavior of party committee participate in corporate governance in state-owned listed companies as the research object, separate the body of political intervention into "government" and "political party", extended the research perspectives from the government sector outside to the grass-roots party organizations in the enterprises, research the system background, related theories, participation ways and the influence on business decisions and actions of the party organizations participated in corporate governance in state-owned enterprises, build the theory model of party organization participating in corporate governance effectiveness. By constructing a new index system of the party organization participating in corporate governance, examine the effect of the behavior of the party organization participate in corporate governance to agency problem from the insider control, executive compensation contract and labor redundancy, and how to exert governance effect and value effect finally. According to the results of empirical analysis, the main conclusions of this study are as follows:
1. In the state-owned list companies in our country, the party organizations participate in corporate governance will restrict the managers'behavior, prevent agency cost from insider control problems, reduce executive compensation, and restrain executives grab excessive compensation; reduce the salary gap between executives and ordinary employees. In this paper, the results further support the previous scholars'view, that the power of the party's personnel appointment and removal is the most important balance power to insider control in the state-owned enterprises; the party organization department will restrict the managers. Before the incentive and restraint mechanisms from the internal governance and external market work effectively, the administrative measures will not be replaced by market means, position, career, political and social objectives will still play an important role.
2. The party committee participate in corporate governance will bring extra political burden, redundant employees to the enterprise. With the increase of the level of party committee participating in corporate governance, the number of employees increases, resulting labor redundancy. The result shows that except for the state-owned shareholders and government's political intervention, there is a third type of intervention approaches:through the party organization to intervene the enterprise. The party network covering the entire social units, including state-owned enterprises in our country, and influence the business decision. This paper verifies the impact on employment behavior in state-owned enterprises.
3. The governance effect of party committee is different in varying participation degrees, higher or lower participation degrees are not conductive to raising the level of corporate governance. This is because the agency cost, salary cost and political cost in state-owned enterprises will change with the degree of the party's "two-way access", and has an inverted "U-shaped" relationship with the level of corporate governance, but has a negative impact on corporate value.
This study based on the largest corporate governance characteristics in China's state-owned enterprises, which is party committee participating in corporate governance. The innovation is to break the study of political intervention, examining the effect of party committee participating in corporate governance to corporate actions and results from the perspective of internal party organization. The research results show that in addition to government departments and state-owned shareholders, the grass-roots party organizations are also another main political intervention, through the internal party organization, the enterprises can still be intervened. The research provides a new perspective for political intervention, enriched the research achievements in the field and the Chinese characteristics corporate governance theory.
由于与其他国家典型的公司治理模式相比,我国国有企业的公司治理有着非常重要的一个特征——党组织参与公司治理。特别是我国的《宪法》、《公司法》和《中国共产党章程》的有关规定使得国有企业党组织具备了参与公司治理的主体资格,成为我国国有公司治理的一大特色,但也使得现代公司制企业治理结构的主体框架——董事会、监事会以及管理层与传统企业制度中的党委会关系更为复杂；同时,由于目前我国国有企业存在着“内部人控制”、外部治理机制缺失等问题,也为国有企业中党组织参与公司治理提供了现实基础。面对越来越突出的董事会与党委会职能定位模糊、权力和角色冲突等问题,本文以国有上市公司中党组织参与公司治理这一行为为研究对象,将政治干预主体区分为“政府”与“政党”,研究视角从外部政府部门扩展到企业内部的基层党组织,研究国有企业中基层党组织参与公司治理的制度背景、相关理论、参与方式以及对企业决策和行为的影响,构建了党组织参与公司治理有效性的理论模型。通过构建新的关于党组织参与公司治理程度的指标体系,依次检验了党组织参与公司治理这一行为对公司内部人控制导致的代理问题、高管薪酬契约以及公司冗余雇员的影响,并最终如何发挥治理效应和价值效应。根据实证分析结果,本研究的主要结论如下：
(一)我国国有上市公司中,党组织参与公司治理有助于对经理人行为产生制约,抑制内部人控制问题产生的代理成本；降低公司高管人员的绝对薪酬,抑制高管攫取超额薪酬的行为,同时缩小高管与普通员工之间的薪酬差距。本文的结果进一步支持了卢昌崇(1994)、李稻葵(1999)和Qian(2000)的观点,即党的人事任免权是国有企业内部人控制的最重要的平衡力量,党组织部门会对经理人员构成严重的制衡。在来自内部治理和外部市场的激励和约束机制都不能有效发挥作用之前,行政手段不会被市场手段取代,职位、仕途和社会目标等的激励和约束机制仍发挥重要的作用。
(二)党组织参与公司治理会为企业带来额外的政治成本——冗余雇员。随着党组织参与公司治理程度的增加,公司雇佣的员工数量增加,形成冗余雇员。这一结果证明了除国有股东、政府带来的政治干预以外的第三种干预途径——通过国有企业内部党组织对企业进行干预的存在。党组织形成的系统网络,覆盖了全部社会单位,包括我国的国有企业,并对国有企业的经营决策构成影响和制衡,本文验证了其对国有企业雇佣行为的影响。
(三)党组织在不同的参与程度下发挥的治理效应不尽相同,较高或较低的参与程度均不利于公司治理水平的提高。这是因为国有企业承担的代理成本、薪酬成本以及政治成本会随着党组织“双向进入”的程度呈现此消彼长的变化,最终企业的公司治理水平与党组织参与程度呈倒U型曲线关系。但党组织参与公司治理最终体现在公司价值上,表现为公司价值的降低。
本研究是基于党组织参与公司治理这一我国国有公司治理最大的特点而开展的探索性研究,其创新点就在于突破了以往对政治干预公司这一行为的研究,从公司内部基层党组织的视角考察了国有企业中党组织参与公司治理对公司行为和价值的影响。研究结果证明除政府部门、国有股东外,企业基层党组织也是政治干预的另一主体,通过企业内部基层党组织依然可以对公司进行干预,为政治干预相关研究提供了新的视角,丰富了相关领域的研究成果以及中国特色的公司治理理论。本文的研究意味着,在现阶段不断丰富和深化中国特色的现代企业制度的实践特色和理论特色的背景下,如何有效开展党组织参与公司治理的具体内容和方式,需要在实践上对这一行为进行制度化的设计,并进一步关注高管薪酬激励机制的有效性以及对“双向进入”人员的考评体系。
The central and local governments in most of countries in the world today are mastered by the political parties and use its ruling position to impact political, economic and social aspects. Parties play an important role in the modern social and political life. Party system in China is different from the competitive party system in western countries; it is the combination of Marxism political party theory with China's actual conditions and it is unique. State-owned enterprises are the backbone of our national economy, the reform and development of state-owned enterprises are related to the country's economic security and the development and perfection of Chinese characteristics socialist system. Currently, with the establishment of modern enterprise system, the development of state-owned enterprises and the political advantage of party organization are faced with great challenges. When establishing modern enterprise system, we must fully consider our country's political, economic, social basic system, and let the party play political role fully is the major features and the unique advantages of state-owned enterprises in our country, it is also a distinctive feature and the essential requirements of modern enterprise system with Chinese characteristics.2009national state-owned enterprise party construction work conference stressed that since the founding of new China, especially since the reform and opening up30years ago, the state-owned enterprise development process shows that the party construction work has always been the unique political resources of state-owned enterprises, is an organic part of enterprise core competitiveness, and the key factor to realize scientific development. It is also an essential feature of establishing a modern enterprise system with Chinese characteristics. Therefore, on the basis of fully using the experience of international corporate governance, the study of party organization's effectiveness in modern corporate governance in the new period has important theoretical value and practical significance in enriching the characteristics of the practice and theoretical of socialism with Chinese characteristics.
Comparing with the typical corporate governance models of foreign countries, the corporate governance structure of China's state-owned companies has a very important characteristic:party organization participated in corporate governance. Especially through the provisions of the Constitution, the Company Law and the Constitution of the Chinese Communist Party, the Communist Party Committees of China in state-owned enterprises are entitled the qualification in the corporate governance. This is the most prominent character in the corporate governance of our country, at the same time, it is also make the relationship between the main frame of the structure of modern corporate governance and the traditional enterprise system more complicated. At the same time, because there are problems such as insider control, lack of external governance mechanism in state-owned enterprise now, provides the realistic foundation for party organization to participate in corporate governance in state-owned enterprises. Facing the increasingly prominent problems of the duty of the board of directors and party committee are not clear, power and role conflict, this paper take the behavior of party committee participate in corporate governance in state-owned listed companies as the research object, separate the body of political intervention into "government" and "political party", extended the research perspectives from the government sector outside to the grass-roots party organizations in the enterprises, research the system background, related theories, participation ways and the influence on business decisions and actions of the party organizations participated in corporate governance in state-owned enterprises, build the theory model of party organization participating in corporate governance effectiveness. By constructing a new index system of the party organization participating in corporate governance, examine the effect of the behavior of the party organization participate in corporate governance to agency problem from the insider control, executive compensation contract and labor redundancy, and how to exert governance effect and value effect finally. According to the results of empirical analysis, the main conclusions of this study are as follows:
1. In the state-owned list companies in our country, the party organizations participate in corporate governance will restrict the managers'behavior, prevent agency cost from insider control problems, reduce executive compensation, and restrain executives grab excessive compensation; reduce the salary gap between executives and ordinary employees. In this paper, the results further support the previous scholars'view, that the power of the party's personnel appointment and removal is the most important balance power to insider control in the state-owned enterprises; the party organization department will restrict the managers. Before the incentive and restraint mechanisms from the internal governance and external market work effectively, the administrative measures will not be replaced by market means, position, career, political and social objectives will still play an important role.
2. The party committee participate in corporate governance will bring extra political burden, redundant employees to the enterprise. With the increase of the level of party committee participating in corporate governance, the number of employees increases, resulting labor redundancy. The result shows that except for the state-owned shareholders and government's political intervention, there is a third type of intervention approaches:through the party organization to intervene the enterprise. The party network covering the entire social units, including state-owned enterprises in our country, and influence the business decision. This paper verifies the impact on employment behavior in state-owned enterprises.
3. The governance effect of party committee is different in varying participation degrees, higher or lower participation degrees are not conductive to raising the level of corporate governance. This is because the agency cost, salary cost and political cost in state-owned enterprises will change with the degree of the party's "two-way access", and has an inverted "U-shaped" relationship with the level of corporate governance, but has a negative impact on corporate value.
This study based on the largest corporate governance characteristics in China's state-owned enterprises, which is party committee participating in corporate governance. The innovation is to break the study of political intervention, examining the effect of party committee participating in corporate governance to corporate actions and results from the perspective of internal party organization. The research results show that in addition to government departments and state-owned shareholders, the grass-roots party organizations are also another main political intervention, through the internal party organization, the enterprises can still be intervened. The research provides a new perspective for political intervention, enriched the research achievements in the field and the Chinese characteristics corporate governance theory.
引文
2 《中共中央关于进一步加强和改进国有企业党的建设工作的通知》,来自人民网http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64162/71380/71382/71383/4844844.html
1 孙振声.推进国企党建改革创新.湖北日报,2010-12-08,来自人民网http://theory.people.com.cn/GB/13430597.html
2 马丽,马国钧.论党的作用是经济增长的内生变量.学术交流,2011(4)：1-7。
3 我国《宪法》第1条规定：“中华人民共和国是工人阶级领导的、以工农联盟为基础的人民民主专政的
社会主义国家,社会主义制度是中华人民共和国的根本制度。禁止任何组织或者个人破坏社会主义制度。”我国《公司法》第19条规定：“在公司中,根据中国共产党章程的规定,设立中国共产党的组织,开展党的活动。公司应当为党组织的活动提供必要条件。”《中国共产党章程》第32条第2款规定：“国有企业和集体企业中党的基层组织,发挥政治核心作用,围绕企业生产经营开展工作；支持股东会、董事会、监事会和经理依法行使职权；参与企业重大问题的决策。”
1 我国国有控股上市公司治理的相关主体都被法律赋予了不同职责。参见《中华人民共和国公司法》第18、19、68、118条。
2 详见《公司法》第19条。
1 李东方,李崇军.党委会参与公司治理的法律分析.经济法论坛,2011：73-84。
1 E.E.Schattschneider. Party Government, New Brunswick and London:Transaction Publishers.2004, pp.4-5.
1 [美]曼瑟奥尔森.《权力与繁荣》.上海：上海人民出版社,2005,第3页。
1 张军.政府转型、政治治理与经济增长：中国的经验[N].社会学视野网,2007-09-05。
2 胡鞍钢.中国的制度优势何在.人民论坛,2011(21)：23-24。
3 张树华.中国道路的政治优势与思想价值,红旗文稿,2011(1)：4-9。
1 何玉长.国有公司产权结构与治理结构.上海：上海财经大学出版社,1997。
2 杨瑞龙.面对制度之规.北京：中国发展出版社,1998。
3 吴敬琏.改进党组织在企业中的工作方式——《国有企业改革与发展》课题报告之五.工厂管理,1999(7)：13-14。
4 李清均.关于存续企业改革的思考.黑龙江省社会主义学院学报,2004(1)：23-25。
1 朱平.论党的主张与国家意志的统一.江西社会科学,2003(7)：132-133。
1 顾建键、韩狄明、王翠萍编著：《新经济组织党的建设工作》,上海人民出版社,2002年版,第216页。
2 见《中国共产党章程》总纲第27自然段及第32条。
3 李荣融：《在中央企业党建工作会议上的讲话》,2006年7月5日,材料来源：国资委网站http://www.sasac.gov.cn.
1 中共中央组织部研究室、中共中央组织部组织局编,《党的组织工作问答(修订本)》,(北京：党建读物出版社,1996年),21页。
1 马丽、马国钧.论党的作用是经济增长的内生变量.学术交流,2011(4)：1-7。
2 在文革时期曾一度出现了“砸烂党委闹革命”，党组织一度被摧毁,但是不久即恢复了党组织对企业的领导,而且走到了极端,实行党组织直接领导一切的“党的一元化领导”。详情参见：张占斌等.新中国企业领导制度.北京：春秋出版社,1988：万福义,朱惠珍.现代企业制度与国有企业党的建设.北京：中共中央党校出版社,1997。
1 如果中国共产党接受这种观点,把它的党组织退出社会基层组织,党的领导就失去了根基。江泽民说：“党的战斗力,党的力量,表现在哪里?我看首先表现在300万个基层党组织的战斗堡垒作用。不然,中央的领导作用从哪里来?你不垮才怪!党的基层组织统统都淡化了,我看总书记就一定会变成“空头司令””。参见：中共中央组织部党建研究所编,《企业党建大事记》,51页。
2 《中国共产党章程部分条文修正案》(中国共产党第十三次全国代表大会1987年11月1日通过),参见：《十三大以后重要文献选编》(上),(北京：人民出版社,1991年),64页。
3在中共十三大上,企业党组织的作用被定位为“保证监督”,1989年江泽民接任中共中央总书记以后,把企业党组织的作用重新定义为“政治核心”,参见：侯少文主编,《企业领导体制改革与党的建设指南》,184-189页。
4 中共中央组织部,《关于在现代企业制度败家试点企业中加强和改进党的工作的意见(试行)》,(1996年4月20日),参见：中共中央组织部党建研究所编,《企业党建大事记》,198页。
1 几乎在所有关于解决这一问题的论文中,都提到了这种方法。《中共中央关于进一步加强和改进国有企业党的建设工作的通知》第五部分也专门论述了“一肩挑和双向进入”。参见：全国加强国有企业领导班子建设协调小组办公室编,《国有企业领导班子考核建设工作指导》,6-7页。
1 任铁缨.论发挥企业党组织在法人治理结构中的作用.党建研究,1998(7)：3 1-34。
1 卢昌崇.公司治理机构及新、老三会关系论.经济研究,1994(11)：10-17。
2 金碚著.何去何从——当代中国的国有企业问题.今日中国出版社,1997：224-225。
3 荣兆梓等著.现代企业法人治理结构.安徽人民出版社,1995,173页。
1 决策表决权不同于决策权,也不同于参与决策权。决策表决权的主体是公司董事,决策权的主体是公司董事会,而参与决策权的主体可以是董事会、党委会、经理。决策表决权的行使是在决策过程中,参与决策一般是在决策之前进行的。参见张忠军：《国有公司治理与坚持党的领导》,载于《中国党政干部论坛》2005年第9期,第7页。
1 吴敬琏.现代公司于企业改革.天津：天津人民出版社,1994年版,第286页。
2 豆建民.中国公司制思想研究.上海：上海财经大学出版社,1999年版,第187页。
1 孙振声.推进国企党建改革创新.湖北日报,2010-12-08。
1 中共中央组织部办公厅关于印发《关于<党政领导干部选拔任用工作条例>若干问题的答复意见(一)》的通知中对第二个问题“中央金融机构和国有重要骨干企业领导人员的选拔任用是否参照执行《干部任用条例》”的回答。http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64162/71380/102565/182144/10994898.html
2 中组部国资委就中央企业领导人员管理暂行规定答问中对第二个问题“《管理规定》和《考评办法》作为中央企业领导人员管理的基本规章,它的指导思想和总体思路是什么”的回答。http://www.gov.cn/jrzg/2009-12/30/content_1500249.htm
1 《中共中央组织部关于在深化国有企业改革中党组织设置和领导关系等有关问题的通知》中对大企业集团设立党的基层委员会的规定。http://www.gmw.cn/01gmrb/1998-08/10/GB/17780%5eGM4-1004.HTM.
[1]Acemoglu D., Johnson S., Robinson J.A..The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development:An Empirical Investigation[J]. American Economic Review,2001,91:1369-1401
[2]Acemoglu D., Robinson J.A..Institutions as the Fundamental Cause of Long-Run Growth[J]. Handbook of Economic Growth,2005,1:385-472
[3]Adam Smith. The Wealth of Nations[M].1776.
[4]Adams H.C..Relation of the State to Industrial Action[J]. Publications of the American Economic Association,1887,1:7-85
[5]Aggarwal R.K., Meschke, F., Wang T. Corporate Political Contribution:Investment or Agency[J]? Working paper, University of Minnesota,2007
[6]Ajay Adhikari, Chek Derashid, Hao Zhang. Public policy, political connections and effective tax rates:longitudinal evidence from Malaysia[J]. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy,2006,25:574-595
[7]Alchian A.A. The basis of some recent advances in the theory of management of the firm[J]. The Journal of Industrial Economics,1965,14(1):30-41
[8]Alesina A., Perotti R. Income Distribution, Political Instability and Investment. European Economic Review,1996,40:1203-1228
[9]Allen F., Qian J. Corruption and Competition[J]. Working paper, University of Pennsylvania and Boston College,2007
[10]Allen F., Qian J., Qian M.J. Law, Fiance, and Economic Growth in China[J]. Journal of Financial Economics,2005,77:57-116
[11]Angrist J., Alan. K...Instrumental Variables and the Search for Identification:From Supply and Demand to Natural Experiments[J]. Journal of Economic Perspectives,2001,15: 69-85
[12]Ang J., Cole R., Lin J..Agency Costs and Ownership Structure[J]. Journal of Finance, 2000,60:81-106
[13]Bai C.E., Lu J.Y., Tao Z.G. Property Rights Protection and Access to Bank Loans: Evidence from Private Enterprises in China[J]. Economics of Transition,2006,14:611-628
[14]Barro R.J. Government spending in a simple model of endogenous growth[J]. Journal of Political Economy,1990,98:103-125
[15]Becker G., Stigler G. Law enforcement, malfeasance and the compensation of enforcers[J]. Journal of Legal Studies,1974,3:1-19
[16]Bertrand M., Kramarz F., Schoar A., et al.Politically Connected CEOs and Political Business Cycle:Evidence from France[J]. Working paper, University of Chicago and MIT,2006
[17]Bertrand M., Mehta P., Mullainathan S. Ferreting out Tunneling:an Application to Indian Business Groups[J]. Quarterly Journal of Economics,2002,118:121-148
[18]Besley T., Burgess R. The Political Economy of Government Responsiveness:Theory and Evidence from India[J]. Quarterly Journal of Economics,2002,117:1415-1451
[19]Bill B.Francis, Iftekhar Hasan, Xian Sun. Political connections and the process of going public:evidence from China[J]. Journal of international money and finance,2009,28:696-719
[20]Blanchard O., Shleifer A. Federalism with and without Political Centralization:China versus Russia[J].NBER Working Paper No.7616,2000,3
[21]Blair, Margaret. Ownership and Control:Rethinking Corporate Governance for the 21 Century[M]. Washington:the Brookings Institution,1995
[22]Bloom N., Floetotto M, Jaimovich N. Really Uncertain Business Cycles[J]. Working Paper, Stanford University,2008
[23]Bodenheimer E. Jurisprudence:the philosophy and method of law[M]. Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press,1962
[24]Boubakri M., J.C.Cosset, W.Saffar. Political Connections of Newly Privatized Firms[J]. Journal of Corporate Finance,2008,14(5):654-673
[25]Boycko M., Shleifer A., Vishny R.W. A Theory of Privatisation[J]. The Economic Journal,1996,106:309-319
[26]Boyreau-Debray G., Wei S.J. Pitfalls of state, dominated financial system, the case of China[J].NBER Working paper,11214,2005
[27]Brockman P., Chung D.Y. Investor Protection and Firm Liquidity[J]. Journal of Finance, 2003,58:921-937
[28]Burgess J.G.H. The economics of regulation and antitrust[J]. New York, Harper Collins College Publishers,1995
[29]Bunkanwanicha Wiwattanakantang. Big business owners in political[J]. Review of Financial Studies,2009,22(6):2122-2168.
[30]Burkart M., Gromb D., Panunzi F. Why Higher Takeover Premia Protect Minority Shareholders[J]. Journal of Political Economy,1998,106:172-204
[31]Byrd J., Hickman K. Do Outside Directors Monitor Managers:Evidence from Tender Offer Bids[J]. Journal of Financial Economics,1992,32:195-221
[32]Campbell D.E. A Matter of Faith:Religion in the 2004 Presidential Election[M]. Washington, DC:Brookings Institution Press,2007
[33]Carvalho D.R. The Real Effects of Government-owned Banks:Evidence from an Emerging Market[J]. SSRN Working Papers,2010
[34]Chaney P.K., Faccio M., Parsley D.C..The Quality of Accounting Information in Politically Connected Firms[J]. Working paper, Vanderbilt University,2007
[35]Chang E.C., Wong S.M.L. Political Control and Performance in China's Listed Firms[J]. Journal of Comparative Economics,2004,32:617-636
[36]Che Jiahua, Qian Yingyi. Insecure property rights and government ownership of firms[J]. Quarterly Journal of Economics,1998,113(2):467-496
[37]Chen C.J.P., Li Z., Su X. Rent Seeking Incentives, Political Connections and Organizational:Empirical Evidence from Listed Family Firms in China[J]. Working paper, The Chinese University of Hong Kong.2005
[38]Cheung Y.L., Jing L., Rau P.R., et al..How does the Grabbing Hand Grab? Tunneling Assets from Chinese Listed Companies to the State[J]. Working Paper, City University of Hong Kong,2006
[39]Cheung Y.L., Jing L., Rau P.R., et al.Tunneling, Propping and Expropriation:Evidence from Connected Party Transactions in Hong Kong[J]. Journal of Financial Economics,2006,82: 343-386
[40]Chiu M.M., Joh S.W. Loans to Distressed Firms:Political Connections, Related lending, Business Group Affiliations, and Bank Governance[J]. Working paper, Chinese University of Hong Kong,2004
[41]Chong A., Lopez-de-Silanes F..Privatization and Labor Force Restructuring around the World[J]. Working paper, The World Bank,2002
[42]Claessens S., Djankov S., Fan J.P.H. Disentangling the Incentive and Entrenchment Effects of Large Shareholdings[J]. Journal of Finance,2002,57:2741-2771
[43]Claessens S., Djankov S., Lang L.H.P. The Separation of Ownership and Control in East Asian Corporations[J]. Journal of Financial Economics,2000,58:81-112
[44]Claessens S., Feijen E., Laeven L. Political Connections and Preferential Access to Finance:The Role of Campaign Contributions[J]. Journal of Financial Economics,2008,88(3): 554-580
[45]Cole, S. Fixing Market Failures or Fixing Elcetions? Agricultural Credit in India[J]. American Economic Journal:Applied Economics,2009,1:219-250.
[46]Cooper M.J., Gulen Huseyin, Ovtchinnikov Alexei V. Corporate political contributions and stock returns[J]. The Journal of Finance,2010,65(2):687-724
[47]Core J.E., Guay W., Larcker D.F. The power of Pen and executive Compensation[J]. Journal of Financial Economics,2008,88(1):1-25
[48]Cull R., Xu L.C. Who Gets Credit? The Behavior of Bureaucrats and State Banks in Allocating Credit to Chinese State-owned Enterprises[J]. Journal of Development Economics, 2003,71:533-559
[49]Cull R., Xu L.C..Institutions, Ownership, and Finance:The Determinants of Profit Reinvestment among Chinese Firms[J]. Journal of Financial Economics,2005,77:117-146
[50]Delong J.B., Shleifer A..Princes and Merchants:City Growth Brfore the Industrial Revolution[J]. Journal of Law and Economics,1993,36:671-702
[51]Demsetz H. Towards a theory of property right[J]. American Economic Review,1967, 57:61-70
[52]Dewenter K.L., Malatesta P.H. State-owned and Privately Owned Firms:An Empirical Analysis of Profitability, Leverage and Labor Intensity[J]. The American Economic Review, 2001,91(1):320-334
[53]Dinc I.S. Politicians and Banks:Political Influences on Government-owned Banks in Emerging Countries[J]. Journal of Financial Economics,2005,77:453-479
[54]Djankov S., Glaeser E., La Porta R., et al. The New Comparative Economics[J]. Journal of Comparative Economics,2003,31:595-619
[55]Djankov S., Murrell P. Enterprise restructuring in transition:a quantitative survey[J]. Journal of economic literature,2002,40:739-792
[56]Durnev A. The Real Effects of Political Uncertainty:Elections and Investment Sensitivity to Stock Prices[J]. Working Paper, London School of Economics and Political Science,2010
[57]Earle J., Estrin S., Leshcenko L. Ownership Structure, Patterns of Control, and Enterprise Behavior in Russia[J]. Enterprise Restructuring and Economic Policy in Russia, The World Bank, Washington DC,1996:205-252
[58]Edward E.G., George S.B., David L.F., et al. Corporate Boards:Keys to Effectiveness[J]. Organizational Dynamics,2002,30(4)
[59]E.E.Schattschneider. Party Government, New Brunswick and London[M]. Transaction Publishers,2004.4-5
[60]Eitan Goldman, Jorg Rocholl, Jongil So. Politically connected boards of directors and the allocation of procurement contracts[J]. Working Paper,2001
[61]Ely R.T..Outlines of Economics[M]. New York, Macmillan,1937
[62]Eugene F. Fama, Michael C. Jensen..Agency Problems and Residual Claims[J]. Journal of Law and Economics,1983,26(2):327-349
[63]Faccio M., Lang H.P. The ultimate ownership of Western European corporations[J]. Journal of Financial Economics,2002,65(3):365-395
[64]Faccio M. Politically Connected Firms[J]. American Economic Review,2006a,96: 369-386
[65]Faccio M. The Characteristics of Politically Connected Firms[J]. Working paper, Mimeo, Vanderbilt University,2006
[66]Faccio M., Masulis R.W., McConnell J.J. Political Connections and Corporate Bailouts[J]. Journal of Finance,2006,61:2596-2635
[67]Faccio M., Parsley D. Sudden Death:Taking Stock of Political Connections[J]. Working paper, Vanderbilt University,2006
[68]Fan J.P.H, Rui M.O., Zhao M. Rent Seeking and Corporate Finance:Evidence from Corruption Cases[J]. Working paper, The Chinese University of Hong Kong,2006
[69]Fan P.H, Wong T.J., Zhang T. Politically Connected CEOs, Corporate Governance, and Post-IPO Performance of China's Newly Partially privatized firms[J]. Journal of financial economics,2007,8(2):330-357
[70]Fan J.P.H, Rui M.O., Zhao M..Public governance and corporate finance:evidence from corruption cases[J]. Journal of Comparative Economics,2008,36(3):343-364
[71]Farrer T.H.. The state in its relation to trade[M]. London, Macmillan,1902
[72]Ferguson Thomas, Voth Hans-Joachim. Betting on Hitler-the value of political connections in Nazi Germany[J]. Quaterly Journal of Economics.2008.123(1):101-137
[73]Firth M., Fung P., Rui O..Corporate Performance and CEO Compensation in China[J]. Journal of Corporate Finance,2006.12(4):693-714
[74]Fisman R. Estimating the Value of Political Connections[J]. American Economic Review.2001,91:1095-1102
[75]Freeman RE, Reed DL. Stockholders and stakeholders:a new perspective on corporate governance[J]. California Management Review,1983,25
[76]Frydman R., Hessel M., Rapaczynski A. Why Ownership Matters? Politicization and Entrepreneurship in the Restructuring of Enterprises in Central Europe[J]. C.V.Starr Center For Applied Economics, NYU, Research Report 14,1998
[77]Getz D. Encyclopedia of hospitality and tourism[J]. Van Nostrand Reinhold. New York, NY,1993:789-810
[78]Glaeser E.L., Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes et al..Do Institution Cause Growth[J], NBER Working Paper 10568, http://www.nber.org/papers/w10568,2004
[79]Goldman E., Rocholl J., So J. Does Political Connectedness Affect Firm Value[J]? Working paper, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill,2006
[80]Groves T., Hong Y., McMillan J.et al..China's Evolving Managerial Labor Market[J]. Journal of Political Economy,1995,103:873-892
[81]Hampel Committee on Corporate Governance.Hampel report on corporate governance(published on 29 January 1998). the European Corporate Governance Institute's (ECGI) website,1998
[82]Hardin G.The tragedy of the commons[J]. Science,1968,162:1243-1248
[83]Heckman James J..Sample Selection Bias as a Specification Error[J]. Econometrica, 1979,47:153-161
[84]Hellman J., Schankerman M. Intervention, Corruption and Capture:The Nexus between Enterprise and the State[J]. Economics of Transition,2000,8(3):545-576
[85]Hung Mingyi, Wong T.J., Zhang Tianyu. Political relations and overseas stock exchange listing:evidence from Chinese state-owned enterprises[J]. SSRN Working Paper,2008
[86]Huntington S.P..Political order in changing societies[M]. New Haven:Yale University Press,1968
[87]Imai, M. Political Determinants of Government Loans in Japan[J]. Journal of Law and Economics,2009,52:41-70
[88]Jayachandran Seema. The Jeffords Effect[J]. Journal of Law and Economics,2006,49(2)
[89]Jensen M..Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance and Takeovers[J]. American Economic Review,1986,76:323-329
[90]Jensen M., Meckling W. Theory of the Firm:Managerial Behavior, Agency Cost and Ownership Structure[J]. Journal of Financial Economics,1976,3(4):305-360
[91]Ji Y. China's Enterprise Reform:Changing State/Society Relations after Mao[M]. Routledge, London,1998
[92]Jin Hebui, Qian Yingyi, Weingast Barry R. Regional decentralization and fiscal incentives:federalism, Chinese style[J]. Journal of public economics,2005,89:1719-1742
[93]Johnson S., La Porta R., Lopez-de-Silanes F., et al..Tunneling[J]. American Economic Review,2000,90:22-27
[94]Johnson S., Mitton T. Cronyism and Capital Controls:Evidence form Malaysia[J]. Journal of Financial Economics,2003,67:351-382
[95]Jones B., Olken B. Do Leaders Matter? National Leadership and Growth Since World War II[J]. Quarterly Journal of Economics,2005,120:835-864
[96]Julio B., Yook Y. Political Uncertainty and Corporate Investment Cycles[J]. Journal of Finance,2012,67(1):45-83
[97]Khwaja A.I., Mian A. Do Lenders Favor Politically Connected Firms? Rent Seeking in an Emerging Financial Market[J]. Quarterly Journal of Economics,2005,120:1371-1411
[98]Klitgaard R. Controlling corruption[M]. Berkeley, CA:University of California Press, 1988
[99]Knight B. Are Policy Platforms Capitalized into Equity Prices? Evidence from the Bush/Gore 2000 Presidential Election[J]. Journal of Public Economics,2007,91:389-409
[100]Kornai J. Economics of shortage[M]. Amsterdam:North Holland,1980
[101]Kornai J., Maskin E., Roland G.Understanding the soft budget constraint[J]. Journal of economic literature,2003,41 (4):1095-1136
[102]Kornai J..The Socialist System:The Political Economy of Communism[M]. Princeton, NJ:Princeton University Press,1992
[103]Laffont J.J., Tirole J. A theory of incentives in procurement and regulation[M]. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.,1993
[104]La Porta R., Lopez-de-Silanes F., Shleifer A., et al. Law and Finance[J]. Journal of Political Economy,1998,106:1113-1155
[105]La Porta R., Lopez-de-Silanes F., Shleifer A..Corporate ownership around the world[J]. Journal of Finance,1999,54:471-518
[106]La Porta R., Lopez-de-Silanes F, Shleifer A..Government ownership of banks[J]. Journal of Finance,2002,57:256-301
[107]La Porta R., Lopez-de-Silanes F., Shleifer A., et al.Agency Problems and Dividend Policies around the World[J]. Journal of Finance,2000,55:1-33
[108]Lee C.W., Xiao X. Cash Dividends in China:Earnings Management, Liquidating, and Tunneling[J]. Working paper, Tulane University, New Orleans,2004
[109]Leff N.H. Economic Development through Bureaucratic Corruption[J]. American Behavioral Scientist,1964,82:337-341
[110]Leone A., Wu J., Zimmerman J. Asymmetric Sensitivity of CEO Cash Compensation to Stock Returns[J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics,2006,42:167-192
[111]Lewellen W.G., Huntsman B. Managerial pay and corporate performance[J]. The American Economic Review,1970,60(4):710-720
[112]Leuz C., Gee F. Political relationships, global financing and corporate transparency: Evidence from Indonesia[J]. Journal of Financial Economics,2006,81:411-439
[113]Li D. Insider Control vs. Government Control:A Study of China's State Enterprise Reform[J]. Manuscript. Department of Economics, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, Hong Kong,2000
[114]Li Hongbin, Meng Lingsheng, Wang Qian, et al..Political Connections, Financing and Firm Performance:Evidence from Chinese Private Firms[J]. Journal of Development Economics, 2008,87:283-299
[115]Li H., Meng L., Zhang J. Why Do Entrepreneurs Enter Politics[J]. Economic Inquiry, 2006,44:559-578
[116]Li H., Zhou L.A. Political Turnover and Economic Performance:The Incentive Role of Personnel Control in China[J]. Journal of Public Economics,2005,89:1743-1762
[117]Lin J.Y., Cai F., Li Z. Competition, Policy Burdens, and State-Owned Enterprise Reform[J]. American Economic Review,1998,88:422-427
[118]Lindbeck A. Swedish economic policy[M]. London:MacMillan Press,1957
[119]Liu T. Institutional Investor Protection and Political Uncertainty:Evidence form Cycles of Investment and Elections[J]. Working Paper, Concordia University,2010
[120]Lu Yi. Political connections and trade expansion:evidence from Chinese private firms[J]. Economics of Transition,2011,19(2):231-254
[121]Lui F.T. An equilibrium queuing model of bribery [J]. Journal of Political Economy, 1985,93(4),760-781
[122]Mankiw N.G..Principles of economics[M]. Fort Worth, Texas, Dryden Pres,1997
[123]Mauro P..Corruption and Growth[J]. Quarterly Journal of Economics,1995,110: 681-712
[124]McGregor R. The Little Red Book of Business in China[J]. Financial Times,2001, 8,July.
[125]McGuire J.W., Chiu S.Y., Elbing A.O. Executive incomes, sales and profits[J]. The American Economic Review,1962,52(4):753-761
[126]McMillan J., Woodruff C. The center role of entrepreneurs in transition economies[J]. Journal of economic perspectives,2002,16:153-170
[127]Megginson W.L., Netter J.M. From State to Market:A Survey of Empirical Studies on Privatization[J]. Journal of Economic Perspectives,2001,39:321-389
[128]Micco A., U. Panizza, M. Yanez. Bank Ownership and Performance:Does Politics Matter[J]? Journal of Banking and Finance,2007,31:219-241.
[129]Michael C. Jensen, William H. Meckling. Theory of the Firm:Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure[J]. Journal of Financial Economics,1976,3(4):305-360
[130]Mill J.S..Principles of political economy with some of their applications to social[M]. London, Longmans, Green and Co., ed.,1848
[131]Murphy K.J..Corporate performance and managerial remuneration:an empirical analysis[J]. University of Rochester, Rochester, NY 14627,1985
[132]Niessen Alexandra, Ruenzi Stefan. Political connectedness and firm performance: evidence from Germany[J]. German Economic Review,2010,11(4):441-464
[133]North D..Structure and Change in Economic History[M]. New York:Norton Co.,1981
[134]North D. Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance[M]. Cambridge University Press,1990
[135]North D., Thomas R. The Rise of the Western World:A New Economics History[M]. Cambridge University Press,1973
[136]Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development:OECD. OECD Principles of Corporate Governance[M].1999, June.
[137]Pindyck R., Solimano A. Economic Instability and Aggregate Investment [J]. NBER Macroeconomics Annual,1993,8:259-303
[138]Qian Yingyi. Reforming Corporate Governance and Finance in China[J]. Corporate Governance in Transitional Economies, World Bank, Washington DC,1995
[139]Qian Yingyi.Enterprise Reform in China:Agency Problems and Political Control[J]. Economic of Transition,1996,4
[140]Qian Yingyi. Government Control in Corporate Governance as A Transitional Institute: Lesson from China[J]. Working Paper, University of Maryland,2000
[141]Qian Y., Xu C.The M-form Hierarchy and China's Economic Reform[J]. European Economic Review,1993,1(2):541-548
[142]Qian Y., Roland G..Federalism and the Soft Budget Constraint[J]. American Economic Review,1998,88:1143-1162
[143]Rajan R., Zingales L. Which capitalism? Lessons from the East Asian crisis[J]. Journal of Applied Corporate Finance,1998,11:40-48
[144]Rauch J., Evans P. Bureaucratic Structure and Bureaucratic Performance in Less Developed Countries[J]. Journal of Public Economics,2000,75:49-71
[145]Rothschild M., Stiglitz J.E. Equilibrium in competitive insurance markets:an essay on the economics of information[J]. Quarterly journal of economics,1976,90:630-649
[146]Sachs J.D., Warner A.M. Economic reform and the process of global integration[J]. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity,1995,1:1-118
[147]Sapienza Paola. The effects of government ownership on bank lending[J], Journal of Financial Economics,2004,72(2):357-384
[148]Shanghai Stock Exchange.The Corporate Governance of China's Listed Firms[J]. Shanghai Stock Exchange, Shanghai,2000,
[149]Shleifer Andrei, Robert W.Vishny.Politicians and Firms [J]. Quarterly Journal of Economics,1994,109
[150]Shleifer A., Vishny R., Survey of Corporate Governance[J]. Journal of Finance,1997, 52:737-783
[151]Shleifer A., Vishny R. Corruption[J]. Quarterly Journal of Economics.1993,108: 599-617
[152]Shleifer A., Vishny R. The Grabbing Hand:Government Pathologies and their Cures[M]. Harvard University Press, Cambridge,1998
[153]Shleifer A., Vishny R. How does privatization work? Evidence from Russian shops[J]. Journal of Political Economy,1996,104:764-790
[154]Sonja O., Wong S.M.L., Hu Ruyin. Party Power, Market and Private Power:Chinese Communist Patry Persistence in China's Lusted Companies[J]. The Future of Market Transition, 2002,19:105-138
[155]Sun Q., Tong W.H.S. China Share Issue Privatization:The Extent of Its Success[J]. Journal of Financial Economics,2003,70:183-222
[156]Svensson J..Eight Questions about Corruption[J]. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2005,19:19-42
[157]Tao Y. F. Rationalization of Political Business Cycle in China[J]. The International Conference on the Rise of China Revisited:Perception and Reality, Institute of International Relations, National Chengchi University,2003
[158]Tao Y. F. Rationalization of Political Business Cycle in China[J]. Working Paper,2004
[159]Tella R.D., Weinschelbaum F..Choosing Agents and Monitoring Consumption:A Note on Wealth as a Corruption-Controlling Device[J]. NBER Working papers, Harvard Business School,2007
[160]Tenev S., Zhang Chunlin. Corporate Governance and Enterprise Reform in China: Building the Institution of Modern Market[J]. World Bank and the International Finance Corporation, Washington, DC.,2002
[161]Treisman D..The Causes of Corruption:A Cross-National Study[J]. Journal of Public Economics,2000,76:399-457
[162]Vining A.R., Boardman A. Ownership versus competition:efficiency in public enterprise[J]. Public Choice,1992,73:205-239
[163]Wong S.M.L., Sonja O., Hu Ruyin. Shareholding Structure, Depoliticization and Enterprise Performance:Evidence from China's Listed Firms[J]. Economics of Transition,2004, 12(1):29-66
[164]World Bank. China's Management of Enterprise Assets:The State as Shareholder[J]. World Bank, Washington, DC.,1997
[165]Xu Chenggang. The Fundamental Institutions of China's Reforms and Development[J]. Journal of Economic Literature,2011,49:1076-1151
[166]Xu L.C., Zhu T., Lin Y..Political Control, Agency Problems and Ownership Reform: Evidence from China[J]. Working paper No.233, Center for Economic Development, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, Hong Kong,2002
[167]Yonce Adam. Uncertain growth cycles, corporate investment and dynamic hedging[J].UC Berkeley:Business Administration, Ph.D. Program,2010, Retrieved from: http://escholarship.org/uc/item/38p0r10v
[168]Yermack, D. Remuneration, Retention and Reputation Incentives for Outside Directors[J]. Journal of Finance,2004,59(5):2281-2308
[169]白重恩,刘俏,陆洲等.中国上市公司治理结构的实证研究[J].经济研究,2005(2)：81-91
[170]白云霞,吴联生.信息披露与国有股权私有化中的盈余管理[J].会计研究,2008(10)：37-45
[171]陈冬华.地方政府、公司治理与补贴收入——来自我国证券市场的经验证据[J].财经研究,2003(9)：15-21
[172]陈冬华,陈信元,万华林.国有企业中的薪酬管制与在职消费[J].经济研究,2005(2)：92-101
[173]陈爽英,井润田,龙小宁等.民营企业家社会关系资本对研发投资决策影响的实证研究[J].管理世界,2010(1)：88-97
[174]陈湘永,张剑文,张伟文.我国上市公司“内部人控制”研究[J].管理世界,2000(4)：103-109
[175]陈信元,黄俊.政府干预、多元化经营与公司业绩[J].管理世界,2007(1)：92-97
[176]陈钊,陆铭.中国所有制结果调整的理论和实证分析[M].太原：山西经济出版社,2003
[177]程仲鸣,夏新平,余明桂.政府干预、金字塔结构与地方国有上市公司投资[J].管理世界,2008(9)：37-47
[178]崔之元.美国二十九个州公司法变革的理论背景[J].经济研究,1996(4)：35-40
[179]代彬,刘星,郝颖.高管权力、薪酬契约与国企改革——来自国有上市公司的实证研究[J].当代经济科学,2011,33(4)：90-98
[180]董学群.浅析党委在国有企业公司治理结构中的作用[J].煤炭经济研究,2009(7)：56-57
[181]豆建民.中国公司制思想研究[M].上海财经大学出版社,1999
[182]杜兴强.“内部人控制”及其防范——会计人员委派制的作用[J].经济评论,2000(3)：116-118
[183]杜兴强,王丽华.高层管理当局薪酬与上市公司业绩的相关性实证研究[J].会计研究,2007(1)：58-65
[184]杜兴强,曾泉,杜颖杰.政治联系、过度投资与公司价值——基于国有上市公司的经验证据[J].金融研究,2011(8)：93-110
[185]方军雄.政府干预、所有权性质与企业并购[J].管理世界,2008(9)：118-123
[186]方军雄.我国上市公司高管的薪酬存在粘性吗[J]?经济研究,2009(3)：110-124
[187]费方域.控制内部人控制——国企改革中的治理机制研究[J].经济研究,1996(6)：31-39
[188]郭熙保,罗知.贸易自由化、经济增长与减轻贫困——基于中国省际数据的经验研究[J].管理世界,2008(2)：15-24
[189]郭正模,李晓梅.工资收入差距与政府宏观调控[J].社会科学研究,2006(3)：39-42
[190]韩旭.国有企业中党的政治优势问题思考[J].理论与改革,1999(5)：63-66
[191]黄枫,甘犁.过度需求还是有效需求?城镇老人健康与医疗保险的实证分析[J].经济研究,2010(6)：105-119
[192]黄俊,陈信元.集团化经营与企业研发投资——基于知识溢出与内部资本市场视角的分析[J].经济研究,2011(6)：80-92
[193]黄兴孪,沈维涛.政府干预、内部人控制与上市公司并购绩效[J].经济管理,2009(6)：70-76
[194]胡永平,张宗益.高管的政治关联与公司绩效：基于国有电力生产上市公司的经验[J].中国软科学,2009(6)：128-137
[195]贾明,张喆.高管的政治关联影响公司慈善行为吗[J]?管理世界,2010(4)：99-113
[196]蒋铁柱,沈桂龙.企业党建与公司治理的融合[J].社会科学,2006(1)：144-153
[197]蒋铁柱.论企业党建与公司治理和谐发展的制度创新[J].社会科学,2007(7)：31-39
[198]雷光勇,李帆,金鑫.股权分置改革、经理薪酬与会计业绩敏感度[J].中国会计评论,2010(1)：17-30
[199]李稻葵.政府控制转型过程中的国有企业所引起的成本和收益：来自中国的证据.工作论文[J],密歇根大学,1999
[200]李世辉,雷新途.两类代理成本、债务治理及其可观测绩效的研究——来自我国中小上市公司的经验证据[J].会计研究,2008(5)：30-37
[201]李维安.国有企业经济型治理机制的构建[M].21世纪的天津科技与经济,天津市科学技术协会编,1999
[202]李维安.国际经验与企业实践——制定适合国情的中国公司治理原则[J].南开管理评论,2001(1)：4-8
[203]李维安,唐跃军.上市公司利益相关者治理机制、治理指数与企业业绩[J].管理世界,2005,Vol(9)：127-136
[204]李毅中.增强新形势下国有企业党建工作的活力和实效[J].党建,2004(10)：6-7
[205]李增泉.激励机制与企业绩效——一项基于上市公司的实证研究[J].会计研究,2000(1)：24-30
[206]李增泉,孙铮,王志伟.掏空与所有权安排——来自我国上市公司大股东资金占用的经验证据[J].会计研究,2004(12)：3-14
[207]李增泉,余谦,王小坤.掏空、支持与并购重组——来自我国上市公司的经验证据[J].经济研究,2005(1)：95-105
[208]梁建,陈爽英,盖庆恩.民营企业的政治参与、治理结构与慈善捐赠[J].管理世界,2010(7)：109-118
[209]林毅夫,蔡昉,李周.充分信息与国有企业改革M].上海：上海三联出版社,1997
[210]林毅夫,李志赞.政策性负担、道德风险与预算软约束[J].经济研究,2004(2)：17-27
[211]林毅夫,李志赞.中国的国有企业与金融体制改革[J].经济学(季刊),2005(3)：913-936
[212]林毅夫,刘明兴,章奇.政策性负担与企业的预算软约束：来自中国的实证研究[J].管理世界,2004(8)：81-127
[213]刘瑞明,白永秀.晋升激励、宏观调控与经济周期：一个政治经济学框架[J].南开经济研究,2007(5)：19-31
[214]刘小玄.中国企业发展报告：1990～2000[M].北京：社会科学文献出版社,2001
[215]刘玉敏.我国上市公司董事会效率与公司绩效的实证研究[J].南开管理评论,2009(1)：84-90
[216]刘振华.目前影响国有企业党建工作的几个因素及对策[J].理论探讨,1997(4)：92-96
[217]卢昌崇.公司治理机构及新老三会关系论[J].经济研究,1994(11)：10-17
[218]陆磊,李世宏.中央—地方—国有银行—公众博弈：国有独资商业银行改革的基本逻辑[J].经济研究,2004(10)：45-55
[219]罗党论,黄琼宇.民营企业的政治关系与企业价值[J].管理科学,2008(6)：21-28
[220]马丽、马国钧.论党的作用是经济增长的内生变量[J].学术交流,2011(4)：1-7
[221]马连福,曹春方.制度环境、地方政府干预、公司治理与IPO募集资金投向变更[J].管理世界,2011(5)：127-148
[222]南开大学中国公司治理原则研究课题组(课题主持人李维安).中国公司治理原则(草案)及其解说[J].南开管理评论,2001(1)：9-24
[223]潘红波,夏新平,余明桂.政府干预、政治关联与地方国有企业并购[J].经济研究,2008(4)：41-52
[224]钱先航,曹廷求,李维安.晋升压力、官员任期与城市商业银行的贷款行为[J].经济研究,2011(12)：72-85
[225]钱颖一.企业治理结构改革和融资结构改革[J].经济研究,1995(1)：20-29
[226]青木昌彦.对内部人控制的控制：转轨经济中公司治理的若干问题[J].改革,1994(6)：11-24
[227]沈永建,张天琴.政府干预、冗余雇员与高管薪酬业绩敏感性——基于中国国有上市公司的实证研究[C].中国会计学会2011学术年会论文集,2011
[228]苏启林.基于代理理论与管家理论视角的家族企业经理人行为选择[J].外国经济与管理,2007(2)：51-56
[229]孙铮,刘凤委,李增泉.市场化程度、政府干预与企业债务期限结构——来自我国上市公司的经验证据[J].经济研究,2005(5)：52-63
[230]谭劲松,郑国坚,彭松.地方政府公共治理与国有控股上市公司控制权转移——1996-2004年深圳市属上市公司重组案例研究[J].管理世界,2009(10)：135-151
[231]谭劲松,郑国坚.产权安排、政企关系、治理机制与企业效率——以“科龙”和“美的”为例[J].管理世界,2004(2)：104-116
[232]田利辉.国有产权、预算软约束和中国上市公司杠杆治理[J].管理世界,2005(7)：123-128
[233]田志龙,贺远琼.公司政治行为：西方相关研究的综述与评价[J].中国软科学,2003(2)：68-73
[234]王克敏,王志超.高管控制权、报酬与盈余管理——基于中国上市公司的实证研究[J].管理世界,2007(7)：111-119
[235]王鹏.投资者保护、代理成本与公司绩效[J].经济研究,2008(2)：68-82
[236]王文剑,仉建涛,覃成林.财政分权、地方政府竞争与FDI的增长效应[J].管理世界,2007(3)：13-22
[237]王贤斌,徐现祥.地方官员来源、去向、任期与经济增长——来自中国省长省委书记的证据[J].管理世界,2008(3)：16-26
[238]王贤斌,徐现祥,李郇.地方官员更替与经济增长[J].经济学(季刊),20098(3)：1301-1328
[239]王贤斌,徐现祥,周靖祥.晋升激励与投资周期——来自中国省级官员的证据[J].中国工业经济,2010,22(12)：16-26
[240]魏刚.高级管理层激励与上市公司经营绩效[J].经济研究,2000(3)：32-39
[241]卫武,田志龙,刘晶.我国企业经营活动中的政治关联性研究[J].中国工业经济,2004(4)：67-75
[242]Wooldridge Jeffrey M.计量经济学导论.第3版M].北京：中国人民大学出版社,2002
[243]吴敬琏.现代公司与企业改革[M].天津：天津人民出版社,1994
[244]吴联生,林景艺,王亚平.薪酬外部公平性、股权性质与公司业绩[J].管理世界,2010(3)：117-126
[245]吴文峰,吴冲锋,芮萌.中国上市公司高管的政府背景与税收优惠[J].管理世界,2009(3)：134-142
[246]吴有昌.国有企业内部人控制问题的成因及对策[J].改革,1995(4)：73-78
[247]夏立军,方轶强.政府控制、治理环境与公司价值——来自中国证券市场的经验证据[J].经济研究,2005(5)：40-51
[248]辛清泉,林斌,王彦超.政府控制、经理薪酬与资本投资[J].经济研究,2007(8)：110-122
[249]辛清泉,谭伟强.市场化改革、企业业绩与国有企业经理薪酬[J].经济研究,2009(11)：68-81
[250]辛清泉,郑国坚,杨德明.企业集团、政府控制与投资效率[J].金融研究,2007(10)：123-142
[251]修宗峰,杜兴强.幸福感、社会资本与代理成本[J].中国工业经济,2011(7)：107-117
[252]徐清海,李兰芝.中国经济的政治周期[J].三峡大学学报,2006(11)：92-94
[253]徐现祥,王贤斌,舒元.地方官员与经济增长——来自中国省长、省委书记交流的证据[J].经济研究,2007,42(9)：18-31
[254]徐业坤,钱先航,李维安.政治不确定性、政治关联与民营企业投资——来自市委书记更替的证据[J].管理世界,2013(5)：116-130
[255]薛云奎,白云霞.国家所有权、冗余雇员与公司业绩[J].管理世界,2008(10)：96-105
[256]徐二明,张晗.中国上市公司国有股权对技术创新方式的影响[J].经济管理,2008(15)：42-46
[257]徐晓东,陈小悦.第一大股东对公司治理、企业业绩的影响分析[J].经济研究,2003(2)：64---74
[258]杨记军,逯东,杨丹.国有企业的政府控制权转让研究[J].经济研究,2010(2)：69-82
[259]杨瑞龙,王元,聂辉华.“准官员”的晋升机制：来自中国央企的证据[J].管理世界,2013(1)：103-115
[260]杨瑞龙,杨其静.对“资本雇佣劳动”命题的反思[J].经济科学,2000(6)：91-100
[261]杨瑞龙,杨其静.专用性、专有性与企业制度[J].经济研究,2001(3)：3-11
[262]杨瑞龙,周业安.相机治理与国有企业监控[J].中国社会科学,1998(3)：4-17
[263]杨瑞龙,周业安.一个关于企业所有权安排的规范性分析框架及其理论含义[J].经济研究,1997(1)：12-22
[264]尹振东.垂直管理与属地管理：行政管理体制的选择[J].经济研究,2011(4)：41-54
[265]游家兴,徐盼盼,陈淑敏.政治关联、职位壕沟与高管变更——来自中国财务困境上市公司的经验证据[J].金融研究,2010(4)：128-143
[266]余明桂,夏新平.控股股东、代理问题与关联交易：对中国上市公司的实证研究[J].南开管理评论,2004(6)：33-38
[267]余明桂,潘红波.政治关系、制度环境与民营企业银行贷款[J].管理世界,2008(8)：9-21
[268]余明桂,回雅甫,潘红波.政治联系、寻租与地方政府财政补贴有效性[J].经济研究,2010(3)：65-77
[269]曾庆生.超额雇员、权益代理成本与公司价值[J].上海立信会计学院学报,2007(1)：41-47
[270]曾庆生,陈信元.国家控股、超额雇员与劳动力成本[J].经济研究,2006(5)：74-86
[271]张宝柱,黄辉.考虑政府干预的企业R&D行为研究[J].财经论坛,2009(3)：9-14
[272]张车伟.失业率定义的国际比较及中国城镇失业率[J].世界经济,2003(5)：47-54
[273]张春霖.从融资角度分析国有企业的治理机构改革[J].改革,1995(3)：34-46
[274]张洪辉,王宗军.政府干预、政府目标与国有上市公司的过度投资[J].南开管理评论,2010(3)：101-108
[275]张军,高远.官员任期、异地交流与经济增长——来自省级经验的证据[J].经济研究,2007,42(11)：91-103
[276]张俊瑞,赵进文,张建.高级管理层激励与上市公司经营绩效相关性的实证分析[J].会计研究,2003(9)：29-34
[277]张敏,张胜,申慧慧等.政治关联与信贷资源配置效率——来自我国民营上市公司的经验证据[J].管理世界,2010(11)：143-153
[278]张曙光.中国转轨中的制度结构与变迁[J].北京：经济科学出版社,2005
[279]张维迎.从现代企业理论看中国国有企业的改革[J].改革与战略,1994(6)：17-19
[280]张维迎.从现代企业理论看国有企业改革[J].改革,1995(1)：30-33
[281]张维迎,马捷.恶性竞争的产权基础[J].经济研究,1999(6)：11-20
[282]张维迎.产权安排与企业内部的权力斗争[J].经济研究,2000(6)：41-50
[283]张新.并购重组是否创造价值?中国证券市场的理论与实证研究[J].经济研究,2003(6)：20-29
[284]张一驰.试论国有企业改革中的内部人控制与公司治理结构[J].经济科学,1996(6)：23-30
[285]郑志刚.经理人超额薪酬和公司治理——一个文献综述[J].金融评论,2012(1)：103-112
[286]中共上海市委组织部.“双向进入、交叉任职”是一种有效机制[J].党建研究,1999(9)：15-17
[287]钟海燕,冉茂盛,文守逊.政府干预、内部人控制与公司投资[J].管理世界,2010(7)：98-108
[288]周黎安.晋升博弈中政府官员的激励与合作——兼论我国地方保护主义和重复建设问题长期存在的原因[J].经济研究,2004(6)：33-40
[289]周黎安.中国地方官员的晋升锦标赛模式研究[J].经济研究,2007(7)：36-50
[290]周黎安.转型中的地方政府：官员激励与治理[M].上海：上海人民出版社,2008
[291]周黎安,李宏彬,陈烨.对绩效考核：中国地方官员晋升机制的一项经验研究[J].经济学报,2005(1)：83-96
[291]周其仁.市场里的企业：一个人力资本与非人力资本的特别合约[J].经济研究,1996(6)：71-80
[293]周雪光.“逆向软预算约束”：一个政府行为的组织分析[J].中国社会科学,2005(2)：132-143
[294]周业安.县乡级财政支出管理体制改革的理论与对策[J].管理世界,2000(5)：122-132
[295]周业安,冯兴元,赵坚毅.地方政府竞争与市场秩序的重构[J].中国社会科学,2004(1)：56-65
1 孙振声.推进国企党建改革创新.湖北日报,2010-12-08,来自人民网http://theory.people.com.cn/GB/13430597.html
2 马丽,马国钧.论党的作用是经济增长的内生变量.学术交流,2011(4)：1-7。
3 我国《宪法》第1条规定：“中华人民共和国是工人阶级领导的、以工农联盟为基础的人民民主专政的
社会主义国家,社会主义制度是中华人民共和国的根本制度。禁止任何组织或者个人破坏社会主义制度。”我国《公司法》第19条规定：“在公司中,根据中国共产党章程的规定,设立中国共产党的组织,开展党的活动。公司应当为党组织的活动提供必要条件。”《中国共产党章程》第32条第2款规定：“国有企业和集体企业中党的基层组织,发挥政治核心作用,围绕企业生产经营开展工作；支持股东会、董事会、监事会和经理依法行使职权；参与企业重大问题的决策。”
1 我国国有控股上市公司治理的相关主体都被法律赋予了不同职责。参见《中华人民共和国公司法》第18、19、68、118条。
2 详见《公司法》第19条。
1 李东方,李崇军.党委会参与公司治理的法律分析.经济法论坛,2011：73-84。
1 E.E.Schattschneider. Party Government, New Brunswick and London:Transaction Publishers.2004, pp.4-5.
1 [美]曼瑟奥尔森.《权力与繁荣》.上海：上海人民出版社,2005,第3页。
1 张军.政府转型、政治治理与经济增长：中国的经验[N].社会学视野网,2007-09-05。
2 胡鞍钢.中国的制度优势何在.人民论坛,2011(21)：23-24。
3 张树华.中国道路的政治优势与思想价值,红旗文稿,2011(1)：4-9。
1 何玉长.国有公司产权结构与治理结构.上海：上海财经大学出版社,1997。
2 杨瑞龙.面对制度之规.北京：中国发展出版社,1998。
3 吴敬琏.改进党组织在企业中的工作方式——《国有企业改革与发展》课题报告之五.工厂管理,1999(7)：13-14。
4 李清均.关于存续企业改革的思考.黑龙江省社会主义学院学报,2004(1)：23-25。
1 朱平.论党的主张与国家意志的统一.江西社会科学,2003(7)：132-133。
1 顾建键、韩狄明、王翠萍编著：《新经济组织党的建设工作》,上海人民出版社,2002年版,第216页。
2 见《中国共产党章程》总纲第27自然段及第32条。
3 李荣融：《在中央企业党建工作会议上的讲话》,2006年7月5日,材料来源：国资委网站http://www.sasac.gov.cn.
1 中共中央组织部研究室、中共中央组织部组织局编,《党的组织工作问答(修订本)》,(北京：党建读物出版社,1996年),21页。
1 马丽、马国钧.论党的作用是经济增长的内生变量.学术交流,2011(4)：1-7。
2 在文革时期曾一度出现了“砸烂党委闹革命”，党组织一度被摧毁,但是不久即恢复了党组织对企业的领导,而且走到了极端,实行党组织直接领导一切的“党的一元化领导”。详情参见：张占斌等.新中国企业领导制度.北京：春秋出版社,1988：万福义,朱惠珍.现代企业制度与国有企业党的建设.北京：中共中央党校出版社,1997。
1 如果中国共产党接受这种观点,把它的党组织退出社会基层组织,党的领导就失去了根基。江泽民说：“党的战斗力,党的力量,表现在哪里?我看首先表现在300万个基层党组织的战斗堡垒作用。不然,中央的领导作用从哪里来?你不垮才怪!党的基层组织统统都淡化了,我看总书记就一定会变成“空头司令””。参见：中共中央组织部党建研究所编,《企业党建大事记》,51页。
2 《中国共产党章程部分条文修正案》(中国共产党第十三次全国代表大会1987年11月1日通过),参见：《十三大以后重要文献选编》(上),(北京：人民出版社,1991年),64页。
3在中共十三大上,企业党组织的作用被定位为“保证监督”,1989年江泽民接任中共中央总书记以后,把企业党组织的作用重新定义为“政治核心”,参见：侯少文主编,《企业领导体制改革与党的建设指南》,184-189页。
4 中共中央组织部,《关于在现代企业制度败家试点企业中加强和改进党的工作的意见(试行)》,(1996年4月20日),参见：中共中央组织部党建研究所编,《企业党建大事记》,198页。
1 几乎在所有关于解决这一问题的论文中,都提到了这种方法。《中共中央关于进一步加强和改进国有企业党的建设工作的通知》第五部分也专门论述了“一肩挑和双向进入”。参见：全国加强国有企业领导班子建设协调小组办公室编,《国有企业领导班子考核建设工作指导》,6-7页。
1 任铁缨.论发挥企业党组织在法人治理结构中的作用.党建研究,1998(7)：3 1-34。
1 卢昌崇.公司治理机构及新、老三会关系论.经济研究,1994(11)：10-17。
2 金碚著.何去何从——当代中国的国有企业问题.今日中国出版社,1997：224-225。
3 荣兆梓等著.现代企业法人治理结构.安徽人民出版社,1995,173页。
1 决策表决权不同于决策权,也不同于参与决策权。决策表决权的主体是公司董事,决策权的主体是公司董事会,而参与决策权的主体可以是董事会、党委会、经理。决策表决权的行使是在决策过程中,参与决策一般是在决策之前进行的。参见张忠军：《国有公司治理与坚持党的领导》,载于《中国党政干部论坛》2005年第9期,第7页。
1 吴敬琏.现代公司于企业改革.天津：天津人民出版社,1994年版,第286页。
2 豆建民.中国公司制思想研究.上海：上海财经大学出版社,1999年版,第187页。
1 孙振声.推进国企党建改革创新.湖北日报,2010-12-08。
1 中共中央组织部办公厅关于印发《关于<党政领导干部选拔任用工作条例>若干问题的答复意见(一)》的通知中对第二个问题“中央金融机构和国有重要骨干企业领导人员的选拔任用是否参照执行《干部任用条例》”的回答。http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64162/71380/102565/182144/10994898.html
2 中组部国资委就中央企业领导人员管理暂行规定答问中对第二个问题“《管理规定》和《考评办法》作为中央企业领导人员管理的基本规章,它的指导思想和总体思路是什么”的回答。http://www.gov.cn/jrzg/2009-12/30/content_1500249.htm
1 《中共中央组织部关于在深化国有企业改革中党组织设置和领导关系等有关问题的通知》中对大企业集团设立党的基层委员会的规定。http://www.gmw.cn/01gmrb/1998-08/10/GB/17780%5eGM4-1004.HTM.
[1]Acemoglu D., Johnson S., Robinson J.A..The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development:An Empirical Investigation[J]. American Economic Review,2001,91:1369-1401
[2]Acemoglu D., Robinson J.A..Institutions as the Fundamental Cause of Long-Run Growth[J]. Handbook of Economic Growth,2005,1:385-472
[3]Adam Smith. The Wealth of Nations[M].1776.
[4]Adams H.C..Relation of the State to Industrial Action[J]. Publications of the American Economic Association,1887,1:7-85
[5]Aggarwal R.K., Meschke, F., Wang T. Corporate Political Contribution:Investment or Agency[J]? Working paper, University of Minnesota,2007
[6]Ajay Adhikari, Chek Derashid, Hao Zhang. Public policy, political connections and effective tax rates:longitudinal evidence from Malaysia[J]. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy,2006,25:574-595
[7]Alchian A.A. The basis of some recent advances in the theory of management of the firm[J]. The Journal of Industrial Economics,1965,14(1):30-41
[8]Alesina A., Perotti R. Income Distribution, Political Instability and Investment. European Economic Review,1996,40:1203-1228
[9]Allen F., Qian J. Corruption and Competition[J]. Working paper, University of Pennsylvania and Boston College,2007
[10]Allen F., Qian J., Qian M.J. Law, Fiance, and Economic Growth in China[J]. Journal of Financial Economics,2005,77:57-116
[11]Angrist J., Alan. K...Instrumental Variables and the Search for Identification:From Supply and Demand to Natural Experiments[J]. Journal of Economic Perspectives,2001,15: 69-85
[12]Ang J., Cole R., Lin J..Agency Costs and Ownership Structure[J]. Journal of Finance, 2000,60:81-106
[13]Bai C.E., Lu J.Y., Tao Z.G. Property Rights Protection and Access to Bank Loans: Evidence from Private Enterprises in China[J]. Economics of Transition,2006,14:611-628
[14]Barro R.J. Government spending in a simple model of endogenous growth[J]. Journal of Political Economy,1990,98:103-125
[15]Becker G., Stigler G. Law enforcement, malfeasance and the compensation of enforcers[J]. Journal of Legal Studies,1974,3:1-19
[16]Bertrand M., Kramarz F., Schoar A., et al.Politically Connected CEOs and Political Business Cycle:Evidence from France[J]. Working paper, University of Chicago and MIT,2006
[17]Bertrand M., Mehta P., Mullainathan S. Ferreting out Tunneling:an Application to Indian Business Groups[J]. Quarterly Journal of Economics,2002,118:121-148
[18]Besley T., Burgess R. The Political Economy of Government Responsiveness:Theory and Evidence from India[J]. Quarterly Journal of Economics,2002,117:1415-1451
[19]Bill B.Francis, Iftekhar Hasan, Xian Sun. Political connections and the process of going public:evidence from China[J]. Journal of international money and finance,2009,28:696-719
[20]Blanchard O., Shleifer A. Federalism with and without Political Centralization:China versus Russia[J].NBER Working Paper No.7616,2000,3
[21]Blair, Margaret. Ownership and Control:Rethinking Corporate Governance for the 21 Century[M]. Washington:the Brookings Institution,1995
[22]Bloom N., Floetotto M, Jaimovich N. Really Uncertain Business Cycles[J]. Working Paper, Stanford University,2008
[23]Bodenheimer E. Jurisprudence:the philosophy and method of law[M]. Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press,1962
[24]Boubakri M., J.C.Cosset, W.Saffar. Political Connections of Newly Privatized Firms[J]. Journal of Corporate Finance,2008,14(5):654-673
[25]Boycko M., Shleifer A., Vishny R.W. A Theory of Privatisation[J]. The Economic Journal,1996,106:309-319
[26]Boyreau-Debray G., Wei S.J. Pitfalls of state, dominated financial system, the case of China[J].NBER Working paper,11214,2005
[27]Brockman P., Chung D.Y. Investor Protection and Firm Liquidity[J]. Journal of Finance, 2003,58:921-937
[28]Burgess J.G.H. The economics of regulation and antitrust[J]. New York, Harper Collins College Publishers,1995
[29]Bunkanwanicha Wiwattanakantang. Big business owners in political[J]. Review of Financial Studies,2009,22(6):2122-2168.
[30]Burkart M., Gromb D., Panunzi F. Why Higher Takeover Premia Protect Minority Shareholders[J]. Journal of Political Economy,1998,106:172-204
[31]Byrd J., Hickman K. Do Outside Directors Monitor Managers:Evidence from Tender Offer Bids[J]. Journal of Financial Economics,1992,32:195-221
[32]Campbell D.E. A Matter of Faith:Religion in the 2004 Presidential Election[M]. Washington, DC:Brookings Institution Press,2007
[33]Carvalho D.R. The Real Effects of Government-owned Banks:Evidence from an Emerging Market[J]. SSRN Working Papers,2010
[34]Chaney P.K., Faccio M., Parsley D.C..The Quality of Accounting Information in Politically Connected Firms[J]. Working paper, Vanderbilt University,2007
[35]Chang E.C., Wong S.M.L. Political Control and Performance in China's Listed Firms[J]. Journal of Comparative Economics,2004,32:617-636
[36]Che Jiahua, Qian Yingyi. Insecure property rights and government ownership of firms[J]. Quarterly Journal of Economics,1998,113(2):467-496
[37]Chen C.J.P., Li Z., Su X. Rent Seeking Incentives, Political Connections and Organizational:Empirical Evidence from Listed Family Firms in China[J]. Working paper, The Chinese University of Hong Kong.2005
[38]Cheung Y.L., Jing L., Rau P.R., et al..How does the Grabbing Hand Grab? Tunneling Assets from Chinese Listed Companies to the State[J]. Working Paper, City University of Hong Kong,2006
[39]Cheung Y.L., Jing L., Rau P.R., et al.Tunneling, Propping and Expropriation:Evidence from Connected Party Transactions in Hong Kong[J]. Journal of Financial Economics,2006,82: 343-386
[40]Chiu M.M., Joh S.W. Loans to Distressed Firms:Political Connections, Related lending, Business Group Affiliations, and Bank Governance[J]. Working paper, Chinese University of Hong Kong,2004
[41]Chong A., Lopez-de-Silanes F..Privatization and Labor Force Restructuring around the World[J]. Working paper, The World Bank,2002
[42]Claessens S., Djankov S., Fan J.P.H. Disentangling the Incentive and Entrenchment Effects of Large Shareholdings[J]. Journal of Finance,2002,57:2741-2771
[43]Claessens S., Djankov S., Lang L.H.P. The Separation of Ownership and Control in East Asian Corporations[J]. Journal of Financial Economics,2000,58:81-112
[44]Claessens S., Feijen E., Laeven L. Political Connections and Preferential Access to Finance:The Role of Campaign Contributions[J]. Journal of Financial Economics,2008,88(3): 554-580
[45]Cole, S. Fixing Market Failures or Fixing Elcetions? Agricultural Credit in India[J]. American Economic Journal:Applied Economics,2009,1:219-250.
[46]Cooper M.J., Gulen Huseyin, Ovtchinnikov Alexei V. Corporate political contributions and stock returns[J]. The Journal of Finance,2010,65(2):687-724
[47]Core J.E., Guay W., Larcker D.F. The power of Pen and executive Compensation[J]. Journal of Financial Economics,2008,88(1):1-25
[48]Cull R., Xu L.C. Who Gets Credit? The Behavior of Bureaucrats and State Banks in Allocating Credit to Chinese State-owned Enterprises[J]. Journal of Development Economics, 2003,71:533-559
[49]Cull R., Xu L.C..Institutions, Ownership, and Finance:The Determinants of Profit Reinvestment among Chinese Firms[J]. Journal of Financial Economics,2005,77:117-146
[50]Delong J.B., Shleifer A..Princes and Merchants:City Growth Brfore the Industrial Revolution[J]. Journal of Law and Economics,1993,36:671-702
[51]Demsetz H. Towards a theory of property right[J]. American Economic Review,1967, 57:61-70
[52]Dewenter K.L., Malatesta P.H. State-owned and Privately Owned Firms:An Empirical Analysis of Profitability, Leverage and Labor Intensity[J]. The American Economic Review, 2001,91(1):320-334
[53]Dinc I.S. Politicians and Banks:Political Influences on Government-owned Banks in Emerging Countries[J]. Journal of Financial Economics,2005,77:453-479
[54]Djankov S., Glaeser E., La Porta R., et al. The New Comparative Economics[J]. Journal of Comparative Economics,2003,31:595-619
[55]Djankov S., Murrell P. Enterprise restructuring in transition:a quantitative survey[J]. Journal of economic literature,2002,40:739-792
[56]Durnev A. The Real Effects of Political Uncertainty:Elections and Investment Sensitivity to Stock Prices[J]. Working Paper, London School of Economics and Political Science,2010
[57]Earle J., Estrin S., Leshcenko L. Ownership Structure, Patterns of Control, and Enterprise Behavior in Russia[J]. Enterprise Restructuring and Economic Policy in Russia, The World Bank, Washington DC,1996:205-252
[58]Edward E.G., George S.B., David L.F., et al. Corporate Boards:Keys to Effectiveness[J]. Organizational Dynamics,2002,30(4)
[59]E.E.Schattschneider. Party Government, New Brunswick and London[M]. Transaction Publishers,2004.4-5
[60]Eitan Goldman, Jorg Rocholl, Jongil So. Politically connected boards of directors and the allocation of procurement contracts[J]. Working Paper,2001
[61]Ely R.T..Outlines of Economics[M]. New York, Macmillan,1937
[62]Eugene F. Fama, Michael C. Jensen..Agency Problems and Residual Claims[J]. Journal of Law and Economics,1983,26(2):327-349
[63]Faccio M., Lang H.P. The ultimate ownership of Western European corporations[J]. Journal of Financial Economics,2002,65(3):365-395
[64]Faccio M. Politically Connected Firms[J]. American Economic Review,2006a,96: 369-386
[65]Faccio M. The Characteristics of Politically Connected Firms[J]. Working paper, Mimeo, Vanderbilt University,2006
[66]Faccio M., Masulis R.W., McConnell J.J. Political Connections and Corporate Bailouts[J]. Journal of Finance,2006,61:2596-2635
[67]Faccio M., Parsley D. Sudden Death:Taking Stock of Political Connections[J]. Working paper, Vanderbilt University,2006
[68]Fan J.P.H, Rui M.O., Zhao M. Rent Seeking and Corporate Finance:Evidence from Corruption Cases[J]. Working paper, The Chinese University of Hong Kong,2006
[69]Fan P.H, Wong T.J., Zhang T. Politically Connected CEOs, Corporate Governance, and Post-IPO Performance of China's Newly Partially privatized firms[J]. Journal of financial economics,2007,8(2):330-357
[70]Fan J.P.H, Rui M.O., Zhao M..Public governance and corporate finance:evidence from corruption cases[J]. Journal of Comparative Economics,2008,36(3):343-364
[71]Farrer T.H.. The state in its relation to trade[M]. London, Macmillan,1902
[72]Ferguson Thomas, Voth Hans-Joachim. Betting on Hitler-the value of political connections in Nazi Germany[J]. Quaterly Journal of Economics.2008.123(1):101-137
[73]Firth M., Fung P., Rui O..Corporate Performance and CEO Compensation in China[J]. Journal of Corporate Finance,2006.12(4):693-714
[74]Fisman R. Estimating the Value of Political Connections[J]. American Economic Review.2001,91:1095-1102
[75]Freeman RE, Reed DL. Stockholders and stakeholders:a new perspective on corporate governance[J]. California Management Review,1983,25
[76]Frydman R., Hessel M., Rapaczynski A. Why Ownership Matters? Politicization and Entrepreneurship in the Restructuring of Enterprises in Central Europe[J]. C.V.Starr Center For Applied Economics, NYU, Research Report 14,1998
[77]Getz D. Encyclopedia of hospitality and tourism[J]. Van Nostrand Reinhold. New York, NY,1993:789-810
[78]Glaeser E.L., Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes et al..Do Institution Cause Growth[J], NBER Working Paper 10568, http://www.nber.org/papers/w10568,2004
[79]Goldman E., Rocholl J., So J. Does Political Connectedness Affect Firm Value[J]? Working paper, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill,2006
[80]Groves T., Hong Y., McMillan J.et al..China's Evolving Managerial Labor Market[J]. Journal of Political Economy,1995,103:873-892
[81]Hampel Committee on Corporate Governance.Hampel report on corporate governance(published on 29 January 1998). the European Corporate Governance Institute's (ECGI) website,1998
[82]Hardin G.The tragedy of the commons[J]. Science,1968,162:1243-1248
[83]Heckman James J..Sample Selection Bias as a Specification Error[J]. Econometrica, 1979,47:153-161
[84]Hellman J., Schankerman M. Intervention, Corruption and Capture:The Nexus between Enterprise and the State[J]. Economics of Transition,2000,8(3):545-576
[85]Hung Mingyi, Wong T.J., Zhang Tianyu. Political relations and overseas stock exchange listing:evidence from Chinese state-owned enterprises[J]. SSRN Working Paper,2008
[86]Huntington S.P..Political order in changing societies[M]. New Haven:Yale University Press,1968
[87]Imai, M. Political Determinants of Government Loans in Japan[J]. Journal of Law and Economics,2009,52:41-70
[88]Jayachandran Seema. The Jeffords Effect[J]. Journal of Law and Economics,2006,49(2)
[89]Jensen M..Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance and Takeovers[J]. American Economic Review,1986,76:323-329
[90]Jensen M., Meckling W. Theory of the Firm:Managerial Behavior, Agency Cost and Ownership Structure[J]. Journal of Financial Economics,1976,3(4):305-360
[91]Ji Y. China's Enterprise Reform:Changing State/Society Relations after Mao[M]. Routledge, London,1998
[92]Jin Hebui, Qian Yingyi, Weingast Barry R. Regional decentralization and fiscal incentives:federalism, Chinese style[J]. Journal of public economics,2005,89:1719-1742
[93]Johnson S., La Porta R., Lopez-de-Silanes F., et al..Tunneling[J]. American Economic Review,2000,90:22-27
[94]Johnson S., Mitton T. Cronyism and Capital Controls:Evidence form Malaysia[J]. Journal of Financial Economics,2003,67:351-382
[95]Jones B., Olken B. Do Leaders Matter? National Leadership and Growth Since World War II[J]. Quarterly Journal of Economics,2005,120:835-864
[96]Julio B., Yook Y. Political Uncertainty and Corporate Investment Cycles[J]. Journal of Finance,2012,67(1):45-83
[97]Khwaja A.I., Mian A. Do Lenders Favor Politically Connected Firms? Rent Seeking in an Emerging Financial Market[J]. Quarterly Journal of Economics,2005,120:1371-1411
[98]Klitgaard R. Controlling corruption[M]. Berkeley, CA:University of California Press, 1988
[99]Knight B. Are Policy Platforms Capitalized into Equity Prices? Evidence from the Bush/Gore 2000 Presidential Election[J]. Journal of Public Economics,2007,91:389-409
[100]Kornai J. Economics of shortage[M]. Amsterdam:North Holland,1980
[101]Kornai J., Maskin E., Roland G.Understanding the soft budget constraint[J]. Journal of economic literature,2003,41 (4):1095-1136
[102]Kornai J..The Socialist System:The Political Economy of Communism[M]. Princeton, NJ:Princeton University Press,1992
[103]Laffont J.J., Tirole J. A theory of incentives in procurement and regulation[M]. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.,1993
[104]La Porta R., Lopez-de-Silanes F., Shleifer A., et al. Law and Finance[J]. Journal of Political Economy,1998,106:1113-1155
[105]La Porta R., Lopez-de-Silanes F., Shleifer A..Corporate ownership around the world[J]. Journal of Finance,1999,54:471-518
[106]La Porta R., Lopez-de-Silanes F, Shleifer A..Government ownership of banks[J]. Journal of Finance,2002,57:256-301
[107]La Porta R., Lopez-de-Silanes F., Shleifer A., et al.Agency Problems and Dividend Policies around the World[J]. Journal of Finance,2000,55:1-33
[108]Lee C.W., Xiao X. Cash Dividends in China:Earnings Management, Liquidating, and Tunneling[J]. Working paper, Tulane University, New Orleans,2004
[109]Leff N.H. Economic Development through Bureaucratic Corruption[J]. American Behavioral Scientist,1964,82:337-341
[110]Leone A., Wu J., Zimmerman J. Asymmetric Sensitivity of CEO Cash Compensation to Stock Returns[J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics,2006,42:167-192
[111]Lewellen W.G., Huntsman B. Managerial pay and corporate performance[J]. The American Economic Review,1970,60(4):710-720
[112]Leuz C., Gee F. Political relationships, global financing and corporate transparency: Evidence from Indonesia[J]. Journal of Financial Economics,2006,81:411-439
[113]Li D. Insider Control vs. Government Control:A Study of China's State Enterprise Reform[J]. Manuscript. Department of Economics, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, Hong Kong,2000
[114]Li Hongbin, Meng Lingsheng, Wang Qian, et al..Political Connections, Financing and Firm Performance:Evidence from Chinese Private Firms[J]. Journal of Development Economics, 2008,87:283-299
[115]Li H., Meng L., Zhang J. Why Do Entrepreneurs Enter Politics[J]. Economic Inquiry, 2006,44:559-578
[116]Li H., Zhou L.A. Political Turnover and Economic Performance:The Incentive Role of Personnel Control in China[J]. Journal of Public Economics,2005,89:1743-1762
[117]Lin J.Y., Cai F., Li Z. Competition, Policy Burdens, and State-Owned Enterprise Reform[J]. American Economic Review,1998,88:422-427
[118]Lindbeck A. Swedish economic policy[M]. London:MacMillan Press,1957
[119]Liu T. Institutional Investor Protection and Political Uncertainty:Evidence form Cycles of Investment and Elections[J]. Working Paper, Concordia University,2010
[120]Lu Yi. Political connections and trade expansion:evidence from Chinese private firms[J]. Economics of Transition,2011,19(2):231-254
[121]Lui F.T. An equilibrium queuing model of bribery [J]. Journal of Political Economy, 1985,93(4),760-781
[122]Mankiw N.G..Principles of economics[M]. Fort Worth, Texas, Dryden Pres,1997
[123]Mauro P..Corruption and Growth[J]. Quarterly Journal of Economics,1995,110: 681-712
[124]McGregor R. The Little Red Book of Business in China[J]. Financial Times,2001, 8,July.
[125]McGuire J.W., Chiu S.Y., Elbing A.O. Executive incomes, sales and profits[J]. The American Economic Review,1962,52(4):753-761
[126]McMillan J., Woodruff C. The center role of entrepreneurs in transition economies[J]. Journal of economic perspectives,2002,16:153-170
[127]Megginson W.L., Netter J.M. From State to Market:A Survey of Empirical Studies on Privatization[J]. Journal of Economic Perspectives,2001,39:321-389
[128]Micco A., U. Panizza, M. Yanez. Bank Ownership and Performance:Does Politics Matter[J]? Journal of Banking and Finance,2007,31:219-241.
[129]Michael C. Jensen, William H. Meckling. Theory of the Firm:Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure[J]. Journal of Financial Economics,1976,3(4):305-360
[130]Mill J.S..Principles of political economy with some of their applications to social[M]. London, Longmans, Green and Co., ed.,1848
[131]Murphy K.J..Corporate performance and managerial remuneration:an empirical analysis[J]. University of Rochester, Rochester, NY 14627,1985
[132]Niessen Alexandra, Ruenzi Stefan. Political connectedness and firm performance: evidence from Germany[J]. German Economic Review,2010,11(4):441-464
[133]North D..Structure and Change in Economic History[M]. New York:Norton Co.,1981
[134]North D. Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance[M]. Cambridge University Press,1990
[135]North D., Thomas R. The Rise of the Western World:A New Economics History[M]. Cambridge University Press,1973
[136]Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development:OECD. OECD Principles of Corporate Governance[M].1999, June.
[137]Pindyck R., Solimano A. Economic Instability and Aggregate Investment [J]. NBER Macroeconomics Annual,1993,8:259-303
[138]Qian Yingyi. Reforming Corporate Governance and Finance in China[J]. Corporate Governance in Transitional Economies, World Bank, Washington DC,1995
[139]Qian Yingyi.Enterprise Reform in China:Agency Problems and Political Control[J]. Economic of Transition,1996,4
[140]Qian Yingyi. Government Control in Corporate Governance as A Transitional Institute: Lesson from China[J]. Working Paper, University of Maryland,2000
[141]Qian Y., Xu C.The M-form Hierarchy and China's Economic Reform[J]. European Economic Review,1993,1(2):541-548
[142]Qian Y., Roland G..Federalism and the Soft Budget Constraint[J]. American Economic Review,1998,88:1143-1162
[143]Rajan R., Zingales L. Which capitalism? Lessons from the East Asian crisis[J]. Journal of Applied Corporate Finance,1998,11:40-48
[144]Rauch J., Evans P. Bureaucratic Structure and Bureaucratic Performance in Less Developed Countries[J]. Journal of Public Economics,2000,75:49-71
[145]Rothschild M., Stiglitz J.E. Equilibrium in competitive insurance markets:an essay on the economics of information[J]. Quarterly journal of economics,1976,90:630-649
[146]Sachs J.D., Warner A.M. Economic reform and the process of global integration[J]. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity,1995,1:1-118
[147]Sapienza Paola. The effects of government ownership on bank lending[J], Journal of Financial Economics,2004,72(2):357-384
[148]Shanghai Stock Exchange.The Corporate Governance of China's Listed Firms[J]. Shanghai Stock Exchange, Shanghai,2000,
[149]Shleifer Andrei, Robert W.Vishny.Politicians and Firms [J]. Quarterly Journal of Economics,1994,109
[150]Shleifer A., Vishny R., Survey of Corporate Governance[J]. Journal of Finance,1997, 52:737-783
[151]Shleifer A., Vishny R. Corruption[J]. Quarterly Journal of Economics.1993,108: 599-617
[152]Shleifer A., Vishny R. The Grabbing Hand:Government Pathologies and their Cures[M]. Harvard University Press, Cambridge,1998
[153]Shleifer A., Vishny R. How does privatization work? Evidence from Russian shops[J]. Journal of Political Economy,1996,104:764-790
[154]Sonja O., Wong S.M.L., Hu Ruyin. Party Power, Market and Private Power:Chinese Communist Patry Persistence in China's Lusted Companies[J]. The Future of Market Transition, 2002,19:105-138
[155]Sun Q., Tong W.H.S. China Share Issue Privatization:The Extent of Its Success[J]. Journal of Financial Economics,2003,70:183-222
[156]Svensson J..Eight Questions about Corruption[J]. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2005,19:19-42
[157]Tao Y. F. Rationalization of Political Business Cycle in China[J]. The International Conference on the Rise of China Revisited:Perception and Reality, Institute of International Relations, National Chengchi University,2003
[158]Tao Y. F. Rationalization of Political Business Cycle in China[J]. Working Paper,2004
[159]Tella R.D., Weinschelbaum F..Choosing Agents and Monitoring Consumption:A Note on Wealth as a Corruption-Controlling Device[J]. NBER Working papers, Harvard Business School,2007
[160]Tenev S., Zhang Chunlin. Corporate Governance and Enterprise Reform in China: Building the Institution of Modern Market[J]. World Bank and the International Finance Corporation, Washington, DC.,2002
[161]Treisman D..The Causes of Corruption:A Cross-National Study[J]. Journal of Public Economics,2000,76:399-457
[162]Vining A.R., Boardman A. Ownership versus competition:efficiency in public enterprise[J]. Public Choice,1992,73:205-239
[163]Wong S.M.L., Sonja O., Hu Ruyin. Shareholding Structure, Depoliticization and Enterprise Performance:Evidence from China's Listed Firms[J]. Economics of Transition,2004, 12(1):29-66
[164]World Bank. China's Management of Enterprise Assets:The State as Shareholder[J]. World Bank, Washington, DC.,1997
[165]Xu Chenggang. The Fundamental Institutions of China's Reforms and Development[J]. Journal of Economic Literature,2011,49:1076-1151
[166]Xu L.C., Zhu T., Lin Y..Political Control, Agency Problems and Ownership Reform: Evidence from China[J]. Working paper No.233, Center for Economic Development, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, Hong Kong,2002
[167]Yonce Adam. Uncertain growth cycles, corporate investment and dynamic hedging[J].UC Berkeley:Business Administration, Ph.D. Program,2010, Retrieved from: http://escholarship.org/uc/item/38p0r10v
[168]Yermack, D. Remuneration, Retention and Reputation Incentives for Outside Directors[J]. Journal of Finance,2004,59(5):2281-2308
[169]白重恩,刘俏,陆洲等.中国上市公司治理结构的实证研究[J].经济研究,2005(2)：81-91
[170]白云霞,吴联生.信息披露与国有股权私有化中的盈余管理[J].会计研究,2008(10)：37-45
[171]陈冬华.地方政府、公司治理与补贴收入——来自我国证券市场的经验证据[J].财经研究,2003(9)：15-21
[172]陈冬华,陈信元,万华林.国有企业中的薪酬管制与在职消费[J].经济研究,2005(2)：92-101
[173]陈爽英,井润田,龙小宁等.民营企业家社会关系资本对研发投资决策影响的实证研究[J].管理世界,2010(1)：88-97
[174]陈湘永,张剑文,张伟文.我国上市公司“内部人控制”研究[J].管理世界,2000(4)：103-109
[175]陈信元,黄俊.政府干预、多元化经营与公司业绩[J].管理世界,2007(1)：92-97
[176]陈钊,陆铭.中国所有制结果调整的理论和实证分析[M].太原：山西经济出版社,2003
[177]程仲鸣,夏新平,余明桂.政府干预、金字塔结构与地方国有上市公司投资[J].管理世界,2008(9)：37-47
[178]崔之元.美国二十九个州公司法变革的理论背景[J].经济研究,1996(4)：35-40
[179]代彬,刘星,郝颖.高管权力、薪酬契约与国企改革——来自国有上市公司的实证研究[J].当代经济科学,2011,33(4)：90-98
[180]董学群.浅析党委在国有企业公司治理结构中的作用[J].煤炭经济研究,2009(7)：56-57
[181]豆建民.中国公司制思想研究[M].上海财经大学出版社,1999
[182]杜兴强.“内部人控制”及其防范——会计人员委派制的作用[J].经济评论,2000(3)：116-118
[183]杜兴强,王丽华.高层管理当局薪酬与上市公司业绩的相关性实证研究[J].会计研究,2007(1)：58-65
[184]杜兴强,曾泉,杜颖杰.政治联系、过度投资与公司价值——基于国有上市公司的经验证据[J].金融研究,2011(8)：93-110
[185]方军雄.政府干预、所有权性质与企业并购[J].管理世界,2008(9)：118-123
[186]方军雄.我国上市公司高管的薪酬存在粘性吗[J]?经济研究,2009(3)：110-124
[187]费方域.控制内部人控制——国企改革中的治理机制研究[J].经济研究,1996(6)：31-39
[188]郭熙保,罗知.贸易自由化、经济增长与减轻贫困——基于中国省际数据的经验研究[J].管理世界,2008(2)：15-24
[189]郭正模,李晓梅.工资收入差距与政府宏观调控[J].社会科学研究,2006(3)：39-42
[190]韩旭.国有企业中党的政治优势问题思考[J].理论与改革,1999(5)：63-66
[191]黄枫,甘犁.过度需求还是有效需求?城镇老人健康与医疗保险的实证分析[J].经济研究,2010(6)：105-119
[192]黄俊,陈信元.集团化经营与企业研发投资——基于知识溢出与内部资本市场视角的分析[J].经济研究,2011(6)：80-92
[193]黄兴孪,沈维涛.政府干预、内部人控制与上市公司并购绩效[J].经济管理,2009(6)：70-76
[194]胡永平,张宗益.高管的政治关联与公司绩效：基于国有电力生产上市公司的经验[J].中国软科学,2009(6)：128-137
[195]贾明,张喆.高管的政治关联影响公司慈善行为吗[J]?管理世界,2010(4)：99-113
[196]蒋铁柱,沈桂龙.企业党建与公司治理的融合[J].社会科学,2006(1)：144-153
[197]蒋铁柱.论企业党建与公司治理和谐发展的制度创新[J].社会科学,2007(7)：31-39
[198]雷光勇,李帆,金鑫.股权分置改革、经理薪酬与会计业绩敏感度[J].中国会计评论,2010(1)：17-30
[199]李稻葵.政府控制转型过程中的国有企业所引起的成本和收益：来自中国的证据.工作论文[J],密歇根大学,1999
[200]李世辉,雷新途.两类代理成本、债务治理及其可观测绩效的研究——来自我国中小上市公司的经验证据[J].会计研究,2008(5)：30-37
[201]李维安.国有企业经济型治理机制的构建[M].21世纪的天津科技与经济,天津市科学技术协会编,1999
[202]李维安.国际经验与企业实践——制定适合国情的中国公司治理原则[J].南开管理评论,2001(1)：4-8
[203]李维安,唐跃军.上市公司利益相关者治理机制、治理指数与企业业绩[J].管理世界,2005,Vol(9)：127-136
[204]李毅中.增强新形势下国有企业党建工作的活力和实效[J].党建,2004(10)：6-7
[205]李增泉.激励机制与企业绩效——一项基于上市公司的实证研究[J].会计研究,2000(1)：24-30
[206]李增泉,孙铮,王志伟.掏空与所有权安排——来自我国上市公司大股东资金占用的经验证据[J].会计研究,2004(12)：3-14
[207]李增泉,余谦,王小坤.掏空、支持与并购重组——来自我国上市公司的经验证据[J].经济研究,2005(1)：95-105
[208]梁建,陈爽英,盖庆恩.民营企业的政治参与、治理结构与慈善捐赠[J].管理世界,2010(7)：109-118
[209]林毅夫,蔡昉,李周.充分信息与国有企业改革M].上海：上海三联出版社,1997
[210]林毅夫,李志赞.政策性负担、道德风险与预算软约束[J].经济研究,2004(2)：17-27
[211]林毅夫,李志赞.中国的国有企业与金融体制改革[J].经济学(季刊),2005(3)：913-936
[212]林毅夫,刘明兴,章奇.政策性负担与企业的预算软约束：来自中国的实证研究[J].管理世界,2004(8)：81-127
[213]刘瑞明,白永秀.晋升激励、宏观调控与经济周期：一个政治经济学框架[J].南开经济研究,2007(5)：19-31
[214]刘小玄.中国企业发展报告：1990～2000[M].北京：社会科学文献出版社,2001
[215]刘玉敏.我国上市公司董事会效率与公司绩效的实证研究[J].南开管理评论,2009(1)：84-90
[216]刘振华.目前影响国有企业党建工作的几个因素及对策[J].理论探讨,1997(4)：92-96
[217]卢昌崇.公司治理机构及新老三会关系论[J].经济研究,1994(11)：10-17
[218]陆磊,李世宏.中央—地方—国有银行—公众博弈：国有独资商业银行改革的基本逻辑[J].经济研究,2004(10)：45-55
[219]罗党论,黄琼宇.民营企业的政治关系与企业价值[J].管理科学,2008(6)：21-28
[220]马丽、马国钧.论党的作用是经济增长的内生变量[J].学术交流,2011(4)：1-7
[221]马连福,曹春方.制度环境、地方政府干预、公司治理与IPO募集资金投向变更[J].管理世界,2011(5)：127-148
[222]南开大学中国公司治理原则研究课题组(课题主持人李维安).中国公司治理原则(草案)及其解说[J].南开管理评论,2001(1)：9-24
[223]潘红波,夏新平,余明桂.政府干预、政治关联与地方国有企业并购[J].经济研究,2008(4)：41-52
[224]钱先航,曹廷求,李维安.晋升压力、官员任期与城市商业银行的贷款行为[J].经济研究,2011(12)：72-85
[225]钱颖一.企业治理结构改革和融资结构改革[J].经济研究,1995(1)：20-29
[226]青木昌彦.对内部人控制的控制：转轨经济中公司治理的若干问题[J].改革,1994(6)：11-24
[227]沈永建,张天琴.政府干预、冗余雇员与高管薪酬业绩敏感性——基于中国国有上市公司的实证研究[C].中国会计学会2011学术年会论文集,2011
[228]苏启林.基于代理理论与管家理论视角的家族企业经理人行为选择[J].外国经济与管理,2007(2)：51-56
[229]孙铮,刘凤委,李增泉.市场化程度、政府干预与企业债务期限结构——来自我国上市公司的经验证据[J].经济研究,2005(5)：52-63
[230]谭劲松,郑国坚,彭松.地方政府公共治理与国有控股上市公司控制权转移——1996-2004年深圳市属上市公司重组案例研究[J].管理世界,2009(10)：135-151
[231]谭劲松,郑国坚.产权安排、政企关系、治理机制与企业效率——以“科龙”和“美的”为例[J].管理世界,2004(2)：104-116
[232]田利辉.国有产权、预算软约束和中国上市公司杠杆治理[J].管理世界,2005(7)：123-128
[233]田志龙,贺远琼.公司政治行为：西方相关研究的综述与评价[J].中国软科学,2003(2)：68-73
[234]王克敏,王志超.高管控制权、报酬与盈余管理——基于中国上市公司的实证研究[J].管理世界,2007(7)：111-119
[235]王鹏.投资者保护、代理成本与公司绩效[J].经济研究,2008(2)：68-82
[236]王文剑,仉建涛,覃成林.财政分权、地方政府竞争与FDI的增长效应[J].管理世界,2007(3)：13-22
[237]王贤斌,徐现祥.地方官员来源、去向、任期与经济增长——来自中国省长省委书记的证据[J].管理世界,2008(3)：16-26
[238]王贤斌,徐现祥,李郇.地方官员更替与经济增长[J].经济学(季刊),20098(3)：1301-1328
[239]王贤斌,徐现祥,周靖祥.晋升激励与投资周期——来自中国省级官员的证据[J].中国工业经济,2010,22(12)：16-26
[240]魏刚.高级管理层激励与上市公司经营绩效[J].经济研究,2000(3)：32-39
[241]卫武,田志龙,刘晶.我国企业经营活动中的政治关联性研究[J].中国工业经济,2004(4)：67-75
[242]Wooldridge Jeffrey M.计量经济学导论.第3版M].北京：中国人民大学出版社,2002
[243]吴敬琏.现代公司与企业改革[M].天津：天津人民出版社,1994
[244]吴联生,林景艺,王亚平.薪酬外部公平性、股权性质与公司业绩[J].管理世界,2010(3)：117-126
[245]吴文峰,吴冲锋,芮萌.中国上市公司高管的政府背景与税收优惠[J].管理世界,2009(3)：134-142
[246]吴有昌.国有企业内部人控制问题的成因及对策[J].改革,1995(4)：73-78
[247]夏立军,方轶强.政府控制、治理环境与公司价值——来自中国证券市场的经验证据[J].经济研究,2005(5)：40-51
[248]辛清泉,林斌,王彦超.政府控制、经理薪酬与资本投资[J].经济研究,2007(8)：110-122
[249]辛清泉,谭伟强.市场化改革、企业业绩与国有企业经理薪酬[J].经济研究,2009(11)：68-81
[250]辛清泉,郑国坚,杨德明.企业集团、政府控制与投资效率[J].金融研究,2007(10)：123-142
[251]修宗峰,杜兴强.幸福感、社会资本与代理成本[J].中国工业经济,2011(7)：107-117
[252]徐清海,李兰芝.中国经济的政治周期[J].三峡大学学报,2006(11)：92-94
[253]徐现祥,王贤斌,舒元.地方官员与经济增长——来自中国省长、省委书记交流的证据[J].经济研究,2007,42(9)：18-31
[254]徐业坤,钱先航,李维安.政治不确定性、政治关联与民营企业投资——来自市委书记更替的证据[J].管理世界,2013(5)：116-130
[255]薛云奎,白云霞.国家所有权、冗余雇员与公司业绩[J].管理世界,2008(10)：96-105
[256]徐二明,张晗.中国上市公司国有股权对技术创新方式的影响[J].经济管理,2008(15)：42-46
[257]徐晓东,陈小悦.第一大股东对公司治理、企业业绩的影响分析[J].经济研究,2003(2)：64---74
[258]杨记军,逯东,杨丹.国有企业的政府控制权转让研究[J].经济研究,2010(2)：69-82
[259]杨瑞龙,王元,聂辉华.“准官员”的晋升机制：来自中国央企的证据[J].管理世界,2013(1)：103-115
[260]杨瑞龙,杨其静.对“资本雇佣劳动”命题的反思[J].经济科学,2000(6)：91-100
[261]杨瑞龙,杨其静.专用性、专有性与企业制度[J].经济研究,2001(3)：3-11
[262]杨瑞龙,周业安.相机治理与国有企业监控[J].中国社会科学,1998(3)：4-17
[263]杨瑞龙,周业安.一个关于企业所有权安排的规范性分析框架及其理论含义[J].经济研究,1997(1)：12-22
[264]尹振东.垂直管理与属地管理：行政管理体制的选择[J].经济研究,2011(4)：41-54
[265]游家兴,徐盼盼,陈淑敏.政治关联、职位壕沟与高管变更——来自中国财务困境上市公司的经验证据[J].金融研究,2010(4)：128-143
[266]余明桂,夏新平.控股股东、代理问题与关联交易：对中国上市公司的实证研究[J].南开管理评论,2004(6)：33-38
[267]余明桂,潘红波.政治关系、制度环境与民营企业银行贷款[J].管理世界,2008(8)：9-21
[268]余明桂,回雅甫,潘红波.政治联系、寻租与地方政府财政补贴有效性[J].经济研究,2010(3)：65-77
[269]曾庆生.超额雇员、权益代理成本与公司价值[J].上海立信会计学院学报,2007(1)：41-47
[270]曾庆生,陈信元.国家控股、超额雇员与劳动力成本[J].经济研究,2006(5)：74-86
[271]张宝柱,黄辉.考虑政府干预的企业R&D行为研究[J].财经论坛,2009(3)：9-14
[272]张车伟.失业率定义的国际比较及中国城镇失业率[J].世界经济,2003(5)：47-54
[273]张春霖.从融资角度分析国有企业的治理机构改革[J].改革,1995(3)：34-46
[274]张洪辉,王宗军.政府干预、政府目标与国有上市公司的过度投资[J].南开管理评论,2010(3)：101-108
[275]张军,高远.官员任期、异地交流与经济增长——来自省级经验的证据[J].经济研究,2007,42(11)：91-103
[276]张俊瑞,赵进文,张建.高级管理层激励与上市公司经营绩效相关性的实证分析[J].会计研究,2003(9)：29-34
[277]张敏,张胜,申慧慧等.政治关联与信贷资源配置效率——来自我国民营上市公司的经验证据[J].管理世界,2010(11)：143-153
[278]张曙光.中国转轨中的制度结构与变迁[J].北京：经济科学出版社,2005
[279]张维迎.从现代企业理论看中国国有企业的改革[J].改革与战略,1994(6)：17-19
[280]张维迎.从现代企业理论看国有企业改革[J].改革,1995(1)：30-33
[281]张维迎,马捷.恶性竞争的产权基础[J].经济研究,1999(6)：11-20
[282]张维迎.产权安排与企业内部的权力斗争[J].经济研究,2000(6)：41-50
[283]张新.并购重组是否创造价值?中国证券市场的理论与实证研究[J].经济研究,2003(6)：20-29
[284]张一驰.试论国有企业改革中的内部人控制与公司治理结构[J].经济科学,1996(6)：23-30
[285]郑志刚.经理人超额薪酬和公司治理——一个文献综述[J].金融评论,2012(1)：103-112
[286]中共上海市委组织部.“双向进入、交叉任职”是一种有效机制[J].党建研究,1999(9)：15-17
[287]钟海燕,冉茂盛,文守逊.政府干预、内部人控制与公司投资[J].管理世界,2010(7)：98-108
[288]周黎安.晋升博弈中政府官员的激励与合作——兼论我国地方保护主义和重复建设问题长期存在的原因[J].经济研究,2004(6)：33-40
[289]周黎安.中国地方官员的晋升锦标赛模式研究[J].经济研究,2007(7)：36-50
[290]周黎安.转型中的地方政府：官员激励与治理[M].上海：上海人民出版社,2008
[291]周黎安,李宏彬,陈烨.对绩效考核：中国地方官员晋升机制的一项经验研究[J].经济学报,2005(1)：83-96
[291]周其仁.市场里的企业：一个人力资本与非人力资本的特别合约[J].经济研究,1996(6)：71-80
[293]周雪光.“逆向软预算约束”：一个政府行为的组织分析[J].中国社会科学,2005(2)：132-143
[294]周业安.县乡级财政支出管理体制改革的理论与对策[J].管理世界,2000(5)：122-132
[295]周业安,冯兴元,赵坚毅.地方政府竞争与市场秩序的重构[J].中国社会科学,2004(1)：56-65
© 2004-2018 中国地质图书馆版权所有 京ICP备05064691号 京公网安备11010802017129号 地址：北京市海淀区学院路29号 邮编：100083 电话：办公室：(+86 10)66554848；文献借阅、咨询服务、科技查新：66554700 |