城市商业房地产市场主体之间的利益均衡博弈研究
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摘要
中国商业房地产业的发展相对滞后，回顾20多年的发展及现状，既可以揭示中国商业房地产发展的轨迹，也可以发掘中国商业房地产业潜在的巨大机会。
商业地产表面繁荣的背后是规划无序、生态破坏、经营混乱等一系列问题，这让越来越多的经济学者对未来充满忧虑。
商业房地产市场的不均衡发展是常态，研究我国商业房地产市场理论现状及其市场所暴露的问题，既有其理论层面的意义，也有现实意义。
商业房地产市场参与各方既具有一定的独立性，又相互依存、相互影响；市场中的每一方都有各自的利益，而其利益的兑现却取决于相关各方的承诺与选择。毫无疑问，博弈论特别适合于对商业房地产市场的平衡分析并对制度设计与选择提供支持与帮助。
商业房地产的发展可以带动一个城市甚至一个区域的经济发展，这是城市化进程中重要的推动力量。商业房地产的开发投资额度巨大，影响广泛，一个城市的商业发达程度直接影响着这个城市的经济发展水平。
商业房地产市场中，利益相关者一般是指参与商业房地产市场并对其产生影响的每一个群体，他们是房地产市场的重要构成要素。概括而言，主要包括政府（中央政府和地方政府）、商业房地产开发商、零售商三个主体。
本文第四章围绕开发商行为与政府职能展开论述。重点针对监管问题展开。在商业房地产市场中，政府一方面扮演土地提供方的角色，同时也是市场规则的制定者与裁判员（由不同政府部门执行）。为了探究商业房地产开发过程中市场失衡的根本原因，我们应当考虑这些行为主体的利益，并认为他们的选择是利益博弈的结果。
本文第五章介绍了开发商作为市场中最重要的主体，开发商与开发商之间也存在着博弈关系。最突出的问题就是，面对市场利益，房地产企业面临两难选择，价格竞争或者合谋。商业房地产市场竞争的激烈程度与企业的盈利能力负相关，因此，企业有强烈的动机通过合谋来弱化竞争，以获取利润最大化。房地产市场独特的市场结构使得房地产企业间的合谋不仅成为可能，而且具有相当的稳定性。
本文第六章讨论的是在开发商与零售商相互选择的过程，开发商与零售商在商业房地产市场中如何建立彼此的信任？在交易合作过程中如何降低交易成本？本章节引入了博弈论中的声誉模型进行详尽的分析。在这一市场中，企业的行为正如我们所知道的那样，声誉的本质在于可以使行为人获取长期的收益。
本文第七章为案例研究，结合长春市房地产市场及ZD集团的成功展开论述。
博弈论的核心是分析均衡。从商业房地产市场的供给、需求以及价格形成的过程来看，这个市场是非常典型的带有博弈特征的竞争性业务活动的。商业房地产市场发展是为了满足城市各种活动对空间的需求而进行的土地开发过程，这一过程中，具有不同利益和目的的政府、开发商、零售商，作为最重要的主体构成，其相互间的利益分配关系直接影响着市场的均衡发展。
商业房地产的可持续发展，不仅有利于国家监督商业房地产企业的经营行为，也能够对于确立房地产企业发展的自律机制和竞争机制提供有效帮助，从而促进房地产行业的健康发展，这对国家资源的合理配置，保证零售商的利益，协助政府相关部门制定决策并确保这一市场良性循环具有重要的意义
China commercial real estate industry development is relatively lagging, reviewsthe development of more than20years and the status,we can reveal the path ofChinese commercial real estate development, and also can discover the Chinesecommercial real estate industry potentially opportunities.
Commercial real estate the surface of the back of prosperity is planning disorder,ecological destruction, and business chaos, which makes more and more economistsare full of worries for the future.
Unbalanced development of commercial real estate market is the normal stage.Study on the theory of commercial real estate market in China has a practicalsignificance. Commercial real estate market participants have certain independence,both are interdependent and influence each other. Every party in the market have theirown interests, and their interests is depends on the commitment and select relatedparties. There is no doubt that the balance of the game theory is suitable for thecommercial real estate market analysis. It can provide support and assistance tosystem design and selection.
Commercial real estate development can lead to a city or a region's economicdevelopment; it is the important driving force in the process of urbanization.Commercial real estate investment is huge, the influence is widespread. Thecommercial development in a city directly affects the level of economic developmentof the city.
Commercial real estate market, stakeholders generally refers to participate in thecommercial real estate market and the impact of each group, and they are importantcomponents of the real estate market. Summarized, mainly including government(central and local governments), commercial real estate developers, retailers, threemain bodies.
This fourth chapter is mainly about developer behavior and the functions of thegovernment. Focus on regulatory issues. In commercial real estate market, thegovernment on the one hand, the role of land provider, as well as market regulatorsand referees (performed by different government departments). On the other hand therelevant government departments need to fulfill the supervision of the commercial real estate developers, especially in the process of land acquisition, development andmanagement behavior is legal, compliance. Behavior main body under thegovernment in the regulatory system is also interest subjects. In order to explore theroot cause of the commercial real estate market imbalances in the developmentprocess, we should consider the interests of the behavior subject, and that their choiceis the result of the interest game.
In the fifth chapter the developer is as the most important main body of themarket, the game between the developers and developers. The most prominentproblem is that in the face of market interests, real estate enterprises face a dilemma,price competition or conspiracy. Commercial real estate market competition intensityis negatively related to the enterprise's profit ability, therefore, companies have astrong incentive through conspiring to weaken the competition, in order to getmaximum profit. However, the real estate market unique market structure makecollusion between real estate enterprises is not only possible, but also considerablestability.
This paper focuses on chapter6is in the process of developers and retailerschoose each other. How to establish trust each other? It is a real problem in the market.How to reduce transaction costs in the trading cooperation process? This sectionintroduces the reputation model in game theory to carry on the detailed analysis.Market behavior is most businesses and individuals a repeated process of dynamicinteraction, the commercial property market in particular. In this market, theenterprise behavior, as we know, the essence of reputation lies in can make the personobtain long-term benefits.
In the chapter7, there is a case study, this chapter combined with the city ofChangchun real estate market and ZD group's success.
Game theory is the core of equilibrium analysis. From commercial real estatemarket supply and demand and price formation process, this market is very typicalgame competitive business activities. Commercial real estate market development isto satisfy the space requirements of urban activities and land development process, theprocess, with different interests and objectives of the government, developers,retailers, as one of the most important main body, their mutual interest distributiondirectly affects the relationship between the balanced development of the market.
The balanced development of the commercial property market is sustainable development. The sustainable development of commercial real estate, is not onlybeneficial to the national supervision of commercial real estate enterprise'smanagement behavior, may also be able to establish self-discipline mechanism andcompetition mechanism of the development of real estate enterprises to provideeffective help, so as to promote the healthy development of real estate industry, therational allocation of national resources, guarantee the interests of the retailer, to assistthe relevant government departments to make decisions and to ensure that the marketcycle is of great importance.
商业地产表面繁荣的背后是规划无序、生态破坏、经营混乱等一系列问题，这让越来越多的经济学者对未来充满忧虑。
商业房地产市场的不均衡发展是常态，研究我国商业房地产市场理论现状及其市场所暴露的问题，既有其理论层面的意义，也有现实意义。
商业房地产市场参与各方既具有一定的独立性，又相互依存、相互影响；市场中的每一方都有各自的利益，而其利益的兑现却取决于相关各方的承诺与选择。毫无疑问，博弈论特别适合于对商业房地产市场的平衡分析并对制度设计与选择提供支持与帮助。
商业房地产的发展可以带动一个城市甚至一个区域的经济发展，这是城市化进程中重要的推动力量。商业房地产的开发投资额度巨大，影响广泛，一个城市的商业发达程度直接影响着这个城市的经济发展水平。
商业房地产市场中，利益相关者一般是指参与商业房地产市场并对其产生影响的每一个群体，他们是房地产市场的重要构成要素。概括而言，主要包括政府（中央政府和地方政府）、商业房地产开发商、零售商三个主体。
本文第四章围绕开发商行为与政府职能展开论述。重点针对监管问题展开。在商业房地产市场中，政府一方面扮演土地提供方的角色，同时也是市场规则的制定者与裁判员（由不同政府部门执行）。为了探究商业房地产开发过程中市场失衡的根本原因，我们应当考虑这些行为主体的利益，并认为他们的选择是利益博弈的结果。
本文第五章介绍了开发商作为市场中最重要的主体，开发商与开发商之间也存在着博弈关系。最突出的问题就是，面对市场利益，房地产企业面临两难选择，价格竞争或者合谋。商业房地产市场竞争的激烈程度与企业的盈利能力负相关，因此，企业有强烈的动机通过合谋来弱化竞争，以获取利润最大化。房地产市场独特的市场结构使得房地产企业间的合谋不仅成为可能，而且具有相当的稳定性。
本文第六章讨论的是在开发商与零售商相互选择的过程，开发商与零售商在商业房地产市场中如何建立彼此的信任？在交易合作过程中如何降低交易成本？本章节引入了博弈论中的声誉模型进行详尽的分析。在这一市场中，企业的行为正如我们所知道的那样，声誉的本质在于可以使行为人获取长期的收益。
本文第七章为案例研究，结合长春市房地产市场及ZD集团的成功展开论述。
博弈论的核心是分析均衡。从商业房地产市场的供给、需求以及价格形成的过程来看，这个市场是非常典型的带有博弈特征的竞争性业务活动的。商业房地产市场发展是为了满足城市各种活动对空间的需求而进行的土地开发过程，这一过程中，具有不同利益和目的的政府、开发商、零售商，作为最重要的主体构成，其相互间的利益分配关系直接影响着市场的均衡发展。
商业房地产的可持续发展，不仅有利于国家监督商业房地产企业的经营行为，也能够对于确立房地产企业发展的自律机制和竞争机制提供有效帮助，从而促进房地产行业的健康发展，这对国家资源的合理配置，保证零售商的利益，协助政府相关部门制定决策并确保这一市场良性循环具有重要的意义
China commercial real estate industry development is relatively lagging, reviewsthe development of more than20years and the status,we can reveal the path ofChinese commercial real estate development, and also can discover the Chinesecommercial real estate industry potentially opportunities.
Commercial real estate the surface of the back of prosperity is planning disorder,ecological destruction, and business chaos, which makes more and more economistsare full of worries for the future.
Unbalanced development of commercial real estate market is the normal stage.Study on the theory of commercial real estate market in China has a practicalsignificance. Commercial real estate market participants have certain independence,both are interdependent and influence each other. Every party in the market have theirown interests, and their interests is depends on the commitment and select relatedparties. There is no doubt that the balance of the game theory is suitable for thecommercial real estate market analysis. It can provide support and assistance tosystem design and selection.
Commercial real estate development can lead to a city or a region's economicdevelopment; it is the important driving force in the process of urbanization.Commercial real estate investment is huge, the influence is widespread. Thecommercial development in a city directly affects the level of economic developmentof the city.
Commercial real estate market, stakeholders generally refers to participate in thecommercial real estate market and the impact of each group, and they are importantcomponents of the real estate market. Summarized, mainly including government(central and local governments), commercial real estate developers, retailers, threemain bodies.
This fourth chapter is mainly about developer behavior and the functions of thegovernment. Focus on regulatory issues. In commercial real estate market, thegovernment on the one hand, the role of land provider, as well as market regulatorsand referees (performed by different government departments). On the other hand therelevant government departments need to fulfill the supervision of the commercial real estate developers, especially in the process of land acquisition, development andmanagement behavior is legal, compliance. Behavior main body under thegovernment in the regulatory system is also interest subjects. In order to explore theroot cause of the commercial real estate market imbalances in the developmentprocess, we should consider the interests of the behavior subject, and that their choiceis the result of the interest game.
In the fifth chapter the developer is as the most important main body of themarket, the game between the developers and developers. The most prominentproblem is that in the face of market interests, real estate enterprises face a dilemma,price competition or conspiracy. Commercial real estate market competition intensityis negatively related to the enterprise's profit ability, therefore, companies have astrong incentive through conspiring to weaken the competition, in order to getmaximum profit. However, the real estate market unique market structure makecollusion between real estate enterprises is not only possible, but also considerablestability.
This paper focuses on chapter6is in the process of developers and retailerschoose each other. How to establish trust each other? It is a real problem in the market.How to reduce transaction costs in the trading cooperation process? This sectionintroduces the reputation model in game theory to carry on the detailed analysis.Market behavior is most businesses and individuals a repeated process of dynamicinteraction, the commercial property market in particular. In this market, theenterprise behavior, as we know, the essence of reputation lies in can make the personobtain long-term benefits.
In the chapter7, there is a case study, this chapter combined with the city ofChangchun real estate market and ZD group's success.
Game theory is the core of equilibrium analysis. From commercial real estatemarket supply and demand and price formation process, this market is very typicalgame competitive business activities. Commercial real estate market development isto satisfy the space requirements of urban activities and land development process, theprocess, with different interests and objectives of the government, developers,retailers, as one of the most important main body, their mutual interest distributiondirectly affects the relationship between the balanced development of the market.
The balanced development of the commercial property market is sustainable development. The sustainable development of commercial real estate, is not onlybeneficial to the national supervision of commercial real estate enterprise'smanagement behavior, may also be able to establish self-discipline mechanism andcompetition mechanism of the development of real estate enterprises to provideeffective help, so as to promote the healthy development of real estate industry, therational allocation of national resources, guarantee the interests of the retailer, to assistthe relevant government departments to make decisions and to ensure that the marketcycle is of great importance.
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