农村信贷担保的财政支持政策研究
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摘要
目前,资金短缺已成为解决“三农”问题的瓶颈。因绝大多数农村中小企业和农户的经济实力较薄弱,自身经营所具有的小农经济性质,以及我国现有的支农政策和农村金融机构存在的诸多制度性和功能性缺陷,导致金融机构不敢也不愿发放大额度的贷款给农村中小企业和农户。要解决农业资金短缺、农村企业和农民贷款难的问题,需要健全我国农村金融体系、信用体系以及农村土地制度和其他一些相关政策。信贷担保是确保银行信贷资金安全的有效保障措施之一,它在加速资金循环融通、促进企业和银行良性互动、推动中小企业发展等方面都有着积极的意义。但是,由于城乡二元结构导致的城乡金融差异、农村有效担保物的匮乏、农村经济主体信用的缺失以及相应信贷担保法律制度对农村环境的不适应等因素,信贷担保在农村发展缓慢,甚至出现了停滞状态。担保不力使农村经济主体走入信贷困境,引发了一系列亟待解决的问题,制约了农村经济的发展。
农村信贷担保制度包括两大基本要素：一是以物为基础的抵押担保制度,另一个是以人为载体的第三方信用担保制度。
作为农村的主要财产,农地在整个农村产权抵押融资过程中起到了关键性作用,农民拥有的农地使用权所具有的特性,决定了农地使用权适合在农地金融制度中充当抵押物,这一方面可以解决农民贷款难的问题,另一方面可以降低农村金融机构的经营风险,农业发展资金短缺的问题也就迎刃而解。然而目前我国的农地产权抵押融资制度尚处于初创阶段,要建立适合中国国情的农地产权抵押贷款制度还需要大量工作去做。
信用担保机构作为农村信用担保发挥作用的微观主体,使农民与金融机构之间信息不对称的问题得到了一定程度的透明,降低了银行等金融机构的贷款风险,有助于缓解农民融资难的问题。因此,构建与完善我国农村信用担保体系具有现实意义。然而,农村信用担保所具有的特质使得市场失灵问题较为严重。农村信用担保存在很大的外部经济,是一个高风险的行业,且信用担保产品具有准公共产品性质,这使得农村信用担保的发展不可能完全依靠市场机制来推动,政府的支持、特别是财政支持至关重要。
基于以上两方面的问题,本文从国家宏观战略视角出发,提出政府应主要运用财政支出手段,发挥财政功能,解决农村产权(以农地产权为主)抵押融资制度建立过程中“钱从哪里来”的问题,处理好各种矛盾。同时,政府有必要运用直接投资、财政补贴、税收优惠等方式对农村中小企业和农户的信用担保机构与方式进行财政上的支持,以解决农业资金短缺、农村企业和农民贷款难的问题。
基于以上分析,本文研究的主要内容如下：
(1)农村信贷担保体系的相关问题研究
农村信贷担保体系是一个综合性的系统工程,发展农村信贷担保体系需要同时进行两方面基础性内容的建设：农村抵押担保市场和农村信用担保机构。
1)以农村土地产权制度改革为契机,发展农村抵押担保市场
农民拥有的动产较少,而且不是其财产的主要表现形式,通过抵押动产进行融资的发展空间有限,农民拥有的各类产权才是其最重要的可用财产。但是我国农村产权制度复杂,对所有权、承包权和经营权的归属关系错乱不清,极大限制了农村产权抵押融资的发展。因此,农村产权制度改革是农村拓展抵押担保市场的首要步骤。以农村土地产权制度改革为契机,顺应形势,建立我国农村土地产权抵押担保市场。
2)进行农村信用担保机构的建设
与服务于城市中小企业的担保机构相比,农村信用担保机构具有如下特点：农村信贷配给现象明显高于城市,农村信贷担保市场的公共品性质以及市场失灵现象更为严重；农村信贷担保机构更多地要为农村中小企业贷款进行担保服务,贷款的额度小,笔数多,需要大量的服务费用开支,增加了管理的难度；农村信用担保机构与农村信用社的关系紧密,在担保过程中为减小担保风险,尝试与农村信用社合作进行贷款模式的创新。在农村信用担保体系建立初期,为适应农村信贷发展的特点,并参照城市信用担保机构的发展模式,发展以政策性和互助性农村担保机构为主,农村商业信用担保机构为辅的“两主一辅”的农村信用担保体系。
3)对农村抵押担保与农村信用担保互动机制的介绍
首先,无论是抵押担保还是信用担保,服务目标是一致的,都是为了缓和农村信贷供需矛盾,减少农村信贷双方的信息不对称,增加农户和农村中小企业的贷款机会。其次,农村信用担保摆脱不了对物的抵押。信用担保机构只是将放贷机构的风险转移,但本身无法消除面临的担保风险,通常要进行抵押的反担保或再担保。再次,在发展农村产权抵押融资过程中,需要信用担保的辅助,特别是在农村土地产权交易的初期,一些地方政府允许农地抵押的政策有可能与现行法律相违背,在抵押过程中银行面临较大的政策风险,需要政策性担保机构的参与,强化农地产权担保的安全性。在未来构筑有中国特色的农地金融制度时,农村信用担保机构是不可或缺的组成部分。
(2)关于农村信贷担保体系中的财政角色与功能
1)在农村产权制度改革方面,一系列制度的建立都需要财政资金的支持
建设农村产权交易平台,前期需要政府的大量投入。如购置交易所用地、基础设施、设备系统建设等方面的固定资产投资；还需要专门用于对农地流转客户的注册费、管理费补贴,对中介机构入场租金和工作经费补贴,对服务效果良好的中介机构进行税收减免等优惠措施。另外,在确权过程中相关费用的承担以及建立政府评估机构和完善农村抵押融资的风险分担机构等方面,财政都起到支撑的作用。
2)在农村信用担保机构方面,要区分不同性质的农村信用担保机构,采取不同的支持策略
对于政策性担保机构,要发挥财政的基础性功能,用财政资金全面覆盖政策性担保机构的运营环节；对于商业性担保机构,要通过财政手段引导其进入农村市场,在税收方面给予优惠,对经营过程中出现的资金问题进行有条件的补偿；对互助性的农村信用担保机构,政策上的支持要大于资金的资助,发挥财政政策的调节功能,促使各类政府和金融机构与农村互助性担保机构进行合作,推动信贷担保的创新。
3)在抵押品的替代机制方面
通过财政补贴方式建立农村担保贷款制度,通过财政途径促进农户联保贷款环境的改善和联保贷款方式的优化,增加涉农贷款的利率补贴种类与数量,以减少对农村抵押品的过分依赖。
(3)农村信贷担保的配套体系及财政政策
经过近几年的发展,农村信贷担保,特别是借鉴国外模式发展的信用担保体系已较完善。然而,促进农村信贷发展的方式不应局限于担保一种,还需要包括其他金融财政、法律、文化等手段。从农村金融生态环境建设的角度出发,分析作用于农村信贷的一些重要经济制度与措施,以及农村信贷担保与这些制度措施的关系,从更宏观的视角探讨财政对农村信贷担保的支持政策,以保证农村信贷机构及担保体系的更好发展。本文认为与农村信贷担保联系最为紧密的制度包括农业保险制度、农村信用体系以及农村的社会保障制度,这些制度都与农村信贷担保有着非常明确的逻辑联系。因此,需要重新整合相关的支农资金,在服务农村经济和金融的层面上,把握农村信贷担保的配套体系。
The shortage of capital has become the bottleneck to solve Three Rural Issues. For the economic strength of small and medium-sized enterprises and rural farmers is weak, small-scale peasant economy of self-support, the existing policy of financial support to agriculture of our country, the existing defects on institution and function of financial institutions in rural areas, institutions not willing to extend the loan in amount. Solving the capital shortage of agricultural and the difficulties in loans of enterprises and farmers need to improve the system of finance, credit, and land in our rural areas as well as other relevant policies. Among these, the credit guarantee is a safeguard measure that could ensure the bank credit capital. It has significance in speeding up the capital circulation, promoting the benign interaction between enterprises and bank encouraging the development of small and medium-sized enterprises. But the development of credit guarantee in rural is slow, even stagnates, because of factors bring out of dual economic structure of urban and rural areas, such as the financial difference between urban and rural areas, the lack of effective security, the credit flaw of rural economic entities, and the in-adaptation between corresponding legal system of credit guarantee and rural environment. Poor guarantee brought the rural economic entities into credit trouble, sparked a series of problems to be solved, and restricted the development of rural economy.
The rural credit guarantee system includes two basic elements:one is the mortgage guarantee system, which is based on, and the other is the third party credit guarantee system, which takes human as carrier.
As the main property of the countryside, rural land played a critical role in the whole process of the property rights mortgage financing. The characteristics of farmer's right to use of land determined that land use right is appropriate for serving as mortgage in rural land financial system. On one hand, it can solve the difficulties in farmers' loan problems; on the other hand, it can reduce the risk of operating rural financial institutions. Then fund shortage problem of agricultural development can be solved. But at present, mortgage financing of farmland property rights in our country is still in the initial stage, there's a lot of work need to be done in the future to establish a farmland financial system, which is suitable for China's national conditions. Therefore, from the national strategic perspective, this paper proposes that the government should take fiscal measures, play financial function, to solve the problems that occurred in the establishing process of this system, deal well with all kinds of contradictions.
As the microscopic subject that playing function in rural credit guarantee, credit guarantee agencies make the information asymmetry between farmers and financial institutions transparent to some extent; reduce the loan risk of financial institution such as banks, the difficulties in financing difficulties. Therefore, constructing our country's rural credit guarantee system has practical significance. However, the typical characteristic of rural credit guarantee makes market a serious problem. The rural credit guarantee has a big external economy, it is a high-risk industry, and credit guarantee product has the characteristic of quasi-public goods, this makes the development of rural credit guarantee can't depend entirely on the market mechanism to promote. The government's support, especially financial support is very important.
Based on the two problems mentioned above, this paper put forward that the government should use fiscal measures and play fiscal function to resolve the series problems appeared in the process of rural land financial system construction, deal well with all kinds of contradictions. In the same time, it is necessary for the government to use direct investment, financial subsidies and tax incentives and other ways to give financial support in credit guarantee of small and medium-sized enterprises so as to resolve the problems of capital and loan difficulties for rural enterprises and farmers. The main content of this paper is as follows:
(1) The research of related problems about rural credit guarantee system
The rural credit guarantee system is a comprehensive one, and the development of rural credit guarantee system need simultaneously two aspects of the construction of the basic content:rural mortgage guarantee market and rural credit guarantee agencies.
1) Take the property rights system reform in the rural areas as an opportunity to the development of rural mortgage guarantee market.
The space of finance through mortgage is limited because of chattels in farmers'hands is less and not the main form of their property. And the rural property right system in our country is complicated, the relations of ownership, contract right, and the right of management are not clear, greatly limits the development of rural property mortgage financing. Therefore, the rural property rights system reform is the first step of expanding rural mortgage guarantee market. Take the opportunity of right system reform in the rural areas, and follow this trend, then set up the rural property mortgage guarantee market.
2) Constructing the rural credit guarantee agencies
Compared with the credit guarantee agencies in cities, rural credit guarantee agencies have the following characteristics:the rural credit rationing phenomenon was significantly higher than the cities, the public nature of rural credit guarantee market and market failure phenomenon were more serious; the rural credit guarantee agencies guaranteed more for farmers'loan. This need large amount of service, and increased the difficulty of management; the relationship between rural credit guarantee agencies and rural credit cooperatives was close, in order to reduce risk in the process of guarantee, the rural credit guarantee agencies try cooperate with rural credit cooperatives to innovate the mode of loan. In the early step of rural credit guarantee system construction, referring to the development mode of urban credit agencies, we should develop such credit guarantee system that giving priority to policy guarantee agencies, supplementing by commercial and mutual guarantee agencies.
3)The introduction to the rural mortgage guarantee and interaction mechanism of rural credit guarantee
First of all, whether mortgage guarantee, or credit guarantee, the service target is consistent, that is to alleviate the contradiction between supply and demand of rural credit, reduce the information asymmetry of both sides of the rural credit parties, and increase the loan opportunities for farmers and the rural small and medium-sized enterprise. Second, rural credit guarantee can not lack of mortgage. Credit guarantee agencies only transfer the risk but cannot remove the risk by itself. Removing risk usually need the counter guarantee or re-guarantee. Last but not least, in the development of rural property mortgage financing process, credit guarantee auxiliary is needed, especially in the early stages of the rural property transactions, polices that allowed the mortgage of the land of some local governments were against with current laws. Banks are confronted with great political risk in the mortgage process, so participation of political guarantee agencies is needed, in order to strengthen the security of property right of the guarantee.
(2) The financial roles and functions in the rural credit guarantee system
1) In rural property rights system reform, the establishment of series system needs financial funds support.
In the early step of rural property right trading construction, large amount of investment from government is needed, such as the fixed assets investments in purchasing of exchange land, constructing of basic installation and equipment system and other aspects, as well as some incentive measures, for instance, the subsidies to register and management that specially used for farmland circulation, the subsidies to the rent and working allowance of intermediary agencies, and tax relive to those intermediary institutions that have good service effects. In addition, finance plays the supportive role in bearing cost that appeared in the process of indeed the right, setting up a government agency for evaluation and improving the institution of rural mortgage financing risk allocation and so on.
2) In aspect of the rural credit guarantee agencies, we need to distinguish the different nature of these agencies, and then adopt different supportive strategy. For the political guarantee agencies, we should make full use of the financial founded function, and cover the operating links of political guarantee agencies comprehensively in use of capital. For the commercial guarantee agencies, we should use financial measures to guide them into rural market, give preferences in taxes, and make conditional compensation to the capital that appeared in the management process. For the rural mutual guarantee agencies, political supports should be more than fund support. Our government should play the adjustment function of fiscal policy, induce the cooperation among kinds of financial institutions, mutual guarantee agencies, and prompt the innovation of credit guarantee.
3) In aspect of the alternative mechanisms in collateral
Establish rural guarantee loan system through the financial subsidy way, and through the financial way to improve the environment of joint guarantee lending and the optimization of its form, increase the types and volume of interest rate for the loan subsidies in order to reduce the over-rely on the rural collateral.
(3) The complete set of rural credit guarantee system and fiscal policies
With the development in recent years, rural credit guarantee system, especially those refer from foreign mode have become relatively perfect. However, the ways to promote the rural credit should not be limited to the guarantee; it also needs financial, legal, and cultural means. From the view of rural financial ecological environment construction, analyzing some important economic system and measures that working on rural credit guarantee as well as the relations between them then discuss the support policy on rural credit guarantee at the macroscopic level, so as to ensure a better development of rural credit agency and guarantee system. In the view of this paper, the systems that having the most closely contact with rural credit guarantee including the agricultural insurance system, rural credit system, and rural social security system. There is a very clear logic connection between these systems and the rural credit guarantee. Therefore, it is necessary to re-integrate the relevant capital that used for agriculture support, and ensure the matching system of rural credit guarantee at the level of servicing rural economy and finance.
农村信贷担保制度包括两大基本要素：一是以物为基础的抵押担保制度,另一个是以人为载体的第三方信用担保制度。
作为农村的主要财产,农地在整个农村产权抵押融资过程中起到了关键性作用,农民拥有的农地使用权所具有的特性,决定了农地使用权适合在农地金融制度中充当抵押物,这一方面可以解决农民贷款难的问题,另一方面可以降低农村金融机构的经营风险,农业发展资金短缺的问题也就迎刃而解。然而目前我国的农地产权抵押融资制度尚处于初创阶段,要建立适合中国国情的农地产权抵押贷款制度还需要大量工作去做。
信用担保机构作为农村信用担保发挥作用的微观主体,使农民与金融机构之间信息不对称的问题得到了一定程度的透明,降低了银行等金融机构的贷款风险,有助于缓解农民融资难的问题。因此,构建与完善我国农村信用担保体系具有现实意义。然而,农村信用担保所具有的特质使得市场失灵问题较为严重。农村信用担保存在很大的外部经济,是一个高风险的行业,且信用担保产品具有准公共产品性质,这使得农村信用担保的发展不可能完全依靠市场机制来推动,政府的支持、特别是财政支持至关重要。
基于以上两方面的问题,本文从国家宏观战略视角出发,提出政府应主要运用财政支出手段,发挥财政功能,解决农村产权(以农地产权为主)抵押融资制度建立过程中“钱从哪里来”的问题,处理好各种矛盾。同时,政府有必要运用直接投资、财政补贴、税收优惠等方式对农村中小企业和农户的信用担保机构与方式进行财政上的支持,以解决农业资金短缺、农村企业和农民贷款难的问题。
基于以上分析,本文研究的主要内容如下：
(1)农村信贷担保体系的相关问题研究
农村信贷担保体系是一个综合性的系统工程,发展农村信贷担保体系需要同时进行两方面基础性内容的建设：农村抵押担保市场和农村信用担保机构。
1)以农村土地产权制度改革为契机,发展农村抵押担保市场
农民拥有的动产较少,而且不是其财产的主要表现形式,通过抵押动产进行融资的发展空间有限,农民拥有的各类产权才是其最重要的可用财产。但是我国农村产权制度复杂,对所有权、承包权和经营权的归属关系错乱不清,极大限制了农村产权抵押融资的发展。因此,农村产权制度改革是农村拓展抵押担保市场的首要步骤。以农村土地产权制度改革为契机,顺应形势,建立我国农村土地产权抵押担保市场。
2)进行农村信用担保机构的建设
与服务于城市中小企业的担保机构相比,农村信用担保机构具有如下特点：农村信贷配给现象明显高于城市,农村信贷担保市场的公共品性质以及市场失灵现象更为严重；农村信贷担保机构更多地要为农村中小企业贷款进行担保服务,贷款的额度小,笔数多,需要大量的服务费用开支,增加了管理的难度；农村信用担保机构与农村信用社的关系紧密,在担保过程中为减小担保风险,尝试与农村信用社合作进行贷款模式的创新。在农村信用担保体系建立初期,为适应农村信贷发展的特点,并参照城市信用担保机构的发展模式,发展以政策性和互助性农村担保机构为主,农村商业信用担保机构为辅的“两主一辅”的农村信用担保体系。
3)对农村抵押担保与农村信用担保互动机制的介绍
首先,无论是抵押担保还是信用担保,服务目标是一致的,都是为了缓和农村信贷供需矛盾,减少农村信贷双方的信息不对称,增加农户和农村中小企业的贷款机会。其次,农村信用担保摆脱不了对物的抵押。信用担保机构只是将放贷机构的风险转移,但本身无法消除面临的担保风险,通常要进行抵押的反担保或再担保。再次,在发展农村产权抵押融资过程中,需要信用担保的辅助,特别是在农村土地产权交易的初期,一些地方政府允许农地抵押的政策有可能与现行法律相违背,在抵押过程中银行面临较大的政策风险,需要政策性担保机构的参与,强化农地产权担保的安全性。在未来构筑有中国特色的农地金融制度时,农村信用担保机构是不可或缺的组成部分。
(2)关于农村信贷担保体系中的财政角色与功能
1)在农村产权制度改革方面,一系列制度的建立都需要财政资金的支持
建设农村产权交易平台,前期需要政府的大量投入。如购置交易所用地、基础设施、设备系统建设等方面的固定资产投资；还需要专门用于对农地流转客户的注册费、管理费补贴,对中介机构入场租金和工作经费补贴,对服务效果良好的中介机构进行税收减免等优惠措施。另外,在确权过程中相关费用的承担以及建立政府评估机构和完善农村抵押融资的风险分担机构等方面,财政都起到支撑的作用。
2)在农村信用担保机构方面,要区分不同性质的农村信用担保机构,采取不同的支持策略
对于政策性担保机构,要发挥财政的基础性功能,用财政资金全面覆盖政策性担保机构的运营环节；对于商业性担保机构,要通过财政手段引导其进入农村市场,在税收方面给予优惠,对经营过程中出现的资金问题进行有条件的补偿；对互助性的农村信用担保机构,政策上的支持要大于资金的资助,发挥财政政策的调节功能,促使各类政府和金融机构与农村互助性担保机构进行合作,推动信贷担保的创新。
3)在抵押品的替代机制方面
通过财政补贴方式建立农村担保贷款制度,通过财政途径促进农户联保贷款环境的改善和联保贷款方式的优化,增加涉农贷款的利率补贴种类与数量,以减少对农村抵押品的过分依赖。
(3)农村信贷担保的配套体系及财政政策
经过近几年的发展,农村信贷担保,特别是借鉴国外模式发展的信用担保体系已较完善。然而,促进农村信贷发展的方式不应局限于担保一种,还需要包括其他金融财政、法律、文化等手段。从农村金融生态环境建设的角度出发,分析作用于农村信贷的一些重要经济制度与措施,以及农村信贷担保与这些制度措施的关系,从更宏观的视角探讨财政对农村信贷担保的支持政策,以保证农村信贷机构及担保体系的更好发展。本文认为与农村信贷担保联系最为紧密的制度包括农业保险制度、农村信用体系以及农村的社会保障制度,这些制度都与农村信贷担保有着非常明确的逻辑联系。因此,需要重新整合相关的支农资金,在服务农村经济和金融的层面上,把握农村信贷担保的配套体系。
The shortage of capital has become the bottleneck to solve Three Rural Issues. For the economic strength of small and medium-sized enterprises and rural farmers is weak, small-scale peasant economy of self-support, the existing policy of financial support to agriculture of our country, the existing defects on institution and function of financial institutions in rural areas, institutions not willing to extend the loan in amount. Solving the capital shortage of agricultural and the difficulties in loans of enterprises and farmers need to improve the system of finance, credit, and land in our rural areas as well as other relevant policies. Among these, the credit guarantee is a safeguard measure that could ensure the bank credit capital. It has significance in speeding up the capital circulation, promoting the benign interaction between enterprises and bank encouraging the development of small and medium-sized enterprises. But the development of credit guarantee in rural is slow, even stagnates, because of factors bring out of dual economic structure of urban and rural areas, such as the financial difference between urban and rural areas, the lack of effective security, the credit flaw of rural economic entities, and the in-adaptation between corresponding legal system of credit guarantee and rural environment. Poor guarantee brought the rural economic entities into credit trouble, sparked a series of problems to be solved, and restricted the development of rural economy.
The rural credit guarantee system includes two basic elements:one is the mortgage guarantee system, which is based on, and the other is the third party credit guarantee system, which takes human as carrier.
As the main property of the countryside, rural land played a critical role in the whole process of the property rights mortgage financing. The characteristics of farmer's right to use of land determined that land use right is appropriate for serving as mortgage in rural land financial system. On one hand, it can solve the difficulties in farmers' loan problems; on the other hand, it can reduce the risk of operating rural financial institutions. Then fund shortage problem of agricultural development can be solved. But at present, mortgage financing of farmland property rights in our country is still in the initial stage, there's a lot of work need to be done in the future to establish a farmland financial system, which is suitable for China's national conditions. Therefore, from the national strategic perspective, this paper proposes that the government should take fiscal measures, play financial function, to solve the problems that occurred in the establishing process of this system, deal well with all kinds of contradictions.
As the microscopic subject that playing function in rural credit guarantee, credit guarantee agencies make the information asymmetry between farmers and financial institutions transparent to some extent; reduce the loan risk of financial institution such as banks, the difficulties in financing difficulties. Therefore, constructing our country's rural credit guarantee system has practical significance. However, the typical characteristic of rural credit guarantee makes market a serious problem. The rural credit guarantee has a big external economy, it is a high-risk industry, and credit guarantee product has the characteristic of quasi-public goods, this makes the development of rural credit guarantee can't depend entirely on the market mechanism to promote. The government's support, especially financial support is very important.
Based on the two problems mentioned above, this paper put forward that the government should use fiscal measures and play fiscal function to resolve the series problems appeared in the process of rural land financial system construction, deal well with all kinds of contradictions. In the same time, it is necessary for the government to use direct investment, financial subsidies and tax incentives and other ways to give financial support in credit guarantee of small and medium-sized enterprises so as to resolve the problems of capital and loan difficulties for rural enterprises and farmers. The main content of this paper is as follows:
(1) The research of related problems about rural credit guarantee system
The rural credit guarantee system is a comprehensive one, and the development of rural credit guarantee system need simultaneously two aspects of the construction of the basic content:rural mortgage guarantee market and rural credit guarantee agencies.
1) Take the property rights system reform in the rural areas as an opportunity to the development of rural mortgage guarantee market.
The space of finance through mortgage is limited because of chattels in farmers'hands is less and not the main form of their property. And the rural property right system in our country is complicated, the relations of ownership, contract right, and the right of management are not clear, greatly limits the development of rural property mortgage financing. Therefore, the rural property rights system reform is the first step of expanding rural mortgage guarantee market. Take the opportunity of right system reform in the rural areas, and follow this trend, then set up the rural property mortgage guarantee market.
2) Constructing the rural credit guarantee agencies
Compared with the credit guarantee agencies in cities, rural credit guarantee agencies have the following characteristics:the rural credit rationing phenomenon was significantly higher than the cities, the public nature of rural credit guarantee market and market failure phenomenon were more serious; the rural credit guarantee agencies guaranteed more for farmers'loan. This need large amount of service, and increased the difficulty of management; the relationship between rural credit guarantee agencies and rural credit cooperatives was close, in order to reduce risk in the process of guarantee, the rural credit guarantee agencies try cooperate with rural credit cooperatives to innovate the mode of loan. In the early step of rural credit guarantee system construction, referring to the development mode of urban credit agencies, we should develop such credit guarantee system that giving priority to policy guarantee agencies, supplementing by commercial and mutual guarantee agencies.
3)The introduction to the rural mortgage guarantee and interaction mechanism of rural credit guarantee
First of all, whether mortgage guarantee, or credit guarantee, the service target is consistent, that is to alleviate the contradiction between supply and demand of rural credit, reduce the information asymmetry of both sides of the rural credit parties, and increase the loan opportunities for farmers and the rural small and medium-sized enterprise. Second, rural credit guarantee can not lack of mortgage. Credit guarantee agencies only transfer the risk but cannot remove the risk by itself. Removing risk usually need the counter guarantee or re-guarantee. Last but not least, in the development of rural property mortgage financing process, credit guarantee auxiliary is needed, especially in the early stages of the rural property transactions, polices that allowed the mortgage of the land of some local governments were against with current laws. Banks are confronted with great political risk in the mortgage process, so participation of political guarantee agencies is needed, in order to strengthen the security of property right of the guarantee.
(2) The financial roles and functions in the rural credit guarantee system
1) In rural property rights system reform, the establishment of series system needs financial funds support.
In the early step of rural property right trading construction, large amount of investment from government is needed, such as the fixed assets investments in purchasing of exchange land, constructing of basic installation and equipment system and other aspects, as well as some incentive measures, for instance, the subsidies to register and management that specially used for farmland circulation, the subsidies to the rent and working allowance of intermediary agencies, and tax relive to those intermediary institutions that have good service effects. In addition, finance plays the supportive role in bearing cost that appeared in the process of indeed the right, setting up a government agency for evaluation and improving the institution of rural mortgage financing risk allocation and so on.
2) In aspect of the rural credit guarantee agencies, we need to distinguish the different nature of these agencies, and then adopt different supportive strategy. For the political guarantee agencies, we should make full use of the financial founded function, and cover the operating links of political guarantee agencies comprehensively in use of capital. For the commercial guarantee agencies, we should use financial measures to guide them into rural market, give preferences in taxes, and make conditional compensation to the capital that appeared in the management process. For the rural mutual guarantee agencies, political supports should be more than fund support. Our government should play the adjustment function of fiscal policy, induce the cooperation among kinds of financial institutions, mutual guarantee agencies, and prompt the innovation of credit guarantee.
3) In aspect of the alternative mechanisms in collateral
Establish rural guarantee loan system through the financial subsidy way, and through the financial way to improve the environment of joint guarantee lending and the optimization of its form, increase the types and volume of interest rate for the loan subsidies in order to reduce the over-rely on the rural collateral.
(3) The complete set of rural credit guarantee system and fiscal policies
With the development in recent years, rural credit guarantee system, especially those refer from foreign mode have become relatively perfect. However, the ways to promote the rural credit should not be limited to the guarantee; it also needs financial, legal, and cultural means. From the view of rural financial ecological environment construction, analyzing some important economic system and measures that working on rural credit guarantee as well as the relations between them then discuss the support policy on rural credit guarantee at the macroscopic level, so as to ensure a better development of rural credit agency and guarantee system. In the view of this paper, the systems that having the most closely contact with rural credit guarantee including the agricultural insurance system, rural credit system, and rural social security system. There is a very clear logic connection between these systems and the rural credit guarantee. Therefore, it is necessary to re-integrate the relevant capital that used for agriculture support, and ensure the matching system of rural credit guarantee at the level of servicing rural economy and finance.
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