基于利益相关者理论的我国上市公司独立董事治理机制研究
|
摘要
中国证监会2001年8月颁布《关于在上市公司建立独立董事制度的指导意见》,标志着独立董事制度在我国步入实施阶段,由于独立董事制度应用于我国公司治理实践的时间不长,目前,针对我国上市公司的公司治理的系统研究不太多,对独立董事治理机制的系统研究就更少,如何建立有效的独立董事治理机制尚处于实践探索阶段。随着我国现代企业制度改革的日益深化,独立董事参与公司治理实践的不断深入和发展,健全和完善独立董事制度将成为完善公司治理结构的重要内容之一,对独立董事治理机制的相关研究就显得愈加重要和迫切。因此,本文对我国上市公司独立董事治理机制进行深入的研究。
首先,对独立董事治理的制度背景进行了全面的描述。从两个角度归纳总结了国外公司治理的主要模式,梳理了国外公司独立董事制度不断发展的诱因和主要演进阶段。分析了我国公司治理发展的四个特点和目前存在的一些有利变化和弊端。一方面,独立董事仍然缺少独立性和保证性;另一方面,独立董事的治理机制亟待完善。
其次,构建我国上市公司独立董事治理机制和评价指标体系。立足于企业的利益相关者理论,系统构建独立董事治理机制,主要包括动力机制、独立性和保证机制。在此基础上,建立相应的实证分析指标体系,通过对沪市454家上市公司数据的实证分析,选择了以单位资产经济增加值(EVA类指标)作为公司绩效和利益相关者价值的衡量指标。
再次,研究独立董事单项治理机制的最优值。在建立独立董事治理机制指标体系的基础上,运用上市公司的2005年和2006年的实际数据,通过分配数列、计算各组均值、变异系数等基本统计指标,对各单项指标和公司绩效进行了实证分析。结果表明,公司规模、独立董事声誉、独立董事年龄、公司高管年薪、股权集中程度、董事长总经理合一性、独立董事报酬、独立董事工作地、独立董事比例、独立董事规模、独立董事职业、独立董事兼职数和独立董事出席率指标对公司绩效都具有显著影响,并计算出最佳的公司治理指标值。
然后,研究独立董事组合治理机制的最优值。一方面,使用多元线性回归分析,证明了公司独立董事治理特征与公司绩效之间的关联是显著的,这与单项治理分析的结论是一致的。另一方面,运用数据挖掘技术对基于利益相关者的独立董事治理机制进行系统化研究,得到不同绩效水平的公司具有的治理组合,提出了独立董事治理机制系统优化的目标模式,即是第一大股东持股比例不能过高,独立董事要保持一定规模,多数来自来自高校、科研机构和行业协会,薪酬处于中等水平等特点。
最后,提出完善独立董事治理机制的对策。在独立董事单项治理机制和组合治理机制实证研究的基础上,结合独立董事治理机制存在的问题,从激励机制、独立性、保证机制和法律建设等方面,对进一步完善独立董事治理机制提出了相关对策建议,为完善公司治理提供参考。
论文的创新之处在于:一是论文从独立董事的独立性、动力性、群体结构和参与治理的途径等方面构建独立董事治理机制,突破以往单一从独立性或动力性研究独立董事参与公司治理的局限,而是对其较为系统、综合地加以研究;二是采用主成分分析、Spearman相关系数和逐步回归法论证了EVA类指标作为公司绩效衡量指标的有效性;三是运用多元线性回归和数据挖掘技术对独立董事治理机制进行系统化研究,从而得到独立董事治理机制不同组合和公司绩效之间的对应关系,其结果比以往的研究更加直观,对完善公司治理机制的更具有实用性。四是针对性地提出上市公司独立董事治理机制优化对策,为相关部门提供决策参考。
Establishment of Independent Director Systems by Listed Companies Guiding Opinion issued by the China Securities Regulatory Commission(CSRC) in August 2001 is the mark of independent director systems was went to practice stage.Due to not long time of applying independent director systems to corporate governance, recently, there are few systematic researches on corporate governance mechanism, and much less systematic researches of independent director governance mechanism. How to establish effective independent director governance mechanism is in the exploring phase. With the deepening of reform of modern enterprise institution and the development of independent directors engage in corporate governance practice, to strengthen and perfect independent director systems will be one of the important contents of improving the corporate governance structures. The research on independent director governance mechanism will be more and more important and urgent. For these reasons, the paper tries to dive deep into this research.
First of all, the paper gives a comprehensive background description of the independent director governance mechanism. A conclusion of the main corporate governance models in other countries is drawn from two perspectives, which identified the trigger of their constant development and clarified the main stages in that process. The paper also analyzes the four characters of the corporate governance development in our country and some beneficial or unfavorable situations. On the one hand, independent director is still in want of independence and assurance; on the other hand, independent director mechanism urgently needs to improve.
Secondly, construct independent director governance mechanism and evaluation indicator system. Based on the stakeholder theory, the independent director governance mechanism should include enterprises dynamic mechanism, independence and assurance mechanism before setting up corresponding indicator system of empirical analysis. By conducting an empirical analysis of the 454 listed companies in Shanghai, economic value added (EVA) of unit capital is selected as a value indicator of company performance measurement.
Thirdly, work out the optimal value of individual governance mechanism of independent director. On the basis of independent director governance mechanism indicator system, combined with actual data of the listed companies in 2005 and 2006, and some basic statistic indicators, such as, frequency distribution, calculate the ratio, coefficient of variation, etc, the paper carries out an empirical analysis of the individual indicator and company performance. The result indicates that, company size; fame and age of the independent director; management annual salary;concentration ratio of stockholders’equity; the unity of the board of director and the manager; salary, career and working place of the independent director; ratio of the independent director;the concurrent posts of the independent director; attendance of the independent director;all the above indicators are important to the company performance, and they are helpful in calculating the optimal corporate governance indicator value.
Fourthly, work out the optimal value of fabricated governance mechanism of independent director. On the one hand, applying multiple linear regression analysis to demonstrate that the governing features of independent director is closely related with the company performance and this result is in correspondence with the individual governance analysis. On the other hand, applying data mining technology to the systematic research of independent director governance mechanism based on the stakeholder theory. The result manifests the distinct governing features of different company performances, which shows directly the change of company performance under the fabricated governance mechanism of independent director, reveals the governing features of independent director of the high performance company, and puts forward a systematic model of independent director governance mechanism.
Finally, propose strategies to improve the independent director governance mechanism. Based on the empirical study of the individual and fabricated governance of the independent director and given consideration to the existing problems of independent director governance, the paper provides suggestions to improve the independent director governance mechanism according to motivation system, independence, assurance mechanism and legal construction, which serves as an inspiration to corporate governance perfection in future.
The new point of this paper includes: (1) Based on independence, enterprises dynamic mechanism, group construction and the way to governance, this paper constructs independent director governance mechanism. It breaks the limitation of study only based on independence or dynamic mechanism, but studies systematically and comprehensively. (2) It demonstrates the efficient of EVA indexes through primary component analysis , Spearman correlation coefficient and linear regression analysis.(3) It makes the systematic research to get the correlation between independent director governance mechanism and company performance with multiple linear regression analysis and data mining technology, then have the result more directly than before, it is more practical to perfect corporate governance mechanism.(4)It proposes pertinent solutions to optimize independent director governance mechanism and offers reference for relative departments to make decisions.
首先,对独立董事治理的制度背景进行了全面的描述。从两个角度归纳总结了国外公司治理的主要模式,梳理了国外公司独立董事制度不断发展的诱因和主要演进阶段。分析了我国公司治理发展的四个特点和目前存在的一些有利变化和弊端。一方面,独立董事仍然缺少独立性和保证性;另一方面,独立董事的治理机制亟待完善。
其次,构建我国上市公司独立董事治理机制和评价指标体系。立足于企业的利益相关者理论,系统构建独立董事治理机制,主要包括动力机制、独立性和保证机制。在此基础上,建立相应的实证分析指标体系,通过对沪市454家上市公司数据的实证分析,选择了以单位资产经济增加值(EVA类指标)作为公司绩效和利益相关者价值的衡量指标。
再次,研究独立董事单项治理机制的最优值。在建立独立董事治理机制指标体系的基础上,运用上市公司的2005年和2006年的实际数据,通过分配数列、计算各组均值、变异系数等基本统计指标,对各单项指标和公司绩效进行了实证分析。结果表明,公司规模、独立董事声誉、独立董事年龄、公司高管年薪、股权集中程度、董事长总经理合一性、独立董事报酬、独立董事工作地、独立董事比例、独立董事规模、独立董事职业、独立董事兼职数和独立董事出席率指标对公司绩效都具有显著影响,并计算出最佳的公司治理指标值。
然后,研究独立董事组合治理机制的最优值。一方面,使用多元线性回归分析,证明了公司独立董事治理特征与公司绩效之间的关联是显著的,这与单项治理分析的结论是一致的。另一方面,运用数据挖掘技术对基于利益相关者的独立董事治理机制进行系统化研究,得到不同绩效水平的公司具有的治理组合,提出了独立董事治理机制系统优化的目标模式,即是第一大股东持股比例不能过高,独立董事要保持一定规模,多数来自来自高校、科研机构和行业协会,薪酬处于中等水平等特点。
最后,提出完善独立董事治理机制的对策。在独立董事单项治理机制和组合治理机制实证研究的基础上,结合独立董事治理机制存在的问题,从激励机制、独立性、保证机制和法律建设等方面,对进一步完善独立董事治理机制提出了相关对策建议,为完善公司治理提供参考。
论文的创新之处在于:一是论文从独立董事的独立性、动力性、群体结构和参与治理的途径等方面构建独立董事治理机制,突破以往单一从独立性或动力性研究独立董事参与公司治理的局限,而是对其较为系统、综合地加以研究;二是采用主成分分析、Spearman相关系数和逐步回归法论证了EVA类指标作为公司绩效衡量指标的有效性;三是运用多元线性回归和数据挖掘技术对独立董事治理机制进行系统化研究,从而得到独立董事治理机制不同组合和公司绩效之间的对应关系,其结果比以往的研究更加直观,对完善公司治理机制的更具有实用性。四是针对性地提出上市公司独立董事治理机制优化对策,为相关部门提供决策参考。
Establishment of Independent Director Systems by Listed Companies Guiding Opinion issued by the China Securities Regulatory Commission(CSRC) in August 2001 is the mark of independent director systems was went to practice stage.Due to not long time of applying independent director systems to corporate governance, recently, there are few systematic researches on corporate governance mechanism, and much less systematic researches of independent director governance mechanism. How to establish effective independent director governance mechanism is in the exploring phase. With the deepening of reform of modern enterprise institution and the development of independent directors engage in corporate governance practice, to strengthen and perfect independent director systems will be one of the important contents of improving the corporate governance structures. The research on independent director governance mechanism will be more and more important and urgent. For these reasons, the paper tries to dive deep into this research.
First of all, the paper gives a comprehensive background description of the independent director governance mechanism. A conclusion of the main corporate governance models in other countries is drawn from two perspectives, which identified the trigger of their constant development and clarified the main stages in that process. The paper also analyzes the four characters of the corporate governance development in our country and some beneficial or unfavorable situations. On the one hand, independent director is still in want of independence and assurance; on the other hand, independent director mechanism urgently needs to improve.
Secondly, construct independent director governance mechanism and evaluation indicator system. Based on the stakeholder theory, the independent director governance mechanism should include enterprises dynamic mechanism, independence and assurance mechanism before setting up corresponding indicator system of empirical analysis. By conducting an empirical analysis of the 454 listed companies in Shanghai, economic value added (EVA) of unit capital is selected as a value indicator of company performance measurement.
Thirdly, work out the optimal value of individual governance mechanism of independent director. On the basis of independent director governance mechanism indicator system, combined with actual data of the listed companies in 2005 and 2006, and some basic statistic indicators, such as, frequency distribution, calculate the ratio, coefficient of variation, etc, the paper carries out an empirical analysis of the individual indicator and company performance. The result indicates that, company size; fame and age of the independent director; management annual salary;concentration ratio of stockholders’equity; the unity of the board of director and the manager; salary, career and working place of the independent director; ratio of the independent director;the concurrent posts of the independent director; attendance of the independent director;all the above indicators are important to the company performance, and they are helpful in calculating the optimal corporate governance indicator value.
Fourthly, work out the optimal value of fabricated governance mechanism of independent director. On the one hand, applying multiple linear regression analysis to demonstrate that the governing features of independent director is closely related with the company performance and this result is in correspondence with the individual governance analysis. On the other hand, applying data mining technology to the systematic research of independent director governance mechanism based on the stakeholder theory. The result manifests the distinct governing features of different company performances, which shows directly the change of company performance under the fabricated governance mechanism of independent director, reveals the governing features of independent director of the high performance company, and puts forward a systematic model of independent director governance mechanism.
Finally, propose strategies to improve the independent director governance mechanism. Based on the empirical study of the individual and fabricated governance of the independent director and given consideration to the existing problems of independent director governance, the paper provides suggestions to improve the independent director governance mechanism according to motivation system, independence, assurance mechanism and legal construction, which serves as an inspiration to corporate governance perfection in future.
The new point of this paper includes: (1) Based on independence, enterprises dynamic mechanism, group construction and the way to governance, this paper constructs independent director governance mechanism. It breaks the limitation of study only based on independence or dynamic mechanism, but studies systematically and comprehensively. (2) It demonstrates the efficient of EVA indexes through primary component analysis , Spearman correlation coefficient and linear regression analysis.(3) It makes the systematic research to get the correlation between independent director governance mechanism and company performance with multiple linear regression analysis and data mining technology, then have the result more directly than before, it is more practical to perfect corporate governance mechanism.(4)It proposes pertinent solutions to optimize independent director governance mechanism and offers reference for relative departments to make decisions.
引文
程宗璋.2003.论中国公司经理权约束机制的路径思考[J].经济与管理研究,1:34-39.
陈芳.2006.上市公司独立董事制度的建立和完善[J].集团经济研究,13:71-74.
崔学刚.2004.公司治理机制对公司透明度的影响——来自中国上市公司的经验数据[J].会计研究,8:51-60.
杜胜利,张杰. ,2004.独立董事薪酬影响因素的实证研究[J].会计研究,9:31-42.
段从清. 2004.我国独立董事制度运行的目的、障碍与对策研究[J].中国工业经济,6:50-62.
范英杰.2006.独立董事制度的理性思考—基于道德的视角[J].会计研究,6:22-27.
范英杰.2006 .独立董事制度的理性思考——基于道德的视角[J].会计研究,6:29-34.
高明华,马守莉.2002.独立董事制度与公司绩效关系的实证分析——兼论中国独立董事有效行权的制度环境[J].南开经济研究,2:72-80.
胡兴球,徐芳. 2002.论独立董事激励和约束机制的建设[J].华东经济管理,1:68-76.
黄再胜.2003.国有企业隐性激励”双重缺位”问题探析[J].当代经济科学.5:45-49.郭金林.2002.
产权契约与公司治理结构——演进与创新.北京[M].经济管理出版社,11:60-75.
郭强,蒋东生.2003.不完全契约与独立董事作用的本质及有效性分析[J].管理世界,2:78-98.
金永红,奚玉芹.2003.独立董事制度与中国上市公司治理[M].上海:立信会计出版杜.
简新华,石华巍.2006.独立董事的“独立性悖论”和有效行权的制度设计[J].中国工业经济,3:60-67.
暨朝满.2007.对完善我国独立董事制度的构想——基于独立董事选拔机制的视角[J].财会研究,5:35-43.
寇晓宇.2007.独立董事与上市公司博弈的经济学分析[J].生产力研究,6:112-114.
娄芳,原红旗. 2002.独立董事制度:西方的研究和中国实践中的问题[J].改革,2:79-90.
李传军. 2003.利益相关者共同治理的理论基础与实践[J].管理科学,8:78-87.
李辉婕.2007.独立董事薪酬制度的经济学分析[J].企业经济,9:148-150.
李洪,张德明. 2006 .独立董事与公司治理绩效的灰色关联分析[J].经济管理,18:56-64.
李阳,王辉.2004.利益相关者理论的动态发展与启示[J].当代财经,7:55-62.
梁能.2000.大型企业的实践.公司治理结构:中国的实践与美国的经验[M].中国人民大学出版社.
李常青,赖建清. 2004.董事会特征影响公司绩效吗?[J].金融研究,5:81-89.
李亚静,朱宏泉,黄登仕,周应峰. 2005.董事会控制、经理报酬与公司经营绩效[J].系统工程理论与实践,2:30-39.
李豫湘,甘霖. 2004.中国上市公司各种主体治理机制的相关性和有效性实证研究[J].系统工程理论与实践,6:34-41.
李冬梅.2006.中国独立董事制度的完善和创新[J].经济理论与经济管理,6:67-71.
李海舰,魏恒.2006.重构独立董事制度[J].中国工业经济,4:21-25.
罗跃龙. 2002.关于建立独立董事制度的四个问题[J].经济体制改革,1:43-48.
罗党论,徐璇,封煜.2007.独立董事报酬形成机制研究—以中国上市公司为例[J].管理科学,4:46-53.
马兆平,杨汉明.2002.独立董事引入后董事间的冲突变化[J].中国工业经济,12:75-88.
梅慎实.2002.现代公司治理规范动作论[M].北京:中国法制出版社.
潘华,孙良胜.2006.从上市公司信息披露看我国独立董事制度[J].经济问题探索,6:33-37.
潘泽清.2003.公司社区治理机制与转轨中的日本公司治理[J].世界经济研究,3:18-27.
潘华,孙良胜.2006.从上市公司信息披露看我国独立董事制度[J].经济问题探索,6: 146 -149.
彭真明,江华.2003.美国独立董事制度与德国监事会制度之比较—也论中国公司治理模式的选择[J].法学评论,1:38-45.
青木昌彦.2001.比较制度分析[M].上海远东出版社.
沈辉. 2006.承担与支付相分离:我国独立董事薪酬制度的必然选择[J].经济师,11:42-47.
苏新龙,张建英.2007.上市公司财务独立董事的职能分析[J].生产力研究,14:46-48.
申富平,韩巧艳,赵红梅.2007.我国上市公司独立董事制度实施现状分析--以河北、浙江、云南和甘肃省为例[J].审计研究,3:53-57.
孙回回,刘斌,于波成.2005.浅析完善独立董事制度的长短期策略[J].重庆大学学报(自然科学版),2:155-158.
孙君亮,刘志雄. 2002.谁给独立董事付酬[J].经济论坛,10:32-36.
孙泽蕤,朱晓妹.2005.上市公司独立董事薪酬制度的理论研究及现状分析[J].南开管理评论.1:81-92.唐清泉.2005.上市公司作用下独立董事任职的动机与作用[J].管理科学,8:8-13.
唐清泉. 2006 .设置独立董事一定能够提升公司业绩[J].经济管理,1:78-84.
唐清泉,叶艳芬.2006.独立董事行权的有效性与实现途径——基于独立董事问卷调查的研究[J].经济管理,11:30-36.
唐清泉,叶艳芬.2006.独立董事行权的有效性与实现途径——基于独立董事问卷调查的研究[J].经济管理,11:30-36.
唐清泉,罗党论,王莉.2006.上市公司独立董事辞职行为研究——基于前景理论的分析[J].南开管理评论,1:61-66
唐清泉,罗党论.2006.设立独立董事的效果分析——来自中国上市公司独立董事的问卷调查[J].中国工业经济,1:23-27
唐清泉.2006.独立董事对报酬与风险的取向──基于深交所的实证研究[J].财经理论与实践,1:51-55.
唐跃军,徐飞.2007.独立董事保护了中小股东权益吗?——基于中国上市公司投票机制的研究[J].经济管理,7:42-47.
唐跃军,张贻燮.2007.利益相关者治理评价和治理指数——基于中国最具上市公司评价[N].证券市场导报,5: 63-70.
童小军,李传昭,杜璿. ,2007 .不完全信息条件下独立董事的信号机制[J].统计与决策,14:67-78.
王国成.2002.企业治理结构与企业家选择——博弈论在企业组织行为选择中的应用[M].经济管理出版社,12.
王国海.2003.独立董事有效性:一个制度经济学视角的分析[J].财经理论与实践,1:33-41.
王伟,李艳. 2002 .论董事责任保险制度[J].保险研究,1:78-86.
王颖.2002.对开办我国独立董事责任保险的思考[J].上海保险,2:45-51.
魏晓琴,孙立军,滕园. 2003.从国际视角看独立董事制度的完善[J].技术经济与管理研究,2:81-88.
吴建雄等.2002.独立董事怎么样了--上市公司推行独立董事制度现状调研分析[N].证券时报.1:10.吴晓晖,姜彦福.2006.机构投资者影响下独立董事治理效率变化研究[J].中国工业经济,5:32-37.
吴晓晖,陈闯,姜彦福.2007.非政策性因素的独立董事形成机制实证研究[J].中国工业经济,1:104-111
吴晓晖,娄景辉.2008.独立董事对传统内部治理机制影响的实证研究--基于多元回归模型和Logistic模型的中国证据[J].数量经济技术经济研究,4:142-152.
向锐,曹国华,杨秀苔. 2001.公司治理的政府介入结构分析[J].中国管理科学,2:66-71.
肖元涛.2004.利益相关者共同治理与企业所有权边界研究[J].技术经济与管理研究,3:67-73.
谢德仁.2005.独立董事:代理问题之一部分[J].会计研究,2:33-41.
徐碧琳.2002.上市公司独立董事制度研究—中美上市公司独立董事制度之比较[J].外国经济与管理,1:70-78.
肖曙光. 2006.独立董事制度与我国上市公司业绩的相关性研究[J].系统工程,8:87-92.
徐光华,王怀明,陈万明.2007.关于现阶段中国独立董事制度若干问题的思考[J].财政研究,1:78-83.
阎达五,谭劲松.2003.我国上市公司独立董事制度:缺陷与改进——一个基于制度分析的研究框架[J].会计研究,11:82-91.
杨瑞龙,周业安.2000.企业的利益相关者理论及其应用[M].经济科学出版社,7.
杨瑞龙,周业安.2001..企业共同治理机制的经济学分析[M].经济科学出版社.
杨瑞龙,周业安.1997.一个关于企业所有权安排的规范性分析框架及其理论含义———兼评张维迎、周其仁及崔之元的一些观点[J].经济研究,1:12-22.
杨瑞龙,周业安.1998.论利益相关者合作逻辑下的企业共同治理机制[J].中国工业经济,1:33-44.
杨蓄忠.2001.利用层次分析综合测定企业活力[J].统计与决策,7:30-31.
杨忠莲,杨振慧.2006.独立董事与审计委员会执行效果研究——来自报表重述的证据[J].审计研究,2:47-52.
姚伟,黄卓,郭磊.2003.公司治理理论前沿综述[J].经济研究,5:53-58.
叶康涛,陆正飞,张志华. 2007独立董事能否抑制大股东的“掏空”[J].经济研究,4:34-40.-
叶康涛,陆正飞,张志华.2007.独立董事能否抑制大股东的“掏空”[J].经济研究,4:101-111.
叶祥松,曹宗平.2003.完善我国独立董事制度的理性思考[J].经济学动态,4:63-69.
于东智.2003.董事会、公司治理与绩效[J].中国社会科学,3:29-41.
于东智,王化成.2003.独立董事与公司治理:理论、经验与实践[J].会计研究,8:83-94.
袁振兴.2004.财务目标:最大化还是均衡——基于利益相关者财务框架[J].会计研究,11:77-86.
张栋,杨淑娥.2005.论企业财权配置——基于公司治理理论发展视角[J].会计研究,4:26-36.
张华伦,王海茸,杨曦,王磊.2007.独立董事与公司业绩关系的实证研究[J].统计与决策,23:12-17.
张庆.2006 .我国上市公司独立董事制度与中小股东的利益保护[J].经济管理,21:66-70.
张维迎.2005.产权激励与公司治理[M].经济科学出版社.
张维迎.1996.所有制、治理结构及委托—代理关系———兼评崔之元和周其仁的一些观点[J].经济研究,9:35-53.
张先治,甄红线.2006.基于价值的公司治理[J].财经问题研究,6: 31-36.
张银杰.美.2003.我国独立董事制度的演进及对我国的启示[J].经济学动态,8:90-95.
张兆国,张庆,宋丽梦.2004.论利益相关者合作逻辑下的企业财权安排[J].会计研究,2:56-62.
张宗益,党文娟.2006.我国独立董事制度创新的“内卷化”问题实证研究[J].当代经济科学,5:40-47.
周刚,姜彦福,雷家骕,傅家骥. 2002(2):77-79.战略性大股东的公司治理[J].中国管理科学.
周鹏,张宏志. 2002.利益相关者间的谈判与企业治理结构[J].经济研究,6:55-62.
Agrawal, Anup and Knoeber,Charles R. 1996. Firm Performance and Mechanisms to Control Agency Problems Between Managers and Shareholders[J]. Journal of Finance and Quantitative Analysis,31: 377-397.
Arthur,N. 2001. Board Composition as the Outcome of an Internal Bargaining Process: EmpiricalEvidence[J]. Journal of Corporate Finance,7:307- 340
Berle,A. and Means,G. 1997. The Modern Corporation and Private Property,1932.[M]. Reprint by Transaction Publishers.
Blair M. M.,1998. For whom should corporations be run: an economic rational for stakeholder management[J]. Long Range Planning,31: 195-200.
Blanchard, Olivier and Michael Kremer. 1997. Disorganization[J]. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112(4):1091-1126.
Borokhovich,K. A., Parrino, P. and Trapani. T. 1996. Outside Directors and CEO Selection[J]. Journal of Financial Quantitative Analysis,Vo l. 31,No. 3:337- 355
Byrd, J.W.,Hickman,K.A .1992.“Do Outside Directors Monitor Managers? Evidence From Tender Offer Bids.”[J]. Journal of Financial Economics,32(2):195-221
Chen,J.P.,Charles, & Jaggi,B. L. 1998. The Association between independent non-executive directors, family control and financial disclosures[J]. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy,4:88-95.
Chow,C.,& Wong-Boren, A. 1987. Voluntary financial disclosure by Mexican corporations[J]. The Accounting Review,62(3): 533-541.
Claessens,S. Simeon Djankov, and Larry, H.P. Lang. 2002. Disentangling the incentive and entrenchment effects of large shareholdings[J]. Journal of Finance,57:2741-2771.
Clarkson,M. 1995. A stakeholder framework for analyzing and evaluating corporate social performance [J]. Academy of Management Review,20(1): 92-117.
Collier,P. 1993. Factors affecting the formation of audit committees in major UK listed companies[J]. Accounting and Business Research,23(91): 421-430
Craswell,A. & Taylor, S. 1992. Discretionary disclosure of reserves by oil and gas companies: an economic analysis[J]. Journal of Business Finance and Accounting,19:295-308
Daily,Catherine M. and Dalton,Dan R. 1993. Board of Directors Leadership and Structure: Control and Performance Implications,Entrepreneurship[J]. Theory & Practice. A.S.B,Vol.17 (Spring):65-81.
Demsetz,H. and Lehn, K. 1985 . The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Cause and Consequence[J]. Journal of Political Economics,Vo l. 93: 1155-1177.
Donaldson, T. & Preston, L.E. 1995. The stakeholder theory of the corporation: Concepts, evidence,and implications[J]. Academy of Management Review,20(1): 65-91.
Denis,D.J, Denis,D.K.,Sarin,A.. 1997. Agency Problem, Equity Ownership,and Corporat Diversification[J]. Journal of Finance,52:135-160.
Eccles,R. G.,& Mavrinac,S. C. 1995. Improving the corporate disclosure process[J].Sloan Management Review.Summer:11-24.
Fama,E. 1980. Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm[J]. Journal of Political Economy,88:288- 307.
Fama,E. and Jensen,M. 1983. Separation of Ownership and Control[J]. Journal of L aw and Economics,Vo l. 26:301-325
Forker,J. J. 1992. Corporate governance and disclosure quality[J]. Accounting and Business Research,22(86): 111-124.
Fosberg,R.H. 1989. Outside Directors and Managerial Monitoring[J]. Akron Business and Economic Review,20:24-32.
Freeman, R.E. 1984. Strategic management: A stakeholder approach[M]. Boston,MA: Pitman.
Freeman, R.E. 1994. The politics of stakeholder theory: Some future directions[J]. Business Ethics Quarterly,4: 409-421.
Gray,S. J.,Radebaugh,L. H., & Robert, C. B. 1990. International perceptions of cost constraints on voluntary information disclosures: a comparative study of UK & US multinationals[J]. Journal of International Business Studies. Fourth Quarter:597-622.
Hart, O. 1983. The Market Mechanism as an Incentive Scheme[J]. Bell Journal of Economic,Vo l. 14,Autumn: 366-382.
Hart O,Moore J. 1990. Property rights and the nature of firm [J]. Journal of Political Economy,98(6): 1119-1158.
Healy,P. M. & Palepu,K. G. 1995. The challenges of investor communication: the case of CUC International,Inc. [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,Vol. 38, No.2:111-140.
Hermalin,B.E. and Weisbach,M.S. 1988. The Determinants of Board Dompsition[J]. Rand Journal of Economics,Vo l. 19,No. 4,Winter:589- 606.
Hill,J. G. 1999. Deconstructing Sunbeam–Contemporary issues in corporate governance [J]. University of Cincinnati Law Review,Vol.67: 1099–1127.
Holmstrom,B. 1979. Moral Hazard and Observability[J]. Bell Journal of Economic,Vo l. 10,Spring: 74-91.
Hossain,M.,Tan,L. M., & Adams, M. 1994. Voluntary disclosure in an emerging capital market: some empirical evidence from companies listed on the K.L. Stock Exchange[J]. International Journal of Accounting,29: 334-351.
Jensen,M. 1993. The Modern Industrial Revolution,Exit,and Failure of Internal Control Systems[J]. Journal of Finance,Vo l.48: 831- 880.
Jensen,M. and Murphy,K. J. 1990. Performance Pay and Top2 Management Incentives[J]. Journal of Political Economics,Vo l.98(2):225- 264.
Jensen, M,C. 2001. Value Maximization, Stakeholder Theory And The Corporate Objective Function[J]. Journal of Applied Corporate Finance,Vol No.3:71-84.
Jensen,M.C.,& Meckling, W. H. 1976. Theory of the firm: managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure[J]. Journal of Financial Economics,3:305-360.
Kang,J. and Shivdasani,A. 1995. Firm Performance,Corporate Governance,and Top Executive Turnover in Japan[J]. Journal of Financial Economics,38:29- 58.
La Porta,R.,Lopez-De-Silances, & Shieifer, A. 1999. Corporate ownership around the world[J]. The Journal of Finance,April:471-517.
Lang,M. H.,& Lundholm, R. J. 1996. Corporate disclosure policy and analyst behavior[J]. The Accounting Review,71(4): 467-492.
LaPorta,A., Lopez2de2slianes,F., Shleifer,A.and Vishny,R. 2000. Investor Protection and Corporate Governance[J]. Journal of Finance Economics,58:3- 27.
Laura Lin. 2001. The Effectiveness of Outside Directors as A Corporate Governance Mechanism: Theories and Evidence[J]. Journal of Finance Economics,31:13- 35.
Lee,Y. S., Rosenstein,S. and Wyatt,J. G. 1999. The Value of Financial Outside Directors on Corporate Boards[J]. International Review of Economic and Finance,8:421- 431.
Leftwich,R.,Watts, R., & Zimmerman,J. 1981. Voluntary corporate disclosure: the case of interim reporting[J]. Journal of Accounting Research.Supplement to,Vol.19: 50-77.
Lev,B. 1992. Information disclosure strategy[J]. California Management Review. Summer: 9-32.
Lorsch,Jay W. 1995. To Authorize Board of Directors[J]. Harvard Business Review,(January / February):35-56.
Malone,D., Fries,C., & Jones,T. 1993. An empirical investigation of the extent of corporate financial disclosure in the oil and gas Industry[J]. Journal of Accounting, Auditing and Finance, 6:249-273.
Mark,Y. T. and L i,Y. 2001. Determinations of Corporate Ownership and Board Structure: Evidence from Singapore[J]. Journal of Corporate Finance,7:235- 256.
Mckinnon,J. L.,& Dalimunthe, L. 1993. Voluntary disclosure of segment information by Australian diversified companie [J]. Accounting and Finance.May:33-50.
McMullen,D. A. 1996. Audit committee performance: an investigation of the consequences associated with audit committee [J]. Auditing: A Journal of Theory and Practice,15 (1):87-103.
Meek,G. K.,Robert,C. B.,& Gray,S. J. 1995. Factors influencing voluntary annual report disclosures by U.S., U.K. and Continental Europe multinational corporations[J]. Journal of International Business Studies,26(3): 555-572.
Millstein, I. 1992. The Limits of Corporate Power: Existing Constraints on the Exercise of Corporate Discretion [M].New York: Macmillan, 44-59.
Molz, R. 1988. Managerial domination of boards of directors and financial performance. [J].Journal of Business Research,16: 235-249.
Morck,R.,Shleifer,A.,& Vishny,R. W. 1988. Management ownership and market valuation: an empirical analysis[J]. Journal of Financial Economics,20: 293-315.
Olson M. 1980.The Logic of Collective Action [M]. Harvard University Press:144-157.
Oppenheim,A. N. 1966. Questionnaire Design and Attitude Measurement. New York: Basic Books.
Pound,J. 1995. The promise of the governed corporation[J]. Harvard Business Review,73 (2): 89-98.
Raffournier,B. 1995. The determinants of voluntary financial disclosure by Swiss listed companies[J]. European Accounting Review,4 (2): 261-280
Redding,S. G.,& Pugh,D. S. 1986. The formal and the informal: Japanese and Chinese organization structures[M] The Enterprise and Management in East Asia, Hong Kong, Center of Asian Studies, the University of Hong Kong,153-168.
Renneboog,L. 2000. Ownership, Managerial Control and the Governance of Companies Listed on the Brussels Stock Exchange[J]. Journal of Banking & Finance,24: 1959-1995.
Roger.H.Ford. 1988. Outside Directors and the Privately-Owned Firm: Are They Necessary[J]. Entrepreneurship: Theory & Practice. Fall88,13(1): 49-57.
Rosenstein,S. and Wyatt, J. G. 1990. Outside Directors, Board Independence and Shareholder Wealth[J]. Journal of Financial Economics,26(2):175-191.
Ruland,W.,Tung,S.,& George, N. 1990. Factors associated with the disclosure of managers’forecasts[J]. The Accounting Review,65:710-21.
Shivsasani,A. 1993. Board Composition,Ownership Structure, and Ho stile Takeover[J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics,Vol. 16,:167-198.
Shleifer,A. and V ishny,R. 1997. A Survey of Corporate Governance[J]. Journal of Finance. No. 2,June:737-783.
Smith,A. 1776.The Wealth of Nations[M]. Cannan edition,New York: Modern library.
Tai, B. Y. K, Au-Yeung, O. K.,Kwok, M. C. M., & Lau, L. W. C. 1990. Noncompliance with disclosure requirements in financial statements: the case of Hong Kong companies[J].International Journal of Accounting, 25(2): 99-112.
Weisbach,Michael S. 1988. Outside Directors and CEO Turnover[J]. Journal of Financial Economics,20(January/March):431-460.
Welker,M. 1995. Disclosure policy, information asymmetry, and liquid in equity market[J]. Contemporary Accounting Research,11(Spring): 800-827.
White,H. 1980. A Hetero skedasticity2Consistent Covariance Matrix and a Direct Test for Hetero skedasticity[J]. Econometrica. 48,:817- 838.
William,O. and Brown, Jr. 1996. Exit,Voice,and the Role of Corporate Directors: Evidence from Acquisition Performance[M]. Working paper in economics,Claremont Collages:129-148.
Yermack,D. 1996. Higher Valuation of Companies With A Small Board of Directors[J]. Journal of Financial Economics,40:185- 212.
陈芳.2006.上市公司独立董事制度的建立和完善[J].集团经济研究,13:71-74.
崔学刚.2004.公司治理机制对公司透明度的影响——来自中国上市公司的经验数据[J].会计研究,8:51-60.
杜胜利,张杰. ,2004.独立董事薪酬影响因素的实证研究[J].会计研究,9:31-42.
段从清. 2004.我国独立董事制度运行的目的、障碍与对策研究[J].中国工业经济,6:50-62.
范英杰.2006.独立董事制度的理性思考—基于道德的视角[J].会计研究,6:22-27.
范英杰.2006 .独立董事制度的理性思考——基于道德的视角[J].会计研究,6:29-34.
高明华,马守莉.2002.独立董事制度与公司绩效关系的实证分析——兼论中国独立董事有效行权的制度环境[J].南开经济研究,2:72-80.
胡兴球,徐芳. 2002.论独立董事激励和约束机制的建设[J].华东经济管理,1:68-76.
黄再胜.2003.国有企业隐性激励”双重缺位”问题探析[J].当代经济科学.5:45-49.郭金林.2002.
产权契约与公司治理结构——演进与创新.北京[M].经济管理出版社,11:60-75.
郭强,蒋东生.2003.不完全契约与独立董事作用的本质及有效性分析[J].管理世界,2:78-98.
金永红,奚玉芹.2003.独立董事制度与中国上市公司治理[M].上海:立信会计出版杜.
简新华,石华巍.2006.独立董事的“独立性悖论”和有效行权的制度设计[J].中国工业经济,3:60-67.
暨朝满.2007.对完善我国独立董事制度的构想——基于独立董事选拔机制的视角[J].财会研究,5:35-43.
寇晓宇.2007.独立董事与上市公司博弈的经济学分析[J].生产力研究,6:112-114.
娄芳,原红旗. 2002.独立董事制度:西方的研究和中国实践中的问题[J].改革,2:79-90.
李传军. 2003.利益相关者共同治理的理论基础与实践[J].管理科学,8:78-87.
李辉婕.2007.独立董事薪酬制度的经济学分析[J].企业经济,9:148-150.
李洪,张德明. 2006 .独立董事与公司治理绩效的灰色关联分析[J].经济管理,18:56-64.
李阳,王辉.2004.利益相关者理论的动态发展与启示[J].当代财经,7:55-62.
梁能.2000.大型企业的实践.公司治理结构:中国的实践与美国的经验[M].中国人民大学出版社.
李常青,赖建清. 2004.董事会特征影响公司绩效吗?[J].金融研究,5:81-89.
李亚静,朱宏泉,黄登仕,周应峰. 2005.董事会控制、经理报酬与公司经营绩效[J].系统工程理论与实践,2:30-39.
李豫湘,甘霖. 2004.中国上市公司各种主体治理机制的相关性和有效性实证研究[J].系统工程理论与实践,6:34-41.
李冬梅.2006.中国独立董事制度的完善和创新[J].经济理论与经济管理,6:67-71.
李海舰,魏恒.2006.重构独立董事制度[J].中国工业经济,4:21-25.
罗跃龙. 2002.关于建立独立董事制度的四个问题[J].经济体制改革,1:43-48.
罗党论,徐璇,封煜.2007.独立董事报酬形成机制研究—以中国上市公司为例[J].管理科学,4:46-53.
马兆平,杨汉明.2002.独立董事引入后董事间的冲突变化[J].中国工业经济,12:75-88.
梅慎实.2002.现代公司治理规范动作论[M].北京:中国法制出版社.
潘华,孙良胜.2006.从上市公司信息披露看我国独立董事制度[J].经济问题探索,6:33-37.
潘泽清.2003.公司社区治理机制与转轨中的日本公司治理[J].世界经济研究,3:18-27.
潘华,孙良胜.2006.从上市公司信息披露看我国独立董事制度[J].经济问题探索,6: 146 -149.
彭真明,江华.2003.美国独立董事制度与德国监事会制度之比较—也论中国公司治理模式的选择[J].法学评论,1:38-45.
青木昌彦.2001.比较制度分析[M].上海远东出版社.
沈辉. 2006.承担与支付相分离:我国独立董事薪酬制度的必然选择[J].经济师,11:42-47.
苏新龙,张建英.2007.上市公司财务独立董事的职能分析[J].生产力研究,14:46-48.
申富平,韩巧艳,赵红梅.2007.我国上市公司独立董事制度实施现状分析--以河北、浙江、云南和甘肃省为例[J].审计研究,3:53-57.
孙回回,刘斌,于波成.2005.浅析完善独立董事制度的长短期策略[J].重庆大学学报(自然科学版),2:155-158.
孙君亮,刘志雄. 2002.谁给独立董事付酬[J].经济论坛,10:32-36.
孙泽蕤,朱晓妹.2005.上市公司独立董事薪酬制度的理论研究及现状分析[J].南开管理评论.1:81-92.唐清泉.2005.上市公司作用下独立董事任职的动机与作用[J].管理科学,8:8-13.
唐清泉. 2006 .设置独立董事一定能够提升公司业绩[J].经济管理,1:78-84.
唐清泉,叶艳芬.2006.独立董事行权的有效性与实现途径——基于独立董事问卷调查的研究[J].经济管理,11:30-36.
唐清泉,叶艳芬.2006.独立董事行权的有效性与实现途径——基于独立董事问卷调查的研究[J].经济管理,11:30-36.
唐清泉,罗党论,王莉.2006.上市公司独立董事辞职行为研究——基于前景理论的分析[J].南开管理评论,1:61-66
唐清泉,罗党论.2006.设立独立董事的效果分析——来自中国上市公司独立董事的问卷调查[J].中国工业经济,1:23-27
唐清泉.2006.独立董事对报酬与风险的取向──基于深交所的实证研究[J].财经理论与实践,1:51-55.
唐跃军,徐飞.2007.独立董事保护了中小股东权益吗?——基于中国上市公司投票机制的研究[J].经济管理,7:42-47.
唐跃军,张贻燮.2007.利益相关者治理评价和治理指数——基于中国最具上市公司评价[N].证券市场导报,5: 63-70.
童小军,李传昭,杜璿. ,2007 .不完全信息条件下独立董事的信号机制[J].统计与决策,14:67-78.
王国成.2002.企业治理结构与企业家选择——博弈论在企业组织行为选择中的应用[M].经济管理出版社,12.
王国海.2003.独立董事有效性:一个制度经济学视角的分析[J].财经理论与实践,1:33-41.
王伟,李艳. 2002 .论董事责任保险制度[J].保险研究,1:78-86.
王颖.2002.对开办我国独立董事责任保险的思考[J].上海保险,2:45-51.
魏晓琴,孙立军,滕园. 2003.从国际视角看独立董事制度的完善[J].技术经济与管理研究,2:81-88.
吴建雄等.2002.独立董事怎么样了--上市公司推行独立董事制度现状调研分析[N].证券时报.1:10.吴晓晖,姜彦福.2006.机构投资者影响下独立董事治理效率变化研究[J].中国工业经济,5:32-37.
吴晓晖,陈闯,姜彦福.2007.非政策性因素的独立董事形成机制实证研究[J].中国工业经济,1:104-111
吴晓晖,娄景辉.2008.独立董事对传统内部治理机制影响的实证研究--基于多元回归模型和Logistic模型的中国证据[J].数量经济技术经济研究,4:142-152.
向锐,曹国华,杨秀苔. 2001.公司治理的政府介入结构分析[J].中国管理科学,2:66-71.
肖元涛.2004.利益相关者共同治理与企业所有权边界研究[J].技术经济与管理研究,3:67-73.
谢德仁.2005.独立董事:代理问题之一部分[J].会计研究,2:33-41.
徐碧琳.2002.上市公司独立董事制度研究—中美上市公司独立董事制度之比较[J].外国经济与管理,1:70-78.
肖曙光. 2006.独立董事制度与我国上市公司业绩的相关性研究[J].系统工程,8:87-92.
徐光华,王怀明,陈万明.2007.关于现阶段中国独立董事制度若干问题的思考[J].财政研究,1:78-83.
阎达五,谭劲松.2003.我国上市公司独立董事制度:缺陷与改进——一个基于制度分析的研究框架[J].会计研究,11:82-91.
杨瑞龙,周业安.2000.企业的利益相关者理论及其应用[M].经济科学出版社,7.
杨瑞龙,周业安.2001..企业共同治理机制的经济学分析[M].经济科学出版社.
杨瑞龙,周业安.1997.一个关于企业所有权安排的规范性分析框架及其理论含义———兼评张维迎、周其仁及崔之元的一些观点[J].经济研究,1:12-22.
杨瑞龙,周业安.1998.论利益相关者合作逻辑下的企业共同治理机制[J].中国工业经济,1:33-44.
杨蓄忠.2001.利用层次分析综合测定企业活力[J].统计与决策,7:30-31.
杨忠莲,杨振慧.2006.独立董事与审计委员会执行效果研究——来自报表重述的证据[J].审计研究,2:47-52.
姚伟,黄卓,郭磊.2003.公司治理理论前沿综述[J].经济研究,5:53-58.
叶康涛,陆正飞,张志华. 2007独立董事能否抑制大股东的“掏空”[J].经济研究,4:34-40.-
叶康涛,陆正飞,张志华.2007.独立董事能否抑制大股东的“掏空”[J].经济研究,4:101-111.
叶祥松,曹宗平.2003.完善我国独立董事制度的理性思考[J].经济学动态,4:63-69.
于东智.2003.董事会、公司治理与绩效[J].中国社会科学,3:29-41.
于东智,王化成.2003.独立董事与公司治理:理论、经验与实践[J].会计研究,8:83-94.
袁振兴.2004.财务目标:最大化还是均衡——基于利益相关者财务框架[J].会计研究,11:77-86.
张栋,杨淑娥.2005.论企业财权配置——基于公司治理理论发展视角[J].会计研究,4:26-36.
张华伦,王海茸,杨曦,王磊.2007.独立董事与公司业绩关系的实证研究[J].统计与决策,23:12-17.
张庆.2006 .我国上市公司独立董事制度与中小股东的利益保护[J].经济管理,21:66-70.
张维迎.2005.产权激励与公司治理[M].经济科学出版社.
张维迎.1996.所有制、治理结构及委托—代理关系———兼评崔之元和周其仁的一些观点[J].经济研究,9:35-53.
张先治,甄红线.2006.基于价值的公司治理[J].财经问题研究,6: 31-36.
张银杰.美.2003.我国独立董事制度的演进及对我国的启示[J].经济学动态,8:90-95.
张兆国,张庆,宋丽梦.2004.论利益相关者合作逻辑下的企业财权安排[J].会计研究,2:56-62.
张宗益,党文娟.2006.我国独立董事制度创新的“内卷化”问题实证研究[J].当代经济科学,5:40-47.
周刚,姜彦福,雷家骕,傅家骥. 2002(2):77-79.战略性大股东的公司治理[J].中国管理科学.
周鹏,张宏志. 2002.利益相关者间的谈判与企业治理结构[J].经济研究,6:55-62.
Agrawal, Anup and Knoeber,Charles R. 1996. Firm Performance and Mechanisms to Control Agency Problems Between Managers and Shareholders[J]. Journal of Finance and Quantitative Analysis,31: 377-397.
Arthur,N. 2001. Board Composition as the Outcome of an Internal Bargaining Process: EmpiricalEvidence[J]. Journal of Corporate Finance,7:307- 340
Berle,A. and Means,G. 1997. The Modern Corporation and Private Property,1932.[M]. Reprint by Transaction Publishers.
Blair M. M.,1998. For whom should corporations be run: an economic rational for stakeholder management[J]. Long Range Planning,31: 195-200.
Blanchard, Olivier and Michael Kremer. 1997. Disorganization[J]. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112(4):1091-1126.
Borokhovich,K. A., Parrino, P. and Trapani. T. 1996. Outside Directors and CEO Selection[J]. Journal of Financial Quantitative Analysis,Vo l. 31,No. 3:337- 355
Byrd, J.W.,Hickman,K.A .1992.“Do Outside Directors Monitor Managers? Evidence From Tender Offer Bids.”[J]. Journal of Financial Economics,32(2):195-221
Chen,J.P.,Charles, & Jaggi,B. L. 1998. The Association between independent non-executive directors, family control and financial disclosures[J]. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy,4:88-95.
Chow,C.,& Wong-Boren, A. 1987. Voluntary financial disclosure by Mexican corporations[J]. The Accounting Review,62(3): 533-541.
Claessens,S. Simeon Djankov, and Larry, H.P. Lang. 2002. Disentangling the incentive and entrenchment effects of large shareholdings[J]. Journal of Finance,57:2741-2771.
Clarkson,M. 1995. A stakeholder framework for analyzing and evaluating corporate social performance [J]. Academy of Management Review,20(1): 92-117.
Collier,P. 1993. Factors affecting the formation of audit committees in major UK listed companies[J]. Accounting and Business Research,23(91): 421-430
Craswell,A. & Taylor, S. 1992. Discretionary disclosure of reserves by oil and gas companies: an economic analysis[J]. Journal of Business Finance and Accounting,19:295-308
Daily,Catherine M. and Dalton,Dan R. 1993. Board of Directors Leadership and Structure: Control and Performance Implications,Entrepreneurship[J]. Theory & Practice. A.S.B,Vol.17 (Spring):65-81.
Demsetz,H. and Lehn, K. 1985 . The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Cause and Consequence[J]. Journal of Political Economics,Vo l. 93: 1155-1177.
Donaldson, T. & Preston, L.E. 1995. The stakeholder theory of the corporation: Concepts, evidence,and implications[J]. Academy of Management Review,20(1): 65-91.
Denis,D.J, Denis,D.K.,Sarin,A.. 1997. Agency Problem, Equity Ownership,and Corporat Diversification[J]. Journal of Finance,52:135-160.
Eccles,R. G.,& Mavrinac,S. C. 1995. Improving the corporate disclosure process[J].Sloan Management Review.Summer:11-24.
Fama,E. 1980. Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm[J]. Journal of Political Economy,88:288- 307.
Fama,E. and Jensen,M. 1983. Separation of Ownership and Control[J]. Journal of L aw and Economics,Vo l. 26:301-325
Forker,J. J. 1992. Corporate governance and disclosure quality[J]. Accounting and Business Research,22(86): 111-124.
Fosberg,R.H. 1989. Outside Directors and Managerial Monitoring[J]. Akron Business and Economic Review,20:24-32.
Freeman, R.E. 1984. Strategic management: A stakeholder approach[M]. Boston,MA: Pitman.
Freeman, R.E. 1994. The politics of stakeholder theory: Some future directions[J]. Business Ethics Quarterly,4: 409-421.
Gray,S. J.,Radebaugh,L. H., & Robert, C. B. 1990. International perceptions of cost constraints on voluntary information disclosures: a comparative study of UK & US multinationals[J]. Journal of International Business Studies. Fourth Quarter:597-622.
Hart, O. 1983. The Market Mechanism as an Incentive Scheme[J]. Bell Journal of Economic,Vo l. 14,Autumn: 366-382.
Hart O,Moore J. 1990. Property rights and the nature of firm [J]. Journal of Political Economy,98(6): 1119-1158.
Healy,P. M. & Palepu,K. G. 1995. The challenges of investor communication: the case of CUC International,Inc. [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,Vol. 38, No.2:111-140.
Hermalin,B.E. and Weisbach,M.S. 1988. The Determinants of Board Dompsition[J]. Rand Journal of Economics,Vo l. 19,No. 4,Winter:589- 606.
Hill,J. G. 1999. Deconstructing Sunbeam–Contemporary issues in corporate governance [J]. University of Cincinnati Law Review,Vol.67: 1099–1127.
Holmstrom,B. 1979. Moral Hazard and Observability[J]. Bell Journal of Economic,Vo l. 10,Spring: 74-91.
Hossain,M.,Tan,L. M., & Adams, M. 1994. Voluntary disclosure in an emerging capital market: some empirical evidence from companies listed on the K.L. Stock Exchange[J]. International Journal of Accounting,29: 334-351.
Jensen,M. 1993. The Modern Industrial Revolution,Exit,and Failure of Internal Control Systems[J]. Journal of Finance,Vo l.48: 831- 880.
Jensen,M. and Murphy,K. J. 1990. Performance Pay and Top2 Management Incentives[J]. Journal of Political Economics,Vo l.98(2):225- 264.
Jensen, M,C. 2001. Value Maximization, Stakeholder Theory And The Corporate Objective Function[J]. Journal of Applied Corporate Finance,Vol No.3:71-84.
Jensen,M.C.,& Meckling, W. H. 1976. Theory of the firm: managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure[J]. Journal of Financial Economics,3:305-360.
Kang,J. and Shivdasani,A. 1995. Firm Performance,Corporate Governance,and Top Executive Turnover in Japan[J]. Journal of Financial Economics,38:29- 58.
La Porta,R.,Lopez-De-Silances, & Shieifer, A. 1999. Corporate ownership around the world[J]. The Journal of Finance,April:471-517.
Lang,M. H.,& Lundholm, R. J. 1996. Corporate disclosure policy and analyst behavior[J]. The Accounting Review,71(4): 467-492.
LaPorta,A., Lopez2de2slianes,F., Shleifer,A.and Vishny,R. 2000. Investor Protection and Corporate Governance[J]. Journal of Finance Economics,58:3- 27.
Laura Lin. 2001. The Effectiveness of Outside Directors as A Corporate Governance Mechanism: Theories and Evidence[J]. Journal of Finance Economics,31:13- 35.
Lee,Y. S., Rosenstein,S. and Wyatt,J. G. 1999. The Value of Financial Outside Directors on Corporate Boards[J]. International Review of Economic and Finance,8:421- 431.
Leftwich,R.,Watts, R., & Zimmerman,J. 1981. Voluntary corporate disclosure: the case of interim reporting[J]. Journal of Accounting Research.Supplement to,Vol.19: 50-77.
Lev,B. 1992. Information disclosure strategy[J]. California Management Review. Summer: 9-32.
Lorsch,Jay W. 1995. To Authorize Board of Directors[J]. Harvard Business Review,(January / February):35-56.
Malone,D., Fries,C., & Jones,T. 1993. An empirical investigation of the extent of corporate financial disclosure in the oil and gas Industry[J]. Journal of Accounting, Auditing and Finance, 6:249-273.
Mark,Y. T. and L i,Y. 2001. Determinations of Corporate Ownership and Board Structure: Evidence from Singapore[J]. Journal of Corporate Finance,7:235- 256.
Mckinnon,J. L.,& Dalimunthe, L. 1993. Voluntary disclosure of segment information by Australian diversified companie [J]. Accounting and Finance.May:33-50.
McMullen,D. A. 1996. Audit committee performance: an investigation of the consequences associated with audit committee [J]. Auditing: A Journal of Theory and Practice,15 (1):87-103.
Meek,G. K.,Robert,C. B.,& Gray,S. J. 1995. Factors influencing voluntary annual report disclosures by U.S., U.K. and Continental Europe multinational corporations[J]. Journal of International Business Studies,26(3): 555-572.
Millstein, I. 1992. The Limits of Corporate Power: Existing Constraints on the Exercise of Corporate Discretion [M].New York: Macmillan, 44-59.
Molz, R. 1988. Managerial domination of boards of directors and financial performance. [J].Journal of Business Research,16: 235-249.
Morck,R.,Shleifer,A.,& Vishny,R. W. 1988. Management ownership and market valuation: an empirical analysis[J]. Journal of Financial Economics,20: 293-315.
Olson M. 1980.The Logic of Collective Action [M]. Harvard University Press:144-157.
Oppenheim,A. N. 1966. Questionnaire Design and Attitude Measurement. New York: Basic Books.
Pound,J. 1995. The promise of the governed corporation[J]. Harvard Business Review,73 (2): 89-98.
Raffournier,B. 1995. The determinants of voluntary financial disclosure by Swiss listed companies[J]. European Accounting Review,4 (2): 261-280
Redding,S. G.,& Pugh,D. S. 1986. The formal and the informal: Japanese and Chinese organization structures[M] The Enterprise and Management in East Asia, Hong Kong, Center of Asian Studies, the University of Hong Kong,153-168.
Renneboog,L. 2000. Ownership, Managerial Control and the Governance of Companies Listed on the Brussels Stock Exchange[J]. Journal of Banking & Finance,24: 1959-1995.
Roger.H.Ford. 1988. Outside Directors and the Privately-Owned Firm: Are They Necessary[J]. Entrepreneurship: Theory & Practice. Fall88,13(1): 49-57.
Rosenstein,S. and Wyatt, J. G. 1990. Outside Directors, Board Independence and Shareholder Wealth[J]. Journal of Financial Economics,26(2):175-191.
Ruland,W.,Tung,S.,& George, N. 1990. Factors associated with the disclosure of managers’forecasts[J]. The Accounting Review,65:710-21.
Shivsasani,A. 1993. Board Composition,Ownership Structure, and Ho stile Takeover[J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics,Vol. 16,:167-198.
Shleifer,A. and V ishny,R. 1997. A Survey of Corporate Governance[J]. Journal of Finance. No. 2,June:737-783.
Smith,A. 1776.The Wealth of Nations[M]. Cannan edition,New York: Modern library.
Tai, B. Y. K, Au-Yeung, O. K.,Kwok, M. C. M., & Lau, L. W. C. 1990. Noncompliance with disclosure requirements in financial statements: the case of Hong Kong companies[J].International Journal of Accounting, 25(2): 99-112.
Weisbach,Michael S. 1988. Outside Directors and CEO Turnover[J]. Journal of Financial Economics,20(January/March):431-460.
Welker,M. 1995. Disclosure policy, information asymmetry, and liquid in equity market[J]. Contemporary Accounting Research,11(Spring): 800-827.
White,H. 1980. A Hetero skedasticity2Consistent Covariance Matrix and a Direct Test for Hetero skedasticity[J]. Econometrica. 48,:817- 838.
William,O. and Brown, Jr. 1996. Exit,Voice,and the Role of Corporate Directors: Evidence from Acquisition Performance[M]. Working paper in economics,Claremont Collages:129-148.
Yermack,D. 1996. Higher Valuation of Companies With A Small Board of Directors[J]. Journal of Financial Economics,40:185- 212.