公用事业投资问题研究
|
摘要
逐年攀升的城市化率带来我国公用事业领域旺盛的投资需求。公用事业投资规模与效率直接影响着城市的综合承载力,公用事业投资的质量则体现了政府管理社会的能力和水平。传统的计划经济体制下,政府做为公用事业的唯一投资主体,包揽了公用事业规划、投资、经营管理的各个环节。进入二十世纪九十年代以来,我国的公用事业领域仿效欧美发达国家,进行了多元化投资主体的引入和市场化改革。历时20年,公用事业投资市场化改革是否卓有成效?公用事业投资供求的矛盾是否应刃而解?进一步的改革如何推进?带着这些问题,本文展开了相关问题的研究。
论文在公用事业投资促进经济增长的前提下展开讨论。在理清公用事业投资问题理论基础的前提下,笔者考察了我国公用事业投资的现状,认为“十一五”期间,我国公用事业投资量骤增,一定程度上缓解了该领域的历史欠帐问题,公用设施服务能力和产品供给能力增强。由于引入多元化投资主体,公用事业企业在竞争中高速发展,形成了一些大型企业集团。但基于公用事业投资存量服务品质提升的要求和增量服务需求的增长,未来相当长的时间内,公用事业投资资金供求缺口仍然存在。地方政府虽然意识到公用事业企业投资效率低下,积极推进国有企业的转制与民营化,但部分城市公用事业垄断的格局并未打破,有些地区改革方法不当,消费者利益受损。究其原因,制度是影响公用事业投融资效率的重要因素。因此,本文考察了公用事业投资体制的变革历程,分析了目前公用事业投资体制中存在的问题,在此基础上提出计划经济体制的“路径依赖”和转型经济体制的“制度缺失”是制约公用事业投资效率提高的重要障碍。
论文将公用事业投资主体区分为政府投资主体、国内企业投资主体和外商投资主体。政府投资主体在财政资金软约束的情况下,具有过度投资公用事业的冲动,委托代理链条过长使其很难规避“内部人”控制,致使投资经济效率低下；国内企业投资主体以经济利益为主导,微观投资经济效率较高,但会自动放弃不具市场价值的公用事业服务供给,形成“公共地悲剧”；外商投资主体目前凭借资金实力正在不断扩大其在中国公用事业市场中的份额。针对不同投资主体追求利益的不同表现,论文逐一分析了三类投资主体的激励和约束,论述了政府主导型投资模式、专业投资商主导型投资模式及政企合作型投资模式的利弊,为深化公用事业投资体制改革提供了新的理论依据。
公用事业投资与融资行为是一个问题的两个方面,投资与融资密不可分,相辅相承。论文考察了公用事业融资的渠道和筹资的方式,对现有的公用事业投资与融资进行了评价。政府的财政投入应用于公用事业投资需做好“代际筹化”；特种税费应用于公用事业投资因征管不力部分被裁撤,后劲不足；债务资金目前应用最多,管理上需注重占款时间的匹配度等。
公用事业投资体制改革的最终目标是为了提高公用事业投资效率,从而实现社会福利的最大化。公用事业投资效率的评价应从投资决策效率、投资生产效率与投资配置效率三个方面入手,兼顾投资的宏观效率与微观效率。为此,论文梳理了公用事业投资效率评价指标,在此基础上,结合公用事业投资特点,提出公用事业投资效率评价应兼顾经济效益、社会效益和环境效益。论文对公用事业投资效率评价指标进行了筛选和补充,建议运用模糊评价法对公用事业投资项目进行科学、客观的评价,以此作为政府扶持公用事业投资项目的标准。
英国、美国、法国等发达国家在公用事业投资市场化改革中久经考验,形成了一整套行之有效的管理思路。新兴工业化国家中新加坡的公用事业改革基础与我国极其相似,且被公认为公用事业投资监管最成功的国家；拉美国家与我国相似之处在于正处于城市化急剧上升期。因此,借鉴新加坡和拉美国家的成功做法对我国具有十分重要的现实意义。在考察了发达国家和新兴工业化国家同期进行的公用事业领域投资管理的经验后发现,无论是发达国家还是新兴工业化国家,公用事业投资资金短缺是一种常态,借助私人资本弥补公共产品投资缺失是大势所趋。但公用事业领域中私人投资主体的引入需要有合理的准入和制约机制,以免形成新的垄断和引发社会问题。在提高公用事业服务的数量和品质的基础上,注重“亲贫”机制的建立必不可少。为了保证政府对公用事业领域投资行为的管制效果,管制体系的构建应先行于投资改革全面推进。
转轨经济条件下的中国公用事业投资改革情况较之市场经济体系完备的发达国家显然更为复杂,各个领域的改革需要同时推进,以便取得协同效应。如配套法律法规的制定可使政府在政企合作中的承诺长期化,节约双方合作的交易成本；公用事业市场化改革中会不断出现新问题、新情况,因此,建立适宜的争端解决法律机制十分必要；投资者需要合理的投资回报预期,政府需要核定适宜的补贴额度,为了兼顾效率与公平,需要早日形成公用事业市场化定价机制；公用事业投资资产专用性强,行业进入和退出壁垒高,降低市场准入的同时,还需构建合理的投资退出机制,解除投资者的后顾之忧；市场化改革中,为保证消费者利益不受侵害,需用正式制度保证公用事业服务安全；为避免商业化投资者“嫌贫爱富”,服务供给中应强化普遍服务义务,建立“亲贫”机制；最后,为了节约投资成本,提高投资效率,公用事业领域的投融资模式创新应及时总结并加以推广。
论文以新制度经济学理论为指导,以激励投资主体、限制垄断、提高投资效率、增进社会福利为主线；以从国外到国内；特殊到一般、理论到实践为内在逻辑,以国内外公用事业改革成功或失败的案例为立论基础,总结规律,最后将之应用于辽宁省公用事业改革实践。通过具体数据,预测了辽宁省公用事业未来十年的投资额度,具体分析了辽宁省公用事业改革中存在的问题,并针对性地提出了具体可操作的意见。
It is the climing citilization ratio that push the urgent demand of investment in China's public utility. The public utility investment size and efficiency affect the capabitility of the city directly, what's more, the quality of public utility investment show the administration ability of the government. Under the condition of traditional planning economical system, as the sole invester, the government is in charge of all the steps of the planning, investment, operation. Since 1990's, China follows European and Amercian countries, take on the reform of marketization in public utility areas, pluralistical investers are guidied to this area.20 years have passed, is it efficient that China's public utility marketization reform? Wether the contradiction between investment supply and demand in public utility has been solved? How to pomote the reform forward nest step? With the puzzle, this paper research associate issues.
Public untility investment can promote economy increase, which is the pre-condition in this paper. After clarify the theorical basis of public utility, the author observe the status of China's public utility investment. It shows that during the 11th five-year-plan period, China enlarge the quantity of public utility investment, it solve the historical debt to some extent and strength the service and product supply ability.Because of the introducing more investors, public utility enterprise developing rapidly in the fierce competence, some of them has grown into huge enterprise group. But since the demand for existed public utility service quality and the extra service quantity have been improved, the capital gap for supply and demand will exist in the near future. The local government realize the low efficiency of public utility enterprise and try their best to enhance the transaction reform and privazation, but the monopoly status of public utility market still exists in some cities. Some city adapt unsuitable reform, the interest of consumer is virolated. Therefore, this paper observes the process of public utility investment system reform, and analysis the problems in the public utitlity investment system. On the base of it, it is pointed out that the most important obstacle to improve the investment efficiency is "path dependence " in planning economic system and " institutional scarce" in transistional economy.
The investors participate the public utility investment are divided into government investor, native enterprise investor and foreign business investor. Under the soft financial capital straint, the government investor has the strong will to invest more than necessary, the entrust and agent chain is so long that it hardly can avoid "insider" control, which lower the investment efficiency; native enterprise investor guided by profit, which has higher economic efficiency, they will cancel the services unprofitable and offer "public tragedy"; the foreign business investor are enlarging the market share in China's opening public utility market. According to the different behavior of the investors, this paper analysis the incentive and constraints factors, analysis the advantage and disadvantage of government-guided investment model, specialty investor-guided investment model and government-enterprise cooperation model, in order to offer theortical basis for further public utility system reform.
Public utility investment and finacing is two sides of one problem, investment and financing can't be divided. This paper observe the different channel and method for public financing and investment, also give the appraisal. The government financial investment is applied into public utility should be given "generation plan"; special tax and fee applied into public utility ivestment is cancelled because of bad levy and administration ability, it can't last long; debt capital is applied most frequently, time administration of the capital should be given more attention.
The final aim for public utilty investment reform is to improve the investment efficiency and realize the maximize the social welfare. Public utility investment efficiency apprisial should be given from three aspect, which including investment decision efficiency, investment production efficiency and investment distribution effieciency. On the base of it, combination with the character of public investment, this paper point out that public utility investment efficiency appraisal should consider economic efficiency, social efficiency and environment efficiency. Therefore, this paper comb the efficiency appraisal index system in public utility investement, suggest fuzzy appraisal method be applied to evaluate the public utility investment project. it set the standard for government which project should be helped.
Britian, America, and France etc. developed countries experience more in the public utility market reform, each country has one set of workable administration method. Among the new industrialization countries, Singapore's public utility reform basis has much similar character with China, also Singapore is regarded as the most successful public utility governance country; Latin American countries are experiencing the rapid citilization just like China. Therefore, obseving developed and the new industrialization countries reform experience in public utility investement administration, it is found that capital scarce in public utility is common whether in developed and developing countries. Private capital are introduced to cover the gap of public goods investment is irresistible. But the introduction of private capital need reseasonable entrenc and constraint mechnisim, so that private capital form the new monopoly and erouse social problem. On the base of improving public utility service quantity and quality, the mechnisim of "close the poor" should be set up. In order to gurantee the regulation effect of government, the regulation system should be built before further investment reform.
The reform happened in China is more complex than in developed countries, because the former is in trasitional economy, while the latter's market economy sysyem is perfect. But since the reform is happening in different area, there are the effort of cooperational benefit. For example, the associated law and regulation can make the government promise last long in the cooperation of government and enterprise, which save the transacition cost. There are always new problems and new status arise in the public utility reform, so establish suitable disbute settlement mechanism is necessary. The invstors need reasonable investment expect, the government need check and ratify suitable subsidy, for the reason of efficiency and fairness, the marketlization price mechanism should formed earlier. Public utility asset is specialized, the industry entrance and withdraw barrier is high, so lower the barrier, and establish suitable capital withdraw mechanism can relieve the worries behind. In the reform, to gurantee the interest of consumer is not infringed, the formal institution can gurantee the public service safety. In the marketliazation reform, to avoid investor offer serive for the rich and ignore the poor, so the investor should be regulated to offer the general service for all the citizens and establish the "close the poor" mechanism. In the end, to save the cost and improve the investment efficiency, public utility investment and finacing innovation model should be summarized and spread.
The paper guided by new institution economics theory, clued by inspiring the investors, confine monopoly, improv ing investment efficiency and enhancing social walfare,abide by the logic rule that abroad to domestic, specialty to common, theory to practice, base the theory on the cases success and defeat, draw the conclusion from the practice, and apply the theory to solve the problem of Liaoning Province public utility reform. Using the data, this paper forcast the investment demand in public utility in the future ten years, analysis the exist problems in the reform, and give the countermeasures.
论文在公用事业投资促进经济增长的前提下展开讨论。在理清公用事业投资问题理论基础的前提下,笔者考察了我国公用事业投资的现状,认为“十一五”期间,我国公用事业投资量骤增,一定程度上缓解了该领域的历史欠帐问题,公用设施服务能力和产品供给能力增强。由于引入多元化投资主体,公用事业企业在竞争中高速发展,形成了一些大型企业集团。但基于公用事业投资存量服务品质提升的要求和增量服务需求的增长,未来相当长的时间内,公用事业投资资金供求缺口仍然存在。地方政府虽然意识到公用事业企业投资效率低下,积极推进国有企业的转制与民营化,但部分城市公用事业垄断的格局并未打破,有些地区改革方法不当,消费者利益受损。究其原因,制度是影响公用事业投融资效率的重要因素。因此,本文考察了公用事业投资体制的变革历程,分析了目前公用事业投资体制中存在的问题,在此基础上提出计划经济体制的“路径依赖”和转型经济体制的“制度缺失”是制约公用事业投资效率提高的重要障碍。
论文将公用事业投资主体区分为政府投资主体、国内企业投资主体和外商投资主体。政府投资主体在财政资金软约束的情况下,具有过度投资公用事业的冲动,委托代理链条过长使其很难规避“内部人”控制,致使投资经济效率低下；国内企业投资主体以经济利益为主导,微观投资经济效率较高,但会自动放弃不具市场价值的公用事业服务供给,形成“公共地悲剧”；外商投资主体目前凭借资金实力正在不断扩大其在中国公用事业市场中的份额。针对不同投资主体追求利益的不同表现,论文逐一分析了三类投资主体的激励和约束,论述了政府主导型投资模式、专业投资商主导型投资模式及政企合作型投资模式的利弊,为深化公用事业投资体制改革提供了新的理论依据。
公用事业投资与融资行为是一个问题的两个方面,投资与融资密不可分,相辅相承。论文考察了公用事业融资的渠道和筹资的方式,对现有的公用事业投资与融资进行了评价。政府的财政投入应用于公用事业投资需做好“代际筹化”；特种税费应用于公用事业投资因征管不力部分被裁撤,后劲不足；债务资金目前应用最多,管理上需注重占款时间的匹配度等。
公用事业投资体制改革的最终目标是为了提高公用事业投资效率,从而实现社会福利的最大化。公用事业投资效率的评价应从投资决策效率、投资生产效率与投资配置效率三个方面入手,兼顾投资的宏观效率与微观效率。为此,论文梳理了公用事业投资效率评价指标,在此基础上,结合公用事业投资特点,提出公用事业投资效率评价应兼顾经济效益、社会效益和环境效益。论文对公用事业投资效率评价指标进行了筛选和补充,建议运用模糊评价法对公用事业投资项目进行科学、客观的评价,以此作为政府扶持公用事业投资项目的标准。
英国、美国、法国等发达国家在公用事业投资市场化改革中久经考验,形成了一整套行之有效的管理思路。新兴工业化国家中新加坡的公用事业改革基础与我国极其相似,且被公认为公用事业投资监管最成功的国家；拉美国家与我国相似之处在于正处于城市化急剧上升期。因此,借鉴新加坡和拉美国家的成功做法对我国具有十分重要的现实意义。在考察了发达国家和新兴工业化国家同期进行的公用事业领域投资管理的经验后发现,无论是发达国家还是新兴工业化国家,公用事业投资资金短缺是一种常态,借助私人资本弥补公共产品投资缺失是大势所趋。但公用事业领域中私人投资主体的引入需要有合理的准入和制约机制,以免形成新的垄断和引发社会问题。在提高公用事业服务的数量和品质的基础上,注重“亲贫”机制的建立必不可少。为了保证政府对公用事业领域投资行为的管制效果,管制体系的构建应先行于投资改革全面推进。
转轨经济条件下的中国公用事业投资改革情况较之市场经济体系完备的发达国家显然更为复杂,各个领域的改革需要同时推进,以便取得协同效应。如配套法律法规的制定可使政府在政企合作中的承诺长期化,节约双方合作的交易成本；公用事业市场化改革中会不断出现新问题、新情况,因此,建立适宜的争端解决法律机制十分必要；投资者需要合理的投资回报预期,政府需要核定适宜的补贴额度,为了兼顾效率与公平,需要早日形成公用事业市场化定价机制；公用事业投资资产专用性强,行业进入和退出壁垒高,降低市场准入的同时,还需构建合理的投资退出机制,解除投资者的后顾之忧；市场化改革中,为保证消费者利益不受侵害,需用正式制度保证公用事业服务安全；为避免商业化投资者“嫌贫爱富”,服务供给中应强化普遍服务义务,建立“亲贫”机制；最后,为了节约投资成本,提高投资效率,公用事业领域的投融资模式创新应及时总结并加以推广。
论文以新制度经济学理论为指导,以激励投资主体、限制垄断、提高投资效率、增进社会福利为主线；以从国外到国内；特殊到一般、理论到实践为内在逻辑,以国内外公用事业改革成功或失败的案例为立论基础,总结规律,最后将之应用于辽宁省公用事业改革实践。通过具体数据,预测了辽宁省公用事业未来十年的投资额度,具体分析了辽宁省公用事业改革中存在的问题,并针对性地提出了具体可操作的意见。
It is the climing citilization ratio that push the urgent demand of investment in China's public utility. The public utility investment size and efficiency affect the capabitility of the city directly, what's more, the quality of public utility investment show the administration ability of the government. Under the condition of traditional planning economical system, as the sole invester, the government is in charge of all the steps of the planning, investment, operation. Since 1990's, China follows European and Amercian countries, take on the reform of marketization in public utility areas, pluralistical investers are guidied to this area.20 years have passed, is it efficient that China's public utility marketization reform? Wether the contradiction between investment supply and demand in public utility has been solved? How to pomote the reform forward nest step? With the puzzle, this paper research associate issues.
Public untility investment can promote economy increase, which is the pre-condition in this paper. After clarify the theorical basis of public utility, the author observe the status of China's public utility investment. It shows that during the 11th five-year-plan period, China enlarge the quantity of public utility investment, it solve the historical debt to some extent and strength the service and product supply ability.Because of the introducing more investors, public utility enterprise developing rapidly in the fierce competence, some of them has grown into huge enterprise group. But since the demand for existed public utility service quality and the extra service quantity have been improved, the capital gap for supply and demand will exist in the near future. The local government realize the low efficiency of public utility enterprise and try their best to enhance the transaction reform and privazation, but the monopoly status of public utility market still exists in some cities. Some city adapt unsuitable reform, the interest of consumer is virolated. Therefore, this paper observes the process of public utility investment system reform, and analysis the problems in the public utitlity investment system. On the base of it, it is pointed out that the most important obstacle to improve the investment efficiency is "path dependence " in planning economic system and " institutional scarce" in transistional economy.
The investors participate the public utility investment are divided into government investor, native enterprise investor and foreign business investor. Under the soft financial capital straint, the government investor has the strong will to invest more than necessary, the entrust and agent chain is so long that it hardly can avoid "insider" control, which lower the investment efficiency; native enterprise investor guided by profit, which has higher economic efficiency, they will cancel the services unprofitable and offer "public tragedy"; the foreign business investor are enlarging the market share in China's opening public utility market. According to the different behavior of the investors, this paper analysis the incentive and constraints factors, analysis the advantage and disadvantage of government-guided investment model, specialty investor-guided investment model and government-enterprise cooperation model, in order to offer theortical basis for further public utility system reform.
Public utility investment and finacing is two sides of one problem, investment and financing can't be divided. This paper observe the different channel and method for public financing and investment, also give the appraisal. The government financial investment is applied into public utility should be given "generation plan"; special tax and fee applied into public utility ivestment is cancelled because of bad levy and administration ability, it can't last long; debt capital is applied most frequently, time administration of the capital should be given more attention.
The final aim for public utilty investment reform is to improve the investment efficiency and realize the maximize the social welfare. Public utility investment efficiency apprisial should be given from three aspect, which including investment decision efficiency, investment production efficiency and investment distribution effieciency. On the base of it, combination with the character of public investment, this paper point out that public utility investment efficiency appraisal should consider economic efficiency, social efficiency and environment efficiency. Therefore, this paper comb the efficiency appraisal index system in public utility investement, suggest fuzzy appraisal method be applied to evaluate the public utility investment project. it set the standard for government which project should be helped.
Britian, America, and France etc. developed countries experience more in the public utility market reform, each country has one set of workable administration method. Among the new industrialization countries, Singapore's public utility reform basis has much similar character with China, also Singapore is regarded as the most successful public utility governance country; Latin American countries are experiencing the rapid citilization just like China. Therefore, obseving developed and the new industrialization countries reform experience in public utility investement administration, it is found that capital scarce in public utility is common whether in developed and developing countries. Private capital are introduced to cover the gap of public goods investment is irresistible. But the introduction of private capital need reseasonable entrenc and constraint mechnisim, so that private capital form the new monopoly and erouse social problem. On the base of improving public utility service quantity and quality, the mechnisim of "close the poor" should be set up. In order to gurantee the regulation effect of government, the regulation system should be built before further investment reform.
The reform happened in China is more complex than in developed countries, because the former is in trasitional economy, while the latter's market economy sysyem is perfect. But since the reform is happening in different area, there are the effort of cooperational benefit. For example, the associated law and regulation can make the government promise last long in the cooperation of government and enterprise, which save the transacition cost. There are always new problems and new status arise in the public utility reform, so establish suitable disbute settlement mechanism is necessary. The invstors need reasonable investment expect, the government need check and ratify suitable subsidy, for the reason of efficiency and fairness, the marketlization price mechanism should formed earlier. Public utility asset is specialized, the industry entrance and withdraw barrier is high, so lower the barrier, and establish suitable capital withdraw mechanism can relieve the worries behind. In the reform, to gurantee the interest of consumer is not infringed, the formal institution can gurantee the public service safety. In the marketliazation reform, to avoid investor offer serive for the rich and ignore the poor, so the investor should be regulated to offer the general service for all the citizens and establish the "close the poor" mechanism. In the end, to save the cost and improve the investment efficiency, public utility investment and finacing innovation model should be summarized and spread.
The paper guided by new institution economics theory, clued by inspiring the investors, confine monopoly, improv ing investment efficiency and enhancing social walfare,abide by the logic rule that abroad to domestic, specialty to common, theory to practice, base the theory on the cases success and defeat, draw the conclusion from the practice, and apply the theory to solve the problem of Liaoning Province public utility reform. Using the data, this paper forcast the investment demand in public utility in the future ten years, analysis the exist problems in the reform, and give the countermeasures.
引文
①武献华：《投资效益分析与评价》辽宁人民出版社,1994,1页
②马秀岩：《投资经济学》东北财经大学出版社,2007.9,4页
①见Kahn,A.The Economics of Regulation:Principles and Institutions, Vol.1, New York: Wily,P.13
② Webster's Unabridged Dictionary. Random House,1998:1563.
③郭朋民营化背景下的公用事业规制研究苏州大学博士学位论文,2006：13页
① Sanford V. Berg. Natural Monopoly Regulation. Cambridge University Press,1988:21.
①参见陈明著：中国城市公用事业民营化研究中国经济出版社,2009.3,13页
①[美]保罗·A·萨缪尔森,威廉·D·诺德豪斯：《经济学》(上),胡代光等译,首都经济贸易大学出版社1996年版,第622页。
②参见[日]植草益：《市场经济与公有企业的作用》,载于陈建安主编：《日本公有企业的民营化及其问题》,上海财经大学出版社1996年版,第1页。
①此前的研究成果多数是论文,篇幅不长,选择公用事业改革的某一方面发表观点,2005年以后,系统的研究成果增多,表现方式为专著和博士论文
①[美]迈克尔.赫德森：《私有化的神话与现实》,李春兰译,《国外理论动态》2007年第9期
②这里所指的公共资本包括公共基础设施投资、公共教育和公共RD投资等。
①唐颖,世界经济研究,2009(10)：80
①参见郭庆旺、鲁听、赵志耘编著的《公共经济学大辞典》,经济科学出版社,1999年；参阅Michael Pickhardt 2002年对当代公共产品定义史演变的研究。
①哈维·罗森,《财政学》(第四版),第59页,北京：中国人民大学出版社,2000年
①唐诗林基础设施产业政府规制的制度分析重庆邮电学院学报2005(4)477-478
①朱文娟：我国公用事业民营化研究四川大学硕士学位论文2006年。
①徐宗威：《公用事业产权改革不能“包治百病”》2006年10月16日《江苏经济报》
①参见陈明,中国城市公用事业民营化研究中国经济出版社,2009
①巴曙松：《构建多元化的城市基础设施融资渠道》,第五届中国城市论坛北京峰会演讲,2004年9月。
①贾海峰：《财政投资比重不足1%城市公用事业过度市场化》,2008年1月2日《21世纪经济报道》
①黄敏地方政府投资主体行为分析,《中国工业经济研究》 1993年02期
①夏骋翔：《城镇居民饮用水资源需求研究》,载于《价格理论与实践》2007年第3期,31-33页。
①杨华云,《地方政府债务率最高达364%部分偿债压力较大》《新京报》2010年06月24日
①高莉莉：安徽投资效率分析,现代商贸工业2008(12)：105有一段实证研究可借鉴
①王东京、孙浩林：《获得巨大成功英国挡不住的私有化浪潮》,2001年10月19日《中国经济时报》
②水皮：《私有化拯救了老大帝国?——国有企业私有化札记》,2006年5月30日《中国工商时报》
③王东京、孙浩林：《获得巨大成功英国挡不住的私有化浪潮》,2001年10月19日《中国经济时报》
①王春花：《英国完成铁路私有化》,1997年12月22日《市场报》。
②转引自：迟福林《处于十字路口的中国基础领域改革》中国经济出版社,2004,181页
①王东京、孙浩林：《获得巨大成功英国挡不住的私有化浪潮》,2001年10月19日《中国经济时报》
①[法]享利.勒帕日：《美国新自由主义经济学》,李燕生译,经北京大学出版社,1985,第158页。
① Swann,D. (1988), The Retreat of the State: Deregulation and Privation in the UK and US, New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, pp.8-9.
①参见许峰《中国公用事业改革中的亲贫规制研究》上海人民出版社,2008年,98-99页。
①常杪：《建立水业投融资机制的战略思路》,2004年3月5日《中国建设报》。
①欧文.E.休斯：《公共管理导论》,彭和平等译,中国人民大学出版社,2000,第131页。
① Harold Demsetz,1968, Why Regulate Utilities? Journal of Law and Economics 11:pp.55-65.
② Stephen J. Bailey,1995, Public Sector Economics; Theory, Policy and Practice, Macmillian Press LTD, P.369
① Viskers,J.S. and Yanrrow, G.K.,1985, Privation and the Natural Monopolies, Public Policy Center, p24;Kolbe,A.L.and Read, J.A.,1984, The Cost of Capital; Estimating the Rate of Return for Public Utilities, MIT Press, Breyer, S,G.,1982, Regulation and Its Reform, Harvard University Press, p49
①参见仇保兴、王俊豪中国市政公用事业监管体制研究中国社会科学出版社2006132-133页
②参见余晖秦虹公私合作制的中国试验上海人民出版社2005年,238-239页
[1]马秀岩.投资经济学[M].大连：东北财经大学出版社,2008.2-6.
[2]马秀岩.项目融资[M].大连：东北财经大学出版社,2002.94-96.
[3]杜两省.有效经济增长与投资方式变革[M].北京：科学出版社,2006.187-188.
[4]许峰.中国公用事业改革中的亲贫规制研究[M].上海：上海人民出版社,2008,23-28.
[5]建设部课题组.市政公用事业改革与发展研究[M].北京：中国建筑工业出版社,2007.12-22.
[6]陈明.中国城市公用事业民营化研究[M].北京：中国经济出版社,2009.166-168.
[7]周林军、曹远征、张智.中国公用事业改革：从理论到实践[M].北京：知识产权出版社,2009.
[8]高踪阳.变革时代的国有公用事业企业管理实践[M].北京：中国经济出版社,2007.
[9]邹东涛、秦虹.社会公用事业改革攻坚[M].北京：中国水利水电出版社,2006.36-38.
[10]仇保兴、王俊豪.中国市政公用事业监管体制研究[M].北京：中国社会科学出版社,2006.8-14.
[11]肖兴志.公用事业市场化与规制模式转型[M].北京：中国财政经济出版社,2008.
[12]周耀东.中国公用事业管制改革研究[M].上海：上海人民出版社,2009.
[13]王俊豪.英国自然垄断产业企业所有制的变革及其启示[J].财经论丛,2002,(1)：
[14]刘小玄.中国转轨经济中的产权结构和市场结构——产业绩效水平的决定因素》[J].经济研究,2003,(1)：
[15]田国强.转轨经济中最优所有权安排的理论[J].经济学季刊,2001,(1)：
[16]玛格丽特.布莱尔著、赵辰宁.共同的所有权[J].经济社会体制比较,1996,(3)：
[17]赵国杰.技术经济学[M].天津：天津大学出版社,1996.120-121.
[18]武献华.投资效益分析与评价[M].大连：辽宁人民出版社,1985.20-21.
[19]曾国安.政府经济学[M].武汉：湖北人民出版社,2002.133.
[20]马白玉.中国市政基础设施市场化改革研究[M].天津：南开大学出版社,2008.21.128-129.
[21]孟耀.绿色投资问题研究[M].大连：东北财经大学出版社,2008.257.
[22]马建春.市政债券市场发展与基础设施融资体系建设[M].经济科学出版社,2007.
[23]肖兴志.公用事业的民营化改革：理论与中国实证,自然垄断与规制：理论和经验[M].经济科学出版社,2004.199.
[24]郭朋.公用事业民营化改革的路径选择[D].苏州大学博士学位论文,2006.
[25]王梅等.市政工程公私合作项目投融资决策研究[M].北京：经济科学出版社,2008.62-63.
[26]济邦咨询公司.基础设施与公用事业——民营化的中国实践[M].北京：学林出版社,2007.46-47.
[27]王广起.公用事业的市场运营与政府规制[M].北京：中国社会科学出版社,2008.78-80.
[28]秦虹.城市建设融资[M].北京：中国发展出版社,2007.15.
[29]余晖、秦虹.公私合作制的中国试验[M].上海：上海人民出版社,2005.250-254.
[30]李珍刚.城市公用事业市场化中的政府责任[M].北京：社会科学文献出版社,2008.327-344.
[31]中仪国际招标公司等.中国市政公用事业改革文件汇编[M].北京：中国建筑工业出版社,2007.
[32]天则公用事业研究中心参考资料2007-2009年.
[33]李银珠.政府公共支出行为的成本—效益研究[M].北京：经济管理出版社,2007-163-166.
[34]李俊江等.外国国有企业改革研究[M].北京：经济科学出版社,2010.124-134.
[35]丹尼尔.W.布罗姆利.《经济利益与经济制度》[M].上海：上海人民出版社,2006.127-141.
[36]道格拉斯.C.诺思.《制度、制度变迁与经济绩效》[M].上海：上海人民出版社,2006.126-128.
[37]姜润宇.城市燃气：欧盟的管理体制和中国的改革[M].北京：中国市场出版社,2005.56-57.
[38]武文婷、王立国.基于价值集成理论的城市轨道交通项目的收益还原分析及融资开发模式研究———以大连市快轨三号线为例[C].2009建设与房地产年会论文集.
[39]周义程、闫娟.什么是公共产品?一个文献综述[J].学海,2008,(1)：104-105.
[40]英吉.考尔等编.全球化之道——全球公共产品的提供与管理[M].北京：人民 出版社,2006.
[4]唐钧.社会政策的基本概念与理论框架[EB/OL]. http://www.chinavalue.net/Article/Archive/2007/4/8/61689_14.html,2009-4-12
[42](澳)休·史卓顿、莱昂内尔·奥查德.公共物品、公共企业和公共选择[M].经济科学出版社,2000.67-69.
[44]王涯茜、王世君、杨宇.基于基础设施建设项目资金最佳使用价值理论的PPP模式分析[J].建筑经济,2009,(11)：95—98.
[45]罗东秋、林勇、刘伟.基于蒂布特模型的公共产品融资创新研究——以城市轨道交通为例[J].现代管理科学,2010,(6)：26-28.
[46]杜亚灵、尹贻林.基于治理结构创新的公共项目管理绩效改善研究——以深圳地铁5号线BT工程为例[J].建筑经济,2010,(4)：66—70.
[47]张凯、张玉魁.工程项目BT模式与代建制相结合的探讨市政技术[J].2009,(1)：157-158.
[48]徐宗威.法国城市公用事业特许经营制度及启示[J].水工业市场,2007,(9)：33-36.
[49]田成诗、盖美.辽宁省2005-2020年GDP预测模型的建立与应用大连海事大学学报[J].2007,(3)：60-64.
[50]朱华友、吕东芳.区域经济发展与水资源利用的关系研究——以辽宁省朝阳市为例[J].浙江师范大学学报(自然科学版),2010,(2)：217-219.
[51]张丹.中央政府与地方政府投资互动关系研究——基于辽宁省投资结构的实证分析[J].生产力研究,2010,(5)：154-156.
[52]裴冬梅、郭启勇.辽宁省1990-2005年卫生总费用与GDP增长相关性[J].中国公共卫生,2010,(1)：116-117.
[53]张峁、徐蓓蓓、江栋.地方财政支出对经济增长影响的空间计量分析——辽宁省为例[J].科学决策,2010,(5)：50-57.
[54]周望军、朱明龙.公用事业价格监管问题研究[J].价格理论与实践,2006,(9)：8-10.
[55]吴绪亮.中国基础设施产业的亲贫规制体系设计[J].改革,2004,(4)：24-29.
[56]肖兴志、孙阳.拉美公用事业市场化改革及经验教训[J].天则公用事业研究中心资料,0803：8-19.
[57]王灏.城市轨道交通投融资问题研究[M].北京：中国金融出版社,2006.44-47.
[58]陈拥军.法国城市基础设施的委托管理模式[J].城市管理,2005,(6)：48-50.
[59]孟祥林.城市公用事业：从英德等国的民营化模式论我国的发展对策[J].青岛科技大学学报(社会科学版),2009,(3)：1-7.
[60]杨学军、董妍伽.英国、美国、新加坡公用事业监管的做法及启示[J].经济纵横,2008,(8)：36-38.
[61]汪文雄、李启明.PPP模式下基础设施项目私营方风险预警模型[J].2008,(10)：90-92.
[62]谢磊、王枢、董建军.PPP融资模式下城市轨道交通经济风险及规避对策[J].建筑经济,2008,(10)：93-95.
[63]周龙.PPP模式在公共基础设施建设中的应用[J].河南师范大学学报(哲学社会科学版),2010,(2)：127-129.
[64]刘禹、何佰洲、武文婷.城市基础设施项目公私合作制模式的新探讨——基于价值集成的视角[J].城市发展研究,2010,(2)：98-103.
[65]王俊豪.美国联邦通信委员会及其运行机制[M].北京：经济管理出版社,2003.55.
[66]马珺.公共品概念的价值[J].《财贸经济》,2005,(11)：28.
[67]顾金亮、郭晓东.我国市政公用基础设施的投资不足与对策分析[J].建筑经济,2007,(2)：19-21.
[68]国家经贸委企业监督司.新加坡国有企业内部监管经验及其启示[J].中国经贸导刊,2000,(8)：22.
[69]李阳.公共产品概念和本质研究综述[J].生产力研究,2010,(4)：30-35.
[70]Cecilia,Tortaja.,2006,Water Management in Singapore, Water Resources Development, Vol122.
[71]Ingo,Vogelsang.,2002,Incentive regulation and competition in public utility markets:a 20-year perspective, Journal of Regulatory Economics.
[72]In,Kessides.,2004,Reforming infrastructure:privatization, regulation, and competition, A World Bank Publication.
[73]Km, Howe.,1982, EF Rasmussen, Public utility economics and finance,Prentice-Hall,Inc.
[74]Ls,Hyman.,1997, America's electric utilities:past, present and future,Public Utilities Reports,Inc. Arlington, VA.
[75]Atkinson, Scott E. Halvorsen, Rober.,1986,The relative efficiency of public and private firms in a regulated environment: The case of U.S. electric utilities, Journal of Public Economics 1986,281-294.
[76]John R.Allan.,1993, PPP:A Review of Literature and Practice. Sasktchewan Institute of Public Policy, Public Policy Paper, No.4.
[77]Swann,D.,1988, The Retreat of the State:Deregulation and Privation in the UK and US, New York:Harvester Wheatsheaf, pp.15.
[78]W. VerEecke., Public goods.An ideal concept, Journal of Social-Economics.
[79]The European Commission. Guidance For Successful PPP,1993.
[80]Armstrong,M.,S.Cowan and J.Vickers,194,Regulator Reform:Economic Anlysis and British Experierice,Cambridge:The MIT Press.
[81]Asha Gupta, Beyond Privatizaion, London:Macmillan Press LTD.2000,p.58.
[82]Clark,J..M.,1940,Toward a Concept of Workable Competition,American Economic Review, Vol.XXX,1940, pp.241-256.
[83]E.S.Savas.,1983,Privatization: The Key to Better Government (Chathm,NJ: Chatham House.
[84]Harold Demsetz.,1968, "Why Regulate Utilities?", Journal of Law and Economics, 1968, pp.55-65.
[85]E.A.Thompsom.,1966,A Pareto Pptimal Decision Process,in G.Tullock, ed. Papers on Non-Market Decision Making, Charlottesville: University of Virginia 113-140.
[86]Michael A. Crew and Paul R. Kleindorfer.,1980,the economics of Public Utility regulation. Cambridge,The MIT Press.
[87]Omar,O. Chisari, Antonio Estache,and Catherine Waddams Price.,"Access by the Poor in Latin America's Utility Reform:Subsidies and Service Obligations", WIDER, Discussion Paper NO.2001/75.
[88]G Brown Jr. MB Johnson.,1969,Public utility pricing and output under risk[J].The American Economic Review.
[89]Hemphill, T.A.,1992,Self-Regualting industry behavior[J].antitrust limitations and trade Business Ethics,1992,11(12).
[90]Priankans, Malikr.,1997,Transportation Infrastructure Financing:Evaluation of Alternatives [J].Journal of Infrastructure Systems,1997 (3):111-118.
[91]Ye S D, Tiong R L K.,2003,The effect of concession period design on comp letion risk management of BOT project,Construction Management and Economics, 2003,21 (5):-471-482.
[92]Laffontjj,1994,The new economics of regulation ten years after, Econometrics, 1994,Vol.62, No.3,507-537.
[93]NFO-communication development authority of Singapore,Notice on The Review of Singapore Telecommunication Limiterps Reference Interconnection Offer.
[94]Telecommunications regulation in Singapore:http://www. lovells. com /germany/ControlServlet/de/publication/pub Id/673/.
[95]Electricity license for generation licensee://elise. ema. gov. sg/elise/public_app lyforlicence. Jsp.
[96]Singaproe government moves toward a competitive marketplace:http:// singapore. usembassy.gov/ep/2001/powersector2001. html.
[97]L iou F M, Huang C P.,2008,Automated app roach to nego tiations of BOT contracts w ith the consideration of p ro ject risk,Journal of Construction Engineering and Management,2008,134 (1):18-24.
[98]Asian Development Bank.,2005, Technical assistance People's Republic of China:App lication of public p rivate partnerships in urban rail-based transportation project, Project Number:39527.
[99]Jin X H, Doloi H.,2008, Interp reting risk allocation mechanism in public private partnership projects:A n emp irical study in a transaction cost economics perspective, Construction Management and Economics,2008,26 (7):707 721.
[100]Roumboutsos A,2008,A nagno stopoulos K P. Public private partnership projects in Greece:R isk ranking and preferred risk allocation, Construction Managem ent and E conom ics,2008,26 (7):751-763.
[101]Eapn,2007, Public P rivate Partnership in Infrastructure Development: Case Studies from Asia and Europe,Weimar, Germany: EU Asia Network of Competence Enhancement on Public P rivate Partnerships in Infrastructure Development.
[102]Wang S Q, T iong R L K.,Case study of government initiatives for PRC's BOT power plant project,.International Journal of Project Management,2000, 18 (1):69-78.
[103]Rosenstein-Rodan.Paul N.,1943Problems of Industrilization of Eastern and Southeastern Europe, Econ.J,June-Sept.53(2).
[104]Nurke.R.,Problem of Capital Formation in Underdeveloped Countries and Patterns of Trade and Development, New York:Oxford University Press.
[105]Hirschman.A.O.,1958,The Strategy of Economic Development,New Haven:Yale Univercity Press.
[106]Rostow. W.W.,1960,The Stages of Economics Growth:A Non-Communist Manifesto,Cambridge and New York:Cambridge University Press.
[107]Aschauer. D.Is Public Expenditure Productive,Journal of Monetary Economics,1989. (23):177-200.
[108]Aschauer. D.Does Public Investment and Productivity Growth in the Group of Seven, Economcic Perspectives,1989.13 (5):17-25.
[109]Aschauer, D."Does Public Capital Crowd Out Private Capital?", Journal of Monetary Economics, September 1989,24,171-88.
[110]Munnell.Alicia Infrastructure Investment and Economic Growth, Journal of Economic Perspectives,1992(6):189-198.
[111]Gramlich. Edward M.1994,Infrastructure Investment: A Review Essay,Journal of Economic Literature,1994,32(3):1177-1196.
[112]HB.Dorau.,1925,Public Utility Financing,1919-1925,The Journal of Land & Public Utility Economics.
②马秀岩：《投资经济学》东北财经大学出版社,2007.9,4页
①见Kahn,A.The Economics of Regulation:Principles and Institutions, Vol.1, New York: Wily,P.13
② Webster's Unabridged Dictionary. Random House,1998:1563.
③郭朋民营化背景下的公用事业规制研究苏州大学博士学位论文,2006：13页
① Sanford V. Berg. Natural Monopoly Regulation. Cambridge University Press,1988:21.
①参见陈明著：中国城市公用事业民营化研究中国经济出版社,2009.3,13页
①[美]保罗·A·萨缪尔森,威廉·D·诺德豪斯：《经济学》(上),胡代光等译,首都经济贸易大学出版社1996年版,第622页。
②参见[日]植草益：《市场经济与公有企业的作用》,载于陈建安主编：《日本公有企业的民营化及其问题》,上海财经大学出版社1996年版,第1页。
①此前的研究成果多数是论文,篇幅不长,选择公用事业改革的某一方面发表观点,2005年以后,系统的研究成果增多,表现方式为专著和博士论文
①[美]迈克尔.赫德森：《私有化的神话与现实》,李春兰译,《国外理论动态》2007年第9期
②这里所指的公共资本包括公共基础设施投资、公共教育和公共RD投资等。
①唐颖,世界经济研究,2009(10)：80
①参见郭庆旺、鲁听、赵志耘编著的《公共经济学大辞典》,经济科学出版社,1999年；参阅Michael Pickhardt 2002年对当代公共产品定义史演变的研究。
①哈维·罗森,《财政学》(第四版),第59页,北京：中国人民大学出版社,2000年
①唐诗林基础设施产业政府规制的制度分析重庆邮电学院学报2005(4)477-478
①朱文娟：我国公用事业民营化研究四川大学硕士学位论文2006年。
①徐宗威：《公用事业产权改革不能“包治百病”》2006年10月16日《江苏经济报》
①参见陈明,中国城市公用事业民营化研究中国经济出版社,2009
①巴曙松：《构建多元化的城市基础设施融资渠道》,第五届中国城市论坛北京峰会演讲,2004年9月。
①贾海峰：《财政投资比重不足1%城市公用事业过度市场化》,2008年1月2日《21世纪经济报道》
①黄敏地方政府投资主体行为分析,《中国工业经济研究》 1993年02期
①夏骋翔：《城镇居民饮用水资源需求研究》,载于《价格理论与实践》2007年第3期,31-33页。
①杨华云,《地方政府债务率最高达364%部分偿债压力较大》《新京报》2010年06月24日
①高莉莉：安徽投资效率分析,现代商贸工业2008(12)：105有一段实证研究可借鉴
①王东京、孙浩林：《获得巨大成功英国挡不住的私有化浪潮》,2001年10月19日《中国经济时报》
②水皮：《私有化拯救了老大帝国?——国有企业私有化札记》,2006年5月30日《中国工商时报》
③王东京、孙浩林：《获得巨大成功英国挡不住的私有化浪潮》,2001年10月19日《中国经济时报》
①王春花：《英国完成铁路私有化》,1997年12月22日《市场报》。
②转引自：迟福林《处于十字路口的中国基础领域改革》中国经济出版社,2004,181页
①王东京、孙浩林：《获得巨大成功英国挡不住的私有化浪潮》,2001年10月19日《中国经济时报》
①[法]享利.勒帕日：《美国新自由主义经济学》,李燕生译,经北京大学出版社,1985,第158页。
① Swann,D. (1988), The Retreat of the State: Deregulation and Privation in the UK and US, New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, pp.8-9.
①参见许峰《中国公用事业改革中的亲贫规制研究》上海人民出版社,2008年,98-99页。
①常杪：《建立水业投融资机制的战略思路》,2004年3月5日《中国建设报》。
①欧文.E.休斯：《公共管理导论》,彭和平等译,中国人民大学出版社,2000,第131页。
① Harold Demsetz,1968, Why Regulate Utilities? Journal of Law and Economics 11:pp.55-65.
② Stephen J. Bailey,1995, Public Sector Economics; Theory, Policy and Practice, Macmillian Press LTD, P.369
① Viskers,J.S. and Yanrrow, G.K.,1985, Privation and the Natural Monopolies, Public Policy Center, p24;Kolbe,A.L.and Read, J.A.,1984, The Cost of Capital; Estimating the Rate of Return for Public Utilities, MIT Press, Breyer, S,G.,1982, Regulation and Its Reform, Harvard University Press, p49
①参见仇保兴、王俊豪中国市政公用事业监管体制研究中国社会科学出版社2006132-133页
②参见余晖秦虹公私合作制的中国试验上海人民出版社2005年,238-239页
[1]马秀岩.投资经济学[M].大连：东北财经大学出版社,2008.2-6.
[2]马秀岩.项目融资[M].大连：东北财经大学出版社,2002.94-96.
[3]杜两省.有效经济增长与投资方式变革[M].北京：科学出版社,2006.187-188.
[4]许峰.中国公用事业改革中的亲贫规制研究[M].上海：上海人民出版社,2008,23-28.
[5]建设部课题组.市政公用事业改革与发展研究[M].北京：中国建筑工业出版社,2007.12-22.
[6]陈明.中国城市公用事业民营化研究[M].北京：中国经济出版社,2009.166-168.
[7]周林军、曹远征、张智.中国公用事业改革：从理论到实践[M].北京：知识产权出版社,2009.
[8]高踪阳.变革时代的国有公用事业企业管理实践[M].北京：中国经济出版社,2007.
[9]邹东涛、秦虹.社会公用事业改革攻坚[M].北京：中国水利水电出版社,2006.36-38.
[10]仇保兴、王俊豪.中国市政公用事业监管体制研究[M].北京：中国社会科学出版社,2006.8-14.
[11]肖兴志.公用事业市场化与规制模式转型[M].北京：中国财政经济出版社,2008.
[12]周耀东.中国公用事业管制改革研究[M].上海：上海人民出版社,2009.
[13]王俊豪.英国自然垄断产业企业所有制的变革及其启示[J].财经论丛,2002,(1)：
[14]刘小玄.中国转轨经济中的产权结构和市场结构——产业绩效水平的决定因素》[J].经济研究,2003,(1)：
[15]田国强.转轨经济中最优所有权安排的理论[J].经济学季刊,2001,(1)：
[16]玛格丽特.布莱尔著、赵辰宁.共同的所有权[J].经济社会体制比较,1996,(3)：
[17]赵国杰.技术经济学[M].天津：天津大学出版社,1996.120-121.
[18]武献华.投资效益分析与评价[M].大连：辽宁人民出版社,1985.20-21.
[19]曾国安.政府经济学[M].武汉：湖北人民出版社,2002.133.
[20]马白玉.中国市政基础设施市场化改革研究[M].天津：南开大学出版社,2008.21.128-129.
[21]孟耀.绿色投资问题研究[M].大连：东北财经大学出版社,2008.257.
[22]马建春.市政债券市场发展与基础设施融资体系建设[M].经济科学出版社,2007.
[23]肖兴志.公用事业的民营化改革：理论与中国实证,自然垄断与规制：理论和经验[M].经济科学出版社,2004.199.
[24]郭朋.公用事业民营化改革的路径选择[D].苏州大学博士学位论文,2006.
[25]王梅等.市政工程公私合作项目投融资决策研究[M].北京：经济科学出版社,2008.62-63.
[26]济邦咨询公司.基础设施与公用事业——民营化的中国实践[M].北京：学林出版社,2007.46-47.
[27]王广起.公用事业的市场运营与政府规制[M].北京：中国社会科学出版社,2008.78-80.
[28]秦虹.城市建设融资[M].北京：中国发展出版社,2007.15.
[29]余晖、秦虹.公私合作制的中国试验[M].上海：上海人民出版社,2005.250-254.
[30]李珍刚.城市公用事业市场化中的政府责任[M].北京：社会科学文献出版社,2008.327-344.
[31]中仪国际招标公司等.中国市政公用事业改革文件汇编[M].北京：中国建筑工业出版社,2007.
[32]天则公用事业研究中心参考资料2007-2009年.
[33]李银珠.政府公共支出行为的成本—效益研究[M].北京：经济管理出版社,2007-163-166.
[34]李俊江等.外国国有企业改革研究[M].北京：经济科学出版社,2010.124-134.
[35]丹尼尔.W.布罗姆利.《经济利益与经济制度》[M].上海：上海人民出版社,2006.127-141.
[36]道格拉斯.C.诺思.《制度、制度变迁与经济绩效》[M].上海：上海人民出版社,2006.126-128.
[37]姜润宇.城市燃气：欧盟的管理体制和中国的改革[M].北京：中国市场出版社,2005.56-57.
[38]武文婷、王立国.基于价值集成理论的城市轨道交通项目的收益还原分析及融资开发模式研究———以大连市快轨三号线为例[C].2009建设与房地产年会论文集.
[39]周义程、闫娟.什么是公共产品?一个文献综述[J].学海,2008,(1)：104-105.
[40]英吉.考尔等编.全球化之道——全球公共产品的提供与管理[M].北京：人民 出版社,2006.
[4]唐钧.社会政策的基本概念与理论框架[EB/OL]. http://www.chinavalue.net/Article/Archive/2007/4/8/61689_14.html,2009-4-12
[42](澳)休·史卓顿、莱昂内尔·奥查德.公共物品、公共企业和公共选择[M].经济科学出版社,2000.67-69.
[44]王涯茜、王世君、杨宇.基于基础设施建设项目资金最佳使用价值理论的PPP模式分析[J].建筑经济,2009,(11)：95—98.
[45]罗东秋、林勇、刘伟.基于蒂布特模型的公共产品融资创新研究——以城市轨道交通为例[J].现代管理科学,2010,(6)：26-28.
[46]杜亚灵、尹贻林.基于治理结构创新的公共项目管理绩效改善研究——以深圳地铁5号线BT工程为例[J].建筑经济,2010,(4)：66—70.
[47]张凯、张玉魁.工程项目BT模式与代建制相结合的探讨市政技术[J].2009,(1)：157-158.
[48]徐宗威.法国城市公用事业特许经营制度及启示[J].水工业市场,2007,(9)：33-36.
[49]田成诗、盖美.辽宁省2005-2020年GDP预测模型的建立与应用大连海事大学学报[J].2007,(3)：60-64.
[50]朱华友、吕东芳.区域经济发展与水资源利用的关系研究——以辽宁省朝阳市为例[J].浙江师范大学学报(自然科学版),2010,(2)：217-219.
[51]张丹.中央政府与地方政府投资互动关系研究——基于辽宁省投资结构的实证分析[J].生产力研究,2010,(5)：154-156.
[52]裴冬梅、郭启勇.辽宁省1990-2005年卫生总费用与GDP增长相关性[J].中国公共卫生,2010,(1)：116-117.
[53]张峁、徐蓓蓓、江栋.地方财政支出对经济增长影响的空间计量分析——辽宁省为例[J].科学决策,2010,(5)：50-57.
[54]周望军、朱明龙.公用事业价格监管问题研究[J].价格理论与实践,2006,(9)：8-10.
[55]吴绪亮.中国基础设施产业的亲贫规制体系设计[J].改革,2004,(4)：24-29.
[56]肖兴志、孙阳.拉美公用事业市场化改革及经验教训[J].天则公用事业研究中心资料,0803：8-19.
[57]王灏.城市轨道交通投融资问题研究[M].北京：中国金融出版社,2006.44-47.
[58]陈拥军.法国城市基础设施的委托管理模式[J].城市管理,2005,(6)：48-50.
[59]孟祥林.城市公用事业：从英德等国的民营化模式论我国的发展对策[J].青岛科技大学学报(社会科学版),2009,(3)：1-7.
[60]杨学军、董妍伽.英国、美国、新加坡公用事业监管的做法及启示[J].经济纵横,2008,(8)：36-38.
[61]汪文雄、李启明.PPP模式下基础设施项目私营方风险预警模型[J].2008,(10)：90-92.
[62]谢磊、王枢、董建军.PPP融资模式下城市轨道交通经济风险及规避对策[J].建筑经济,2008,(10)：93-95.
[63]周龙.PPP模式在公共基础设施建设中的应用[J].河南师范大学学报(哲学社会科学版),2010,(2)：127-129.
[64]刘禹、何佰洲、武文婷.城市基础设施项目公私合作制模式的新探讨——基于价值集成的视角[J].城市发展研究,2010,(2)：98-103.
[65]王俊豪.美国联邦通信委员会及其运行机制[M].北京：经济管理出版社,2003.55.
[66]马珺.公共品概念的价值[J].《财贸经济》,2005,(11)：28.
[67]顾金亮、郭晓东.我国市政公用基础设施的投资不足与对策分析[J].建筑经济,2007,(2)：19-21.
[68]国家经贸委企业监督司.新加坡国有企业内部监管经验及其启示[J].中国经贸导刊,2000,(8)：22.
[69]李阳.公共产品概念和本质研究综述[J].生产力研究,2010,(4)：30-35.
[70]Cecilia,Tortaja.,2006,Water Management in Singapore, Water Resources Development, Vol122.
[71]Ingo,Vogelsang.,2002,Incentive regulation and competition in public utility markets:a 20-year perspective, Journal of Regulatory Economics.
[72]In,Kessides.,2004,Reforming infrastructure:privatization, regulation, and competition, A World Bank Publication.
[73]Km, Howe.,1982, EF Rasmussen, Public utility economics and finance,Prentice-Hall,Inc.
[74]Ls,Hyman.,1997, America's electric utilities:past, present and future,Public Utilities Reports,Inc. Arlington, VA.
[75]Atkinson, Scott E. Halvorsen, Rober.,1986,The relative efficiency of public and private firms in a regulated environment: The case of U.S. electric utilities, Journal of Public Economics 1986,281-294.
[76]John R.Allan.,1993, PPP:A Review of Literature and Practice. Sasktchewan Institute of Public Policy, Public Policy Paper, No.4.
[77]Swann,D.,1988, The Retreat of the State:Deregulation and Privation in the UK and US, New York:Harvester Wheatsheaf, pp.15.
[78]W. VerEecke., Public goods.An ideal concept, Journal of Social-Economics.
[79]The European Commission. Guidance For Successful PPP,1993.
[80]Armstrong,M.,S.Cowan and J.Vickers,194,Regulator Reform:Economic Anlysis and British Experierice,Cambridge:The MIT Press.
[81]Asha Gupta, Beyond Privatizaion, London:Macmillan Press LTD.2000,p.58.
[82]Clark,J..M.,1940,Toward a Concept of Workable Competition,American Economic Review, Vol.XXX,1940, pp.241-256.
[83]E.S.Savas.,1983,Privatization: The Key to Better Government (Chathm,NJ: Chatham House.
[84]Harold Demsetz.,1968, "Why Regulate Utilities?", Journal of Law and Economics, 1968, pp.55-65.
[85]E.A.Thompsom.,1966,A Pareto Pptimal Decision Process,in G.Tullock, ed. Papers on Non-Market Decision Making, Charlottesville: University of Virginia 113-140.
[86]Michael A. Crew and Paul R. Kleindorfer.,1980,the economics of Public Utility regulation. Cambridge,The MIT Press.
[87]Omar,O. Chisari, Antonio Estache,and Catherine Waddams Price.,"Access by the Poor in Latin America's Utility Reform:Subsidies and Service Obligations", WIDER, Discussion Paper NO.2001/75.
[88]G Brown Jr. MB Johnson.,1969,Public utility pricing and output under risk[J].The American Economic Review.
[89]Hemphill, T.A.,1992,Self-Regualting industry behavior[J].antitrust limitations and trade Business Ethics,1992,11(12).
[90]Priankans, Malikr.,1997,Transportation Infrastructure Financing:Evaluation of Alternatives [J].Journal of Infrastructure Systems,1997 (3):111-118.
[91]Ye S D, Tiong R L K.,2003,The effect of concession period design on comp letion risk management of BOT project,Construction Management and Economics, 2003,21 (5):-471-482.
[92]Laffontjj,1994,The new economics of regulation ten years after, Econometrics, 1994,Vol.62, No.3,507-537.
[93]NFO-communication development authority of Singapore,Notice on The Review of Singapore Telecommunication Limiterps Reference Interconnection Offer.
[94]Telecommunications regulation in Singapore:http://www. lovells. com /germany/ControlServlet/de/publication/pub Id/673/.
[95]Electricity license for generation licensee://elise. ema. gov. sg/elise/public_app lyforlicence. Jsp.
[96]Singaproe government moves toward a competitive marketplace:http:// singapore. usembassy.gov/ep/2001/powersector2001. html.
[97]L iou F M, Huang C P.,2008,Automated app roach to nego tiations of BOT contracts w ith the consideration of p ro ject risk,Journal of Construction Engineering and Management,2008,134 (1):18-24.
[98]Asian Development Bank.,2005, Technical assistance People's Republic of China:App lication of public p rivate partnerships in urban rail-based transportation project, Project Number:39527.
[99]Jin X H, Doloi H.,2008, Interp reting risk allocation mechanism in public private partnership projects:A n emp irical study in a transaction cost economics perspective, Construction Management and Economics,2008,26 (7):707 721.
[100]Roumboutsos A,2008,A nagno stopoulos K P. Public private partnership projects in Greece:R isk ranking and preferred risk allocation, Construction Managem ent and E conom ics,2008,26 (7):751-763.
[101]Eapn,2007, Public P rivate Partnership in Infrastructure Development: Case Studies from Asia and Europe,Weimar, Germany: EU Asia Network of Competence Enhancement on Public P rivate Partnerships in Infrastructure Development.
[102]Wang S Q, T iong R L K.,Case study of government initiatives for PRC's BOT power plant project,.International Journal of Project Management,2000, 18 (1):69-78.
[103]Rosenstein-Rodan.Paul N.,1943Problems of Industrilization of Eastern and Southeastern Europe, Econ.J,June-Sept.53(2).
[104]Nurke.R.,Problem of Capital Formation in Underdeveloped Countries and Patterns of Trade and Development, New York:Oxford University Press.
[105]Hirschman.A.O.,1958,The Strategy of Economic Development,New Haven:Yale Univercity Press.
[106]Rostow. W.W.,1960,The Stages of Economics Growth:A Non-Communist Manifesto,Cambridge and New York:Cambridge University Press.
[107]Aschauer. D.Is Public Expenditure Productive,Journal of Monetary Economics,1989. (23):177-200.
[108]Aschauer. D.Does Public Investment and Productivity Growth in the Group of Seven, Economcic Perspectives,1989.13 (5):17-25.
[109]Aschauer, D."Does Public Capital Crowd Out Private Capital?", Journal of Monetary Economics, September 1989,24,171-88.
[110]Munnell.Alicia Infrastructure Investment and Economic Growth, Journal of Economic Perspectives,1992(6):189-198.
[111]Gramlich. Edward M.1994,Infrastructure Investment: A Review Essay,Journal of Economic Literature,1994,32(3):1177-1196.
[112]HB.Dorau.,1925,Public Utility Financing,1919-1925,The Journal of Land & Public Utility Economics.