审计师行业专长研究
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摘要
独立审计在确保会计信息质量方面的作用受到广泛的关注。会计信息的可信程度(credibility)会因审计质量的差异而有所不同,以往的审计研究特别是实证研究中,更多地关注影响审计质量的独立性因素,而对构成审计质量的另一重要因素——审计师的专业能力却关注不够。在审计师独立性既定的条件下,审计师掌握客户所在行业的生产经营特点、正常经济技术指标、特殊会计规则等知识,对增强其专业能力、提高审计质量、防范和降低审计风险的意义日趋重要。事实上,国内外许多审计失败案件之所以发生,一个很重要的原因就是执行审计业务的审计师缺乏对客户所在行业相关知识的了解。如20世纪末美国发生的林肯储蓄信贷银行审计失败案,以及中国证券市场上银广夏、蓝田股份审计失败案,其发生均与其审计师的行业专业技能存在缺陷有关(余玉苗,2004)。
除此之外,随着审计市场竞争的加剧,审计师需要寻求某种有效的竞争战略以维持其竞争优势。自20世纪80年代末,“八大”开始走向行业专业化的发展道路。1993年,毕马威会计师事务所在“六大”中率先按照行业服务线重整了其组织结构,开展了行业专业化的发展战略。截止1998年,六大会计公司均在各自的网站上披露了其聚焦发展的行业。1998年,在一个关于CPA职业发展前景的国际论坛上,行业专长被确认为关系到CPA职业生存的关键因素之一,并被列为CPA职业未来发展面临的五个最重要的问题之一(AICPA,1998)。
自上一世纪八十年代中期起,国外兴起了审计师行业专长的研究。这些研究以实证研究和实验研究为主,主要研究了审计师行业专长与审计效率及效果的关系、审计师行业专长与审计收费的关系以及审计师行业专长与审计质量的关系,并得出大量有意义的结论。然而,在中国审计市场上,审计师行业专长的研究仍处于起步阶段。考虑到中国审计市场特定的法制环境、市场结构及审计师发展水平与国外成熟审计市场有较大的差异,因此,在中国审计市场上进行审计师行业专长研究须结合中国特有的制度背景和现实状况才能正确地形成理论假设、恰当地度量研究变量和设定模型、谨慎地对研究结果进行解释。本文主要围绕审计师发展行业专长的动因、审计师行业专长的度量、审计师行业专长与审计质量、审计定价的关系等诸问题,从理论和实证两个角度展开分析和检验,并为中国审计市场上发展审计师行业专长提供相关的政策建议。
全文共分6章。
第1章,导论。介绍本文的研究背景、研究问题、以及研究思路与方法。
第2章,审计师行业专长研究的理论基础。从审计需求和审计供给两个角度对审计师发展行业专长的动因进行了理论分析。从审计需求的角度分析,受托经济责任的内在要求是产生审计师行业专长需求的根本动因;改善信息不对称状况,降低信息租金,最大化委托人的收益,是审计师发展行业专长的契约动因;降低信息风险,促使信息使用者做出合理的经济决策,从而提高了资本市场的资源配置效率的作用,是审计师发展行业专长的信息动因;发送行业专家信号、获取审计收费溢价,是审计师发展行业专长的信号动因。从审计供给的角度分析,行业专长会带来行业内的规模经济,降低单位审计成本,增强事务所的成本优势;审计师通过干中学,建立学习经验曲线,不但可以提高审计效率进而降低审计成本,而且还可以创造与审计师个人相关的行业专用性隐性知识,令竞争对手难以模仿,成为审计师行业专长竞争优势的重要来源;从风险导向审计模式看,审计师熟知行业现状,把握行业动态,理解被审计单位战略,掌握被审计单位经营的主要环节,才能更好地识别被审计单位的经营风险,提高审计质量。从审计产品差异化策略看,审计师行业专长是通过对特定行业进行专用性投资以实现产品纵向差异化来避开价格竞争的一种战略,它可以为审计师带来行业专长溢价;从审计师的声誉机制看,树立行业专长声誉可以使审计师获取更高的经济利益。本章的理论分析为理解审计师行业专长行为奠定了理论基础。
第3章,审计师行业专长度量研究。首先对以往审计师行业专长度量方法进行了文献综述,并对审计师行业专长的六种度量方法分别进行了分析和评述。然后,对中国上市公司审计市场中的审计师行业专长指标进行了系统的描述和分析。(1)通过对中国上市公司审计市场和行业细分市场的集中度分析,发现行业审计市场结构与整体审计市场结构有显著差别。(2)建立中国上市公司审计市场中审计师行业专长指标体系并对各指标之间的关系进行了的简单相关分析。(3)运用典型相关分析方法研究了行业市场份额类指标与行业组合份额类指标之间的关系,证实了Neal和Riley(2004)提出的审计师行业专长指标可以分为两个互补的子指标体系的论述。(4)运用主成份分析方法构建了审计师行业专长综合评价指标。本章是国内首次系统地检验了各审计师行业专长指标之间的关系,为未来的研究者合理选择审计师行业专长度量指标提依据。
第4章,审计师行业专长与审计质量关系的实证检验。本章以2001—2006年中国上市公司为样本,以5个行业市场份额指标、2个行业组合份额指标和1个行业专长综合评价指标分别度量审计师行业专长,以操控性应计利润的绝对值度量审计质量,检验了审计师行业专长与审计质量之间的关系。实证结果发现,(1)从总体上,即从审计师行业专长综合指标与审计质量的关系来看,审计师行业专长与审计质量之间没有显著的线性相关性。但是这个初步结论显然受到了审计师行业专长非线性效应的影响,表现在行业市场份额连续变量和行业市场份额哑变量系数变化方向的不一致方面。(2)审计师行业专长与审计质量之间存在着显著的非线性关系,即审计师行业专长与操控性应计利润的绝对值之间的关系是一种形如“倒U”型的非线性关系,或者说,审计师行业专长与审计质量之间是“U”型的非线性关系。(3)按不同审计师类型分组检验发现:①总体上,国际“四大”组内的审计师行业专长与审计质量没有显著的关系;②总体上,国内“十大”组内的审计师行业专长与审计质量负相关;③总体上,国内非“十大”组内的审计师行业专长与审计质量没有显著的关系;但是其行业专长单项指标效应表现不一致:如果是行业组合份额领先者,则其审计质量较低;如果是行业市场份额较高者,则其审计质量较高。(4)不同类型审计师行业专长的边际效应检验结果:①总体上国际“四大”的行业专长对审计质量没有显著的边际影响。②总体上国内“十大”的行业专长对审计质量有显著的边际递减作用。③总体上国内非“十大”的行业专长对审计质量没有显著的边际影响。但是,从单项指标来看,当行业市场份额超过15%时,国内非“十大”行业专长审计师有较高的审计质量;但是,当国内非“十大”审计师在其行业组合份额最大的行业里,其行业专长却对审计质量造成负面影响。本章最后从六个方面总结了造成我国审计师行业专长未能提升审计质量的原因。
第5章,审计师行业专长与审计定价关系的实证检验。本章以2001—2006年中国上市公司为样本,以行业市场份额、客户组合份额及行业专长综合指标作为审计师行业专长的替代变量,研究了审计师行业专长与审计定价之间的关系。研究发现:(1)在整体样本中,审计师行业专长与审计费用正相关。说明审计师的行业专长能够给审计师带来审计收费溢价。(2)在大客户样本中,审计师行业专长与审计费用正相关,同样说明审计师行业专长能够审计师审计收费溢价。(3)在小客户样本中,审计师行业专长与审计费用没有显著的相关性,说明在小客户市场上,缺乏对行业专长审计的需求,审计师没能获得行业专长审计收费溢价。对以上的结果,笔者结合中国审计市场的实际进行了解释:第一,从整体样本的回归结果来看,审计师行业专长与审计费用正相关,说明从整体上看,客户具有差异化的审计需求,而审计师凭借其行业专长替代变量的“信号传递功能”获得了审计收费溢价。第二,整体市场上审计师的行业专长溢价实际上是由大客户市场上的差异化审计需求驱动的。大客户因具有较高的代理成本而产生高质量审计的需求,并且认为那些在本行业具有较高市场份额(或专注于某行业)的审计师能够提供具有行业差异化的审计服务,因此愿意付出较高的审计费用;而行业专长审计师可以凭借其在目标市场显著的份额,声称其具有较高的行业知识和经验,能够提供高质量的行业专业化服务,并预期通过“信号传递功能”获取审计收费溢价。第三,小客户相对代理成本较小,缺乏对差异化审计服务的需求,审计师的行业专长未能为审计师带来审计收费溢价。第四,进一步放宽“产品差异化”的定义,运用广义上的“产品差异化”解释行业专长审计收费溢价。
最后一章,即第6章,总结了本文研究的主要结论和主要创新点,提出了相关政策建议,并指出了本文研究的局限性以及后续研究的方向。
论文的主要创新点主要包括:
1.首次系统地研究了审计师行业专长的各种度量指标之间的关系,并得出若干有意义的结论。研究的方法包括简单相关系数分析、典型相关分析和主成份分析,这三种研究方法也是以往审计师行业专长研究中所没有出现过的;通过典型相关分析证实了审计师行业专长指标体系可以分为两个互补的子指标体系;通过主成份分析对审计师行业专长的各种指标进行了信息综合,建立了基于主成份的审计师行业专长综合评价指标,该指标相对于单一指标具有更高的综合性和可靠性,并且可以在一定程度上降低人为或主观选择审计师行业专长指标的影响,不仅为审计师行业专长的度量提供了新思路,也为进一步进行审计师行业专长实证研究奠定了可靠的基础。
2.首次系统地检验了各种审计师行业专长指标与审计质量的关系,并得出若干有意义的结论。由于审计师行业专长有多种度量方式,研究者往往凭主观经验选择其中某一个或和几个指标来检验其与审计质量的相关性,这就使得相关的研究结论常缺乏一致性和可靠性。而本文采用以审计师行业专长综合评价指标为主,以各传统单项审计师行业专长指标为辅的方法,来检验行业专长与审计质量的相关性,这就使得实证研究结论更加可靠;本文研究发现,审计师行业专长综合评价指标与审计质量没有显著的相关性,审计师行业专长连续变量与审计质量之间存在着显著的非线性关系;进一步,本文还就审计师行业专长对审计质量的影响,分别进行了分组检验和边际效果检验并得出相关结论。最后,结合中国审计市场的具体背景,对上述实证结果进行了深入剖析与解释,特别地,对目前我国审计市场上审计师行业专长未能提升审计质量的原因从六个方面进行了分析和总结。
3.系统地检验了各种审计师行业专长指标与审计定价的关系,并得出若干有意义的结论。实证研究发现,在整体样本中,审计师行业专长综合评价指标与审计收费显著正相关,说明整体上审计师的行业专长能够带来审计收费溢价。进一步检验发现,在大客户市场上审计师行业专长与审计收费正相关,而在小客户市场上审计师行业专长与审计收费没有显著的相关性,进一步说明整体市场上审计师的行业专长溢价实际上是由大客户市场上的差异化审计需求驱动的。由于本文没有发现审计师行业专长能够提升审计质量,因此不能推定审计师行业专长审计溢价来源于审计师提供了高质量的行业专长审计服务。结合中国审计市场的实际背景,本文联合“产品差异化”假设和“信号传递功能”假设对上述结果进行了解释。此外,在审计师行业专长与审计定价关系的研究中,同样由于采用了多种行业专长度量方式,与同类研究相比,研究结论具有更高的可靠性。
The role of independent auditor to ensure the quality of accounting information has the wide concern. The credibility of accounting information has the variations because of different in the quality of the audit. In previous audit researches, especially the empirical researchers, the researchers pay attention to the independent factor of audit quality, and not to the professional competence of audit quality. On the conditions of auditors having invariant independence, if the auditor masters more knowledge and has more experiences about customer’s industry and environment, grasps special accounting standards and rules, understands normal economic and technical indicators, they will enhance their professional capabilities, reduce the significance of audit risk and improve audit quality. In fact, many audit failures took place, a very important reason for this is that the incumbent auditor lacks of customer-related industry knowledge. The case of audit failure about Lincoln Savings Bank of United States, as well as China's Guangxia Company, indicates that the reasons are concerned about the lack of industry's professional knowledge and skills.
With the intense competition in the audit market, auditors need to find some effective methods for competition, in order to maintain their strategic advantage. In the early 1990s, large accounting firms began to change their organizational structures, which, at that time, were built around the traditional product lines of auditing, taxation, and consulting. The firms restructured their activities around broad industry sectors, and began marketing their expertise around industry specializations. Today, the Big 4 firms continue to promote their industry-based expertise. Specialization in the audit market is critical for the future survival of the audit firms, and specialization is one of the five top issues impacting the CPA profession in the 21st century (AICPA 1998).
So, why the auditor develop the industry specialization? How to measure the auditor specialization? Whether the auditor specialization can improve audit quality? Whether the auditor specialization can earn audit fee premiums? The dissertation answers these problems by theoretical analysis and empirical test. The dissertation has 6 chapters.
Chapter 1 is preface, introducing the background, objective and research methodology. In Chapter 2, the author constitutes the fundamental theory from the demand and supply point of view. From the angle of demand of audit, the essential motive for auditor to develop industry specialization is the demand by economic accountability. Besides, Improving the information asymmetry, reducing information rent are the contract motive; reducing the risk of information and helping decision-makers are the information motive; signaling the indication of industry specialist to users and earning fee premiums are the signal motive. From the angle of supply of audit, Economies of scale, learning by doing, risk-based audit, product differentiation strategy, and reputation mechanism are the motives for auditor to develop industry specialization.
In Chapter 3, the author discusses the issues on the measure of auditor specialization. After surveying the literatures, the author use the tool of correlation coefficient to explore the inner relationship among all kinds of measures of industry specialization. Then, the author uses Canonical Correlation Analysis to explore the relationship between industry market-based variables and industry portfolio-based variables. In the end section of Chapter 3, a PCA method is applied to constitute a comprehensive evaluation index for auditor industry specialization. The contributions of Chapter 3 have three aspects: (1) the author fistly explores the inner relationship among all kinds of measures and between two categories, i.e. market-based variables and industry portfolio-based variables. (2) verifies the ideas which was promoted by Neal and Riley(2004) that the whole measures of auditor industry specialization can be divided into two complementary group.(3) fistly promotes a new comprehensive evaluation index for auditor industry specialization. All the works in Chapter 3 give a tool to test the the relationship between industry specialization and audit quality or audit fees.
In Chapter 4, the author empirically explores the relationship between auditor industry specialization and audit quality. The sample range is from 2001 to 2006, in Chinese list companies market. The number of samples is 6929. We use one comprehensive evaluation index, five industry market index, and two industry portfolio index as the proxy of industry specialation., and use the absolutely value of discretionary accrual as the proxy of audit quality. After controlling other factors which affect audit quality, we find that, in the whole, the auditor industry specialization comprehensive evaluation index has no significant correlation with the absolutely value of discretionary accrual (DAC), which means that in Chinese audit market, auditor industry specialization can’t improve audit quality. This result is supprising contrasting by American relavant results. In the end of this chapter, the author put forwards six causes to explain why auditor industry specialization cannot improve audit quality in Chinese audit market.
In Chapter 5, the author tests the industry specialization effect on audit fees. The author uses samples range from 2001 to 2006, in Chinese list company audit market; investigates the relation between auditor industry specialation and audit fees. The results indicate (1) In whole samples, Auditor industry specialization is positively correlated with audit fees; (2) In big client market, auditor industry specialization also positively correlated with audit fees; (3) But in small client market, auditor industry specialization has no significant effect on audit fees. The results means that: (1) On the whole, the client has differencial audit demand, but auditor gain audit fee premium depending on signaling function; (2) In fact, the auditor industry specialization premium is drived by big clients market because big clients usally have high agent cost and think those auditors with higher industry market share will provide more special service; (3)In the small client market, the clients have less agent cost, so that the demand for auditor industry speacialization is low, this lead to no premium in small clients market; (4)Besides, the author broaden the concept of product differentiation in order to better explain the value of industry specialization in Chinese audit market.
In Chapter 6, the author summarizes the main conclusions made in the dissertation and points out its limitations and directions of the later study. What’s more, there are some innovations in the dissertation.They are as follows:
1. The author firstly reseaches the relationship among all kinds of measures of auditor industry specialization; firstly employs Canonical Correlation Analysis to explore the relationship between industry market-based variables and industry portfolio-based variables; firstly constitutes a comprehensive evaluation index for auditor industry specialization and use this robust measure to test the relationship between auditor industry specialization and audit quality or audit fees.
2. The author systemly tests the relationship between auditor industry specialization and audit quality. By using above meaures of autior industry specialization, the study gives many new results and the author put forward six causes to explain why auditor industry specialization cannot improve audit quality in Chinese audit market.
3. The author systemly tests the relationship between auditor industry specialization and audit fees and gain many new conclusions. By using above meaures of autior industry specialization, the empirical results are more robust contrasted by other research conserning the relationship between auditor industry specialization and audit fees.
除此之外,随着审计市场竞争的加剧,审计师需要寻求某种有效的竞争战略以维持其竞争优势。自20世纪80年代末,“八大”开始走向行业专业化的发展道路。1993年,毕马威会计师事务所在“六大”中率先按照行业服务线重整了其组织结构,开展了行业专业化的发展战略。截止1998年,六大会计公司均在各自的网站上披露了其聚焦发展的行业。1998年,在一个关于CPA职业发展前景的国际论坛上,行业专长被确认为关系到CPA职业生存的关键因素之一,并被列为CPA职业未来发展面临的五个最重要的问题之一(AICPA,1998)。
自上一世纪八十年代中期起,国外兴起了审计师行业专长的研究。这些研究以实证研究和实验研究为主,主要研究了审计师行业专长与审计效率及效果的关系、审计师行业专长与审计收费的关系以及审计师行业专长与审计质量的关系,并得出大量有意义的结论。然而,在中国审计市场上,审计师行业专长的研究仍处于起步阶段。考虑到中国审计市场特定的法制环境、市场结构及审计师发展水平与国外成熟审计市场有较大的差异,因此,在中国审计市场上进行审计师行业专长研究须结合中国特有的制度背景和现实状况才能正确地形成理论假设、恰当地度量研究变量和设定模型、谨慎地对研究结果进行解释。本文主要围绕审计师发展行业专长的动因、审计师行业专长的度量、审计师行业专长与审计质量、审计定价的关系等诸问题,从理论和实证两个角度展开分析和检验,并为中国审计市场上发展审计师行业专长提供相关的政策建议。
全文共分6章。
第1章,导论。介绍本文的研究背景、研究问题、以及研究思路与方法。
第2章,审计师行业专长研究的理论基础。从审计需求和审计供给两个角度对审计师发展行业专长的动因进行了理论分析。从审计需求的角度分析,受托经济责任的内在要求是产生审计师行业专长需求的根本动因;改善信息不对称状况,降低信息租金,最大化委托人的收益,是审计师发展行业专长的契约动因;降低信息风险,促使信息使用者做出合理的经济决策,从而提高了资本市场的资源配置效率的作用,是审计师发展行业专长的信息动因;发送行业专家信号、获取审计收费溢价,是审计师发展行业专长的信号动因。从审计供给的角度分析,行业专长会带来行业内的规模经济,降低单位审计成本,增强事务所的成本优势;审计师通过干中学,建立学习经验曲线,不但可以提高审计效率进而降低审计成本,而且还可以创造与审计师个人相关的行业专用性隐性知识,令竞争对手难以模仿,成为审计师行业专长竞争优势的重要来源;从风险导向审计模式看,审计师熟知行业现状,把握行业动态,理解被审计单位战略,掌握被审计单位经营的主要环节,才能更好地识别被审计单位的经营风险,提高审计质量。从审计产品差异化策略看,审计师行业专长是通过对特定行业进行专用性投资以实现产品纵向差异化来避开价格竞争的一种战略,它可以为审计师带来行业专长溢价;从审计师的声誉机制看,树立行业专长声誉可以使审计师获取更高的经济利益。本章的理论分析为理解审计师行业专长行为奠定了理论基础。
第3章,审计师行业专长度量研究。首先对以往审计师行业专长度量方法进行了文献综述,并对审计师行业专长的六种度量方法分别进行了分析和评述。然后,对中国上市公司审计市场中的审计师行业专长指标进行了系统的描述和分析。(1)通过对中国上市公司审计市场和行业细分市场的集中度分析,发现行业审计市场结构与整体审计市场结构有显著差别。(2)建立中国上市公司审计市场中审计师行业专长指标体系并对各指标之间的关系进行了的简单相关分析。(3)运用典型相关分析方法研究了行业市场份额类指标与行业组合份额类指标之间的关系,证实了Neal和Riley(2004)提出的审计师行业专长指标可以分为两个互补的子指标体系的论述。(4)运用主成份分析方法构建了审计师行业专长综合评价指标。本章是国内首次系统地检验了各审计师行业专长指标之间的关系,为未来的研究者合理选择审计师行业专长度量指标提依据。
第4章,审计师行业专长与审计质量关系的实证检验。本章以2001—2006年中国上市公司为样本,以5个行业市场份额指标、2个行业组合份额指标和1个行业专长综合评价指标分别度量审计师行业专长,以操控性应计利润的绝对值度量审计质量,检验了审计师行业专长与审计质量之间的关系。实证结果发现,(1)从总体上,即从审计师行业专长综合指标与审计质量的关系来看,审计师行业专长与审计质量之间没有显著的线性相关性。但是这个初步结论显然受到了审计师行业专长非线性效应的影响,表现在行业市场份额连续变量和行业市场份额哑变量系数变化方向的不一致方面。(2)审计师行业专长与审计质量之间存在着显著的非线性关系,即审计师行业专长与操控性应计利润的绝对值之间的关系是一种形如“倒U”型的非线性关系,或者说,审计师行业专长与审计质量之间是“U”型的非线性关系。(3)按不同审计师类型分组检验发现:①总体上,国际“四大”组内的审计师行业专长与审计质量没有显著的关系;②总体上,国内“十大”组内的审计师行业专长与审计质量负相关;③总体上,国内非“十大”组内的审计师行业专长与审计质量没有显著的关系;但是其行业专长单项指标效应表现不一致:如果是行业组合份额领先者,则其审计质量较低;如果是行业市场份额较高者,则其审计质量较高。(4)不同类型审计师行业专长的边际效应检验结果:①总体上国际“四大”的行业专长对审计质量没有显著的边际影响。②总体上国内“十大”的行业专长对审计质量有显著的边际递减作用。③总体上国内非“十大”的行业专长对审计质量没有显著的边际影响。但是,从单项指标来看,当行业市场份额超过15%时,国内非“十大”行业专长审计师有较高的审计质量;但是,当国内非“十大”审计师在其行业组合份额最大的行业里,其行业专长却对审计质量造成负面影响。本章最后从六个方面总结了造成我国审计师行业专长未能提升审计质量的原因。
第5章,审计师行业专长与审计定价关系的实证检验。本章以2001—2006年中国上市公司为样本,以行业市场份额、客户组合份额及行业专长综合指标作为审计师行业专长的替代变量,研究了审计师行业专长与审计定价之间的关系。研究发现:(1)在整体样本中,审计师行业专长与审计费用正相关。说明审计师的行业专长能够给审计师带来审计收费溢价。(2)在大客户样本中,审计师行业专长与审计费用正相关,同样说明审计师行业专长能够审计师审计收费溢价。(3)在小客户样本中,审计师行业专长与审计费用没有显著的相关性,说明在小客户市场上,缺乏对行业专长审计的需求,审计师没能获得行业专长审计收费溢价。对以上的结果,笔者结合中国审计市场的实际进行了解释:第一,从整体样本的回归结果来看,审计师行业专长与审计费用正相关,说明从整体上看,客户具有差异化的审计需求,而审计师凭借其行业专长替代变量的“信号传递功能”获得了审计收费溢价。第二,整体市场上审计师的行业专长溢价实际上是由大客户市场上的差异化审计需求驱动的。大客户因具有较高的代理成本而产生高质量审计的需求,并且认为那些在本行业具有较高市场份额(或专注于某行业)的审计师能够提供具有行业差异化的审计服务,因此愿意付出较高的审计费用;而行业专长审计师可以凭借其在目标市场显著的份额,声称其具有较高的行业知识和经验,能够提供高质量的行业专业化服务,并预期通过“信号传递功能”获取审计收费溢价。第三,小客户相对代理成本较小,缺乏对差异化审计服务的需求,审计师的行业专长未能为审计师带来审计收费溢价。第四,进一步放宽“产品差异化”的定义,运用广义上的“产品差异化”解释行业专长审计收费溢价。
最后一章,即第6章,总结了本文研究的主要结论和主要创新点,提出了相关政策建议,并指出了本文研究的局限性以及后续研究的方向。
论文的主要创新点主要包括:
1.首次系统地研究了审计师行业专长的各种度量指标之间的关系,并得出若干有意义的结论。研究的方法包括简单相关系数分析、典型相关分析和主成份分析,这三种研究方法也是以往审计师行业专长研究中所没有出现过的;通过典型相关分析证实了审计师行业专长指标体系可以分为两个互补的子指标体系;通过主成份分析对审计师行业专长的各种指标进行了信息综合,建立了基于主成份的审计师行业专长综合评价指标,该指标相对于单一指标具有更高的综合性和可靠性,并且可以在一定程度上降低人为或主观选择审计师行业专长指标的影响,不仅为审计师行业专长的度量提供了新思路,也为进一步进行审计师行业专长实证研究奠定了可靠的基础。
2.首次系统地检验了各种审计师行业专长指标与审计质量的关系,并得出若干有意义的结论。由于审计师行业专长有多种度量方式,研究者往往凭主观经验选择其中某一个或和几个指标来检验其与审计质量的相关性,这就使得相关的研究结论常缺乏一致性和可靠性。而本文采用以审计师行业专长综合评价指标为主,以各传统单项审计师行业专长指标为辅的方法,来检验行业专长与审计质量的相关性,这就使得实证研究结论更加可靠;本文研究发现,审计师行业专长综合评价指标与审计质量没有显著的相关性,审计师行业专长连续变量与审计质量之间存在着显著的非线性关系;进一步,本文还就审计师行业专长对审计质量的影响,分别进行了分组检验和边际效果检验并得出相关结论。最后,结合中国审计市场的具体背景,对上述实证结果进行了深入剖析与解释,特别地,对目前我国审计市场上审计师行业专长未能提升审计质量的原因从六个方面进行了分析和总结。
3.系统地检验了各种审计师行业专长指标与审计定价的关系,并得出若干有意义的结论。实证研究发现,在整体样本中,审计师行业专长综合评价指标与审计收费显著正相关,说明整体上审计师的行业专长能够带来审计收费溢价。进一步检验发现,在大客户市场上审计师行业专长与审计收费正相关,而在小客户市场上审计师行业专长与审计收费没有显著的相关性,进一步说明整体市场上审计师的行业专长溢价实际上是由大客户市场上的差异化审计需求驱动的。由于本文没有发现审计师行业专长能够提升审计质量,因此不能推定审计师行业专长审计溢价来源于审计师提供了高质量的行业专长审计服务。结合中国审计市场的实际背景,本文联合“产品差异化”假设和“信号传递功能”假设对上述结果进行了解释。此外,在审计师行业专长与审计定价关系的研究中,同样由于采用了多种行业专长度量方式,与同类研究相比,研究结论具有更高的可靠性。
The role of independent auditor to ensure the quality of accounting information has the wide concern. The credibility of accounting information has the variations because of different in the quality of the audit. In previous audit researches, especially the empirical researchers, the researchers pay attention to the independent factor of audit quality, and not to the professional competence of audit quality. On the conditions of auditors having invariant independence, if the auditor masters more knowledge and has more experiences about customer’s industry and environment, grasps special accounting standards and rules, understands normal economic and technical indicators, they will enhance their professional capabilities, reduce the significance of audit risk and improve audit quality. In fact, many audit failures took place, a very important reason for this is that the incumbent auditor lacks of customer-related industry knowledge. The case of audit failure about Lincoln Savings Bank of United States, as well as China's Guangxia Company, indicates that the reasons are concerned about the lack of industry's professional knowledge and skills.
With the intense competition in the audit market, auditors need to find some effective methods for competition, in order to maintain their strategic advantage. In the early 1990s, large accounting firms began to change their organizational structures, which, at that time, were built around the traditional product lines of auditing, taxation, and consulting. The firms restructured their activities around broad industry sectors, and began marketing their expertise around industry specializations. Today, the Big 4 firms continue to promote their industry-based expertise. Specialization in the audit market is critical for the future survival of the audit firms, and specialization is one of the five top issues impacting the CPA profession in the 21st century (AICPA 1998).
So, why the auditor develop the industry specialization? How to measure the auditor specialization? Whether the auditor specialization can improve audit quality? Whether the auditor specialization can earn audit fee premiums? The dissertation answers these problems by theoretical analysis and empirical test. The dissertation has 6 chapters.
Chapter 1 is preface, introducing the background, objective and research methodology. In Chapter 2, the author constitutes the fundamental theory from the demand and supply point of view. From the angle of demand of audit, the essential motive for auditor to develop industry specialization is the demand by economic accountability. Besides, Improving the information asymmetry, reducing information rent are the contract motive; reducing the risk of information and helping decision-makers are the information motive; signaling the indication of industry specialist to users and earning fee premiums are the signal motive. From the angle of supply of audit, Economies of scale, learning by doing, risk-based audit, product differentiation strategy, and reputation mechanism are the motives for auditor to develop industry specialization.
In Chapter 3, the author discusses the issues on the measure of auditor specialization. After surveying the literatures, the author use the tool of correlation coefficient to explore the inner relationship among all kinds of measures of industry specialization. Then, the author uses Canonical Correlation Analysis to explore the relationship between industry market-based variables and industry portfolio-based variables. In the end section of Chapter 3, a PCA method is applied to constitute a comprehensive evaluation index for auditor industry specialization. The contributions of Chapter 3 have three aspects: (1) the author fistly explores the inner relationship among all kinds of measures and between two categories, i.e. market-based variables and industry portfolio-based variables. (2) verifies the ideas which was promoted by Neal and Riley(2004) that the whole measures of auditor industry specialization can be divided into two complementary group.(3) fistly promotes a new comprehensive evaluation index for auditor industry specialization. All the works in Chapter 3 give a tool to test the the relationship between industry specialization and audit quality or audit fees.
In Chapter 4, the author empirically explores the relationship between auditor industry specialization and audit quality. The sample range is from 2001 to 2006, in Chinese list companies market. The number of samples is 6929. We use one comprehensive evaluation index, five industry market index, and two industry portfolio index as the proxy of industry specialation., and use the absolutely value of discretionary accrual as the proxy of audit quality. After controlling other factors which affect audit quality, we find that, in the whole, the auditor industry specialization comprehensive evaluation index has no significant correlation with the absolutely value of discretionary accrual (DAC), which means that in Chinese audit market, auditor industry specialization can’t improve audit quality. This result is supprising contrasting by American relavant results. In the end of this chapter, the author put forwards six causes to explain why auditor industry specialization cannot improve audit quality in Chinese audit market.
In Chapter 5, the author tests the industry specialization effect on audit fees. The author uses samples range from 2001 to 2006, in Chinese list company audit market; investigates the relation between auditor industry specialation and audit fees. The results indicate (1) In whole samples, Auditor industry specialization is positively correlated with audit fees; (2) In big client market, auditor industry specialization also positively correlated with audit fees; (3) But in small client market, auditor industry specialization has no significant effect on audit fees. The results means that: (1) On the whole, the client has differencial audit demand, but auditor gain audit fee premium depending on signaling function; (2) In fact, the auditor industry specialization premium is drived by big clients market because big clients usally have high agent cost and think those auditors with higher industry market share will provide more special service; (3)In the small client market, the clients have less agent cost, so that the demand for auditor industry speacialization is low, this lead to no premium in small clients market; (4)Besides, the author broaden the concept of product differentiation in order to better explain the value of industry specialization in Chinese audit market.
In Chapter 6, the author summarizes the main conclusions made in the dissertation and points out its limitations and directions of the later study. What’s more, there are some innovations in the dissertation.They are as follows:
1. The author firstly reseaches the relationship among all kinds of measures of auditor industry specialization; firstly employs Canonical Correlation Analysis to explore the relationship between industry market-based variables and industry portfolio-based variables; firstly constitutes a comprehensive evaluation index for auditor industry specialization and use this robust measure to test the relationship between auditor industry specialization and audit quality or audit fees.
2. The author systemly tests the relationship between auditor industry specialization and audit quality. By using above meaures of autior industry specialization, the study gives many new results and the author put forward six causes to explain why auditor industry specialization cannot improve audit quality in Chinese audit market.
3. The author systemly tests the relationship between auditor industry specialization and audit fees and gain many new conclusions. By using above meaures of autior industry specialization, the empirical results are more robust contrasted by other research conserning the relationship between auditor industry specialization and audit fees.
引文
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