低价竞争、价格管制与审计质量研究
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摘要
独立审计作为提高上市公司公开披露会计信息可信性的一种制度安排，对保护中小投资者以及其他财务报告的使用者有着重要意义，对优化资本市场资源配置、维护市场经济秩序发挥着不可替代的重要作用。然而，在我国市场经济不断发展、资本市场日渐完善的过程中，我国的审计市场仍面临一些困境：首先，我国审计市场在经济转型和新兴市场的总体背景之下，尽管发展迅速，但缺乏市场自发需求，审计市场的主要需求来自于政府推动下的市场强制性需求，自发性需求不足导致了我国审计市场上会计师事务所的竞争方式主要是以价格竞争而不是质量竞争为主。其次，我国审计市场结构尽管己经达到了比较稳定的阶段，但是市场集中度仍然较低，市场竞争较为激烈，会计师事务所普遍存在在不能保证审计质量的前提下降低审计收费的行为。本文将沿着“低价竞争——价格管制——审计质量”这一研究线索开展系统研究，并回答如下四个问题：1）我国审计市场是否存在低价竞争现象；2)低价竞争是否影响审计质量；3）如果低价竞争影响审计质量，政府对审计价格进行管制能否提高审计质量；4）制定怎样的管制措施才能提高审计质量？
在研究审计市场是否存在低价竞争方面，本文对2002-2010年所有上市公司样本的审计收费进行了分析，共筛选出了满足本文所定义的低价竞争标准的279家上市公司，证明了我国审计市场存在低价竞争行为。
在研究低价竞争是否影响审计质量方面，本文使用操控性应计利润的绝对值作为审计质量的替代变量，建立审计质量与低价竞争之间的多元回归模型，以满足低价竞争标准的279家公司为研究样本进行了实证研究。结果表明，实际审计费用的降低率与操控性应计利润的绝对值显著负相关，即实际审计费用低于正常审计费用水平，审计质量将随之下降，证明了低价竞争确实会影响审计质量。
为了研究政府价格管制对审计质量的影响，本文通过建立进化博弈模型，从一个全新的角度分析了审计价格管制能否提高审计质量以及如何提高审计质量的问题。并从审计质量强调专业胜任能力与审计质量强调审计独立性两个角度分别进行了研究。
当审计质量强调专业胜任能力时，进化博弈理论分析显示：
1）当低审计收费策略存在收益，但未达到高审计收费策略收益的一半时，就会有会计师事务所采用低审计收费策略。对审计收费进行设定最低价的管制，只会提高低审计收费策略的收益，使得选择低审计收费策略的会计师事务所越来越多，特别是当低审计收费策略收益达到高审计收费策略收益一半时，所有的会计师事务所都会选择低审计收费低审计质量策略。因此，设定审计最低价并不能提高审计质量，只能使低审计收费低审计质量的策略最终变成高审计收费低审计质量的策略。
2）要想让所有会计师事务所最终放弃低审计收费低审计质量策略而选择高审计收费高审计质量策略，只有让低审计收费低审计质量策略收益小于0，研究显示提高诉讼风险成本可以降低审计收费低审计质量策略收益，因此将诉讼风险成本提高到足够大时，可以使得低审计收费低审计质量策略收益小于0，从而所有会计师事务所都会放弃低审计收费低审计质量策略，自发采用高收费高审计质量策略。
当审计质量强调审计独立性时，进化博弈理论分析显示：
1）当会计师事务所与客户合谋的收益大于零，但又低于诉讼风险成本时，就会有会计师事务所选择合谋策略，选择合谋策略会计师事务所的比例将受合谋收益影响。对审计收费进行设定最低价的管制，只会提高该策略的收益，而使得选择该策略的会计师事务所越来越多，特别是当收益超过诉讼风险成本时，选择合谋策略的会计师事务所将占据主导地位，这显然无法改变会计师事务所对合谋策略的选择。
2）要想让所有会计师事务所最终放弃合谋策略，只有让该策略的收益小于0，研究显示提高诉讼风险成本可以降低合谋策略收益，因此只有将诉讼风险成本提高到足够大时，可以使得该策略收益小于0，从而使所有会计师事务所都放弃低审计质量策略，自发采用高审计质量策略。
因此，无论审计质量是强调专业胜任能力还是强调审计独立性，设定审计收费最低价均无助于提高审计质量，提高审计质量应从提高注册会计师诉讼风险成本入手，在我国现有的法律体系下，应提高会计师事务所因低质量审计而被追究责任的概率，简化诉讼程序，降低诉讼成本。
就进化博弈理论分析的结果，本文开展了相关的实证研究。
对于政府价格管制与审计质量的关系，本文分别选取操控性应计利润的绝对值以及审计意见作为审计质量的替代变量，建立审计质量与政府价格管制之间的多元回归模型，对满足低价竞争标准的85个有效上市公司样本进行了实证研究。分析2010年1月国家发展改革委员会和财政部联合发布《会计师事务所服务收费管理办法》对审计市场进行低价管制后，审计价格提高的样本公司的审计质量是否提高。实证研究发现，政府低价管制后，上市公司的审计费用虽然提高了，但是操控性应计利润的绝对值却没有显著减少，并且被出具非标意见的可能性也没有加大，即没有显著改善公司的审计质量；与正常收费相比，低价竞争上市公司审计费用的提高并没有显著提高审计质量，即政府管制的效果不太明显，这与进化博弈理论分析结果相一致。
对于制定怎样的管制措施才能提高审计质量的问题，本文基于进化博弈分析结论，研究了诉讼风险成本与审计质量的关系，利用2007年6月最高人民法院通过《关于审理涉及会计师事务所在审计业务活动中民事侵权赔偿案件的若干规定》（后简称《12号法释》）这一对诉讼风险成本有重大影响的标志性事件，分别选取操控性应计利润的绝对值以及审计意见作为审计质量的替代变量，建立审计质量的多元回归模型，分析了诉讼风险成本对审计质量的影响，实证分析结果表明，诉讼风险成本变量与操控性应计利润绝对值呈显著的负相关，但2007年出具非标准审计意见的比例并不显著高于2006年，说明2007年《12号法释》的实施对提升审计质量有显著的促进作用。也说明了《12号法释》通过提高诉讼风险成本对审计质量有显著的促进作用，与进化博弈分析结论相一致。
为此，本文得出研究结论，简单的对审计市场进行低价管制，无助于提高审计质量，提高审计质量的途径应为提高诉讼风险成本，并提出相应的政策建议：1）强化法律责任，进一步提高诉讼风险成本；2）完善治理结构，培养对高质量审计的自发需求；3）优化审计市场结构、鼓励有序竞争。
As an essentially systematic arrangement to enhance the quality and reliability ofaccounting information of our listed company, independent auditing can help to protectthe interest of medium and small investors, also other information users. And it alsopossesses the function of optimizing the allocation of the resource in capital market andprotecting the running order of market economy. However, our auditing market is stillconfronted with many difficulties despite the stock market continues to develop andimprove. These difficulties include two aspects.
First of all is inadequate spontaneous demand of auditing. In our country, under thebackground of economic transition and development of emerging market, the demand ofauditing mainly comes from the mandatory requirement of the governments instead ofthe automatic demand of the firms. This phenomenon directly causes not the qualitycompetition but the price competition of accounting firms.
Secondly, though the structure of our auditing market becomes more stable, thecompetition is still severe and market concentration is relatively low. In such phase,accounting firms select to low the fee collected from the customers and relevant qualityof auditing not to unite other firms and keep the limit of auditing charge.
So, our research will follow the clue as low price competition, price control andquality of auditing, and will answer four questions.
1) Whether low price competition is existed in our auditing market?
2) Whether low price will affect the quality of auditing?
3)) whether quality of auditing will be enhanced under the price control ofgovernment?
4) How to regulate and design the control system in order to guarantee the qualityof auditing?
For question one, our research select279samples satisfying the requirement of lowprice competition in our listed companies and make empirical study, using the series ofdata from2002to2010. The result testified that low price competition is existed inour stock market.
For question two, our research select the absolute value of discretional accrualprofits as the substitute variable of auditing quality, build up the regression model ofauditing quality and low price and make empirical research using the selected samples. The result is that the decreasing ratio of actual auditing charge is negative relevant withthe absolute value of discretional accrual profits. That is to say, auditing quality ispositive relevant with the decreasing ratio of actual auditing charge. In a word, lowerauditing charge than normal level will damage the quality of auditing.
Then in order to research the role and affection of government control, we establisha evolutionary game, and analyze audit price controls from a new perspective through itas well as how to improve audit quality and found that:(1) so long as low audit feesstrategy can generate profit in the audit market, there will be at least one accountingfirm to select this strategy;(2)if the return of low audit fees policy generate is more thanhalf of the profit of the high charging strategy in the market, all the accounting firmswill tend to choose the strategy of low audit fees;(3) the only selection of promoting anaccounting firm to give up the low audit charging strategy is to make accounting firmswho adopt this strategy facing negative earnings. Therefore Audit price controls methodsuch as setting the audit fees limit will not help improving audit quality. Morereasonable methods to improve audit quality are to set more strict laws and regulationsand regulate the legal responsibility of the Certified Public Accountant. Under ourexisting legal system, we also need to reduce litigation costs and time of lawsuits andimprove the probability of accounting firm due to the low quality auditingaccountability.
Then pointing at the result of game analysis, we make empirical research tosupport it.
Firstly, for the relation of low-cost control and audit quality, we build up regressionmodel to testify whether auditing quality has been enhanced after government form therelative regulations of auditing charge control. And we found that government promotedlow-cost control cause that audit fees of listed companies improved, but the absolutevalue of the accrual profits did not significantly decrease, and the possibility of beingissued non Standard audit opinion did not increase, so we can find there were nosignificant improvement in the quality of auditing. Compared with the normal chargingstrategy, even if accounting firms who are apt to low-price competition charge more,there will be no significant improvement of the auditing quality. So we can say theeffect of government regulation is less obvious than expected in short-run. This outcomeis similar with the conclusion of game theory.
In order to research how to make the specific regulation to increase the quality ofauditing, we make application of the result of game analysis and discuss the relationship between lawsuits cost and auditing quality. In2010, supreme people's court formedsome regulations which significantly influence the auditing lawsuits cost. So we buildanother empirical regression model and the conclusion is that the YEAR variable isnegative relevant with the manipulated accrual profit, but2007accrual manipulation ofthe audited profit was significantly lower than in2006. This result also indicates that theimplementation of the Act No.12and the improvement of law suits cost in2007hasplayed an important role in some extent to enhance auditing quality and keeps the sametrend of game analysis.
Through the theoretical and empirical analysis, we can draw conclusions thatmerely regulation of auditing charge collected is hard to improve auditing quality inessential, and more reliable suggestion is to enhance the lawsuits cost regarding to theauditing quality. So, new policies may be focused in such aspect,
1) The integration of regulatory power, and improve the regulatory laws andregulations,
2) Optimizing the governance structure of listed company and promote thespontaneous demand,
3) Optimizing the structure of the auditing market and encouraging orderlycompetition.
在研究审计市场是否存在低价竞争方面，本文对2002-2010年所有上市公司样本的审计收费进行了分析，共筛选出了满足本文所定义的低价竞争标准的279家上市公司，证明了我国审计市场存在低价竞争行为。
在研究低价竞争是否影响审计质量方面，本文使用操控性应计利润的绝对值作为审计质量的替代变量，建立审计质量与低价竞争之间的多元回归模型，以满足低价竞争标准的279家公司为研究样本进行了实证研究。结果表明，实际审计费用的降低率与操控性应计利润的绝对值显著负相关，即实际审计费用低于正常审计费用水平，审计质量将随之下降，证明了低价竞争确实会影响审计质量。
为了研究政府价格管制对审计质量的影响，本文通过建立进化博弈模型，从一个全新的角度分析了审计价格管制能否提高审计质量以及如何提高审计质量的问题。并从审计质量强调专业胜任能力与审计质量强调审计独立性两个角度分别进行了研究。
当审计质量强调专业胜任能力时，进化博弈理论分析显示：
1）当低审计收费策略存在收益，但未达到高审计收费策略收益的一半时，就会有会计师事务所采用低审计收费策略。对审计收费进行设定最低价的管制，只会提高低审计收费策略的收益，使得选择低审计收费策略的会计师事务所越来越多，特别是当低审计收费策略收益达到高审计收费策略收益一半时，所有的会计师事务所都会选择低审计收费低审计质量策略。因此，设定审计最低价并不能提高审计质量，只能使低审计收费低审计质量的策略最终变成高审计收费低审计质量的策略。
2）要想让所有会计师事务所最终放弃低审计收费低审计质量策略而选择高审计收费高审计质量策略，只有让低审计收费低审计质量策略收益小于0，研究显示提高诉讼风险成本可以降低审计收费低审计质量策略收益，因此将诉讼风险成本提高到足够大时，可以使得低审计收费低审计质量策略收益小于0，从而所有会计师事务所都会放弃低审计收费低审计质量策略，自发采用高收费高审计质量策略。
当审计质量强调审计独立性时，进化博弈理论分析显示：
1）当会计师事务所与客户合谋的收益大于零，但又低于诉讼风险成本时，就会有会计师事务所选择合谋策略，选择合谋策略会计师事务所的比例将受合谋收益影响。对审计收费进行设定最低价的管制，只会提高该策略的收益，而使得选择该策略的会计师事务所越来越多，特别是当收益超过诉讼风险成本时，选择合谋策略的会计师事务所将占据主导地位，这显然无法改变会计师事务所对合谋策略的选择。
2）要想让所有会计师事务所最终放弃合谋策略，只有让该策略的收益小于0，研究显示提高诉讼风险成本可以降低合谋策略收益，因此只有将诉讼风险成本提高到足够大时，可以使得该策略收益小于0，从而使所有会计师事务所都放弃低审计质量策略，自发采用高审计质量策略。
因此，无论审计质量是强调专业胜任能力还是强调审计独立性，设定审计收费最低价均无助于提高审计质量，提高审计质量应从提高注册会计师诉讼风险成本入手，在我国现有的法律体系下，应提高会计师事务所因低质量审计而被追究责任的概率，简化诉讼程序，降低诉讼成本。
就进化博弈理论分析的结果，本文开展了相关的实证研究。
对于政府价格管制与审计质量的关系，本文分别选取操控性应计利润的绝对值以及审计意见作为审计质量的替代变量，建立审计质量与政府价格管制之间的多元回归模型，对满足低价竞争标准的85个有效上市公司样本进行了实证研究。分析2010年1月国家发展改革委员会和财政部联合发布《会计师事务所服务收费管理办法》对审计市场进行低价管制后，审计价格提高的样本公司的审计质量是否提高。实证研究发现，政府低价管制后，上市公司的审计费用虽然提高了，但是操控性应计利润的绝对值却没有显著减少，并且被出具非标意见的可能性也没有加大，即没有显著改善公司的审计质量；与正常收费相比，低价竞争上市公司审计费用的提高并没有显著提高审计质量，即政府管制的效果不太明显，这与进化博弈理论分析结果相一致。
对于制定怎样的管制措施才能提高审计质量的问题，本文基于进化博弈分析结论，研究了诉讼风险成本与审计质量的关系，利用2007年6月最高人民法院通过《关于审理涉及会计师事务所在审计业务活动中民事侵权赔偿案件的若干规定》（后简称《12号法释》）这一对诉讼风险成本有重大影响的标志性事件，分别选取操控性应计利润的绝对值以及审计意见作为审计质量的替代变量，建立审计质量的多元回归模型，分析了诉讼风险成本对审计质量的影响，实证分析结果表明，诉讼风险成本变量与操控性应计利润绝对值呈显著的负相关，但2007年出具非标准审计意见的比例并不显著高于2006年，说明2007年《12号法释》的实施对提升审计质量有显著的促进作用。也说明了《12号法释》通过提高诉讼风险成本对审计质量有显著的促进作用，与进化博弈分析结论相一致。
为此，本文得出研究结论，简单的对审计市场进行低价管制，无助于提高审计质量，提高审计质量的途径应为提高诉讼风险成本，并提出相应的政策建议：1）强化法律责任，进一步提高诉讼风险成本；2）完善治理结构，培养对高质量审计的自发需求；3）优化审计市场结构、鼓励有序竞争。
As an essentially systematic arrangement to enhance the quality and reliability ofaccounting information of our listed company, independent auditing can help to protectthe interest of medium and small investors, also other information users. And it alsopossesses the function of optimizing the allocation of the resource in capital market andprotecting the running order of market economy. However, our auditing market is stillconfronted with many difficulties despite the stock market continues to develop andimprove. These difficulties include two aspects.
First of all is inadequate spontaneous demand of auditing. In our country, under thebackground of economic transition and development of emerging market, the demand ofauditing mainly comes from the mandatory requirement of the governments instead ofthe automatic demand of the firms. This phenomenon directly causes not the qualitycompetition but the price competition of accounting firms.
Secondly, though the structure of our auditing market becomes more stable, thecompetition is still severe and market concentration is relatively low. In such phase,accounting firms select to low the fee collected from the customers and relevant qualityof auditing not to unite other firms and keep the limit of auditing charge.
So, our research will follow the clue as low price competition, price control andquality of auditing, and will answer four questions.
1) Whether low price competition is existed in our auditing market?
2) Whether low price will affect the quality of auditing?
3)) whether quality of auditing will be enhanced under the price control ofgovernment?
4) How to regulate and design the control system in order to guarantee the qualityof auditing?
For question one, our research select279samples satisfying the requirement of lowprice competition in our listed companies and make empirical study, using the series ofdata from2002to2010. The result testified that low price competition is existed inour stock market.
For question two, our research select the absolute value of discretional accrualprofits as the substitute variable of auditing quality, build up the regression model ofauditing quality and low price and make empirical research using the selected samples. The result is that the decreasing ratio of actual auditing charge is negative relevant withthe absolute value of discretional accrual profits. That is to say, auditing quality ispositive relevant with the decreasing ratio of actual auditing charge. In a word, lowerauditing charge than normal level will damage the quality of auditing.
Then in order to research the role and affection of government control, we establisha evolutionary game, and analyze audit price controls from a new perspective through itas well as how to improve audit quality and found that:(1) so long as low audit feesstrategy can generate profit in the audit market, there will be at least one accountingfirm to select this strategy;(2)if the return of low audit fees policy generate is more thanhalf of the profit of the high charging strategy in the market, all the accounting firmswill tend to choose the strategy of low audit fees;(3) the only selection of promoting anaccounting firm to give up the low audit charging strategy is to make accounting firmswho adopt this strategy facing negative earnings. Therefore Audit price controls methodsuch as setting the audit fees limit will not help improving audit quality. Morereasonable methods to improve audit quality are to set more strict laws and regulationsand regulate the legal responsibility of the Certified Public Accountant. Under ourexisting legal system, we also need to reduce litigation costs and time of lawsuits andimprove the probability of accounting firm due to the low quality auditingaccountability.
Then pointing at the result of game analysis, we make empirical research tosupport it.
Firstly, for the relation of low-cost control and audit quality, we build up regressionmodel to testify whether auditing quality has been enhanced after government form therelative regulations of auditing charge control. And we found that government promotedlow-cost control cause that audit fees of listed companies improved, but the absolutevalue of the accrual profits did not significantly decrease, and the possibility of beingissued non Standard audit opinion did not increase, so we can find there were nosignificant improvement in the quality of auditing. Compared with the normal chargingstrategy, even if accounting firms who are apt to low-price competition charge more,there will be no significant improvement of the auditing quality. So we can say theeffect of government regulation is less obvious than expected in short-run. This outcomeis similar with the conclusion of game theory.
In order to research how to make the specific regulation to increase the quality ofauditing, we make application of the result of game analysis and discuss the relationship between lawsuits cost and auditing quality. In2010, supreme people's court formedsome regulations which significantly influence the auditing lawsuits cost. So we buildanother empirical regression model and the conclusion is that the YEAR variable isnegative relevant with the manipulated accrual profit, but2007accrual manipulation ofthe audited profit was significantly lower than in2006. This result also indicates that theimplementation of the Act No.12and the improvement of law suits cost in2007hasplayed an important role in some extent to enhance auditing quality and keeps the sametrend of game analysis.
Through the theoretical and empirical analysis, we can draw conclusions thatmerely regulation of auditing charge collected is hard to improve auditing quality inessential, and more reliable suggestion is to enhance the lawsuits cost regarding to theauditing quality. So, new policies may be focused in such aspect,
1) The integration of regulatory power, and improve the regulatory laws andregulations,
2) Optimizing the governance structure of listed company and promote thespontaneous demand,
3) Optimizing the structure of the auditing market and encouraging orderlycompetition.
引文
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