基于内部控制视角的财务舞弊治理研究
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摘要
进入21世纪后,国内外连续出现多起重大财务舞弊事件,严重影响了资本市场的秩序,降低了投资者信心,给利益相关者造成了巨大损失。为此,2002年美国出台了SOX法案,要求上市公司管理层对财务报告可靠性及内部控制的设计和运行的有效性负责。在亚洲,日本金融厅也于2006年6月修改证券交易法,要求上市公司应在期末提交内部控制自我评价报告,并由独立审计师进行内部控制审计。我国监管部门在2008年之后,相继出台的企业内部控制基本规范及其配套指引,构成了我国当前内部控制框架体系。理论界与实务界大多是将舞弊与内部控制分开讨论,或者研究方法集中于案例分析或问卷调查,没有对两者之间的相关关系进行深入研究。
事实上,舞弊的动因分析、识别研究以及防范与治理这三者之间存在紧密的逻辑关系,动因分析是识别和防范与治理的基础,识别研究是为了更好地防范与治理,最终达到抑制舞弊的目标,从而提高财务报告可靠性。
本文,首先,从经济学理论、制度基础以及舞弊动因理论与内部控制框架的角度,对财务舞弊的动因、防范及治理与内部控制之间的联系进行理论分析。理论分析结果表明：内部控制制度是防范舞弊的最有效、最经济的方法。其次,在理论分析的基础上,按照财务舞弊的动因分析、识别研究以及防范的思路,对两者进行实证检验分析。实证结果显示：内部控制质量的提高能有效降低财务舞弊的概率。最后,本文针对识别出的动因特征,提出相应的内部控制过程方面的治理建议。
全文共分为7章展开论述,具体如下：
第1章导论。本章主要说明研究动机、研究意义、研究方法、研究思路结构安排。
第2章：文献综述。分别对有关财务舞弊影响因素的研究；有关内部控制质量与会计信息质量的研究；有关财务舞弊的治理的研究；舞弊识别研究方法等方面进行归纳和总结,引出本文的研究思路。
第3章：理论分析。主要从委托代理理论、契约理论、国内外相关制度背景以及舞弊动因理论的角度探讨财务舞弊的防范、识别和治理与内部控制之间的关系。
第4章：舞弊动因分析。以2007年至2011年间受监管部门处罚的舞弊公司为样本,根据舞弊三因素理论提出可能导致财务舞弊行为发生的风险点,并与非舞弊公司进行对比,运用独立样本T检验筛选出样本组和控制组之间存在显著差异的特征,为构建财务舞弊识别模型奠定基础。
第5章：财务舞弊识别研究。运用支持向量机(SVM)技术和Logistic回归模型,通过两种研究方法的优势互补,为我国上市公司构建财务舞弊识别模型,并对模型的泛化能力进行检验。
第6章：财务舞弊的防范研究。本章主要研究内部控制质量对财务舞弊概率的影响。在舞弊识别模型的基础上,控制原有变量,加入内部控制质量变量,对内部控制质量是否对财务舞弊概率产生影响进行检验。
第7章：研究结论与政策建议。概括了本文研究的主要结论,提出一些针对性的财务舞弊治理方面的政策建议；另外,概括了本文创新点、局限性及未来可能的研究方向。
通过以上研究,本文得出以下结论：
(1)财务舞弊动因分析发现,舞弊公司与非舞弊公司在以下方面表现出显著差异
第一,舞弊动机或压力特征。舞弊前一年舞弊公司的主营业务比率、经营活动净收益/利润总额、营业收入同比增长率、经营活动产生的现金流量净额/负债合计、高管年度报酬特征显著低于非舞弊公司；经营活动产生的现金流量净额小于零、净资产收益率同比增长率、破产风险、资产负债率、亏损、高管持股数量特征显著高于非舞弊公司。
第二,舞弊机会特征。舞弊当年舞弊公司的第一大股东控制度、股东大会出席率、独立董事出席率特征显著低于非舞弊公司；未经审议程序的重大交易、股东大会会议次数、董事会会议次数、二重性、非常规性高管变更状况特征显著高于非舞弊公司。
第三,舞弊借口特征。舞弊公司在舞弊前三年审计师变更次数、舞弊前三年曾获得非标准审计意见这两个特征均显著高于非舞弊公司。
(2)舞弊识别研究相关结论
第一,在支持向量机舞弊识别模型中,对完全独立于训练过程的数据进行测试,能够更加客观、更加充分的验证了分类器的推广能力,训练过程中随着训练集样本数的增多,训练精度也随之提高,而对应的分类器推广能力也呈上升趋势。测试精度都在94%以上,表现了分类器的良好性能。Logistic回归模型的整体识别率为87.5%,发现对本研究的样本与变量来说前者识别率高于后者。
第二,本文将独立于公司内部业务系统的股东、独立董事及审计师的监督功能剥离下来,进行预测。支持向量机识别模型与Logistic回归模型结果均显示,第一大股东控制度、股东大会出席率、独立董事出席率以及审计意见等独立于公司业务系统之外的监督因素的回归结果均显著。说明就我国上市公司而言,股东、独立董事及审计师的监督功能是弥补内部控制固有局限的有力保障,同时我国上市公司应进一步加强股东大会、独立董事的监督职能。
(3)财务舞弊的防范研究发现,内部控制质量与财务舞弊概率呈显著负相关关系
在控制舞弊识别模型中原有变量的基础上,加入内部控制质量变量后发现,内部控制质量对财务舞弊的概率有显著影响,说明我国内部控制鉴证报告的自愿披露具有强有力的信号功能。因此,不具备专业知识的投资者也能将此作为评估投资风险的重要参考指标。
In the21st century, the financial frauds successively appeared at home and abroad. These frauds seriously disrupted the order of capital market and declined the confidence of investors, which have caused huge losses for stakeholders. Therefore, the United States issued SOX bill in2002requiring that the management of listed companies should be responsible for both of the reliability of financial reports and the availability of the design and the operation of internal controls. Also in Asia, the financial services agency of Japan modified the Securities Exchange Act in June2006requiring that listed companies refer self-evaluation reports of internal controls in the period end and execute the internal control auditing by independent auditors. The supervision department of China published in succession the fundamental norms of internal controls and their supporting guidelines, which constitute the framework of internal controls system. As far as is known, there lack the research on the deep relationship of the frauds and internal controls, because most researches in the theory and practice field either analyzed both of them separately or focused the cases study and the questionnaire.
In actual fact, there exists close logical relationship among the prevention and management of frauds as well as the motivation analysis and the identification. The motivation analysis is the basis of the prevention and management of frauds, and the identification of frauds is used to better carry out the prevention and management. The final objective of the three closely correlated aspects is to reduce the frauds so that the reliability of financial reports can be improved.
In this dissertation, firstly, the motivation, the prevention and management as well as their links to internal controls were analyzed theoretically from the perspective of the economics theory, the system foundation and the framework of the frauds motive theory and internal controls. The theoretical analysis showed that internal controls can be the most economic and effective method to prevent the frauds. Secondly, on the basis of theoretical analysis, the empirical analysis of the motivation, the prevention and management as well as their links to internal controls was done. The empirical results showed that the quality improvement of inter controls can effectively reduce the frauds. Finally, management suggests of internal controls process were put forward according to the identified motive characteristics.
This dissertation is divided into seven chapters as follows.
Chapter1:Introduction. This part discusses the motive of the financial frauds and the relevant economic theories of internal control, and draws a conclusion that the construction of internal control plays an important role in preventing the financial frauds.
Chapter2:Literature review. By analyzing the coupling of the triangle theory of frauds and the factors of internal control, relevant research aspects are involved and analyzed such as the factors that impact the financial frauds, the quality of internal control and the accounting information, the governance of the financial frauds and the identification of the financial frauds.
Chapter3:Theoretical analysis. According to the principal-agent theory, the contract theory, the relevant system background at home and abroad and the frauds motive theory, the relationship of internal controls with the prevention, identification and management was analyzed.
Chapter4:The frauds motivation analysis. Listed companies punished by the supervision department from2007to2011were taken as testing samples. The risks possibly resulting in the frauds were proposed on the basis of the three-factor theory. Comparatively analyzing the data from fraud companies and non-fraud companies, the significant characteristics between the sample groups and the control groups can be obtained using the independent sample T-test, which lay the foundation of modeling the identification of financial frauds.
Chapter5:Identification models of the financial frauds. This part models the identification of the financial frauds using the complementary advantages of SVM and Logistic regression analysis, and does tests to verify the generalization ability.
Chapter6:The prevention of the frauds. On the basis of the identification model, the quality variables of internal controls were added while retaining original variables so as to verify the impact of internal controls with the occurrences of the frauds.
Chapter7:Conclusions and policy suggestions. This part summarizes the study conclusions, proposes the targeted policy suggestions, and then gives the innovations, the limitations and the possible future researches.
The conclusions by this dissertation are drawn as follows.
(1)The analysis of the frauds motivation shows that there exist the following.
significant differences between fraud companies and non-fraud companies.
First, the fraud motives or the pressure characteristics. In the year before the year when companies make the frauds, the characteristics values such as the major business rate, the net earnings of business activities/total profit, the annual growth rate of operating revenue, the net cash flows of business activities/aggregate liabilities and the executives' annual compensation, of the fraud companies are significantly lower than that of the non-fraud companies. But, the characteristics values, such as the negative of net cash flows, the annual growth rate of return on equity, the bankruptcy risks, the asset-liability ratio, the losses and the executives'holdings are significantly higher than that of the non-fraud companies.
Second, the characteristics of the fraud opportunity. In the year when companies make the frauds, the characteristics values such as the control degree of the first big shareholder, the meeting attendance of the shareholders and the meeting attendance rate of independent directors are significantly lower than that of the non-fraud companies. But the characteristics values such as the major transactions without the review process, the frequency of shareholders'meetings, the frequency of independent directors' meetings, the duality and the unconventional executives'changes are significantly higher than non-frauds companies.
Third, the characteristics of the fraud excuses. In the three years before the year when the companies make the frauds, the characteristics values such as the auditors'changes and the non-standard auditing opinions are significantly higher than that of the non-fraud companies.
(2)Conclusions of identification models of the financial frauds.
First, the models by SVM can work on the data completely independent of training process to objectively and sufficiently verify the generalization ability of the classifier. As the training samples increase in the training process, the training accuracy will gradually improve as well as the generalization ability. The test results keep upon94%indicating the good performance on identification rate which is better than that of Logistic regression model keeping at87.5%.
Second, the proposed models get rid of the supervision function of shareholders,
independent directors and auditors which is independent of companies'internal business to do tests. The results by the models show that the control degree of the first big shareholder, the meeting attendance of the shareholders and the meeting attendance rate of independent directors and the auditing opinions have the significant properties. Ultimately, the supervision function of the shareholders, the independent directors and the auditors can effectively make up the inherent limitations of internal controls for the listed companies of China and the companies should further improve the supervision function of shareholders'meetings and the independent directors.
(3)The analysis of the prevention shows that there exist a significant inverse. correlation between the quality of internal controls and the probability of the frauds.
The quality of internal controls has significant impacts on the financial frauds under the condition of adding internal controls variables to the original in the identification models of the financial frauds. It is proved that the voluntary disclosure of the auditing reports of internal controls has a powerful signaling function, so the investors without professional knowledge can also take this variable as the reference index to evaluate the companies'investment risks.
事实上,舞弊的动因分析、识别研究以及防范与治理这三者之间存在紧密的逻辑关系,动因分析是识别和防范与治理的基础,识别研究是为了更好地防范与治理,最终达到抑制舞弊的目标,从而提高财务报告可靠性。
本文,首先,从经济学理论、制度基础以及舞弊动因理论与内部控制框架的角度,对财务舞弊的动因、防范及治理与内部控制之间的联系进行理论分析。理论分析结果表明：内部控制制度是防范舞弊的最有效、最经济的方法。其次,在理论分析的基础上,按照财务舞弊的动因分析、识别研究以及防范的思路,对两者进行实证检验分析。实证结果显示：内部控制质量的提高能有效降低财务舞弊的概率。最后,本文针对识别出的动因特征,提出相应的内部控制过程方面的治理建议。
全文共分为7章展开论述,具体如下：
第1章导论。本章主要说明研究动机、研究意义、研究方法、研究思路结构安排。
第2章：文献综述。分别对有关财务舞弊影响因素的研究；有关内部控制质量与会计信息质量的研究；有关财务舞弊的治理的研究；舞弊识别研究方法等方面进行归纳和总结,引出本文的研究思路。
第3章：理论分析。主要从委托代理理论、契约理论、国内外相关制度背景以及舞弊动因理论的角度探讨财务舞弊的防范、识别和治理与内部控制之间的关系。
第4章：舞弊动因分析。以2007年至2011年间受监管部门处罚的舞弊公司为样本,根据舞弊三因素理论提出可能导致财务舞弊行为发生的风险点,并与非舞弊公司进行对比,运用独立样本T检验筛选出样本组和控制组之间存在显著差异的特征,为构建财务舞弊识别模型奠定基础。
第5章：财务舞弊识别研究。运用支持向量机(SVM)技术和Logistic回归模型,通过两种研究方法的优势互补,为我国上市公司构建财务舞弊识别模型,并对模型的泛化能力进行检验。
第6章：财务舞弊的防范研究。本章主要研究内部控制质量对财务舞弊概率的影响。在舞弊识别模型的基础上,控制原有变量,加入内部控制质量变量,对内部控制质量是否对财务舞弊概率产生影响进行检验。
第7章：研究结论与政策建议。概括了本文研究的主要结论,提出一些针对性的财务舞弊治理方面的政策建议；另外,概括了本文创新点、局限性及未来可能的研究方向。
通过以上研究,本文得出以下结论：
(1)财务舞弊动因分析发现,舞弊公司与非舞弊公司在以下方面表现出显著差异
第一,舞弊动机或压力特征。舞弊前一年舞弊公司的主营业务比率、经营活动净收益/利润总额、营业收入同比增长率、经营活动产生的现金流量净额/负债合计、高管年度报酬特征显著低于非舞弊公司；经营活动产生的现金流量净额小于零、净资产收益率同比增长率、破产风险、资产负债率、亏损、高管持股数量特征显著高于非舞弊公司。
第二,舞弊机会特征。舞弊当年舞弊公司的第一大股东控制度、股东大会出席率、独立董事出席率特征显著低于非舞弊公司；未经审议程序的重大交易、股东大会会议次数、董事会会议次数、二重性、非常规性高管变更状况特征显著高于非舞弊公司。
第三,舞弊借口特征。舞弊公司在舞弊前三年审计师变更次数、舞弊前三年曾获得非标准审计意见这两个特征均显著高于非舞弊公司。
(2)舞弊识别研究相关结论
第一,在支持向量机舞弊识别模型中,对完全独立于训练过程的数据进行测试,能够更加客观、更加充分的验证了分类器的推广能力,训练过程中随着训练集样本数的增多,训练精度也随之提高,而对应的分类器推广能力也呈上升趋势。测试精度都在94%以上,表现了分类器的良好性能。Logistic回归模型的整体识别率为87.5%,发现对本研究的样本与变量来说前者识别率高于后者。
第二,本文将独立于公司内部业务系统的股东、独立董事及审计师的监督功能剥离下来,进行预测。支持向量机识别模型与Logistic回归模型结果均显示,第一大股东控制度、股东大会出席率、独立董事出席率以及审计意见等独立于公司业务系统之外的监督因素的回归结果均显著。说明就我国上市公司而言,股东、独立董事及审计师的监督功能是弥补内部控制固有局限的有力保障,同时我国上市公司应进一步加强股东大会、独立董事的监督职能。
(3)财务舞弊的防范研究发现,内部控制质量与财务舞弊概率呈显著负相关关系
在控制舞弊识别模型中原有变量的基础上,加入内部控制质量变量后发现,内部控制质量对财务舞弊的概率有显著影响,说明我国内部控制鉴证报告的自愿披露具有强有力的信号功能。因此,不具备专业知识的投资者也能将此作为评估投资风险的重要参考指标。
In the21st century, the financial frauds successively appeared at home and abroad. These frauds seriously disrupted the order of capital market and declined the confidence of investors, which have caused huge losses for stakeholders. Therefore, the United States issued SOX bill in2002requiring that the management of listed companies should be responsible for both of the reliability of financial reports and the availability of the design and the operation of internal controls. Also in Asia, the financial services agency of Japan modified the Securities Exchange Act in June2006requiring that listed companies refer self-evaluation reports of internal controls in the period end and execute the internal control auditing by independent auditors. The supervision department of China published in succession the fundamental norms of internal controls and their supporting guidelines, which constitute the framework of internal controls system. As far as is known, there lack the research on the deep relationship of the frauds and internal controls, because most researches in the theory and practice field either analyzed both of them separately or focused the cases study and the questionnaire.
In actual fact, there exists close logical relationship among the prevention and management of frauds as well as the motivation analysis and the identification. The motivation analysis is the basis of the prevention and management of frauds, and the identification of frauds is used to better carry out the prevention and management. The final objective of the three closely correlated aspects is to reduce the frauds so that the reliability of financial reports can be improved.
In this dissertation, firstly, the motivation, the prevention and management as well as their links to internal controls were analyzed theoretically from the perspective of the economics theory, the system foundation and the framework of the frauds motive theory and internal controls. The theoretical analysis showed that internal controls can be the most economic and effective method to prevent the frauds. Secondly, on the basis of theoretical analysis, the empirical analysis of the motivation, the prevention and management as well as their links to internal controls was done. The empirical results showed that the quality improvement of inter controls can effectively reduce the frauds. Finally, management suggests of internal controls process were put forward according to the identified motive characteristics.
This dissertation is divided into seven chapters as follows.
Chapter1:Introduction. This part discusses the motive of the financial frauds and the relevant economic theories of internal control, and draws a conclusion that the construction of internal control plays an important role in preventing the financial frauds.
Chapter2:Literature review. By analyzing the coupling of the triangle theory of frauds and the factors of internal control, relevant research aspects are involved and analyzed such as the factors that impact the financial frauds, the quality of internal control and the accounting information, the governance of the financial frauds and the identification of the financial frauds.
Chapter3:Theoretical analysis. According to the principal-agent theory, the contract theory, the relevant system background at home and abroad and the frauds motive theory, the relationship of internal controls with the prevention, identification and management was analyzed.
Chapter4:The frauds motivation analysis. Listed companies punished by the supervision department from2007to2011were taken as testing samples. The risks possibly resulting in the frauds were proposed on the basis of the three-factor theory. Comparatively analyzing the data from fraud companies and non-fraud companies, the significant characteristics between the sample groups and the control groups can be obtained using the independent sample T-test, which lay the foundation of modeling the identification of financial frauds.
Chapter5:Identification models of the financial frauds. This part models the identification of the financial frauds using the complementary advantages of SVM and Logistic regression analysis, and does tests to verify the generalization ability.
Chapter6:The prevention of the frauds. On the basis of the identification model, the quality variables of internal controls were added while retaining original variables so as to verify the impact of internal controls with the occurrences of the frauds.
Chapter7:Conclusions and policy suggestions. This part summarizes the study conclusions, proposes the targeted policy suggestions, and then gives the innovations, the limitations and the possible future researches.
The conclusions by this dissertation are drawn as follows.
(1)The analysis of the frauds motivation shows that there exist the following.
significant differences between fraud companies and non-fraud companies.
First, the fraud motives or the pressure characteristics. In the year before the year when companies make the frauds, the characteristics values such as the major business rate, the net earnings of business activities/total profit, the annual growth rate of operating revenue, the net cash flows of business activities/aggregate liabilities and the executives' annual compensation, of the fraud companies are significantly lower than that of the non-fraud companies. But, the characteristics values, such as the negative of net cash flows, the annual growth rate of return on equity, the bankruptcy risks, the asset-liability ratio, the losses and the executives'holdings are significantly higher than that of the non-fraud companies.
Second, the characteristics of the fraud opportunity. In the year when companies make the frauds, the characteristics values such as the control degree of the first big shareholder, the meeting attendance of the shareholders and the meeting attendance rate of independent directors are significantly lower than that of the non-fraud companies. But the characteristics values such as the major transactions without the review process, the frequency of shareholders'meetings, the frequency of independent directors' meetings, the duality and the unconventional executives'changes are significantly higher than non-frauds companies.
Third, the characteristics of the fraud excuses. In the three years before the year when the companies make the frauds, the characteristics values such as the auditors'changes and the non-standard auditing opinions are significantly higher than that of the non-fraud companies.
(2)Conclusions of identification models of the financial frauds.
First, the models by SVM can work on the data completely independent of training process to objectively and sufficiently verify the generalization ability of the classifier. As the training samples increase in the training process, the training accuracy will gradually improve as well as the generalization ability. The test results keep upon94%indicating the good performance on identification rate which is better than that of Logistic regression model keeping at87.5%.
Second, the proposed models get rid of the supervision function of shareholders,
independent directors and auditors which is independent of companies'internal business to do tests. The results by the models show that the control degree of the first big shareholder, the meeting attendance of the shareholders and the meeting attendance rate of independent directors and the auditing opinions have the significant properties. Ultimately, the supervision function of the shareholders, the independent directors and the auditors can effectively make up the inherent limitations of internal controls for the listed companies of China and the companies should further improve the supervision function of shareholders'meetings and the independent directors.
(3)The analysis of the prevention shows that there exist a significant inverse. correlation between the quality of internal controls and the probability of the frauds.
The quality of internal controls has significant impacts on the financial frauds under the condition of adding internal controls variables to the original in the identification models of the financial frauds. It is proved that the voluntary disclosure of the auditing reports of internal controls has a powerful signaling function, so the investors without professional knowledge can also take this variable as the reference index to evaluate the companies'investment risks.
引文
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