中国上市公司会计信息质量研究
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摘要
会计在向管理当局、投资人和债权人等公司利益相关主体提供决策所需信息的同时,在优化配置资源和调控国家经济的过程中也发挥着重要作用。会计信息质量的高低直接影响其在社会经济中发挥作用的大小,关系到市场经济能否有序运转、现代企业制度能否有效建立,同时,高质量的会计信息也有助于从源头上杜绝腐败行为的发生。自上世纪30年代至今的几次经济危机和从未间断的会计造假丑闻使会计信息质量这一早已引起国内外学术界关注的议题从未离开人们的视野。会计系统和公司治理之间是系统和环境的关系,公司的会计系统立足并面向于市场,是传递公司财务状况和经营业绩等经济信息的人造传递系统,会计信息是该系统的最终产物。高效的公司治理能够通过对公司权力的分配和约束,防范并制约管理层在履职过程中的违规行为,纠正管理层侵害利益相关者权益的行为,并对产生的后果给予补救,而会计系统在这一系列制度实施的过程中担当着计价和订约的重任,是投资者监督激励代理人的重要工具,作为制度环境,公司治理在相当程度上会对会计系统产生影响,一旦公司治理出现问题,作为其组成部分的会计系统必然受到波及,进而,其生成并披露的会计信息质量便难以保证。
股权分置是我国经济转轨时期源于政治、经济和意识形态差异的特殊历史现象,给我国“新型并转轨”的资本市场设置了诸多问题和隐患,更对我国公司治理现状产生了深远影响。股权分置改革前,我国上市公司的最基本特征是股权高度集中且被人为地分割为两部分,这种特殊的股权二元分置结构导致中小股东的制衡作用难以发挥,董事会成为控股股东的代言人,股票定价机制被扭曲,资本市场功能被弱化。2005年至2009年实施的股改,突破了制度羁绊,改变了中国股市长期存在的流动性二元结构,降低了非流通股份的交易费用,改变了非流通股股东的激励约束机制,大股东的“隧道挖掘行为”得到抑制,转而支持上市公司发展,对完善董事会功能、调动管理层积极性、提高公司业绩、增强资本市场的配置功能,进而解决我国资本市场存在的制度性缺陷等均起到积极的促进作用。至2009年末,我国A股市场绝大多数上市公司的股权分置改革已完成,资本市场的全流通时代正式到来。股权分置改革是我国资本市场发展的里程碑式的事件,必然会对会计信息质量产生重要影响。旨在解决利益矛盾的股改能否形成新的股权制机制?能否改善上市公司治理,进而提高公司会计信息质量呢?现有研究的视角多以大股东的治理、股市的波动性等为主,关于股改后公司治理与会计信息质量关系的系统性研究并不多见。
对公司治理与会计信息质量关系的相关文献进行梳理后可以发现,关于公司治理与会计信息质量的关系,国内外学者做了大量研究,成果也颇为丰硕,但是由于制度的变迁和各国环境的不同,已有研究的结论并未达成一致,甚至得出完全相反的结论,以所有权性质为出发点,运用多种方法,对不同所有权性质公司之间会计信息质量存在的差异进行系统研究,对不同所有权性质公司的治理要素与会计信息质量的关系进行对比研究的更是少见,而已往研究中被忽视的地方恰恰是研究的新方向和新起点。
首先,通过文献梳理发现,已有研究没有对应计利润分离模型在我国资本市场中的适用性给予合理解释,基本上是拿来就用。本文首次综合采用拟合性检验、盈余持续性检验和模型犯第一类错误的频率检验等三种分析方法,提出了拟合性较好、操控性应计利润分离能力较强的情况下,犯第一类错误的频率最少的那个模型即为最优模型的模型优劣判断标准,并据此对应计利润分离模型在我国资本市场中的有效性进行了检验,得出修正琼斯模型在我国更适用的结论。其次,现有的涉及所有权性质的研究更侧重所有权性质与公司绩效的关系,从所有权性质角度研究公司会计信息质量的尚不多见,国外研究主要从不同市场环境角度出发。本文提出了以所有权性质为出发点,研究不同性质公司间会计信息质量存在的系统性差异的研究路径,研究过程中综合采用了独立性T检验、一元线性回归分析和盈余分布法,检验了不同所有权性质上市公司之间操控性应计利润的实际情况,得出了国有上市公司与非国有上市公司的会计信息质量在整体上确实存在系统性差异的结论。再次,以股权分置改革为背景,从国有公司和非国有公司两个角度,利用分行业并分年度的公司样本,通过多元回归模型的构建,研究不同性质公司其公司治理要素如何影响会计信息质量的研究路径,并得出如下结论：一是从整体角度分析,公司治理要素对公司操控会计信息行为的制约作用有限,加重作用明显；二是从所有权性质角度分析,公司治理要素对会计信息质量的影响在国有公司和非国有公司之间确实存在差异,无论是哪类指标,在国有公司中的作用更为明显；三是从新生现象分析,股权分置改革完成后,流通股比例显著增加,这对于两类公司操控会计信息的行为均产生了抑制作用,说明股权分置改革在一定程度上是成功的,政府转型作用初见成效,中介市场发挥的作用也越来越明显。最后,提出了优化公司治理保证会计信息质量的模型构建。实证检验结果表明,公司治理水平的提高对于优化会计信息质量起到关键作用,实现公司治理与会计信息质量的合理匹配是强化会计监督,消除财务舞弊和会计信息造假的重要措施。根据高效公司治理应具备的三个标准,从强化出资人产权主体责任、激发规模投资者的监管专业性、加强公司三大机构对会计信息的监督力度、降低管理层操控会计信息的动机、推动资本和经理人市场化进程和促进中介组织和政府部门监管能力建设等6个方面,构建了如何提高我国上市公司治理水平,优化会计信息质量的对策模型,以期为我国上市公司会计信息质量的改善提供有益参考。
The accounting can not only provide decision-making related information for users such as managers, investors and creditors, but also be of much importance in distributing resources and regulating national economy better. The informativeness concerns the orderly operation of market economy and the establishment of modern enterprise system. It is also beneficial to originally prevent irregularities. The several economic crises from30th last century and continuous accounting scandals attract attention of academia from internal and abroad again. The relationship between accounting system and corporate governance is about system and environmet. Basing on and facing to the market, the accounting system is the source of accounting information.The effective corporate governace can prevent management irregularities by distributing and restricting powder and even remending the consequences. Accounting system undertakes the responsibility of pricing and contracting in corporate governance system which is also affects informativeness.
The non-tradable share is the special historical phenomenon in China's economic transition, which sets a lot of trouble to the developement of our capital market. Before the reform of non-tradable share, the ownership of our listed company is highly concentrated and divided into two parts, which results in limited restriction from small and medium-size sharehoiders and the weakness of the function of capital market, results that the board of directors becomes representative of the controlling shareholders. The reform of non-tradable share from2005to2009changes our capital structure, reduces the stock transaction costs, suppresses the tunneling from large shareholders, which is positive to improve the corporate governance and the performance of the company. At the end of2009, the full circulation era of capital market came into reality with the accomplishment of the reform of non-tradable share of our most listed compaines. As the significance to capital market, the non-tradable share reform also has an important impact on the quality of accounting informantion. But the relevant research is rare.
After the study of literature about corporate governance and the quality of accounting information, I found that the rich findings are inconsistent and even adverse. Research from the perspective of proprietary nature, with different methods, on the matter of systematic differences in informativeness between different ownership companies is even less, which is also the starting point of a new research.
Firstly, exsiting research hasn't given reasonable explanations to the applicability of accruals separation models in our country. This article comprehensively uses several methods to inspect the effectiveness of the four commonly used accruals separation models and proposes a new model performance criteria, according to which a conclusion that the modified Jones model is more suitable for our country is arrived at. Secondly, exsiting research about proprietary nature focuses more on corporate performance than informativeness. Comprhesively using several methods, this research proposes the path starting from the perspective of proprietary nature to study the systematic differences in accounting information between companies with different proprietary nature and arrives at a conclusion that non-state-owened companies have more earinings management than state-owened companies, whether positive earinings management, negative earinings management or the degree of earinings management. Thirdly, in the background of the accomplishment of non-tradable share reform, from the perspective of proprietary nature,using annual and industrial samples, by the construction of multiple regression model, this article researches the subject that how corporate governance factors affect informativeness between companies with different proprietary nature. Conclusions are arrived at as follows:1) Generally speaking, as far as the effect from corporate governance factors to informativeness concerned, restriction is limited, deterioration is obvious.2) From the perspective of proprietary nature, there really are differences in the effect from corporate governance factors to imformativeness between state-owened companies and non-state-owened companies, and the effect is more obvious in state-owened companies.3) From the perspective of new phenomena, the proportion of circulating stock increases significantly and restricts the false account information, which means that the reform of split share is successful to some extent. The transformation of the government function has achieved initial success. The role intermediary market plays is more and more important. At last, model on optimizing corporate governance to guarantee the quality of accounting information is constructed. The theoretical analysis and empirical test show that the optimization of corporate governance plays a key role in the improvement of the quality of accounting information and the utilization of the match of corporate governance and the quality of accounting information is an important measurement to enhance the supervision to accounting and eliminate financial fraud. According to the criteria that effective corporate governance should has, this article constructs a model that how to optimize corporate governance and guarantee the informativeness, which includes6points such as enhance property sbuject responsibility of investors, stimulate specialized supervision of professional investors, strengthen supervision functions of shareholder meeting, board of directors and the board of supervisors on the quality of accounting information, reduce the power of accounting information manipulation of managers, promote the marketalization progress of capital and professional managers, push forward the building of regulatory capacity of intermediary orgnizations and government departments and so on. There is a hope that the research will be beneficial to improve the quality of accounting information of our listed companies.
股权分置是我国经济转轨时期源于政治、经济和意识形态差异的特殊历史现象,给我国“新型并转轨”的资本市场设置了诸多问题和隐患,更对我国公司治理现状产生了深远影响。股权分置改革前,我国上市公司的最基本特征是股权高度集中且被人为地分割为两部分,这种特殊的股权二元分置结构导致中小股东的制衡作用难以发挥,董事会成为控股股东的代言人,股票定价机制被扭曲,资本市场功能被弱化。2005年至2009年实施的股改,突破了制度羁绊,改变了中国股市长期存在的流动性二元结构,降低了非流通股份的交易费用,改变了非流通股股东的激励约束机制,大股东的“隧道挖掘行为”得到抑制,转而支持上市公司发展,对完善董事会功能、调动管理层积极性、提高公司业绩、增强资本市场的配置功能,进而解决我国资本市场存在的制度性缺陷等均起到积极的促进作用。至2009年末,我国A股市场绝大多数上市公司的股权分置改革已完成,资本市场的全流通时代正式到来。股权分置改革是我国资本市场发展的里程碑式的事件,必然会对会计信息质量产生重要影响。旨在解决利益矛盾的股改能否形成新的股权制机制?能否改善上市公司治理,进而提高公司会计信息质量呢?现有研究的视角多以大股东的治理、股市的波动性等为主,关于股改后公司治理与会计信息质量关系的系统性研究并不多见。
对公司治理与会计信息质量关系的相关文献进行梳理后可以发现,关于公司治理与会计信息质量的关系,国内外学者做了大量研究,成果也颇为丰硕,但是由于制度的变迁和各国环境的不同,已有研究的结论并未达成一致,甚至得出完全相反的结论,以所有权性质为出发点,运用多种方法,对不同所有权性质公司之间会计信息质量存在的差异进行系统研究,对不同所有权性质公司的治理要素与会计信息质量的关系进行对比研究的更是少见,而已往研究中被忽视的地方恰恰是研究的新方向和新起点。
首先,通过文献梳理发现,已有研究没有对应计利润分离模型在我国资本市场中的适用性给予合理解释,基本上是拿来就用。本文首次综合采用拟合性检验、盈余持续性检验和模型犯第一类错误的频率检验等三种分析方法,提出了拟合性较好、操控性应计利润分离能力较强的情况下,犯第一类错误的频率最少的那个模型即为最优模型的模型优劣判断标准,并据此对应计利润分离模型在我国资本市场中的有效性进行了检验,得出修正琼斯模型在我国更适用的结论。其次,现有的涉及所有权性质的研究更侧重所有权性质与公司绩效的关系,从所有权性质角度研究公司会计信息质量的尚不多见,国外研究主要从不同市场环境角度出发。本文提出了以所有权性质为出发点,研究不同性质公司间会计信息质量存在的系统性差异的研究路径,研究过程中综合采用了独立性T检验、一元线性回归分析和盈余分布法,检验了不同所有权性质上市公司之间操控性应计利润的实际情况,得出了国有上市公司与非国有上市公司的会计信息质量在整体上确实存在系统性差异的结论。再次,以股权分置改革为背景,从国有公司和非国有公司两个角度,利用分行业并分年度的公司样本,通过多元回归模型的构建,研究不同性质公司其公司治理要素如何影响会计信息质量的研究路径,并得出如下结论：一是从整体角度分析,公司治理要素对公司操控会计信息行为的制约作用有限,加重作用明显；二是从所有权性质角度分析,公司治理要素对会计信息质量的影响在国有公司和非国有公司之间确实存在差异,无论是哪类指标,在国有公司中的作用更为明显；三是从新生现象分析,股权分置改革完成后,流通股比例显著增加,这对于两类公司操控会计信息的行为均产生了抑制作用,说明股权分置改革在一定程度上是成功的,政府转型作用初见成效,中介市场发挥的作用也越来越明显。最后,提出了优化公司治理保证会计信息质量的模型构建。实证检验结果表明,公司治理水平的提高对于优化会计信息质量起到关键作用,实现公司治理与会计信息质量的合理匹配是强化会计监督,消除财务舞弊和会计信息造假的重要措施。根据高效公司治理应具备的三个标准,从强化出资人产权主体责任、激发规模投资者的监管专业性、加强公司三大机构对会计信息的监督力度、降低管理层操控会计信息的动机、推动资本和经理人市场化进程和促进中介组织和政府部门监管能力建设等6个方面,构建了如何提高我国上市公司治理水平,优化会计信息质量的对策模型,以期为我国上市公司会计信息质量的改善提供有益参考。
The accounting can not only provide decision-making related information for users such as managers, investors and creditors, but also be of much importance in distributing resources and regulating national economy better. The informativeness concerns the orderly operation of market economy and the establishment of modern enterprise system. It is also beneficial to originally prevent irregularities. The several economic crises from30th last century and continuous accounting scandals attract attention of academia from internal and abroad again. The relationship between accounting system and corporate governance is about system and environmet. Basing on and facing to the market, the accounting system is the source of accounting information.The effective corporate governace can prevent management irregularities by distributing and restricting powder and even remending the consequences. Accounting system undertakes the responsibility of pricing and contracting in corporate governance system which is also affects informativeness.
The non-tradable share is the special historical phenomenon in China's economic transition, which sets a lot of trouble to the developement of our capital market. Before the reform of non-tradable share, the ownership of our listed company is highly concentrated and divided into two parts, which results in limited restriction from small and medium-size sharehoiders and the weakness of the function of capital market, results that the board of directors becomes representative of the controlling shareholders. The reform of non-tradable share from2005to2009changes our capital structure, reduces the stock transaction costs, suppresses the tunneling from large shareholders, which is positive to improve the corporate governance and the performance of the company. At the end of2009, the full circulation era of capital market came into reality with the accomplishment of the reform of non-tradable share of our most listed compaines. As the significance to capital market, the non-tradable share reform also has an important impact on the quality of accounting informantion. But the relevant research is rare.
After the study of literature about corporate governance and the quality of accounting information, I found that the rich findings are inconsistent and even adverse. Research from the perspective of proprietary nature, with different methods, on the matter of systematic differences in informativeness between different ownership companies is even less, which is also the starting point of a new research.
Firstly, exsiting research hasn't given reasonable explanations to the applicability of accruals separation models in our country. This article comprehensively uses several methods to inspect the effectiveness of the four commonly used accruals separation models and proposes a new model performance criteria, according to which a conclusion that the modified Jones model is more suitable for our country is arrived at. Secondly, exsiting research about proprietary nature focuses more on corporate performance than informativeness. Comprhesively using several methods, this research proposes the path starting from the perspective of proprietary nature to study the systematic differences in accounting information between companies with different proprietary nature and arrives at a conclusion that non-state-owened companies have more earinings management than state-owened companies, whether positive earinings management, negative earinings management or the degree of earinings management. Thirdly, in the background of the accomplishment of non-tradable share reform, from the perspective of proprietary nature,using annual and industrial samples, by the construction of multiple regression model, this article researches the subject that how corporate governance factors affect informativeness between companies with different proprietary nature. Conclusions are arrived at as follows:1) Generally speaking, as far as the effect from corporate governance factors to informativeness concerned, restriction is limited, deterioration is obvious.2) From the perspective of proprietary nature, there really are differences in the effect from corporate governance factors to imformativeness between state-owened companies and non-state-owened companies, and the effect is more obvious in state-owened companies.3) From the perspective of new phenomena, the proportion of circulating stock increases significantly and restricts the false account information, which means that the reform of split share is successful to some extent. The transformation of the government function has achieved initial success. The role intermediary market plays is more and more important. At last, model on optimizing corporate governance to guarantee the quality of accounting information is constructed. The theoretical analysis and empirical test show that the optimization of corporate governance plays a key role in the improvement of the quality of accounting information and the utilization of the match of corporate governance and the quality of accounting information is an important measurement to enhance the supervision to accounting and eliminate financial fraud. According to the criteria that effective corporate governance should has, this article constructs a model that how to optimize corporate governance and guarantee the informativeness, which includes6points such as enhance property sbuject responsibility of investors, stimulate specialized supervision of professional investors, strengthen supervision functions of shareholder meeting, board of directors and the board of supervisors on the quality of accounting information, reduce the power of accounting information manipulation of managers, promote the marketalization progress of capital and professional managers, push forward the building of regulatory capacity of intermediary orgnizations and government departments and so on. There is a hope that the research will be beneficial to improve the quality of accounting information of our listed companies.
引文
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