交易成本视角的铁路客运制度研究
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摘要
中国铁路客运行业无疑是世界上最复杂、最繁忙的铁路客运系统。这个系统至今处于一个半封闭的系统之内,存在政企不分、客货不分、网运不分、商业化程度低、产权不清、组织效率不高、政府管制过多、重威权轻契约等问题,经济活动中交易成本高,发展相对滞后。由于中国铁路长期以来客运、货运、路网合为一体进行生产经营(2001年初至2003年上半年曾短暂试行过局内客运分开),因此,对中国铁路客运所进行的研究,大都置于铁路运输行业研究的从属地位,并且集中在强化安全管理、质量控制、路风建设、挖潜扩能等方面,对铁路客运所进行的独立的经济研究,特别是关于其制度安排的研究,还非常少。这与中国铁路客运在国家经济体系中所承担的重大责任是不相称的。这是因为,在中国经济发展过程中,一方面铁路货运承担的任务艰巨,运能与运量的矛盾更为突出,大企业、大货主在制度博弈中的力量更强大；另一方面国人对制度的研究还处于起步阶段,对制度的认识仍然有限。本文旨在从交易成本经济学的视角,对中国铁路客运制度安排进行专门研究,以节约交易成本为出发点,针对中国铁路客运存在的问题提出解决思路和方法。本文的主要研究内容有：
1、归纳了铁路客运制度变迁博弈的模型。通过运用交易成本理论和博弈理论,对中国铁路客运过往发生的若干次制度变迁进行分析,归纳了中国铁路客运制度变迁博弈的客观结构、主观博弈模型,描述了中国铁路客运制度变迁的发生机制。论文提出：中国铁路客运制度变迁博弈,是一个沿着均衡点演进的过程,具体可以有两种方式：第一种是参与人从给定的策略集合中,对不同新策略进行“分散试验”,当越来越多的参与人取得共识,达到一定的临界规模时,就演进出自发的秩序,产生新的客运制度。另一种方式是,均衡的变化是由新型的参与人或组织的设计所推动,通过推动使得选择新的设计制度博弈的参与人数达到临界规模时,新的均衡取代原有的均衡,使制度变迁发生。每个参与人对不同策略的选择,都是出于他个人或其组织节约交易成本的预期。
2、通过对与铁路客运制度创新相关的交易成本理论综合评述,探析中国铁路客运制度安排的三个基本问题：制度研究与铁路客运发展的同期效应；中国铁路客运有效率的制度安排亟需新制度经济学前沿理论的渗透与支持；中国铁路客运制度安排作为一种次级制度安排对上一级制度安排具有重要的助推作用。本文通过对基于交易成本的公司理论和企业组织理论、产权理论等方面的文献综述,认为：①中国铁路客运的发展轨迹与制度安排的效率具有一致性,一旦重视了对制度安排的研究,选择了有效率的制度安排,铁路客运的发展就加快,反之就停滞,两者具有非常明显的同期效应。这也是世界铁路客运发展的共同趋势。②要期待中国铁路客运的制度安排更有效率,需要理论渗透和支持。只有更多的铁路经济工作者和各级专业人员掌握了新制度经济学的交易成本理论、产权理论、契约理论、国家理论,并能在实际工作中自觉运用,更有效率的制度安排才会被普遍接受。③铁路客运的制度安排,是由制度环境决定的,它是一种次级制度安排,但反过来,它对上一级的制度安排——包括整个铁路的制度安排及整个交通体系的制度安排甚或整个国家的制度安排,都有重要的助推力,推动其向更有效率(或者相反)的方向进步。
3、运用交易成本理论,重新求证了铁路客运网运分离的有效性,明确了网运分离的限制条件。在若干给定的条件下,铁路客运实行网运分离将更有效率,可以显著地节约交易成本。从中国铁路的实际情况看,大多数的区域和线路,符合网运分离的基本条件,可以而且应该进行网运分离,这对于中国铁路客运进一步提高效率、降低成本、加快发展,具有十分重要的意义。
4、构建了中国铁路客运产权制度安排的模型,提出了实施的步骤。产权制度安排的低效率,是中国铁路客运制度安排存在问题的根本成因。有效率的产权制度安排,能够减少交易成本,也对铁路客运各种制度均衡具有稳定作用。本文从分析共有制产权的固有缺陷出发,提出了铁路客运产权非国有化的模式：宜股则股(主体模式),宜私则私(开放模式),宜民则民(修正模式)。实施的步骤是：国铁在先,立法在先,配套在先。
5、基于节约能交易成本的视角对中国铁路客运的治理机制进行了探讨。中国铁路客运在治理机制方面的制度安排,多年来一直处于僵滞的状态。本论文从制度的角度对此进行了分析,明确提出新的制度安排的内在逻辑是：铁路客运商业化,铁路客运与货运、路网分离(客运专线可除外),对铁路客运进行分割重组,实行区域性专业公司化。在实现这个目标模式之前,本文还提出了当前的过渡模式和必要的补充模式。
6、从节约交易成本的角度提出了铁路客运区域性专业公司的有效规模和内部治理结构。对中国铁路客运进行分割重组,需要遵循一定的经济原则,即节约交易成本原则。一个合理规模的区域性专业化客运公司,可以实现交易成本较低。本文从节约交易成本的角度,对不同规模的铁路客运公司重组方案进行了比较分析和论证。与以往微观经济学关于企业内部组织结构的构造主要取决于人们对集权或分权的偏好不同,本文认为企业组织结构是否有效率,主要看它是否能够节约交易成本,而影响组织的交易成本的因素有：资产专用性、合同、信息处理、资金分配和投机行为。因此,事业部制的M型组织结构,是区域性专业化客运公司的较优选择。
7、按照节约交易成本的要求探析了中国铁路客运的政府管制的效率问题和改进措施。政府管制不一定有效率,但政府管制也不一定比放任不管更坏。的确,政府管制的效用常常被夸大。我们需要的是选择一个适用的制度安排。本文认为,对各个不同行业的政府管制,要根据其所处的制度环境,通过方案对比分析,选择比较能够节约交易成本的制度安排。对于中国铁路客运而言,垄断竞争,适度管制,是可行的选择。
8、通过案例分析,对铁路客运契约的不完全性及其相应的治理方式进行了探讨。合同理论是新制度经济学的精髓,一切经济问题均可作为合同问题来研究。本文在对铁路客运的组织规模进行研究时,将组织及与它有关的各种因素的关系抽象为合同关系来分析。为了更好地印证这一理论,本文对中国铁路旅客运输合同的不完全性及其治理方式进行了实证分析,结论是,当我们把铁路客运的各种经营管理问题、制度安排问题看成合同问题来研究时,通过比较哪一种合同关系更可能节约交易成本,便较容易得到合理的结果。这为人们研究铁路客运制度安排提供了一个重要思路和方法。
The rail passenger transport system in China must be the busiest and the most complicated one in the world. But this system is still semi-closed and shows various problems, such as mixed government functions & enterprise functions, undivided passenger transport & cargo transport, undefined railway network management & transportation management, unclear property rights, inefficient organizations, excessive government regulation, authority-oriented operations with neglection of contracts, which brings high transaction costs and lagging development. Since the operation of China's rail transportation system has been characterized by integrated management of passenger transport, cargo transport and railway network (from early 2001 to the first half year of 2003, the Ministry of Railways used to carry out trial implementation of divided passenger transport and cargo transport and railway network shortly), many previous dependent researches on China's rail passenger transport were subordinate to rail transportation industry researches and usually focused on safety management, quality control, improvement of work style, development of potential capacity, etc. At present, there're extremely rare independent researches on rail passenger transport, especially institutional arrangement. This is inappropriate as China's rail passenger transport plays a highly significant role in national economic system. On one hand, railway freight transport system shoulders a huge responsibility during China's national economic development, the contradiction between transportation capacity & traffic volume is remarkable, and the influence from the big companies & the big goods owners are powerful in the institutional game. On the other hand, the researches in China are starting and the knowledge about the institution is very limited. From the angle of the Transaction Cost Economics, this paper conducts special research on rail passenger transport in China and proposes methods and concrete models for settling various problems in China's rail passenger transport, which focuses on saving transaction costs. The major researches in this paper include:
Ⅰ. With a comprehensive introduction on institutional arrangement related to rail passenger transport, the author puts forward three basic problems in institutional arrangement of China's rail passenger transport:synchronization effects of institutional researches and rail passenger transport development; effective institutional arrangement of China's rail passenger transport calls for promotion and support of state-of-the-art theory of the Neoinstitutional Economics; being a kind of secondary institutional arrangement, the institutional arrangement of China's rail passenger transport helps to promote that of the higher class. By means of summarizing institutional theory, corporate management & corporate organization theories and new property rights theories based on transaction costs, the author points out that:a) The progress of China's rail passenger transport is consistent with the efficiency of institutional arrangement. Once institutional arrangement gets close attention and the effective institutional arrangement is selected, the development of rail passenger transport would be accelerated. On the contrary, the development would be lagged. There is a significant synchronization effects between them. This is a common trend in global development of rail passenger transport. b) To realize effective institutional arrangement of China's rail passenger transport, we need sufficient penetration and support of theories. The introduction and promotion of the Neoinstitutional Economics are urgent. Only after more railway economists and specialists at all levels get familiar with the transaction cost theory, property rights theory, contract theory and state theory of the Neoinstitutional Economics and apply these theories consciously into the practice, can more efficient institutional arrangement be widely accepted. c) The institutional arrangement of rail passenger transport depends on institutional environment. It is a kind of secondary institutional arrangement. But vice versa, it promotes/weakens (the efficiency of) institutional arrangement of the higher class-including institutional arrangement of the entire railway system and traffic system or even institutional arrangement of the entire country.
Ⅱ. In this paper, institutional evolvement of rail passenger transport is summarized. Transaction Cost Theory and Game Theory is used to analyze several institutional evolvements of China's rail passenger transport in the past. The author summarizes objective structure and subjective game model for these institutional evolvements, and describes the mechanism that triggered the institutional arrangement. The author proposes that:The game in institutional arrangement of China's rail passenger transport is a process of evolvement along equilibrium points. There can be 2 specific modes. Mode 1:Participants carry out "dispersion tests" on new strategies from the given strategy set. When more and more participants agree with each other to a critical scale, there will be a spontaneous order and a new passenger transport system will appear. Mode 2:Changes of equilibrium are promoted by the design from the new participants or organizations. By means of such promotion, when the number of game participants that select new design reaches a critical scale, a new equilibrium will take the place of the precious one and the institutional evolvement comes accordingly.
Ⅲ. Used to Transaction Cost Theory, repeat to confirm the effectiveness and indicate relevant constraints about the railway network and transport should be separated. In some given conditions, China's rail passenger transport will be more efficient after the railway network and the transport were separated, can save significantly the transaction cost. From the actual situation of China's railway, on most of the regional and lines, Accord with basic conditions of the separation of the railway network and transport, can and should be it.
Ⅳ. In this paper, the author builds a model for institutional arrangement of property rights of China's rail passenger transport system and proposes implementation steps. Inefficient institutional arrangement of property rights is a root cause for existing problems in institutional arrangement of China's rail passenger transport. Efficient institutional arrangement of property rights can save transaction costs and helps to maintain equilibrium in each institution of rail passenger transport. Based on the inherent defects of co-ownership, the author proposes a mode of denationalization of rail passenger transport system:joint-stock (major mode), private (open mode), or state-owned private-operated (modified mode) as appropriate. Implementation steps: reform of national railway first, improvement of legislation first and sufficient supporting facilities first.
Ⅴ. In this paper, the author has a new insight into the management mechanism of China's rail passenger transport. In view of institutional arrangement, the management mechanism of China's rail passenger transport has been inefficient for years. By means of institutional analysis, the author proposes new idea:there're sufficient objective conditions for commercialization of rail passenger transport. Internal logic of new institutional arrangement:commercialization of rail passenger transport, separation of rail passenger transport from cargo transport & railway network management (special passenger lines excluded), reconstruction of rail passenger transport system, and implementation of regional corporate management. Before realization of this target mode, the author also recommends current transition mode and the essential supplement mode.
Ⅵ. From the angle of saving transaction costs, the author proposes the proper scale and internal management structure of regional rail passenger transport company. China's rail passenger transport system should be reconstructed according to a certain economic principle-saving transaction costs. A proper-scale, regional and professional passenger transport company helps to realize low transaction costs. In this paper, the author compares several reconstruction plans for rail passenger transport companies of different scales to fully demonstrate how to save transaction costs. Unlike microeconomics where internal corporate organizational structure usually depends on leader's favor in centralization or decentralization of power, the author holds that, the efficiency of corporate organizational structure depends on its capacity in saving transaction costs, and the factors that affect transaction costs include:asset exclusivity, contracts, information processing, fund allocation, and speculation. Thus, an M-shaped organizational structure with micro capital market characteristics is a good choice for regional professional passenger transport companies.
Ⅶ. From the angle of saving transaction costs, the author analyzes the efficiency of and improvement measures for government controls on China's rail passenger transport. Sometimes, government control is unnecessary. Sometimes, it's helpful. Yet, the benefits of government control are usually exaggerated. What we need is an efficient institutional arrangement. The author holds that, government control on different industries should be subject to specific institutional environment. There should be comparison analysis of specific plans, so as to select institutional arrangement that helps to save more transaction costs. For China's rail passenger transport, introduction of competition, simplification of rules, open operations and proper control are feasible choices.
Ⅷ. By case analysis, the author discusses the incompleteness of rail passenger transport contracts and corresponding control methods for it. Contract theory is the core of the Neoinstitutional Economics, where it is believed that all economic issues can be treated as contractual issues. In this paper, the author makes the best of the theory to study organizational scale of rail passenger transport and abstract organizations and related elements as contractual relationship for analytical purpose. To further demonstrate the theory, the author conducts positive analysis on the incompleteness of China's rail passenger transport contracts and control methods for it. Conclusion:when we treat various problems in management and institutional arrangement of rail passenger transport as contractual problems, we can easily acquire reasonable solutions as long as we find the contractual relationship that is more likely to save transaction costs. This paper provides an important method for researches on institutional arrangement of rail passenger transport.
1、归纳了铁路客运制度变迁博弈的模型。通过运用交易成本理论和博弈理论,对中国铁路客运过往发生的若干次制度变迁进行分析,归纳了中国铁路客运制度变迁博弈的客观结构、主观博弈模型,描述了中国铁路客运制度变迁的发生机制。论文提出：中国铁路客运制度变迁博弈,是一个沿着均衡点演进的过程,具体可以有两种方式：第一种是参与人从给定的策略集合中,对不同新策略进行“分散试验”,当越来越多的参与人取得共识,达到一定的临界规模时,就演进出自发的秩序,产生新的客运制度。另一种方式是,均衡的变化是由新型的参与人或组织的设计所推动,通过推动使得选择新的设计制度博弈的参与人数达到临界规模时,新的均衡取代原有的均衡,使制度变迁发生。每个参与人对不同策略的选择,都是出于他个人或其组织节约交易成本的预期。
2、通过对与铁路客运制度创新相关的交易成本理论综合评述,探析中国铁路客运制度安排的三个基本问题：制度研究与铁路客运发展的同期效应；中国铁路客运有效率的制度安排亟需新制度经济学前沿理论的渗透与支持；中国铁路客运制度安排作为一种次级制度安排对上一级制度安排具有重要的助推作用。本文通过对基于交易成本的公司理论和企业组织理论、产权理论等方面的文献综述,认为：①中国铁路客运的发展轨迹与制度安排的效率具有一致性,一旦重视了对制度安排的研究,选择了有效率的制度安排,铁路客运的发展就加快,反之就停滞,两者具有非常明显的同期效应。这也是世界铁路客运发展的共同趋势。②要期待中国铁路客运的制度安排更有效率,需要理论渗透和支持。只有更多的铁路经济工作者和各级专业人员掌握了新制度经济学的交易成本理论、产权理论、契约理论、国家理论,并能在实际工作中自觉运用,更有效率的制度安排才会被普遍接受。③铁路客运的制度安排,是由制度环境决定的,它是一种次级制度安排,但反过来,它对上一级的制度安排——包括整个铁路的制度安排及整个交通体系的制度安排甚或整个国家的制度安排,都有重要的助推力,推动其向更有效率(或者相反)的方向进步。
3、运用交易成本理论,重新求证了铁路客运网运分离的有效性,明确了网运分离的限制条件。在若干给定的条件下,铁路客运实行网运分离将更有效率,可以显著地节约交易成本。从中国铁路的实际情况看,大多数的区域和线路,符合网运分离的基本条件,可以而且应该进行网运分离,这对于中国铁路客运进一步提高效率、降低成本、加快发展,具有十分重要的意义。
4、构建了中国铁路客运产权制度安排的模型,提出了实施的步骤。产权制度安排的低效率,是中国铁路客运制度安排存在问题的根本成因。有效率的产权制度安排,能够减少交易成本,也对铁路客运各种制度均衡具有稳定作用。本文从分析共有制产权的固有缺陷出发,提出了铁路客运产权非国有化的模式：宜股则股(主体模式),宜私则私(开放模式),宜民则民(修正模式)。实施的步骤是：国铁在先,立法在先,配套在先。
5、基于节约能交易成本的视角对中国铁路客运的治理机制进行了探讨。中国铁路客运在治理机制方面的制度安排,多年来一直处于僵滞的状态。本论文从制度的角度对此进行了分析,明确提出新的制度安排的内在逻辑是：铁路客运商业化,铁路客运与货运、路网分离(客运专线可除外),对铁路客运进行分割重组,实行区域性专业公司化。在实现这个目标模式之前,本文还提出了当前的过渡模式和必要的补充模式。
6、从节约交易成本的角度提出了铁路客运区域性专业公司的有效规模和内部治理结构。对中国铁路客运进行分割重组,需要遵循一定的经济原则,即节约交易成本原则。一个合理规模的区域性专业化客运公司,可以实现交易成本较低。本文从节约交易成本的角度,对不同规模的铁路客运公司重组方案进行了比较分析和论证。与以往微观经济学关于企业内部组织结构的构造主要取决于人们对集权或分权的偏好不同,本文认为企业组织结构是否有效率,主要看它是否能够节约交易成本,而影响组织的交易成本的因素有：资产专用性、合同、信息处理、资金分配和投机行为。因此,事业部制的M型组织结构,是区域性专业化客运公司的较优选择。
7、按照节约交易成本的要求探析了中国铁路客运的政府管制的效率问题和改进措施。政府管制不一定有效率,但政府管制也不一定比放任不管更坏。的确,政府管制的效用常常被夸大。我们需要的是选择一个适用的制度安排。本文认为,对各个不同行业的政府管制,要根据其所处的制度环境,通过方案对比分析,选择比较能够节约交易成本的制度安排。对于中国铁路客运而言,垄断竞争,适度管制,是可行的选择。
8、通过案例分析,对铁路客运契约的不完全性及其相应的治理方式进行了探讨。合同理论是新制度经济学的精髓,一切经济问题均可作为合同问题来研究。本文在对铁路客运的组织规模进行研究时,将组织及与它有关的各种因素的关系抽象为合同关系来分析。为了更好地印证这一理论,本文对中国铁路旅客运输合同的不完全性及其治理方式进行了实证分析,结论是,当我们把铁路客运的各种经营管理问题、制度安排问题看成合同问题来研究时,通过比较哪一种合同关系更可能节约交易成本,便较容易得到合理的结果。这为人们研究铁路客运制度安排提供了一个重要思路和方法。
The rail passenger transport system in China must be the busiest and the most complicated one in the world. But this system is still semi-closed and shows various problems, such as mixed government functions & enterprise functions, undivided passenger transport & cargo transport, undefined railway network management & transportation management, unclear property rights, inefficient organizations, excessive government regulation, authority-oriented operations with neglection of contracts, which brings high transaction costs and lagging development. Since the operation of China's rail transportation system has been characterized by integrated management of passenger transport, cargo transport and railway network (from early 2001 to the first half year of 2003, the Ministry of Railways used to carry out trial implementation of divided passenger transport and cargo transport and railway network shortly), many previous dependent researches on China's rail passenger transport were subordinate to rail transportation industry researches and usually focused on safety management, quality control, improvement of work style, development of potential capacity, etc. At present, there're extremely rare independent researches on rail passenger transport, especially institutional arrangement. This is inappropriate as China's rail passenger transport plays a highly significant role in national economic system. On one hand, railway freight transport system shoulders a huge responsibility during China's national economic development, the contradiction between transportation capacity & traffic volume is remarkable, and the influence from the big companies & the big goods owners are powerful in the institutional game. On the other hand, the researches in China are starting and the knowledge about the institution is very limited. From the angle of the Transaction Cost Economics, this paper conducts special research on rail passenger transport in China and proposes methods and concrete models for settling various problems in China's rail passenger transport, which focuses on saving transaction costs. The major researches in this paper include:
Ⅰ. With a comprehensive introduction on institutional arrangement related to rail passenger transport, the author puts forward three basic problems in institutional arrangement of China's rail passenger transport:synchronization effects of institutional researches and rail passenger transport development; effective institutional arrangement of China's rail passenger transport calls for promotion and support of state-of-the-art theory of the Neoinstitutional Economics; being a kind of secondary institutional arrangement, the institutional arrangement of China's rail passenger transport helps to promote that of the higher class. By means of summarizing institutional theory, corporate management & corporate organization theories and new property rights theories based on transaction costs, the author points out that:a) The progress of China's rail passenger transport is consistent with the efficiency of institutional arrangement. Once institutional arrangement gets close attention and the effective institutional arrangement is selected, the development of rail passenger transport would be accelerated. On the contrary, the development would be lagged. There is a significant synchronization effects between them. This is a common trend in global development of rail passenger transport. b) To realize effective institutional arrangement of China's rail passenger transport, we need sufficient penetration and support of theories. The introduction and promotion of the Neoinstitutional Economics are urgent. Only after more railway economists and specialists at all levels get familiar with the transaction cost theory, property rights theory, contract theory and state theory of the Neoinstitutional Economics and apply these theories consciously into the practice, can more efficient institutional arrangement be widely accepted. c) The institutional arrangement of rail passenger transport depends on institutional environment. It is a kind of secondary institutional arrangement. But vice versa, it promotes/weakens (the efficiency of) institutional arrangement of the higher class-including institutional arrangement of the entire railway system and traffic system or even institutional arrangement of the entire country.
Ⅱ. In this paper, institutional evolvement of rail passenger transport is summarized. Transaction Cost Theory and Game Theory is used to analyze several institutional evolvements of China's rail passenger transport in the past. The author summarizes objective structure and subjective game model for these institutional evolvements, and describes the mechanism that triggered the institutional arrangement. The author proposes that:The game in institutional arrangement of China's rail passenger transport is a process of evolvement along equilibrium points. There can be 2 specific modes. Mode 1:Participants carry out "dispersion tests" on new strategies from the given strategy set. When more and more participants agree with each other to a critical scale, there will be a spontaneous order and a new passenger transport system will appear. Mode 2:Changes of equilibrium are promoted by the design from the new participants or organizations. By means of such promotion, when the number of game participants that select new design reaches a critical scale, a new equilibrium will take the place of the precious one and the institutional evolvement comes accordingly.
Ⅲ. Used to Transaction Cost Theory, repeat to confirm the effectiveness and indicate relevant constraints about the railway network and transport should be separated. In some given conditions, China's rail passenger transport will be more efficient after the railway network and the transport were separated, can save significantly the transaction cost. From the actual situation of China's railway, on most of the regional and lines, Accord with basic conditions of the separation of the railway network and transport, can and should be it.
Ⅳ. In this paper, the author builds a model for institutional arrangement of property rights of China's rail passenger transport system and proposes implementation steps. Inefficient institutional arrangement of property rights is a root cause for existing problems in institutional arrangement of China's rail passenger transport. Efficient institutional arrangement of property rights can save transaction costs and helps to maintain equilibrium in each institution of rail passenger transport. Based on the inherent defects of co-ownership, the author proposes a mode of denationalization of rail passenger transport system:joint-stock (major mode), private (open mode), or state-owned private-operated (modified mode) as appropriate. Implementation steps: reform of national railway first, improvement of legislation first and sufficient supporting facilities first.
Ⅴ. In this paper, the author has a new insight into the management mechanism of China's rail passenger transport. In view of institutional arrangement, the management mechanism of China's rail passenger transport has been inefficient for years. By means of institutional analysis, the author proposes new idea:there're sufficient objective conditions for commercialization of rail passenger transport. Internal logic of new institutional arrangement:commercialization of rail passenger transport, separation of rail passenger transport from cargo transport & railway network management (special passenger lines excluded), reconstruction of rail passenger transport system, and implementation of regional corporate management. Before realization of this target mode, the author also recommends current transition mode and the essential supplement mode.
Ⅵ. From the angle of saving transaction costs, the author proposes the proper scale and internal management structure of regional rail passenger transport company. China's rail passenger transport system should be reconstructed according to a certain economic principle-saving transaction costs. A proper-scale, regional and professional passenger transport company helps to realize low transaction costs. In this paper, the author compares several reconstruction plans for rail passenger transport companies of different scales to fully demonstrate how to save transaction costs. Unlike microeconomics where internal corporate organizational structure usually depends on leader's favor in centralization or decentralization of power, the author holds that, the efficiency of corporate organizational structure depends on its capacity in saving transaction costs, and the factors that affect transaction costs include:asset exclusivity, contracts, information processing, fund allocation, and speculation. Thus, an M-shaped organizational structure with micro capital market characteristics is a good choice for regional professional passenger transport companies.
Ⅶ. From the angle of saving transaction costs, the author analyzes the efficiency of and improvement measures for government controls on China's rail passenger transport. Sometimes, government control is unnecessary. Sometimes, it's helpful. Yet, the benefits of government control are usually exaggerated. What we need is an efficient institutional arrangement. The author holds that, government control on different industries should be subject to specific institutional environment. There should be comparison analysis of specific plans, so as to select institutional arrangement that helps to save more transaction costs. For China's rail passenger transport, introduction of competition, simplification of rules, open operations and proper control are feasible choices.
Ⅷ. By case analysis, the author discusses the incompleteness of rail passenger transport contracts and corresponding control methods for it. Contract theory is the core of the Neoinstitutional Economics, where it is believed that all economic issues can be treated as contractual issues. In this paper, the author makes the best of the theory to study organizational scale of rail passenger transport and abstract organizations and related elements as contractual relationship for analytical purpose. To further demonstrate the theory, the author conducts positive analysis on the incompleteness of China's rail passenger transport contracts and control methods for it. Conclusion:when we treat various problems in management and institutional arrangement of rail passenger transport as contractual problems, we can easily acquire reasonable solutions as long as we find the contractual relationship that is more likely to save transaction costs. This paper provides an important method for researches on institutional arrangement of rail passenger transport.
引文
①李建德：《经济制度演进大纲》,中国财经出版社,2000年,第142页。
①详见卢现祥.新制度经济学.第五章：制度变迁与制度创新.武汉大学出版社,2004.1
①马歇尔：《经济学原理》,朱志泰、陈脊璧译,商务印书馆,1965。作者对企业规模经济性的论述,并非从节约交易成本的角度进行分析,更多的是经验的归纳。
①乔治·斯蒂格勒,《价格理论》,施仁译,北京经济学院出版社,1992。作者在《ournal of Law and Economics》1958年12月刊发表的另一篇文章《规模经济》中,提出用生存技术测定规模经济,即：“所谓有效率的厂商规模,其含义是在这一规模上,企业家能对付他在实际经营中碰到的所有问题：如紧张的劳工关系、日新月异的创新、政府管制、不稳定的外国市场等等。”
①荣朝和、高宏伟：《运输业规模经济计量方法的探讨》,北京交通大学学报,1999年第3期。作者从这时起已经开始关注运输业的规模经济问题,但还没有形成后来那种对运输业规模经济与范围经济的综合性解释构架。
②详见荣朝和：《对铁路规模经济与范围经济的进一步思考》,载《探究铁路经济问题》,经济科学出版社,2004。
①以上详见威廉姆森《资本主义经济制度——论企业签约与市场签约》中文版,商务印书馆,第十一章“现代公司”,第381-412页
①见威廉姆森《资本主义经济制度——论企业签约与市场签约》中文版,商务印书馆,2002,第一章“交易成本经济学”,第38页
①详见卢现祥《新制度经济学》,北京大学出版社,2007,第8章“产权理论”。
②张维迎：凤凰卫视,世纪大讲堂：“中国改革开放30年”,2009年3月,张维迎在这次演讲中,将中国经济体制改革划分为三个阶段：价格自由化阶段,企业非国有化阶段,法制化阶段。
③见威廉姆森《资本主义经济制度——论企业签约与市场签约》中文版,商务印书馆,2002,第一章“交易成本经济学”,第46页,
①见威廉姆森《资本主义经济制度——论企业签约与市场签约》中文版,商务印书馆,2002,第一章“交易成本经济学”,第36页0
①详见卢现祥《新制度经济学》,北京大学出版社,2007,第8章“产权理论”。
①详见乔治·斯蒂格勒.价格理论.北京经济学院出版社.1992,第166-170页.
①详见罗纳德·科斯.企业、市场与法律.上海：三联书店,1990
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①荣朝和、高宏伟：《运输业规模经济计量方法的探讨》,北京交通大学学报,1999年第3期。作者从这时起已经开始关注运输业的规模经济问题,但还没有形成后来那种对运输业规模经济与范围经济的综合性解释构架。
②详见荣朝和：《对铁路规模经济与范围经济的进一步思考》,载《探究铁路经济问题》,经济科学出版社,2004。
①以上详见威廉姆森《资本主义经济制度——论企业签约与市场签约》中文版,商务印书馆,第十一章“现代公司”,第381-412页
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②张维迎：凤凰卫视,世纪大讲堂：“中国改革开放30年”,2009年3月,张维迎在这次演讲中,将中国经济体制改革划分为三个阶段：价格自由化阶段,企业非国有化阶段,法制化阶段。
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