中小企业融资研究
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摘要
中小企业融资问题是一个世界性难题,也是一个长久性课题。统计研究显示,无论在我国还是世界其他国家,中小企业已经成为拉动经济增长、增加国家税收、推动自主创新、稳定城镇就业的主要企业群体。对中小企业的地位和作用的认识,无论是西方发达国家、新兴化工业国家和地区,还是我国,都经历了一个从不够重视到重视的过程。我国正处于经济转型时期,经过20年以市场取向为主导的经济体制改革,经济结构已从一元化转向多元化,以中小企业为主体的非国有经济迅速成长,已成为我国国民经济持续稳定增长的坚实基础。
随着我国计划经济体制向市场经济体制的转轨,私营企业、个体工商户、外商投资企业、乡镇企业等中小企业得以合法的存在和发展,并逐步成长为支撑国民经济增长、吸纳就业和技术创新的主要力量。到2009年,我国经工商行政部门注册的中小企业已经超过4500万家,上缴工商税收占全国的56%,生产的最终产品和服务价值占到国内生产总值的62%。中小企业提供了我国75%以上的就业岗位,已成为吸纳就业的主要渠道。中小企业成为我国机制与技术创新的主体,占我国发明专利的78%,完成了全国68%以上的专利创新和86%上的新产品开发。实践表明,中小企业和非公有制经济在增加财政收入、促进经济发展、扩大社会就业、繁荣城乡市场、推动技术创新、优化经济结构等方面发挥着日益重要的作用。
然而,中小企业和非公有制经济发展中仍然面临不少问题,其中既有创业门槛高、社会化服务滞后、资金融通难、市场准入和退出机制不健全等发展环境问题；也有结构不合理、管理水平低、增长方式粗放等自身素质问题。现阶段,制约中小企业发展的最核心的问题在于中小企业这一群体长期处于融资困境,中小企业的蓬勃发展与其狭隘的融资渠道形成了鲜明的对比。2009年的数据显示,在我国,除四大国有商业银行之外的十三家股份制银行中,个体私营短期贷款余额仅1468.11亿元,不足这些银行短期贷款总额的6%,在全部贷款余额中仅占2%,贷款难成为小企业谋生存求发展的重大障碍。尤其是当前,解决小企业贷款难成为世界各国金融界普遍关注的问题。
中小企业尚缺乏健全的财务制度与充足的信息披露能力。在融资过程中,中小企业与商业银行等金融机构之间就必然会出现信息不对称。当商业银行等金融机构在权衡信息不对称下的风险时,就自然将偏好锁定在财务制度健全与信息披露能力较强的大型企业上,产生信贷配给。在金融市场上,由中小企业与商业银行等金融机构构成的交易双方之间就必然会出现信息不对称。完全信息市场,可以实现资源的优化配置；在非对称信息下,由于银行作为资金的供给者,对中小企业又有不完全的信息,当银行以一定的利率选择贷款对象时,会诱发金融市场上的逆选择(Adverse Selection),而在贷款获得后,出于融资成本赎回和利润的推动,中小企业往往选择风险较高的投资项目,产生道德风险(Moral Hazard)。逆选择和道德风险的存在,使银行的信贷自己面临巨大的风险。于是,出于风险控制的视角,在重复博弈过程中,银行就会选择相对信息比较完全的大企业融资市场,中小企业就会被信贷配给。
进一步的研究下去我们会发现一系列值得研究的问题：一个对社会经济发展产生显著贡献份额的经济体类型,为什么在社会经济资源配置的总体格局中反而处于不利的地位?市场经济条件下,中小企业会长期存在么?中小企业在资源分配中不利地位的根源仅仅是由于其“规模”是“中小”的么?为什么大企业可以得到资金而中小企业就会被信贷配给?是什么样的特征导致了中小企业被排挤在均衡的信贷市场之外?经济发展与经济增长需要怎样的中小企业?中小企业与银行的博弈过程中,信息的传导机制与一般的大企业有什么不同?这种特殊的信息传导下的商业银行和中小企业的关系怎样?影响信息传导的商业银行体系应该怎样优化?等等。
随着对以上问题的研究和探索,我们展开了全文的撰写,研究结果发现加强商业银行的体系建设可以通过规范市场交易秩序,从一个全新的视角优化信启、的传递,有针对性的掌握系统内部不同个体的充分信息。目前我国的商业银行体系,缺乏掌握中小企业信息、的部门和机构,因此,有必要从商业银行体系建设视角对中小企业的融资难问题进行探讨。
我们根据文章分析的逻辑思路展开论述,将全文分为“总论——分论——专论”三个部分。
总论部分,我们就文章将要研究的主要问题给出大致的轮廓。主要包括三章内容：
第1章主要研究中小企业存在的必要性及其融资特征。首先,提出了世界各国对中小企业的定义和范围,进而根据我国的中小企业特点明确了我国的中小企业的内涵,界定了本文研究的边界。其次,在明确了研究目标后,本文从经济学角度阐述了中小企业存在的合理性和必然性,详尽的描述了研究中小企业融资问题的重要意义。最后,指出了与大企业相比,中小企业的特点和融资行为中的特殊性。介绍了我国的中小企业融资的现状,概括指出了中小企业融资的内核,并根据中小企业融资行为中的特殊因素,结合我国中小企业融资的现状,分析了中小企业信贷配给的产生。
第2章是总论的另外一个部分,主要阐述了商业银行体系建设和中小企业融资的相关研究综述。第一,对商业银行体系和中小企业融资的相关研究进行了系统的综述。包括资本缺口理论、信贷融资理论等理论综述和关于中小企业融资困难的原因、对策等现实研究综述,并对现有的研究成果进行了综述和评价,作为全文分析的基石。第二,研究中小企业的供求局部均衡问题,在微观市场均衡理论的指导下,从中小企业融资中资金供求双方出发,模型化市场参与者,系统研究的信贷配给问题的产生及其根源。第三,在文献综述和模型化分析的启示下,分析我国现行的商业银行体系与中小企业融资难题,在充分论证信贷配给条件下的银企关系后合理的推出我国的商业银行体系现存的问题——银行体系设计与中小企业融资特点不相容。进一步指明我国商业银行体系建设的关键点,指明了我国致力于解决中小企业融资问题的银行体系建设方向。
第3章是全文的理论基础——信息经济学相关理论。在前文的综述和评论的基础上,提出了本文的理论基础——信息不对称理论。从信息不对称下的委托代理理论出发,阐释了中小企业信贷配给的产生和健全的商业银行体系在化解中小企业融资难问题上的重要作用。第一,从信息经济学的视角出发,全面讨论了信息不对称理论的提出、典型行为及其在中小企业融资中的危害作用。第二,具体的说明了信启、不对称下的委托代理问题,是导致中小企业信贷配给的根源。在该问题上,我们详尽的阐述了委托代理问题中的逆选择机制,在逆选择理论的指导下研究了委托代理关系和中小企业融资行为的结合：逆选择的发生机制与不完美信息市场中的信贷配给。
总论部分过后,我们进入了分论的研究部分,主要包括以下几章的内容：
第4章构建了一个商业银行与中小企业的委托——代理模型,模型化的阐释了逆选择下的中小企业信贷配给发生机制。分别设计了完全信息和非完全信息下的两种不同合同和发生机制,研究银行和中小企业的委托代理问题。对比完全信息和不完全信息下的合同和结果,我们发现,商业银行体系的弊端导致了中小企业的信息不对称加剧,最终导致逆选择产生,中小企业被信贷配给。通过将商业银行体系中不同商业银行类别的委托人身份进行差异化,我们得出了不同的博弈结果,于是我们提出了针对中小企业融资的银行体系重建策略。
第5章是实证分析部分,在该部分中,我们设计了一个简单的产出模型,通过将宏观生产函数中不同的资金来源部分进行差别化引入,用数据说话,通过一系列计量经济学方法对中小企业的产出进行冲击和影响,最终,我们根据这些不同的资金来源对中小企业产出的影响差异,进一步验证了前文的重要观点：商业银行体系的重构是化解中小企业融资困境的重要出路。
最后,我们进入了专论部分的研究。
该部分的研究中,从第6章起,我们重点要考察的问题是怎样重新构建我国的商业银行体系,化解中小企业融资瓶颈。在这部分内容中,我们将商业银行体系的构成按委托人的差异化进行了细分,分别讨论国有控股商业银行、股份制商业银行、城市商业银行、农村合作金融机构和政策性金融机构等对中小企业融资的不同影响程度,进而根据这些结果,总结提出针对化解中小企业融资难题的我国商业银行体系建设的主要思路——建立以商业银行体系为主体,政策性银行为重要补充的新的银行体系。
此外,在专论部分的总结与概括部分中,我们还提到了化解中小企业融资难题的另外几个重要的因素及其改进措施,主要包括：中小企业自身的建设、政府的担保作用、银行监管部门的主要任务以及与融资相关的法律、法规和环境建设等等。
SMEs financing problem is not only a worldwide problem, but also a permanent issue. Statistical studies shows that whether in China or other countries all around the world, SMEs have become a driving force of economic growth, state tax revenue increasing, innovation promotion and urban employment stable in the major business groups. Whether it is in western developed countries, emerging industry countries and regions, or in our country, the awareness of the status and role of SMEs has undergone a process of insufficient attention to the importance. Our country is in the acssion of economic transformation, after20years of market-oriented economic reformation, economic structure has shifted from unified to diversity. The rapid growth of non-state economy-as the main body of SMEs, has became the solid foundation of the steady economic growth of our national economy.
With the transition from planned economy to market economy of our country, individual businesses, township enterprises, private businesses, foreign-invested enterprises and other SMEs become to have the legal existence and development, and gradually become an important force in creating jobs, technology innovation and supporting national economic growth.By the year of2006, SMEs registering By industrial and commercial administrative departments in China has more than42million. The value of final goods and services crated by SMEs are accounted for60%of GDP.They also paid53%of the country's industrial and commercial tax;SMEs provide more than75%of jobs in our chuntry.and it has become a major channel for creating jobs; As the main part of technology innovation and mechanism innovation in China, SMEs chieved75%invention patents of the whole country, completed more than65%of the country's patents innovation and80%of the new production development. Practice shows that SMEs and non-public economies are playing an increasingly important role in promoting economic development, promoting the prosperity of urban and rural markets, increasing fiscal revenue, increasing employment opportunities, Promoting technological innovation and optimizing the economic structure etc.
However, the development of SMEs and non-public economic still faces many problems. Among these, there are not only problems of development environment, for example:high threshold of entrepreneurship, market access and exit mechanism is not so perfect; financing is difficult, lagging social services etc, but also their own quality problems, such as:extensive growth pattern, irrational structure, low management level etc. In the present stage, the core problem restricting the development of SMEs is that the group of SMEs trapped in financing problem for a long time. There are distinct comparison between vigorous development of SMEs and its narrow financing channels.2010's data shows that, in China, the thirteen joint-stock banks outside of the four major state-owned commercial banks only provided private short-term loans141.811billion yuan, less than5%of their short-term bank loans, only2%of loan balance in total. Loan problems become the biggest obstacle to the survival and development of the SMEs. In particular, solve the problems of small business loans as the financial world issues of common concern in the current moment. In the process of economic system transformation, the deepening contradictions that the not match of financial structure and economic structure is accelerating. SMEs of occupy GDP63%and industrial added value accounted for74%, achieved only30%of credit assets. State-owned economy is still occupied70%of the credit assets. In the present time, there are "gaps" in SMEs of China in two ways:equity financing and debt financing. There is some market failure in configuration of financial resources. How to create an effective financial support system for SMEs? How to eliminate the financing difficulties of SMEs? All these problems are important issues for effectively promote the process of marketing at present.
SMEs in China, now still lack a sound financial system and adequate disclosure of information capacity, when they face the financing problem in the markets, SMEs and commercial banks and other financial institutions is bound to information asymmetry. When commercial banks and other financial institutions under the weighing the risk under asymmetric information, they naturally prefer to lock in the large enterprises that have a sound financial system and strong ability of information disclosure. Then, credit rationing had happened.In the financial markets, inevitable information asymmetry exists in the two transactions sides between SMEs and commercial banks and other financial institutions. Western economic theory tells us that:On the complete information market, optimum allocation of resources can be achieved. But under asymmetric information, market failure occurs. As banks as suppliers of funds, they do not have complete information about SMEs, when the bank select finance objection by a certain interest rate, this may induce adverse selection in financial markets. And after the SMEs get the loans, SMEs tend to choose higher risky investment projects under profits promotion and financing costs redemption. This will result in moral hazard.The existence of adverse selection and moral hazard made the bank credit face enormous risks. So, based on the perspective of risk control, banks will choose large corporates to finance on a relatively more complete information market, in the course of repeated games. SME will be credit rationned.
With Further researches, we will find a range of issues that worth study:Why, in overall pattern, the economic type with significant contribution to social and economic development is in disadvantaged position in the allocation of social and economic resources? Under conditions of market economy, will SMEs be long-term exist? Is "scale is middle an small" the only root that the SMEs in allocation of resources are in disadvantaged? Why big companies can get funding while SMEs will be credit rationed? What kind of characteristics has led to the phenomenon that SMEs are excluded from the balance of the credit markets? What kind of SMEs are the economic development and economic growth needs? During the game process between SMEs and banks, what's the differern from the large enterprises in information transmission mechanism? What's the relationship between commercial banks and small and medium enterprises in this special information conduction? How to optimize the commercial banking system that affct the transmission of the information? Etc.
With research and exploration of these questions, we started writing the full text. The results showed that strengthening the construction of commercial banking system can regulate the market order, optimize information transfer from a new perspective and targeted master the full information from different individuals within the system. At present, commercial banking system of China lack of departments and agencies that master SMEs' information. Therefore, it is necessary to discuss the problem of SMEs' financing from the perspective of the reconstruction of the commercial banking system.
We expand the discussion according to the logical thinking of the article analysis. The paper is divided into three parts, that is:"General discussion-Expounding---Special discussion"
In the part of General discussion, we show the general outline of the major problem this article will be researched. This section includes three chapters:
As the cornerstone of text analysis, the first chapter detailed described the main need for the existence of SMEs and the characteristics of its financing. At first, we propose the definition and range of SMEs all around the world. Then according to the characteristics of SMEs in China, we defined clearly the meaning of SMEs in China and the boundaries of our study. Second, after knowing the clear goal of this study, we elaborate the rationality and necessity of the existence of SMEs from the economic perspective. It also gave a detailed description of the importance of financing for SMEs. Finally, this paper pointed out the characteristics and special financing acts of SMEs, compared with large enterprises. This article describes the status of the financing of SMEs in China, summary points out the core of SME financing,and according the SME financing behavior under its special factors, with the status of SME financing, analysised the generation of credit rationing for SMEs.
Chapter2is another part of General discussion.It mainly talk about the construction of the commercial banking system and reviewed and evaluated the existing research results about SME financing problem. First of all, in this part we showed a systematic review about the related research on commercial banking system and SME finance, including theoretical summary, such as Capital gap theory, Theory of credit facilities and summary of reality researches, for example: causes of financing difficulties for SMEs, the strategy for solving the problem etc. It conducted comments of existing research as the cornerstone of text analysis. Secondly, we study the problem of partial equilibrium of SMEs supply and demand. Under the guidance of Microscopic market Equilibrium Theory, starting from the two parts of funds supply and demand in SME financing, we model the market participants, system produces the produce of credit rationing problem and its root causes. Thirdly, inspired by the literature review and model analysis, we analyzed our existing commercial banking system and the financing problems of SMEs. After fully demonstrated the bank-enterprise relations under the conditions of credit rationing, we introduced reasonably the existing problems of our commercial banking system——The designing of the banking system is incompatible with the characteristics of SME financing. This paper further pointed out the key point of the construction of our commercial banking system, and indicated the reconstrction direction of our commercial banking system addressing the problem of SME financing.
Chapter3is the theoretical basis of our paper——Information Economics. On the basis of review and comment on the previous text, we propose a theoretical basis for this article——Asymmetric information theory. Starting from the Principal-agent theory under asymmetric information theory, this article illustrated the generation of credit rationing for SMEs and the important role of a sound commercial banking system in resolving the problem of financing SMEs. Firstly, from the perspective of information economics, this part talked about propose and typical behavior of Asymmetric information theory, and its harmful effects in the role of SME financing. Secondly, it instructs specifically the Principal-agent theory under asymmetric information theory is the leading source of credit rationing for SMEs. In this issue, we detailed exposition of adverse selection mechanism in the principal-agent problem. Under the guidance of adverse selection theory, we studied the the combination of the principal-agent relationship and SME financing action:The occurrence of adverse selection mechanism and credit rationing in imperfect information market.
After the General discussion part, we came to discuss the Expounding part. It includes the following chapters:
In Chapter4, we build a principal-agent model with commercial bank and the SMEs. It illustrates by a model that the mechanism of credit rationing for SMEs under adverse selection mechanism. Paper were designed respectively two different mechanisms of the contract——under complete information and incomplete information, in order to discuss principal-agent problem between commercial bank and the SMEs. By comparing the different results between the contrsts under complete information and under incomplete information, we found that it is the shortcomings of the commercial banking system has led to increased information asymmetry in SMEs, this eventually lead to adverse selection arising, SMEs are credit rationing. By differentiating the identity of the principal of the different types of commercial banks in our commercial banking system, we have come to different game results. So we propose a redevelopment strategy that the banking system for SMEs financing problem.
Chapter5is the empirical analysis part. In this section, we designed a simple output model, through the way that differentiated introduct the different sources of funding part into Macro-production function, to speak with the data, through a series of econometric methods, simulate the output of small and medium enterprises. Finally, based on these different sources of differences in output to SMEs, we further validate the importance of earlier views:Reconstruction of the commercial banking system is an important way to resolve the problem of SMEs financing.
Finally, we entered the study of Special discussion part.
In this part of the study, starting from Chapter6, the most important problem we focus on is that:How to rebuild the commercial banking system in China so that we can resolve the bottleneck of SME financing? In this part of the content, we distinguished the different composition of the commercial banking system by client differentiation.Discuss respectively the different effects on the extent of SME financing among state-controlled commercial banks, joint-stock commercial banks, city commercial banks, rural commercial banks and policy financial institutions. Then based on these results, we summarize and put forward the main ideas of resolving the financing problems of SMEs——Create a new commercial banking systemin which contains commercial banking system for SMEs as the mainbody and policy banks as an important complement.
In addition, in the conclusion and summary section of our Special discussion part, we also mentioned several other important factors and improvement measures for resolve the financing problems of SMEs. They include the construction of SMEs itself, the role of government guarantees, the main task of banking supervision department and finance-related laws, regulations, and environmental construction etc.
随着我国计划经济体制向市场经济体制的转轨,私营企业、个体工商户、外商投资企业、乡镇企业等中小企业得以合法的存在和发展,并逐步成长为支撑国民经济增长、吸纳就业和技术创新的主要力量。到2009年,我国经工商行政部门注册的中小企业已经超过4500万家,上缴工商税收占全国的56%,生产的最终产品和服务价值占到国内生产总值的62%。中小企业提供了我国75%以上的就业岗位,已成为吸纳就业的主要渠道。中小企业成为我国机制与技术创新的主体,占我国发明专利的78%,完成了全国68%以上的专利创新和86%上的新产品开发。实践表明,中小企业和非公有制经济在增加财政收入、促进经济发展、扩大社会就业、繁荣城乡市场、推动技术创新、优化经济结构等方面发挥着日益重要的作用。
然而,中小企业和非公有制经济发展中仍然面临不少问题,其中既有创业门槛高、社会化服务滞后、资金融通难、市场准入和退出机制不健全等发展环境问题；也有结构不合理、管理水平低、增长方式粗放等自身素质问题。现阶段,制约中小企业发展的最核心的问题在于中小企业这一群体长期处于融资困境,中小企业的蓬勃发展与其狭隘的融资渠道形成了鲜明的对比。2009年的数据显示,在我国,除四大国有商业银行之外的十三家股份制银行中,个体私营短期贷款余额仅1468.11亿元,不足这些银行短期贷款总额的6%,在全部贷款余额中仅占2%,贷款难成为小企业谋生存求发展的重大障碍。尤其是当前,解决小企业贷款难成为世界各国金融界普遍关注的问题。
中小企业尚缺乏健全的财务制度与充足的信息披露能力。在融资过程中,中小企业与商业银行等金融机构之间就必然会出现信息不对称。当商业银行等金融机构在权衡信息不对称下的风险时,就自然将偏好锁定在财务制度健全与信息披露能力较强的大型企业上,产生信贷配给。在金融市场上,由中小企业与商业银行等金融机构构成的交易双方之间就必然会出现信息不对称。完全信息市场,可以实现资源的优化配置；在非对称信息下,由于银行作为资金的供给者,对中小企业又有不完全的信息,当银行以一定的利率选择贷款对象时,会诱发金融市场上的逆选择(Adverse Selection),而在贷款获得后,出于融资成本赎回和利润的推动,中小企业往往选择风险较高的投资项目,产生道德风险(Moral Hazard)。逆选择和道德风险的存在,使银行的信贷自己面临巨大的风险。于是,出于风险控制的视角,在重复博弈过程中,银行就会选择相对信息比较完全的大企业融资市场,中小企业就会被信贷配给。
进一步的研究下去我们会发现一系列值得研究的问题：一个对社会经济发展产生显著贡献份额的经济体类型,为什么在社会经济资源配置的总体格局中反而处于不利的地位?市场经济条件下,中小企业会长期存在么?中小企业在资源分配中不利地位的根源仅仅是由于其“规模”是“中小”的么?为什么大企业可以得到资金而中小企业就会被信贷配给?是什么样的特征导致了中小企业被排挤在均衡的信贷市场之外?经济发展与经济增长需要怎样的中小企业?中小企业与银行的博弈过程中,信息的传导机制与一般的大企业有什么不同?这种特殊的信息传导下的商业银行和中小企业的关系怎样?影响信息传导的商业银行体系应该怎样优化?等等。
随着对以上问题的研究和探索,我们展开了全文的撰写,研究结果发现加强商业银行的体系建设可以通过规范市场交易秩序,从一个全新的视角优化信启、的传递,有针对性的掌握系统内部不同个体的充分信息。目前我国的商业银行体系,缺乏掌握中小企业信息、的部门和机构,因此,有必要从商业银行体系建设视角对中小企业的融资难问题进行探讨。
我们根据文章分析的逻辑思路展开论述,将全文分为“总论——分论——专论”三个部分。
总论部分,我们就文章将要研究的主要问题给出大致的轮廓。主要包括三章内容：
第1章主要研究中小企业存在的必要性及其融资特征。首先,提出了世界各国对中小企业的定义和范围,进而根据我国的中小企业特点明确了我国的中小企业的内涵,界定了本文研究的边界。其次,在明确了研究目标后,本文从经济学角度阐述了中小企业存在的合理性和必然性,详尽的描述了研究中小企业融资问题的重要意义。最后,指出了与大企业相比,中小企业的特点和融资行为中的特殊性。介绍了我国的中小企业融资的现状,概括指出了中小企业融资的内核,并根据中小企业融资行为中的特殊因素,结合我国中小企业融资的现状,分析了中小企业信贷配给的产生。
第2章是总论的另外一个部分,主要阐述了商业银行体系建设和中小企业融资的相关研究综述。第一,对商业银行体系和中小企业融资的相关研究进行了系统的综述。包括资本缺口理论、信贷融资理论等理论综述和关于中小企业融资困难的原因、对策等现实研究综述,并对现有的研究成果进行了综述和评价,作为全文分析的基石。第二,研究中小企业的供求局部均衡问题,在微观市场均衡理论的指导下,从中小企业融资中资金供求双方出发,模型化市场参与者,系统研究的信贷配给问题的产生及其根源。第三,在文献综述和模型化分析的启示下,分析我国现行的商业银行体系与中小企业融资难题,在充分论证信贷配给条件下的银企关系后合理的推出我国的商业银行体系现存的问题——银行体系设计与中小企业融资特点不相容。进一步指明我国商业银行体系建设的关键点,指明了我国致力于解决中小企业融资问题的银行体系建设方向。
第3章是全文的理论基础——信息经济学相关理论。在前文的综述和评论的基础上,提出了本文的理论基础——信息不对称理论。从信息不对称下的委托代理理论出发,阐释了中小企业信贷配给的产生和健全的商业银行体系在化解中小企业融资难问题上的重要作用。第一,从信息经济学的视角出发,全面讨论了信息不对称理论的提出、典型行为及其在中小企业融资中的危害作用。第二,具体的说明了信启、不对称下的委托代理问题,是导致中小企业信贷配给的根源。在该问题上,我们详尽的阐述了委托代理问题中的逆选择机制,在逆选择理论的指导下研究了委托代理关系和中小企业融资行为的结合：逆选择的发生机制与不完美信息市场中的信贷配给。
总论部分过后,我们进入了分论的研究部分,主要包括以下几章的内容：
第4章构建了一个商业银行与中小企业的委托——代理模型,模型化的阐释了逆选择下的中小企业信贷配给发生机制。分别设计了完全信息和非完全信息下的两种不同合同和发生机制,研究银行和中小企业的委托代理问题。对比完全信息和不完全信息下的合同和结果,我们发现,商业银行体系的弊端导致了中小企业的信息不对称加剧,最终导致逆选择产生,中小企业被信贷配给。通过将商业银行体系中不同商业银行类别的委托人身份进行差异化,我们得出了不同的博弈结果,于是我们提出了针对中小企业融资的银行体系重建策略。
第5章是实证分析部分,在该部分中,我们设计了一个简单的产出模型,通过将宏观生产函数中不同的资金来源部分进行差别化引入,用数据说话,通过一系列计量经济学方法对中小企业的产出进行冲击和影响,最终,我们根据这些不同的资金来源对中小企业产出的影响差异,进一步验证了前文的重要观点：商业银行体系的重构是化解中小企业融资困境的重要出路。
最后,我们进入了专论部分的研究。
该部分的研究中,从第6章起,我们重点要考察的问题是怎样重新构建我国的商业银行体系,化解中小企业融资瓶颈。在这部分内容中,我们将商业银行体系的构成按委托人的差异化进行了细分,分别讨论国有控股商业银行、股份制商业银行、城市商业银行、农村合作金融机构和政策性金融机构等对中小企业融资的不同影响程度,进而根据这些结果,总结提出针对化解中小企业融资难题的我国商业银行体系建设的主要思路——建立以商业银行体系为主体,政策性银行为重要补充的新的银行体系。
此外,在专论部分的总结与概括部分中,我们还提到了化解中小企业融资难题的另外几个重要的因素及其改进措施,主要包括：中小企业自身的建设、政府的担保作用、银行监管部门的主要任务以及与融资相关的法律、法规和环境建设等等。
SMEs financing problem is not only a worldwide problem, but also a permanent issue. Statistical studies shows that whether in China or other countries all around the world, SMEs have become a driving force of economic growth, state tax revenue increasing, innovation promotion and urban employment stable in the major business groups. Whether it is in western developed countries, emerging industry countries and regions, or in our country, the awareness of the status and role of SMEs has undergone a process of insufficient attention to the importance. Our country is in the acssion of economic transformation, after20years of market-oriented economic reformation, economic structure has shifted from unified to diversity. The rapid growth of non-state economy-as the main body of SMEs, has became the solid foundation of the steady economic growth of our national economy.
With the transition from planned economy to market economy of our country, individual businesses, township enterprises, private businesses, foreign-invested enterprises and other SMEs become to have the legal existence and development, and gradually become an important force in creating jobs, technology innovation and supporting national economic growth.By the year of2006, SMEs registering By industrial and commercial administrative departments in China has more than42million. The value of final goods and services crated by SMEs are accounted for60%of GDP.They also paid53%of the country's industrial and commercial tax;SMEs provide more than75%of jobs in our chuntry.and it has become a major channel for creating jobs; As the main part of technology innovation and mechanism innovation in China, SMEs chieved75%invention patents of the whole country, completed more than65%of the country's patents innovation and80%of the new production development. Practice shows that SMEs and non-public economies are playing an increasingly important role in promoting economic development, promoting the prosperity of urban and rural markets, increasing fiscal revenue, increasing employment opportunities, Promoting technological innovation and optimizing the economic structure etc.
However, the development of SMEs and non-public economic still faces many problems. Among these, there are not only problems of development environment, for example:high threshold of entrepreneurship, market access and exit mechanism is not so perfect; financing is difficult, lagging social services etc, but also their own quality problems, such as:extensive growth pattern, irrational structure, low management level etc. In the present stage, the core problem restricting the development of SMEs is that the group of SMEs trapped in financing problem for a long time. There are distinct comparison between vigorous development of SMEs and its narrow financing channels.2010's data shows that, in China, the thirteen joint-stock banks outside of the four major state-owned commercial banks only provided private short-term loans141.811billion yuan, less than5%of their short-term bank loans, only2%of loan balance in total. Loan problems become the biggest obstacle to the survival and development of the SMEs. In particular, solve the problems of small business loans as the financial world issues of common concern in the current moment. In the process of economic system transformation, the deepening contradictions that the not match of financial structure and economic structure is accelerating. SMEs of occupy GDP63%and industrial added value accounted for74%, achieved only30%of credit assets. State-owned economy is still occupied70%of the credit assets. In the present time, there are "gaps" in SMEs of China in two ways:equity financing and debt financing. There is some market failure in configuration of financial resources. How to create an effective financial support system for SMEs? How to eliminate the financing difficulties of SMEs? All these problems are important issues for effectively promote the process of marketing at present.
SMEs in China, now still lack a sound financial system and adequate disclosure of information capacity, when they face the financing problem in the markets, SMEs and commercial banks and other financial institutions is bound to information asymmetry. When commercial banks and other financial institutions under the weighing the risk under asymmetric information, they naturally prefer to lock in the large enterprises that have a sound financial system and strong ability of information disclosure. Then, credit rationing had happened.In the financial markets, inevitable information asymmetry exists in the two transactions sides between SMEs and commercial banks and other financial institutions. Western economic theory tells us that:On the complete information market, optimum allocation of resources can be achieved. But under asymmetric information, market failure occurs. As banks as suppliers of funds, they do not have complete information about SMEs, when the bank select finance objection by a certain interest rate, this may induce adverse selection in financial markets. And after the SMEs get the loans, SMEs tend to choose higher risky investment projects under profits promotion and financing costs redemption. This will result in moral hazard.The existence of adverse selection and moral hazard made the bank credit face enormous risks. So, based on the perspective of risk control, banks will choose large corporates to finance on a relatively more complete information market, in the course of repeated games. SME will be credit rationned.
With Further researches, we will find a range of issues that worth study:Why, in overall pattern, the economic type with significant contribution to social and economic development is in disadvantaged position in the allocation of social and economic resources? Under conditions of market economy, will SMEs be long-term exist? Is "scale is middle an small" the only root that the SMEs in allocation of resources are in disadvantaged? Why big companies can get funding while SMEs will be credit rationed? What kind of characteristics has led to the phenomenon that SMEs are excluded from the balance of the credit markets? What kind of SMEs are the economic development and economic growth needs? During the game process between SMEs and banks, what's the differern from the large enterprises in information transmission mechanism? What's the relationship between commercial banks and small and medium enterprises in this special information conduction? How to optimize the commercial banking system that affct the transmission of the information? Etc.
With research and exploration of these questions, we started writing the full text. The results showed that strengthening the construction of commercial banking system can regulate the market order, optimize information transfer from a new perspective and targeted master the full information from different individuals within the system. At present, commercial banking system of China lack of departments and agencies that master SMEs' information. Therefore, it is necessary to discuss the problem of SMEs' financing from the perspective of the reconstruction of the commercial banking system.
We expand the discussion according to the logical thinking of the article analysis. The paper is divided into three parts, that is:"General discussion-Expounding---Special discussion"
In the part of General discussion, we show the general outline of the major problem this article will be researched. This section includes three chapters:
As the cornerstone of text analysis, the first chapter detailed described the main need for the existence of SMEs and the characteristics of its financing. At first, we propose the definition and range of SMEs all around the world. Then according to the characteristics of SMEs in China, we defined clearly the meaning of SMEs in China and the boundaries of our study. Second, after knowing the clear goal of this study, we elaborate the rationality and necessity of the existence of SMEs from the economic perspective. It also gave a detailed description of the importance of financing for SMEs. Finally, this paper pointed out the characteristics and special financing acts of SMEs, compared with large enterprises. This article describes the status of the financing of SMEs in China, summary points out the core of SME financing,and according the SME financing behavior under its special factors, with the status of SME financing, analysised the generation of credit rationing for SMEs.
Chapter2is another part of General discussion.It mainly talk about the construction of the commercial banking system and reviewed and evaluated the existing research results about SME financing problem. First of all, in this part we showed a systematic review about the related research on commercial banking system and SME finance, including theoretical summary, such as Capital gap theory, Theory of credit facilities and summary of reality researches, for example: causes of financing difficulties for SMEs, the strategy for solving the problem etc. It conducted comments of existing research as the cornerstone of text analysis. Secondly, we study the problem of partial equilibrium of SMEs supply and demand. Under the guidance of Microscopic market Equilibrium Theory, starting from the two parts of funds supply and demand in SME financing, we model the market participants, system produces the produce of credit rationing problem and its root causes. Thirdly, inspired by the literature review and model analysis, we analyzed our existing commercial banking system and the financing problems of SMEs. After fully demonstrated the bank-enterprise relations under the conditions of credit rationing, we introduced reasonably the existing problems of our commercial banking system——The designing of the banking system is incompatible with the characteristics of SME financing. This paper further pointed out the key point of the construction of our commercial banking system, and indicated the reconstrction direction of our commercial banking system addressing the problem of SME financing.
Chapter3is the theoretical basis of our paper——Information Economics. On the basis of review and comment on the previous text, we propose a theoretical basis for this article——Asymmetric information theory. Starting from the Principal-agent theory under asymmetric information theory, this article illustrated the generation of credit rationing for SMEs and the important role of a sound commercial banking system in resolving the problem of financing SMEs. Firstly, from the perspective of information economics, this part talked about propose and typical behavior of Asymmetric information theory, and its harmful effects in the role of SME financing. Secondly, it instructs specifically the Principal-agent theory under asymmetric information theory is the leading source of credit rationing for SMEs. In this issue, we detailed exposition of adverse selection mechanism in the principal-agent problem. Under the guidance of adverse selection theory, we studied the the combination of the principal-agent relationship and SME financing action:The occurrence of adverse selection mechanism and credit rationing in imperfect information market.
After the General discussion part, we came to discuss the Expounding part. It includes the following chapters:
In Chapter4, we build a principal-agent model with commercial bank and the SMEs. It illustrates by a model that the mechanism of credit rationing for SMEs under adverse selection mechanism. Paper were designed respectively two different mechanisms of the contract——under complete information and incomplete information, in order to discuss principal-agent problem between commercial bank and the SMEs. By comparing the different results between the contrsts under complete information and under incomplete information, we found that it is the shortcomings of the commercial banking system has led to increased information asymmetry in SMEs, this eventually lead to adverse selection arising, SMEs are credit rationing. By differentiating the identity of the principal of the different types of commercial banks in our commercial banking system, we have come to different game results. So we propose a redevelopment strategy that the banking system for SMEs financing problem.
Chapter5is the empirical analysis part. In this section, we designed a simple output model, through the way that differentiated introduct the different sources of funding part into Macro-production function, to speak with the data, through a series of econometric methods, simulate the output of small and medium enterprises. Finally, based on these different sources of differences in output to SMEs, we further validate the importance of earlier views:Reconstruction of the commercial banking system is an important way to resolve the problem of SMEs financing.
Finally, we entered the study of Special discussion part.
In this part of the study, starting from Chapter6, the most important problem we focus on is that:How to rebuild the commercial banking system in China so that we can resolve the bottleneck of SME financing? In this part of the content, we distinguished the different composition of the commercial banking system by client differentiation.Discuss respectively the different effects on the extent of SME financing among state-controlled commercial banks, joint-stock commercial banks, city commercial banks, rural commercial banks and policy financial institutions. Then based on these results, we summarize and put forward the main ideas of resolving the financing problems of SMEs——Create a new commercial banking systemin which contains commercial banking system for SMEs as the mainbody and policy banks as an important complement.
In addition, in the conclusion and summary section of our Special discussion part, we also mentioned several other important factors and improvement measures for resolve the financing problems of SMEs. They include the construction of SMEs itself, the role of government guarantees, the main task of banking supervision department and finance-related laws, regulations, and environmental construction etc.
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