短生命周期产品供应链协调激励机制研究
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摘要
根据短生命周期产品供应链协调的特殊性问题,针对系统中的信息不对称和成员间的目标不一致,论文从提高系统全局需求预测水平、建立激励约束机制、改变供应链成员行为三个角度,研究了短生命周期产品供应链协调的激励机制设计问题。
本文基于支持向量机和模式匹配方法建立了组合需求预测模型,进行产品需求预测,为后续研究提供共享需求信息,减弱或消除牛鞭效应现象。采用契约激励方法进行激励协调,目标是实现供应链系统整体收益最大,减弱或消除逆向选择、道德风险和双重边际问题。契约激励方法由静态激励和动态激励组成。在静态激励中,建立了数量折扣契约和收益共享契约的组合应用方法,目的是实现信息不对称条件下单周期供应链系统总体收益最大;在静态激励基础上,建立了信息不对称条件下融入马尔可夫决策过程的动态委托-代理模型,目的是实现短生命周期产品供应链系统有限时段多周期总体收益最大。最后,在契约激励方法基础上,应用学习型组织理论建立了组织激励机制,构建学习型供应链,旨在改变供应链成员的行为,解决供应链系统的学习力问题,进一步解决契约激励方法不能实现的资源配置帕累托最优问题,甚至以整体社会效益最优为目标。
Supply chain management (SCM) is a business management theory gradually developed with ever-changing technology, intensified market competition and globalized economy. Supply chain management is a bran-new management philosophy and is widely valued by international management academe and business circles already. Supply chain is the typical, dynamic and needing to coordinate system, and supply chain coordination is the core question of the supply chain management. Two typical coordination problems, i.e. bullwhip effect and double marginalization, are caused by asymmetric information and the own aim of each member in the supply chain system.
Nowadays, the character of short-life-cycle is already the remarkable characteristic of the product in the society. Therefore, the study on the incentive mechanism of the short-life-cycle product supply chain coordination possesses important academic significance and practical value. Firstly, the thesis adopts the combination forecast model of support vector machine and pattern matching to provide the shared forecast information for the system and weaken or eliminate the bullwhip effect phenomenon. Then the thesis applies incentive theory to design the mechanisms of static incentive and dynamic incentive of the short-life-cycle product to obtain the overall and maximum profit of the system. Lastly, the thesis exerts the learning organization theory to conduct organization incentive and construct the learning supply chain, so that we change the behavior of the member of the system. The thesis systematically solves the coordination problem of the short-life-cycle supply chain in the decentralized condition, i.e., asymmetric information of the system and the individual rationality of the member.
The two coordination obstacle of the system, i.e. bullwhip effect and double marginalization, and their intrinsic reasons are deeply analyzed in the thesis. The thesis expatiates the character of the short-life-cycle product and its supply chain, analyzes the characteristic problem and the policy of the of the supply chain coordination. The pointcut of the study are built from the above-mentioned two aspects in the thesis.
The coordination policy based on the combination demand forecast of the global system is studied in the thesis. The demand information forecast is to afford the sufficient information for the supply chain system and to enhance the information precision of the system. The information sharing can make the member of the supply chain observe more private information, thereby effectively alleviating the phenomenon of bullwhip effect induced by asymmetric information. Adopting different demand forecast methods and lacking the rational information sharing are the main reasons of forming the bullwhip effect of the supply chain system when each echelon member of the supply chain makes predictions.
In response to the characteristic of the short-life-cycle product, the thesis adopts the combination forecast method of support vector machine and pattern matching to make the demand forecast and overcomes the existing deficiency of the previous demand forecast method. The support vector machine as a machine learning method improves the prediction precision. The pattern matching method solves the problem of the absence of the historical data or no data at all. The combination forecast method gain superior forecast precision. Cooperation and competition coexist in the members of the supply chain. Coordinated forecast of the members of the supply chain make them form the strategic fellowship, i.e., they adopt the same forecast method to reduce the prediction error of demand forecast born by independent work.
Except enhancing forecast precision, execution policy is studied in the thesis. To solve the influence of the asymmetric information on the supply chain coordination, the more important work is to build the information platform, except for improving the technology of the information forecast. With the information platform, we can share the demand forecast result, offer the demand information for the decision of the member of each echelon, and institute the policy to make the system obtain the overall and maximum profit according to the result of the demand forecast. When decision based on the sharing of partial or all information, the pace of each echelon of the supply chain will be consistent and the correlation of them will be coordinated. The theoretic study and practical result both indicate that conducting information sharing and avoiding multi-echolon demand forecast will weaken the bullwhip effect greatly. In addition to the information platform, enhancing the information sharing and carrying out the synergy forecast must be based on incentive mechanism, design rational incentive contract and construct perfect incentive and constraint mechamism. Therefore, weakening or eliminating the effect of the information asymmetry on the coordination of the supply chain and building trusty information sharing between members of the supply chain.
The coordination policy based on contract incentive is studied in the thesis. The contract incentive solves the problem of the overall and maximum profit of the supply chain system. The contract incentive is the main method of the supply chain coordination. The asymmetric information in the system and own aim between the members of the supply chain are the two basic factors causing the incentive problems. Appropriate contract design can improve the problem of adverse selection and moral hazard induced by asymmetric information and the problem of double marginalization induced by individual rationality. The contract incentive studied by the thesis contains static incentive and dynamic incentive.
Static incentive, i.e. the single period incentive, centers on content incentive and solves the problem of behavior solicitation. The goal of the static incentive is to realize the overall and maximum profit of the supply chain system in the single period and the asymmetric information. The method of the static incentive is the combination application of quantity discount contract model and revenue sharing contract model. Quantity discount contract motivates the retailer to increase the order quantity and realize the overall and maximum profit of the supply chain system, and the contract induces the double marginalization the same time. And revenue sharing contract can realize another assignment of the increased profit of the system, make each member’s profit increase and eliminate the double marginalization. On the mechanism design of the static incentive, the combination application of the quantity discount contract model and revenue sharing contract model can lead the members of the supply chain to adopt the policy of the overall and maximum profit and realize the overall and maximum profit in the single period and asymmetric information. And the method can realize the bear of the risk and the sharing of the revenue between members of the supply chain. The method conquers the asymmetric information in the supply chain system and the individual rationality of the members of the supply chain by the mechanism design and weakens or eliminates restrains adverse selection, moral hazard and double marginalization.
To deeply mine the profit potential of the supply chain system and solve the special problem of the supply chain coordination for the short-life-cycle products more, the dynamic incentive model of the short-life-cycle product is built in the condition of the asymmetric information based on the markov decision process and the multi-period overall and maximum profit of finite-interval supply chain system is realized. By the analysis of the numerical value, the optimal policy of the incentive coordination of the supply chain is obtained. On the base of the static incentive, i.e. the content incentive, the dynamic incentive coordination, i.e. the process incentive problem is solved. In the thesis, the final state of multi-period incentive coordination of the supply chain system, i.e. the repeated game of the members of the supply chain, is presented theoretically. The system coordination obtains the result of the Pareto Optimality and the supply chain system is in equilibrium in the end. Thereby, the organic combination of static incentive and dynamic incentive of the supply chain system is realized. Because dynamic incentive can make members of the supply chain consider the current benefit and the long benefit, we can realize the overall and maximum profit of finite-interval supply chain system, and obtain the optimal policy of the incentive coordination of the supply chain. The repeated game of the members of the supply chain makes the system coordination obtain the Pareto Optimality result, realizes the overall and maximum profit of the multi-period incentive coordination of the supply chain system. And the supply chain system is in equilibrium in the end. By the organic combination of static incentive and dynamic incentive, the intrinsic profit potential of the supply chain system is deeply mined and the perfect state of the system coordination is approached or attained.
The coordination policy based on organization incentive is studied in the thesis. Organization incentive solves the learning capacity of the supply chain system in the end. The contract incentive only cannot solve all problems of the coordination of the supply chain and the contract incentive adopted in the coordination of the supply chain cannot realize the Pareto Optimum of the resource configuration. The supply chain is a complicated system participated by persons. To further solve the coordination problem of the supply chain, we should try to change the person’s behavior to solve the coordination problem of the supply chain further. Contract incentive is the execution basis of organization incentive and organization incentive enhances the coordination effect of contract incentive further. The supply chain based on incentive studies the coordination problem from the institution point of view, while the supply chain based on learning organization theory studies the coordination problem from the organization point of view. The combination application of contract incentive and organization incentive can effectively improve the core competence of the supply chain system.
Constructing the learning supply chain on the basis of the five disciplines affords a new management measure for studying supply chain coordination. By constructing learning supply chain, organization incentive is executed in the supply chain system and the behavior of members of the supply chain is changed. In the learning supply chain, members of the supply chain reinforce the information sharing initiatively, build trust in members of the supply chain and endeavor to the holistic goal. The profit of members increases with the increase of the system profit. By constructing learning supply chain, the strategic fellowship and trust relationship built in members of the supply chain even help to the realization of the coordination. Learning organization is built in the supply chain system and the coordination problem is solved by organization learning. The organization incentive policy can solve the Pareto Optimality problem of the resource scheme that cannot be realized by contract incentive. The learning supply chain constructed on the basis of contract incentive can realize the Pareto Optimality of resource scheme further, and the optimality of the holistic benefit of the society.
The major innovations are:
(1) On the basis of deeply analyzing the characteristic problem of the supply chain coordination of the short-life-cycle product, by adopting combination forecast method and building the mechanism of the contract incentive and organization incentive, the thesis systematically solves the coordination problems of the short-life-cycle product supply chain in the asymmetric information. The method makes each member’s profit increase with the profit of the supply chain system, even aiming at the optimality of the holistic benefit of the society.
(2) In response to the forecast characteristic of the short-life-cycle product, the thesis adopts the combination forecast method of support vector machine and pattern matching to make synergy prediction of the global supply chain demand information. Support vector machine as a machine learning method enhances the forecast precision; and the method of pattern matching conquers the problem of no history data or shortage. The combination forecast method based on the execution policy of the information platform and incentive mechanism design enhances the level of the information sharing of the short-life-cycle product supply chain.
(3) By combining markov decision process with principal-agent model, the dynamic model of the short-life-cycle product supply chain coordination is built. By computing the model gets the Pareto Optimality policy of the multi-period incentive coordination of the supply chain system. Adopting markov decision process avoids the equilibrium solution problem of repeated game. The multi-period incentive coordination of the supply chain system, i.e. the final result of the repeated game of the supply chain members is presented theoretically. The supply chain system is in equilibrium in the end. Thereby, the organic combination of static incentive and dynamic incentive of the supply chain system is realized in the thesis.
(4) By applying learning organization theory, organization incentive is conducted in the supply chain system and the learning supply chain is built. Organization learning can change the behavior of members of the supply chain, solve the coordination obstacle existing in the supply chain system, and realize the overall and maximum profit of the supply chain system, even the overall and most social profit.
本文基于支持向量机和模式匹配方法建立了组合需求预测模型,进行产品需求预测,为后续研究提供共享需求信息,减弱或消除牛鞭效应现象。采用契约激励方法进行激励协调,目标是实现供应链系统整体收益最大,减弱或消除逆向选择、道德风险和双重边际问题。契约激励方法由静态激励和动态激励组成。在静态激励中,建立了数量折扣契约和收益共享契约的组合应用方法,目的是实现信息不对称条件下单周期供应链系统总体收益最大;在静态激励基础上,建立了信息不对称条件下融入马尔可夫决策过程的动态委托-代理模型,目的是实现短生命周期产品供应链系统有限时段多周期总体收益最大。最后,在契约激励方法基础上,应用学习型组织理论建立了组织激励机制,构建学习型供应链,旨在改变供应链成员的行为,解决供应链系统的学习力问题,进一步解决契约激励方法不能实现的资源配置帕累托最优问题,甚至以整体社会效益最优为目标。
Supply chain management (SCM) is a business management theory gradually developed with ever-changing technology, intensified market competition and globalized economy. Supply chain management is a bran-new management philosophy and is widely valued by international management academe and business circles already. Supply chain is the typical, dynamic and needing to coordinate system, and supply chain coordination is the core question of the supply chain management. Two typical coordination problems, i.e. bullwhip effect and double marginalization, are caused by asymmetric information and the own aim of each member in the supply chain system.
Nowadays, the character of short-life-cycle is already the remarkable characteristic of the product in the society. Therefore, the study on the incentive mechanism of the short-life-cycle product supply chain coordination possesses important academic significance and practical value. Firstly, the thesis adopts the combination forecast model of support vector machine and pattern matching to provide the shared forecast information for the system and weaken or eliminate the bullwhip effect phenomenon. Then the thesis applies incentive theory to design the mechanisms of static incentive and dynamic incentive of the short-life-cycle product to obtain the overall and maximum profit of the system. Lastly, the thesis exerts the learning organization theory to conduct organization incentive and construct the learning supply chain, so that we change the behavior of the member of the system. The thesis systematically solves the coordination problem of the short-life-cycle supply chain in the decentralized condition, i.e., asymmetric information of the system and the individual rationality of the member.
The two coordination obstacle of the system, i.e. bullwhip effect and double marginalization, and their intrinsic reasons are deeply analyzed in the thesis. The thesis expatiates the character of the short-life-cycle product and its supply chain, analyzes the characteristic problem and the policy of the of the supply chain coordination. The pointcut of the study are built from the above-mentioned two aspects in the thesis.
The coordination policy based on the combination demand forecast of the global system is studied in the thesis. The demand information forecast is to afford the sufficient information for the supply chain system and to enhance the information precision of the system. The information sharing can make the member of the supply chain observe more private information, thereby effectively alleviating the phenomenon of bullwhip effect induced by asymmetric information. Adopting different demand forecast methods and lacking the rational information sharing are the main reasons of forming the bullwhip effect of the supply chain system when each echelon member of the supply chain makes predictions.
In response to the characteristic of the short-life-cycle product, the thesis adopts the combination forecast method of support vector machine and pattern matching to make the demand forecast and overcomes the existing deficiency of the previous demand forecast method. The support vector machine as a machine learning method improves the prediction precision. The pattern matching method solves the problem of the absence of the historical data or no data at all. The combination forecast method gain superior forecast precision. Cooperation and competition coexist in the members of the supply chain. Coordinated forecast of the members of the supply chain make them form the strategic fellowship, i.e., they adopt the same forecast method to reduce the prediction error of demand forecast born by independent work.
Except enhancing forecast precision, execution policy is studied in the thesis. To solve the influence of the asymmetric information on the supply chain coordination, the more important work is to build the information platform, except for improving the technology of the information forecast. With the information platform, we can share the demand forecast result, offer the demand information for the decision of the member of each echelon, and institute the policy to make the system obtain the overall and maximum profit according to the result of the demand forecast. When decision based on the sharing of partial or all information, the pace of each echelon of the supply chain will be consistent and the correlation of them will be coordinated. The theoretic study and practical result both indicate that conducting information sharing and avoiding multi-echolon demand forecast will weaken the bullwhip effect greatly. In addition to the information platform, enhancing the information sharing and carrying out the synergy forecast must be based on incentive mechanism, design rational incentive contract and construct perfect incentive and constraint mechamism. Therefore, weakening or eliminating the effect of the information asymmetry on the coordination of the supply chain and building trusty information sharing between members of the supply chain.
The coordination policy based on contract incentive is studied in the thesis. The contract incentive solves the problem of the overall and maximum profit of the supply chain system. The contract incentive is the main method of the supply chain coordination. The asymmetric information in the system and own aim between the members of the supply chain are the two basic factors causing the incentive problems. Appropriate contract design can improve the problem of adverse selection and moral hazard induced by asymmetric information and the problem of double marginalization induced by individual rationality. The contract incentive studied by the thesis contains static incentive and dynamic incentive.
Static incentive, i.e. the single period incentive, centers on content incentive and solves the problem of behavior solicitation. The goal of the static incentive is to realize the overall and maximum profit of the supply chain system in the single period and the asymmetric information. The method of the static incentive is the combination application of quantity discount contract model and revenue sharing contract model. Quantity discount contract motivates the retailer to increase the order quantity and realize the overall and maximum profit of the supply chain system, and the contract induces the double marginalization the same time. And revenue sharing contract can realize another assignment of the increased profit of the system, make each member’s profit increase and eliminate the double marginalization. On the mechanism design of the static incentive, the combination application of the quantity discount contract model and revenue sharing contract model can lead the members of the supply chain to adopt the policy of the overall and maximum profit and realize the overall and maximum profit in the single period and asymmetric information. And the method can realize the bear of the risk and the sharing of the revenue between members of the supply chain. The method conquers the asymmetric information in the supply chain system and the individual rationality of the members of the supply chain by the mechanism design and weakens or eliminates restrains adverse selection, moral hazard and double marginalization.
To deeply mine the profit potential of the supply chain system and solve the special problem of the supply chain coordination for the short-life-cycle products more, the dynamic incentive model of the short-life-cycle product is built in the condition of the asymmetric information based on the markov decision process and the multi-period overall and maximum profit of finite-interval supply chain system is realized. By the analysis of the numerical value, the optimal policy of the incentive coordination of the supply chain is obtained. On the base of the static incentive, i.e. the content incentive, the dynamic incentive coordination, i.e. the process incentive problem is solved. In the thesis, the final state of multi-period incentive coordination of the supply chain system, i.e. the repeated game of the members of the supply chain, is presented theoretically. The system coordination obtains the result of the Pareto Optimality and the supply chain system is in equilibrium in the end. Thereby, the organic combination of static incentive and dynamic incentive of the supply chain system is realized. Because dynamic incentive can make members of the supply chain consider the current benefit and the long benefit, we can realize the overall and maximum profit of finite-interval supply chain system, and obtain the optimal policy of the incentive coordination of the supply chain. The repeated game of the members of the supply chain makes the system coordination obtain the Pareto Optimality result, realizes the overall and maximum profit of the multi-period incentive coordination of the supply chain system. And the supply chain system is in equilibrium in the end. By the organic combination of static incentive and dynamic incentive, the intrinsic profit potential of the supply chain system is deeply mined and the perfect state of the system coordination is approached or attained.
The coordination policy based on organization incentive is studied in the thesis. Organization incentive solves the learning capacity of the supply chain system in the end. The contract incentive only cannot solve all problems of the coordination of the supply chain and the contract incentive adopted in the coordination of the supply chain cannot realize the Pareto Optimum of the resource configuration. The supply chain is a complicated system participated by persons. To further solve the coordination problem of the supply chain, we should try to change the person’s behavior to solve the coordination problem of the supply chain further. Contract incentive is the execution basis of organization incentive and organization incentive enhances the coordination effect of contract incentive further. The supply chain based on incentive studies the coordination problem from the institution point of view, while the supply chain based on learning organization theory studies the coordination problem from the organization point of view. The combination application of contract incentive and organization incentive can effectively improve the core competence of the supply chain system.
Constructing the learning supply chain on the basis of the five disciplines affords a new management measure for studying supply chain coordination. By constructing learning supply chain, organization incentive is executed in the supply chain system and the behavior of members of the supply chain is changed. In the learning supply chain, members of the supply chain reinforce the information sharing initiatively, build trust in members of the supply chain and endeavor to the holistic goal. The profit of members increases with the increase of the system profit. By constructing learning supply chain, the strategic fellowship and trust relationship built in members of the supply chain even help to the realization of the coordination. Learning organization is built in the supply chain system and the coordination problem is solved by organization learning. The organization incentive policy can solve the Pareto Optimality problem of the resource scheme that cannot be realized by contract incentive. The learning supply chain constructed on the basis of contract incentive can realize the Pareto Optimality of resource scheme further, and the optimality of the holistic benefit of the society.
The major innovations are:
(1) On the basis of deeply analyzing the characteristic problem of the supply chain coordination of the short-life-cycle product, by adopting combination forecast method and building the mechanism of the contract incentive and organization incentive, the thesis systematically solves the coordination problems of the short-life-cycle product supply chain in the asymmetric information. The method makes each member’s profit increase with the profit of the supply chain system, even aiming at the optimality of the holistic benefit of the society.
(2) In response to the forecast characteristic of the short-life-cycle product, the thesis adopts the combination forecast method of support vector machine and pattern matching to make synergy prediction of the global supply chain demand information. Support vector machine as a machine learning method enhances the forecast precision; and the method of pattern matching conquers the problem of no history data or shortage. The combination forecast method based on the execution policy of the information platform and incentive mechanism design enhances the level of the information sharing of the short-life-cycle product supply chain.
(3) By combining markov decision process with principal-agent model, the dynamic model of the short-life-cycle product supply chain coordination is built. By computing the model gets the Pareto Optimality policy of the multi-period incentive coordination of the supply chain system. Adopting markov decision process avoids the equilibrium solution problem of repeated game. The multi-period incentive coordination of the supply chain system, i.e. the final result of the repeated game of the supply chain members is presented theoretically. The supply chain system is in equilibrium in the end. Thereby, the organic combination of static incentive and dynamic incentive of the supply chain system is realized in the thesis.
(4) By applying learning organization theory, organization incentive is conducted in the supply chain system and the learning supply chain is built. Organization learning can change the behavior of members of the supply chain, solve the coordination obstacle existing in the supply chain system, and realize the overall and maximum profit of the supply chain system, even the overall and most social profit.
引文
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