商业银行治理、业务创新与绩效评价体系研究
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摘要
金融自由化、经济全球化以及对外资银行的全面开放，给我国商业银行的持续发展既带来了巨大的竞争压力，也提供了良好发展机遇。因此，商业银行纷纷采取了各种应对措施，其目的在于提高我国商业银行的核心竞争能力，并追求更大的经营绩效。由于业务创新对商业银行长期经营绩效起到了核心推动作用，所以在商业银行公司治理与经营绩效关系的研究中，只有引入企业创新理论的基本思想，才能找到最佳的银行治理模式。商业银行的经营绩效取决于商业银行如何配置其所能够掌控的各种资源，而商业银行治理（Commercial banks’governance）所要解决的主要问题是银行法人资源配置和利润分配的相关制度。因此，本文将其研究重点确定为:（1）我国商业银行选择何种形式的治理模式，才能最好地配置银行资源；（2）怎样建立合理的商业银行经营绩效评价体系，才能促进和激励我国商业银行经营者进行创新型的资源配置。
本文从公司治理的视角出发，融合企业创新理论、绩效评价理论等，以计量经济学的回归模型、模糊综合分析法（AHP）、平衡记分卡（BSC）为研究工具，系统地探讨商业银行公司治理与创新型资源配置之间的关系、商业银行公司治理与银行经营绩效的关系、以及商业银行绩效评价方法改进等问题。具体来讲，本文的主要研究工作可以概括如下：
首先，在公司治理的理论中，关于商业银行治理的主要是股东至上理论和利益相关者理论，作为挑战者的利益相关者理论更多的是强调其相互间的利益平衡。本文的研究认为，它们两者的共同之处在于长期的“剩余收益”是由多种生产要素的投入产生的，但这两种理论都忽略了“剩余收益”（residual return）是如何通过资源的开发利用产生的。本文的研究进一步指出，创新型的资源配置是产生剩余收益的最好选择，这是因为创新是一个不断积累的、团队开发的不确定过程，其本质上是资源的重新配置和利用的过程。就商业银行而言，业务创新就是银行能够为其客户提供在风险一定的情况下回报率更高的金融产品。因此，创新型的资源配置具有下面的特征：①战略性。商业银行从长期的经营绩效出发，打破现有技术和市场的条件，更合理地配置资源。②开发性。业务创新过程的未来回报具有不确定性，但需要大量人力、物力和财力的投入。③组织性。业务创新过程同时也是团队学习的过程，在商业银行内部不仅需要成员分工明确，更需要能够将各自的经验整合在一起。
接下来，本文继续分析了能够催生出创新型资源配置的商业银行治理机制所必须满足的三个条件:第一,组织整合(organization intergration)——按照组织性的原则将资源提供的“足够的激励”和“相关的知识”整合到技术开发和利用的组织中；第二,财务支持(financial commitment)——按照开发性的原则为不确定的创新过程提供了义无反顾的“资金”支持；第三,企业家精神——建立银行家信托责任，使银行家重视商业银行的长期经营绩效，按照战略性原则，将公司的战略控制权置于具有业务创新能力的管理者手中。
然后，本文运用近年来商业银行的年报数据对商业银行的公司治理与业务创新的关系进行实证检验。得出降低第一大股东持股比例、适度分散股权、提高独立董事比例以及建立完善的激励机制是提高银行创新能力重要手段。同时，本文以招商银行为案例分析，论证了股权结构、组织整合、财务支持以及银行家精神在业务创新中的重要性。
在商业银行经营绩效评价的研究中，本文的研究认为，科学的经营绩效评价将有利于商业银行经营者与所有者的不同利益具有一致性，从而促进商业银行的长期发展。本文对现有的几种公司治理的评价方法进行比较，认为对公司治理的评价已经形成了系统化，因此建立了对公司治理体现业务创新的部分进行绩效评价体系，从组织整合、财务支持以及银行家精神三个方面共计12个指标来进行评价，并运用AHP方法对具体银行进行了实证分析。
最后，通过总结上述的研究结果，指出了本文存在的不足之处及需要进一步研究的问题或方向。
With the development of financial liberalization, economic globalization and overallopen policy to foreign capital bank, the state-owned banks confront with greatcompetitive pressure and take measures to improve core competitive power and chasehigher economic performance. Innovation drives the long term economic performance ofcommercial banks, therefore in the relationship studying of commercial bank corporategovernance and economic performance, through the innovation economics analysis thebest method of corporate governance can be found. Commercial bank economicperformance depends on how commercial banks distribute the resources they control,while corporate governance focuses on corporate resource allocation and profitdistribution. This thesis defines commercial bank corporate governance as: in thecommercial bank operation, who can make great investment decision, what kind ofdecision and how to distribute the investment revenues. This thesis focuses on two points,the first is what kind of commercial bank corporate governance can optimize resourceallocation, and the second is how commercial bank resource allocation effects on itseconomic performance.
This thesis starts from corporate governance, uses the corporate theory, innovationeconomics theory, performance evaluation theory as basic foundation, and econometricsregression mode, data encircle analysis, balance score card and game model as studyingtools, systematically discusses the relationship between commercial bank corporategovernance and innovative resource allocation, commercial bank corporate governanceand its economic performance, and commercial bank performance evaluationimprovement etc. Concretely, this thesis studied the following problems:
First of all, the main corporate governance theory is stockholder theory andstakeholder theory, but stakeholder theory as a slogan rather than a real challenger. Boththeories agree that long term residual return is produced by diverse production factors.But they disagree on how the residual return should be distributed and what differentdistributions could impact corporate performance.
This thesis figures out that both theories neglect how residual return is produced byresource exploitation, and further, innovative resource allocation is the best choice to gainresidual return. Innovation is an uncertain process of constant accumulation and teamdevelopment, and in essence it is resource reallocation and reuse. To commercial banks innovation means banks can provide financial products with maximum return and under afixed risk. Therefore innovative resource allocation has three characters:①Strategic,commercial bank breaks present technology and market condition, and perform morereasonably in resource allocation on the benefit of long term economic performance.②Developing, innovation process has an uncertain return but needs large amount of humanresource, materials and financial resource input.③Organizing, innovation process isalso a team learning work, so it needs the commercial bank to clearly divine team workand to integrate individual experiences.
In the following, this thesis continues to analyze the three qualifications that canpromote innovative resource allocation of commercial bank governance system: Firstly,organization integration–To integrate “sufficient inspiration” and “knowledge” fromresource into technology development and utilization according to organization rules；Secondly, financial commitment–To provide plenty “financial” support to this uncertaininnovation process according to development rules. Thirdly, insider control--To bringcorporate strategic control to those insiders who are competent and willing to allocateresources on innovative investment according to strategic rules.
In the performance evaluation of commercial banks, this research considers thatscientific management performance evaluation will be conducive to the different interestsof managers and owners of commercial banks with consistency, so as to promote thelong-term development of the commercial banks. The evaluation of corporate governancehas been the formation of a more systematic system, so the establishment of corporategovernance reflects the part of business innovation and performance evaluation system,organizational integration, financial three aspects of support and bankers, the spirit of atotal of12indicators to evaluate and movement AHP method conduct an empiricalanalysis of specific banks.
Finally, on the base of summing up the whole thesis the studying defects and furtherquestions and fields to be researched have been pointed out.
本文从公司治理的视角出发，融合企业创新理论、绩效评价理论等，以计量经济学的回归模型、模糊综合分析法（AHP）、平衡记分卡（BSC）为研究工具，系统地探讨商业银行公司治理与创新型资源配置之间的关系、商业银行公司治理与银行经营绩效的关系、以及商业银行绩效评价方法改进等问题。具体来讲，本文的主要研究工作可以概括如下：
首先，在公司治理的理论中，关于商业银行治理的主要是股东至上理论和利益相关者理论，作为挑战者的利益相关者理论更多的是强调其相互间的利益平衡。本文的研究认为，它们两者的共同之处在于长期的“剩余收益”是由多种生产要素的投入产生的，但这两种理论都忽略了“剩余收益”（residual return）是如何通过资源的开发利用产生的。本文的研究进一步指出，创新型的资源配置是产生剩余收益的最好选择，这是因为创新是一个不断积累的、团队开发的不确定过程，其本质上是资源的重新配置和利用的过程。就商业银行而言，业务创新就是银行能够为其客户提供在风险一定的情况下回报率更高的金融产品。因此，创新型的资源配置具有下面的特征：①战略性。商业银行从长期的经营绩效出发，打破现有技术和市场的条件，更合理地配置资源。②开发性。业务创新过程的未来回报具有不确定性，但需要大量人力、物力和财力的投入。③组织性。业务创新过程同时也是团队学习的过程，在商业银行内部不仅需要成员分工明确，更需要能够将各自的经验整合在一起。
接下来，本文继续分析了能够催生出创新型资源配置的商业银行治理机制所必须满足的三个条件:第一,组织整合(organization intergration)——按照组织性的原则将资源提供的“足够的激励”和“相关的知识”整合到技术开发和利用的组织中；第二,财务支持(financial commitment)——按照开发性的原则为不确定的创新过程提供了义无反顾的“资金”支持；第三,企业家精神——建立银行家信托责任，使银行家重视商业银行的长期经营绩效，按照战略性原则，将公司的战略控制权置于具有业务创新能力的管理者手中。
然后，本文运用近年来商业银行的年报数据对商业银行的公司治理与业务创新的关系进行实证检验。得出降低第一大股东持股比例、适度分散股权、提高独立董事比例以及建立完善的激励机制是提高银行创新能力重要手段。同时，本文以招商银行为案例分析，论证了股权结构、组织整合、财务支持以及银行家精神在业务创新中的重要性。
在商业银行经营绩效评价的研究中，本文的研究认为，科学的经营绩效评价将有利于商业银行经营者与所有者的不同利益具有一致性，从而促进商业银行的长期发展。本文对现有的几种公司治理的评价方法进行比较，认为对公司治理的评价已经形成了系统化，因此建立了对公司治理体现业务创新的部分进行绩效评价体系，从组织整合、财务支持以及银行家精神三个方面共计12个指标来进行评价，并运用AHP方法对具体银行进行了实证分析。
最后，通过总结上述的研究结果，指出了本文存在的不足之处及需要进一步研究的问题或方向。
With the development of financial liberalization, economic globalization and overallopen policy to foreign capital bank, the state-owned banks confront with greatcompetitive pressure and take measures to improve core competitive power and chasehigher economic performance. Innovation drives the long term economic performance ofcommercial banks, therefore in the relationship studying of commercial bank corporategovernance and economic performance, through the innovation economics analysis thebest method of corporate governance can be found. Commercial bank economicperformance depends on how commercial banks distribute the resources they control,while corporate governance focuses on corporate resource allocation and profitdistribution. This thesis defines commercial bank corporate governance as: in thecommercial bank operation, who can make great investment decision, what kind ofdecision and how to distribute the investment revenues. This thesis focuses on two points,the first is what kind of commercial bank corporate governance can optimize resourceallocation, and the second is how commercial bank resource allocation effects on itseconomic performance.
This thesis starts from corporate governance, uses the corporate theory, innovationeconomics theory, performance evaluation theory as basic foundation, and econometricsregression mode, data encircle analysis, balance score card and game model as studyingtools, systematically discusses the relationship between commercial bank corporategovernance and innovative resource allocation, commercial bank corporate governanceand its economic performance, and commercial bank performance evaluationimprovement etc. Concretely, this thesis studied the following problems:
First of all, the main corporate governance theory is stockholder theory andstakeholder theory, but stakeholder theory as a slogan rather than a real challenger. Boththeories agree that long term residual return is produced by diverse production factors.But they disagree on how the residual return should be distributed and what differentdistributions could impact corporate performance.
This thesis figures out that both theories neglect how residual return is produced byresource exploitation, and further, innovative resource allocation is the best choice to gainresidual return. Innovation is an uncertain process of constant accumulation and teamdevelopment, and in essence it is resource reallocation and reuse. To commercial banks innovation means banks can provide financial products with maximum return and under afixed risk. Therefore innovative resource allocation has three characters:①Strategic,commercial bank breaks present technology and market condition, and perform morereasonably in resource allocation on the benefit of long term economic performance.②Developing, innovation process has an uncertain return but needs large amount of humanresource, materials and financial resource input.③Organizing, innovation process isalso a team learning work, so it needs the commercial bank to clearly divine team workand to integrate individual experiences.
In the following, this thesis continues to analyze the three qualifications that canpromote innovative resource allocation of commercial bank governance system: Firstly,organization integration–To integrate “sufficient inspiration” and “knowledge” fromresource into technology development and utilization according to organization rules；Secondly, financial commitment–To provide plenty “financial” support to this uncertaininnovation process according to development rules. Thirdly, insider control--To bringcorporate strategic control to those insiders who are competent and willing to allocateresources on innovative investment according to strategic rules.
In the performance evaluation of commercial banks, this research considers thatscientific management performance evaluation will be conducive to the different interestsof managers and owners of commercial banks with consistency, so as to promote thelong-term development of the commercial banks. The evaluation of corporate governancehas been the formation of a more systematic system, so the establishment of corporategovernance reflects the part of business innovation and performance evaluation system,organizational integration, financial three aspects of support and bankers, the spirit of atotal of12indicators to evaluate and movement AHP method conduct an empiricalanalysis of specific banks.
Finally, on the base of summing up the whole thesis the studying defects and furtherquestions and fields to be researched have been pointed out.
引文
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