基于商业信用的供应链协调研究
|
摘要
随着经济的全球化，市场日趋多变和不可预测，消费者对产品和服务的多样化与个性化需求越来越高。成本和质量已不再被看作企业的竞争优势，而仅仅是企业在市场中参与竞争的必要条件，时间和反应速度成为赢得竞争的第一要素。全球导向、迅速变化的技术经济条件和更加剧烈的市场竞争对企业提出了更高的柔性要求，单个企业已难以凭借自身力量适应快速变化的市场需求。因此企业必然要处于一个复杂的商业生态网络之中，这一网络就是包括供应商、制造商、分销商、零售商以及消费者的供应链。在这个商业生态网络中，许多企业需要借贷资金进行研发、设计、生产、分销和配送，资金的来源除了传统的以银行为代表的金融机构外，大量企业都使用了供应商的商业信用。但是由于供应链中的每个成员都属于不同的企业实体，他们都有各自不同的目标，在分散决策过程中，各成员基于不同目标往往会发生冲突，进而造成“双重边际化”现象。而且，由于成员之间信息不对称，道德风险普遍存在于供应链上。这些都会造成供应链失调、运作效率降低，最终使顾客服务水平下降。因此，必须通过某种激励而非控制的方法来协调供应链成员的利益。为了消除或者降低“双重边际化”现象，供应链成员之间往往签订所谓的供应链合同，通过提供合适的信息和激励措施，保证买卖双方协调优化，使得分散控制决策如同在一个一体化企业内完成，进而实现所谓的供应链协调。
然而，在研究上已经趋于成熟的供应链合同理论没有考虑到两个关键的问题，一个是供应链中的资金流的运作方式，另一个是供应链中的成员可能会违约，并且根据不同国家的破产法条文要求进行破产清算。绝大多数供应链合同理论研究的焦点集中在企业之间的物料流和信息流，而没有考虑资金流。商业信用就是企业之间在购销商品或提供服务时延期支付资金的资金流运作方式。这种支付形式在供应链商业活动中被广泛运用，在实践中商业信用被认为是企业短期融资的主要来源，能有效降低交易成本。而且，随着市场竞争日趋加剧，商业信用成为除成本、质量、时间、柔性以外又一新的竞争要素，被视为是扩大市场份额、提升企业价值和保持竞争力的战略工具。另一方面供应链成员可能会发生违约。违约的行为不仅影响了银行等债权人，而且还波及到了它们所在供应链中的供应商、制造商、分销商和零售商，因此对供应链成员之间的信用风险的认识变得越来越重要。与此同时，随着银行不断收紧它们的信用政策，企业发现筹集资金变得越来越困难，这对供应商、制造商、分销商和零售商提出了筹集资金流的新要求。本论文认为，供应链协调需要考虑供应链中企业的商业信用。本论文在供应链协调理论基础上，以博弈论、最优化方法、委托代理分析方法、计算机数值仿真为工具，采用以定量为主、定性和定量相结合的研究方法，深入研究了基于商业信用的供应链协调问题。这个工作一方面对基于商业信用的供应链成员的决策行为进行了解释，另一方面对如何实现供应链协调、提高供应链整体竞争优势提供指导，因此具有一定的理论和现实意义。
主要研究工作及成果：
1．介绍了本论文的研究背景和意义，总结了国内外关于供应链合同协调的研究现状，在此基础上提出了供应链合同协调理论存在的主要问题以及现有研究的不足，在此基础上提出了本论文欲研究和解决的问题，即基于商业信用的供应链协调问题。
2．分析了在由单个供应商和单个零售商组成的供应链中，研究了零售商使用商业信用进行延期付款的斯塔克伯格模型、批发价格模型以及零利率的延期付款模型。得出了零售商使用商业信用进行延期付款的斯塔克伯格模型的均衡解，得出了零售商使用商业信用进行延期付款的订购合同优于批发价格合同的条件以及供应链协调的条件。研究结论为商业信用在某些情况下可以起到协调供应链的目的提供了论证。
3．延续零售商使用商业信用的基本模型，研究了具有资产的零售商使用商业信用的供应链协调问题，分析了零售商和供应商所做出的运营与商业信用决策，探讨了零售商创办现金与注册资金对运营与商业信用决策所产生的影响。分析了在供应商利率设得过低、零售商的创办现金或注册资金不足的情况下，零售商是否会订购过多，是否会增加供应商无法收回应收账款的风险以及是否能够提高供应链成员的利润。研究结论对中国商务部出台的《零售商与供应商进货交易管理办法》中有关商业信用的条文规定进行了评论。
4．在零售商使用商业信用对供应链进行协调研究的基础上，把商业信用的期限作为决策变量，并且组合订购量限制的条款，为供应商设计了一个新颖的供应链合同。研究并回答如下的一些问题：结合商业信用的合同是否能激励供应链成员的行为，实现供应链协调？合同如何设计以及合同的参数应该如何设置？供应链成员应该如何决策？如何确定能够使供应链系统实现Pareto改善的合同参数范围？零售商使用商业信用的合同效率以及合同的灵活性如何？研究结论为供应商提供了一个基于商业信用的协调供应链的合同设计方法。
5．拓展了Fabbri和Menichini的供应链中的企业提供和使用商业信用的动机模型。首先，本论文认为企业采用商业信用的动机是综合性的，包括非金融与金融动机，即具有收益分享性动机、流动性动机与激励动机，前者对应于非金融性动机，后两者对应于金融性动机。其次，通过提供商业信用的供应商在收益分享上的讨价还价能力考虑了供应链上游市场的市场结构对企业的信贷策略与商业信用策略的影响。最后，本论文对比了四种重要的破产清算制度对企业商业信用策略与银行信贷策略的影响，这四种制度包括企业可以通过自己制定或谈判的方式制定破产清偿银行与供应商债务的比例的制度、优先清偿银行债务的制度（B制度）、优先清偿供应商债务的制度（S制度）以及按双方债务比例清偿的制度（BS制度），并从社会效率的角度讨论了市场结构与破产清算制度的匹配问题。
主要创新点：
1．将资金流运作引入了供应链协调的研究，拓展了只考虑物料流和信息流进行供应链协调的研究思路，并且通过具体化资金流运作中的商业信用，考虑零售商使用商业信用进行延期付款，研究了零售商使用商业信用进行延期付款的斯塔克伯格模型、批发价格模型以及零利率的延期付款模型。得出了零售商使用商业信用进行延期付款的斯塔克伯格模型的均衡解，得出了零售商使用商业信用进行延期付款的订购合同优于批发价格合同的条件以及供应链达到整体协调的条件。解释了使用商业信用的供应链协调应用的普遍性。
2．研究了具有资产的零售商使用商业信用的供应链协调问题，分析了零售商和供应商所做出的运营与商业信用决策，探讨了零售商的创办现金与注册资金对运营决策与商业信用决策所产生的影响。研究结论对中国商务部出台的《零售商与供应商进货交易管理办法》中有关商业信用的条文规定进行了评论。研究认为有关商业信用的条文规定对于规范我国正处于扩张阶段的零售业供应链的健康运营有重大的现实指导意义，然而研究结论表明应该针对不同规模、不同创办现金以及不同注册资金的零售商制订不同的商业信用规定，不能搞一刀切，否则同样会对供应链的整体绩效造成负面影响。
3．把商业信用的期限作为决策变量，并且组合订购量的条款，为供应商设计了一个新颖的供应链合同。研究发现商业信用合同能激励供应链成员的行为，合理设置合同参数可以完全消除双重边际化现象，实现供应链协调，达到供应链的最优绩效。研究给出了协调合同的设计方法和参数设定。还给出了令供应链总利润改善的最小授信订购批量限制参数的范围和令供应链系统实现Pareto改善的信用期限参数的范围。对商业信用合同的效率进行了评估，得出了合同效率的区间范围。研究还对商业信用合同的灵活性进行了评估，研究了商业信用合同设计方如何通过调整合同参数来实现供应链可分配利润的灵活分配。
4．在基于商业信用研究供应链协调的基础上，把为供应链中的企业提供信贷的银行也考虑进分析模型，拓展了Fabbri和Menichini的供应链中的企业提供和使用商业信用的动机模型，进一步考虑了供应商提供商业信用的收益分享性动机，并对企业可以通过自己制定或谈判的方式制定破产清偿银行与供应商债务的比例、优先清偿银行、优先清偿供应商以及按银行和供应商的债务比例进行清偿四种破产清算制度对企业进行银行信贷与商业信用的采用策略的影响进行了探讨，同时也分析了供应链中的企业通过这两种信用在不同的破产清算制度下的投资效率问题，并对我国《企业破产法》的破产清算规则进行了评论。研究结论在一定程度上解释了我国企业在银行与商业信用采用方面所存在的问题，指出了更优的企业破产清算制度。
With the globalization of the economy, market is becoming more changeable andunpredictable, as a result, customer requires more diversified and tailor-made products andservices. Low cost and good quality are never identified as competitive advantages of anenterprise as before; on the contrary, they now become the necessities for competing in themarkets. Globalization, rapid development of technology and economy and even morefurious market competition require more flexibility of the enterprise, thus individualenterprise is very difficult to adjust itself to the rapid changing market independently.Therefore, in order to keep the pace of the market, enterprise should and need to be fullyinvolved into a more complex commercial ecosystem, which contains a supply chain fromsupplier, manufacturer, distributor and retailer to consumer. Inside the ecosystem, manyenterprises need to borrow money from banks to conduct their R&D, designing,manufacturing, distributing and delivering. Nowadays, a large number of enterprisesleverage their suppliers’ trade credit to get money except for borrowing money fromfinancial institutions such as banks as they used to do. However, when the members ofsupply chain have different goals and own different private information as workingtogether, there inevitably arise conflicts and occur moral hazards, which makes theperformance of the supply chain decline and the profit of the supply chain decrease, leadsto double marginalization, and at last reduces the service level. Therefore, measuresshould be taken to motivate but not force supply chain members to achieve thecoordination of profit. In order to eliminate or reduce the effect of double marginalization,supply chain members normally sign supply chain contracts to ensure the optimization ofboth the buyer and seller by providing proper information and incentive measures to eachother, thus individual decisions of both sides are like made in an integrated enterprisewhich can achieve the so-called supply chain coordination.
The research in the theory of supply chain contract is becoming increasingly mature;however, two important issues are ignored. One is the way of operating capital flow andthe other one is that supply chain members may break the contract and the bankruptcyliquidation has to be conducted according to the bankruptcy law in different countries. The research in the theory of supply chain contract mostly focus on the material flow andinformation flow among enterprises instead of capital flow. Trade credit is a way ofoperating capital flow for delay payment when enterprises purchase products and services.Trade credit is widely used as a form of payment in the supply chain commercial activities,and is regarded as the main mode of short-term financing of enterprises in practice. Inaddition, with the increasingly fierce market competition, trade credit becomes a newcompetition necessity except for cost, quality, time and flexibility, and is considered as astrategic tool for enlarging market share, promote enterprise value and keep thecompetitive power. On the other hand, supply chain member may break the contract. Thebreach of contract affects not only the profit of creditors such as banks, but also thesuppliers, manufacturers, distributors and retailers in the supply chain. Therefore,identifying the credit risk of supply chain member is becoming increasingly important. Inthe meantime, enterprises find financing is increasingly difficult while banks tighten theircredit policy and set stricter requirements in financing for suppliers, manufacturers,distributors and retailers. Based on the theory of supply chain coordination, and adoptingmostly the quantitative analysis combined with qualitative analysis with game theory,optimization, principal-agent analysis and simulation method as tools, this thesisparticularly analyzes the issues of coordination. The work is of much value in theory andreal life because it on the one hand explains the behavior of supply chain members basedon trade credit, and on the other hand makes suggestions for realization of supply chaincoordination and enhancement of supply chain competitive advantage.
Main research works and achievements:
1. The research background and meaning are introduced, and the research status ofsupply chain coordination with contracts is concluded in this thesis. On the basis of thesework, this thesis points out the primary issues of supply chain coordination with contractsand deficiency of prior researches, and put forward the issues to analyze and solve, whichis the supply chain coordination with trade credit.
2. After studying Stackelberg model of leveraging trade credit to delay the payment,trade price model and delay payment model with zero interest rate in the supply chainwhich consist of one supplier and one retailer, this thesis figures out the equilibriumsolution of the Stackelberg model in which the retailer leverage trade credit to delay thepayment, the condition under which the purchasing contract in which the retailer leveragetrade credit to delay the payment is better than trade price contract, and precondition ofsupply chain coordination. The conclusion can be considered as proof for that trade creditin certain cases is helpful for supply chain coordination.
3. Based on the basic model of retailers with trade credit, this thesis studies the issues of supply chain coordination in the case of retailers with trade credit and assets, analysesthe operations and trade credit decisions made by retailers and suppliers, discuss the effecton the operations and trade credit decisions due to retailers' initial fund and registered fund.Then this thesis analyses that under the situation of low interest rate set by supplier andinsufficient initial fund and registered fund of retailers', whether retailers will purchase toomuch, whether the risk of supplier in taking back accounts receivable will be increasedand whether the profit of supply chain members will be promoted. The conclusioncomments on the provisions regarding trade credit in "regulation on the stock tradebetween retailers and suppliers" issued by Department of Commerce of China.
4. Based on the research of supply chain coordination in the case of retailers withtrade credit, the time limit of trade credit is considered as decision variable, and then anew type of supply chain contract is designed with a combination of limitations of orderquantity. This thesis studies and figures out below issues: Can contract with trade creditmotivate the behaviors of supply chain members and achieve supply chain coordination?How to design the contract and set the parameters? How do supply chain members maketheir own decisions? How to set the range of parameters in the contract in order to achievethe Pareto improvement of supply chain system? How are the effeciency and flexibility ofcontract in the case of retailers with trade credit? The conclusion provides a method ofdesigning supply chain contract based on trade credit for suppliers.
5. This thesis extends Fabbri and Menichini's motivation model in which enterprisesare provided with trade credit. First of all, this thesis considers that the motivations ofenterprises to leverage trade credit consist of non-financial motivations and financialmotivations, namely profit sharing motivation, fluidity motivation and incentivemotivation. The first motivation corresponds to non-financial motivation, and the last twomotivations correspond to financial motivations. In addition, considering the profit sharingbargain power of suppliers that provide trade credit, this thesis analyses the marketstructure of upper stream supply chain and its influence on bank credit tactics and tradecredit tactics of enterprises. At last, this thesis compares the influence of four importantbankruptcy liquidation systems on bank credit tactics and trade credit tactics of enterprises.The four important bankruptcy liquidation systems include debt liquidation system inwhich the proportion is determined by the supplier itself or by negotiation between banksand suppliers, bank debt liquidation in first priority system (B system), supplier debtliquidation in first priority system (S system), and bank supplier debt liquidation system inwhich the debt is liquidated according to the proportion of bank and supplier’s debt (BSsystem). This thesis discusses the matching of market structure and bankruptcy liquidationsystems from the perspective of social efficiency.
Main innovations:
1. The operations of capital flow is introduced into research of supply chaincoordination, which extends the research approach of just considering material flow andinformation flow in the process of supply chain coordination. After considering theretailers leverage trade credit in the concretization of capital flow operations to delay thepayment, this thesis analyses the Stackelberg model in which the retailers leverage tradecredit to delay the payment, the condition under which the purchasing contract in whichthe retailer leverage trade credit to delay the payment is better than trade price contract,and precondition of supply chain coordination. This thesis explains the wide applicaton oftrade credit in supply chain coordination.
2. This thesis studies the issues of supply chain coordination in the case of retailerswith trade credit and assets, analyses the operation and trade credit decisions made byretailers and suppliers, and discusses the effect on the operation and trade credit decisionsdue to retailers' initial fund and registered fund. The conclusion comments on theprovisions regarding trade credit in "regulation on the stock trade between retailers andsuppliers" issued by Department of Commerce of China. This thesis considers that theprovisions and regulations regarding trade credit have important realistic directivesignificance in keeping the healthy operations of supply chain in retailing industry whichis expanding currently. However, the conclusion indicates the regulations regarding tradecredit should be made according to the scale, initial fund, and registered fund of retailersinstead of applying uniform criterion to all the retailers. Otherwise, it will cause negativeeffect on the overall performance of supply chain.
3. The time limit of trade credit is considered as decision variable, and then a newtype of supply chain contract is designed with a combination of limitations of orderquantity. It is found that contract with trade credit can motivate the behavior of supplychain members and reasonable setting of parameters in the contract can eliminate doublemarginalization completely, achieve supply chain coordination and the optimalperformance of supply chain. This thesis figures out the way to design coordinationcontract and set parameters, the range of parameters which represent the limitations oforder quantity with credit extension to promote the total profit of supply chain, and therange of parameters which represent the credit time limit in the contract in order toachieve the Pareto improvement of supply chain system. The efficiency of contract withtrade credit is evaluated and the range of contract efficiency is figured out. Additionally,This thesis evaluates the flexibility of contract with trade credit and studies the designingof contract with trade credit by adjusting the parameters in the contract so that profit canbe distributed in the supply chain flexibly.
4. Based on the research of supply chain coordination with trade credit, this thesisconsiders banks which provide credit loan to enterprises in the analysis model, andextends Fabbri and Menichini's motivation model in which enterprises are provided withtrade credit, and then considers the profit sharing motivation of suppliers that providetrade credit, and discusses the influence of four important bankruptcy liquidation systemson bank credit tactics and trade credit tactics of enterprises. The four important bankruptcyliquidation systems include debt liquidation system in which the proportion is determinedby the supplier itself or by negotiation between banks and suppliers, bank debt liquidationin first priority system, supplier debt liquidation in first priority system, and bank supplierdebt liquidation system in which the debt is liquidated according to the proportion of bankand supplier’s debt. In the meantime, this thesis analyses the issue of investment efficiencyof enterprises with these two sorts of credit, under different bankruptcy liquidation systemand comment on the bankruptcy liquidation regulations of "enterprise bankruptcy law" ofChina. The conclusion to some extent explains the existing issues of enterprises with thebank credit and trade credit, and point out a better set of bankruptcy liquidationregulations for enterprises.
然而，在研究上已经趋于成熟的供应链合同理论没有考虑到两个关键的问题，一个是供应链中的资金流的运作方式，另一个是供应链中的成员可能会违约，并且根据不同国家的破产法条文要求进行破产清算。绝大多数供应链合同理论研究的焦点集中在企业之间的物料流和信息流，而没有考虑资金流。商业信用就是企业之间在购销商品或提供服务时延期支付资金的资金流运作方式。这种支付形式在供应链商业活动中被广泛运用，在实践中商业信用被认为是企业短期融资的主要来源，能有效降低交易成本。而且，随着市场竞争日趋加剧，商业信用成为除成本、质量、时间、柔性以外又一新的竞争要素，被视为是扩大市场份额、提升企业价值和保持竞争力的战略工具。另一方面供应链成员可能会发生违约。违约的行为不仅影响了银行等债权人，而且还波及到了它们所在供应链中的供应商、制造商、分销商和零售商，因此对供应链成员之间的信用风险的认识变得越来越重要。与此同时，随着银行不断收紧它们的信用政策，企业发现筹集资金变得越来越困难，这对供应商、制造商、分销商和零售商提出了筹集资金流的新要求。本论文认为，供应链协调需要考虑供应链中企业的商业信用。本论文在供应链协调理论基础上，以博弈论、最优化方法、委托代理分析方法、计算机数值仿真为工具，采用以定量为主、定性和定量相结合的研究方法，深入研究了基于商业信用的供应链协调问题。这个工作一方面对基于商业信用的供应链成员的决策行为进行了解释，另一方面对如何实现供应链协调、提高供应链整体竞争优势提供指导，因此具有一定的理论和现实意义。
主要研究工作及成果：
1．介绍了本论文的研究背景和意义，总结了国内外关于供应链合同协调的研究现状，在此基础上提出了供应链合同协调理论存在的主要问题以及现有研究的不足，在此基础上提出了本论文欲研究和解决的问题，即基于商业信用的供应链协调问题。
2．分析了在由单个供应商和单个零售商组成的供应链中，研究了零售商使用商业信用进行延期付款的斯塔克伯格模型、批发价格模型以及零利率的延期付款模型。得出了零售商使用商业信用进行延期付款的斯塔克伯格模型的均衡解，得出了零售商使用商业信用进行延期付款的订购合同优于批发价格合同的条件以及供应链协调的条件。研究结论为商业信用在某些情况下可以起到协调供应链的目的提供了论证。
3．延续零售商使用商业信用的基本模型，研究了具有资产的零售商使用商业信用的供应链协调问题，分析了零售商和供应商所做出的运营与商业信用决策，探讨了零售商创办现金与注册资金对运营与商业信用决策所产生的影响。分析了在供应商利率设得过低、零售商的创办现金或注册资金不足的情况下，零售商是否会订购过多，是否会增加供应商无法收回应收账款的风险以及是否能够提高供应链成员的利润。研究结论对中国商务部出台的《零售商与供应商进货交易管理办法》中有关商业信用的条文规定进行了评论。
4．在零售商使用商业信用对供应链进行协调研究的基础上，把商业信用的期限作为决策变量，并且组合订购量限制的条款，为供应商设计了一个新颖的供应链合同。研究并回答如下的一些问题：结合商业信用的合同是否能激励供应链成员的行为，实现供应链协调？合同如何设计以及合同的参数应该如何设置？供应链成员应该如何决策？如何确定能够使供应链系统实现Pareto改善的合同参数范围？零售商使用商业信用的合同效率以及合同的灵活性如何？研究结论为供应商提供了一个基于商业信用的协调供应链的合同设计方法。
5．拓展了Fabbri和Menichini的供应链中的企业提供和使用商业信用的动机模型。首先，本论文认为企业采用商业信用的动机是综合性的，包括非金融与金融动机，即具有收益分享性动机、流动性动机与激励动机，前者对应于非金融性动机，后两者对应于金融性动机。其次，通过提供商业信用的供应商在收益分享上的讨价还价能力考虑了供应链上游市场的市场结构对企业的信贷策略与商业信用策略的影响。最后，本论文对比了四种重要的破产清算制度对企业商业信用策略与银行信贷策略的影响，这四种制度包括企业可以通过自己制定或谈判的方式制定破产清偿银行与供应商债务的比例的制度、优先清偿银行债务的制度（B制度）、优先清偿供应商债务的制度（S制度）以及按双方债务比例清偿的制度（BS制度），并从社会效率的角度讨论了市场结构与破产清算制度的匹配问题。
主要创新点：
1．将资金流运作引入了供应链协调的研究，拓展了只考虑物料流和信息流进行供应链协调的研究思路，并且通过具体化资金流运作中的商业信用，考虑零售商使用商业信用进行延期付款，研究了零售商使用商业信用进行延期付款的斯塔克伯格模型、批发价格模型以及零利率的延期付款模型。得出了零售商使用商业信用进行延期付款的斯塔克伯格模型的均衡解，得出了零售商使用商业信用进行延期付款的订购合同优于批发价格合同的条件以及供应链达到整体协调的条件。解释了使用商业信用的供应链协调应用的普遍性。
2．研究了具有资产的零售商使用商业信用的供应链协调问题，分析了零售商和供应商所做出的运营与商业信用决策，探讨了零售商的创办现金与注册资金对运营决策与商业信用决策所产生的影响。研究结论对中国商务部出台的《零售商与供应商进货交易管理办法》中有关商业信用的条文规定进行了评论。研究认为有关商业信用的条文规定对于规范我国正处于扩张阶段的零售业供应链的健康运营有重大的现实指导意义，然而研究结论表明应该针对不同规模、不同创办现金以及不同注册资金的零售商制订不同的商业信用规定，不能搞一刀切，否则同样会对供应链的整体绩效造成负面影响。
3．把商业信用的期限作为决策变量，并且组合订购量的条款，为供应商设计了一个新颖的供应链合同。研究发现商业信用合同能激励供应链成员的行为，合理设置合同参数可以完全消除双重边际化现象，实现供应链协调，达到供应链的最优绩效。研究给出了协调合同的设计方法和参数设定。还给出了令供应链总利润改善的最小授信订购批量限制参数的范围和令供应链系统实现Pareto改善的信用期限参数的范围。对商业信用合同的效率进行了评估，得出了合同效率的区间范围。研究还对商业信用合同的灵活性进行了评估，研究了商业信用合同设计方如何通过调整合同参数来实现供应链可分配利润的灵活分配。
4．在基于商业信用研究供应链协调的基础上，把为供应链中的企业提供信贷的银行也考虑进分析模型，拓展了Fabbri和Menichini的供应链中的企业提供和使用商业信用的动机模型，进一步考虑了供应商提供商业信用的收益分享性动机，并对企业可以通过自己制定或谈判的方式制定破产清偿银行与供应商债务的比例、优先清偿银行、优先清偿供应商以及按银行和供应商的债务比例进行清偿四种破产清算制度对企业进行银行信贷与商业信用的采用策略的影响进行了探讨，同时也分析了供应链中的企业通过这两种信用在不同的破产清算制度下的投资效率问题，并对我国《企业破产法》的破产清算规则进行了评论。研究结论在一定程度上解释了我国企业在银行与商业信用采用方面所存在的问题，指出了更优的企业破产清算制度。
With the globalization of the economy, market is becoming more changeable andunpredictable, as a result, customer requires more diversified and tailor-made products andservices. Low cost and good quality are never identified as competitive advantages of anenterprise as before; on the contrary, they now become the necessities for competing in themarkets. Globalization, rapid development of technology and economy and even morefurious market competition require more flexibility of the enterprise, thus individualenterprise is very difficult to adjust itself to the rapid changing market independently.Therefore, in order to keep the pace of the market, enterprise should and need to be fullyinvolved into a more complex commercial ecosystem, which contains a supply chain fromsupplier, manufacturer, distributor and retailer to consumer. Inside the ecosystem, manyenterprises need to borrow money from banks to conduct their R&D, designing,manufacturing, distributing and delivering. Nowadays, a large number of enterprisesleverage their suppliers’ trade credit to get money except for borrowing money fromfinancial institutions such as banks as they used to do. However, when the members ofsupply chain have different goals and own different private information as workingtogether, there inevitably arise conflicts and occur moral hazards, which makes theperformance of the supply chain decline and the profit of the supply chain decrease, leadsto double marginalization, and at last reduces the service level. Therefore, measuresshould be taken to motivate but not force supply chain members to achieve thecoordination of profit. In order to eliminate or reduce the effect of double marginalization,supply chain members normally sign supply chain contracts to ensure the optimization ofboth the buyer and seller by providing proper information and incentive measures to eachother, thus individual decisions of both sides are like made in an integrated enterprisewhich can achieve the so-called supply chain coordination.
The research in the theory of supply chain contract is becoming increasingly mature;however, two important issues are ignored. One is the way of operating capital flow andthe other one is that supply chain members may break the contract and the bankruptcyliquidation has to be conducted according to the bankruptcy law in different countries. The research in the theory of supply chain contract mostly focus on the material flow andinformation flow among enterprises instead of capital flow. Trade credit is a way ofoperating capital flow for delay payment when enterprises purchase products and services.Trade credit is widely used as a form of payment in the supply chain commercial activities,and is regarded as the main mode of short-term financing of enterprises in practice. Inaddition, with the increasingly fierce market competition, trade credit becomes a newcompetition necessity except for cost, quality, time and flexibility, and is considered as astrategic tool for enlarging market share, promote enterprise value and keep thecompetitive power. On the other hand, supply chain member may break the contract. Thebreach of contract affects not only the profit of creditors such as banks, but also thesuppliers, manufacturers, distributors and retailers in the supply chain. Therefore,identifying the credit risk of supply chain member is becoming increasingly important. Inthe meantime, enterprises find financing is increasingly difficult while banks tighten theircredit policy and set stricter requirements in financing for suppliers, manufacturers,distributors and retailers. Based on the theory of supply chain coordination, and adoptingmostly the quantitative analysis combined with qualitative analysis with game theory,optimization, principal-agent analysis and simulation method as tools, this thesisparticularly analyzes the issues of coordination. The work is of much value in theory andreal life because it on the one hand explains the behavior of supply chain members basedon trade credit, and on the other hand makes suggestions for realization of supply chaincoordination and enhancement of supply chain competitive advantage.
Main research works and achievements:
1. The research background and meaning are introduced, and the research status ofsupply chain coordination with contracts is concluded in this thesis. On the basis of thesework, this thesis points out the primary issues of supply chain coordination with contractsand deficiency of prior researches, and put forward the issues to analyze and solve, whichis the supply chain coordination with trade credit.
2. After studying Stackelberg model of leveraging trade credit to delay the payment,trade price model and delay payment model with zero interest rate in the supply chainwhich consist of one supplier and one retailer, this thesis figures out the equilibriumsolution of the Stackelberg model in which the retailer leverage trade credit to delay thepayment, the condition under which the purchasing contract in which the retailer leveragetrade credit to delay the payment is better than trade price contract, and precondition ofsupply chain coordination. The conclusion can be considered as proof for that trade creditin certain cases is helpful for supply chain coordination.
3. Based on the basic model of retailers with trade credit, this thesis studies the issues of supply chain coordination in the case of retailers with trade credit and assets, analysesthe operations and trade credit decisions made by retailers and suppliers, discuss the effecton the operations and trade credit decisions due to retailers' initial fund and registered fund.Then this thesis analyses that under the situation of low interest rate set by supplier andinsufficient initial fund and registered fund of retailers', whether retailers will purchase toomuch, whether the risk of supplier in taking back accounts receivable will be increasedand whether the profit of supply chain members will be promoted. The conclusioncomments on the provisions regarding trade credit in "regulation on the stock tradebetween retailers and suppliers" issued by Department of Commerce of China.
4. Based on the research of supply chain coordination in the case of retailers withtrade credit, the time limit of trade credit is considered as decision variable, and then anew type of supply chain contract is designed with a combination of limitations of orderquantity. This thesis studies and figures out below issues: Can contract with trade creditmotivate the behaviors of supply chain members and achieve supply chain coordination?How to design the contract and set the parameters? How do supply chain members maketheir own decisions? How to set the range of parameters in the contract in order to achievethe Pareto improvement of supply chain system? How are the effeciency and flexibility ofcontract in the case of retailers with trade credit? The conclusion provides a method ofdesigning supply chain contract based on trade credit for suppliers.
5. This thesis extends Fabbri and Menichini's motivation model in which enterprisesare provided with trade credit. First of all, this thesis considers that the motivations ofenterprises to leverage trade credit consist of non-financial motivations and financialmotivations, namely profit sharing motivation, fluidity motivation and incentivemotivation. The first motivation corresponds to non-financial motivation, and the last twomotivations correspond to financial motivations. In addition, considering the profit sharingbargain power of suppliers that provide trade credit, this thesis analyses the marketstructure of upper stream supply chain and its influence on bank credit tactics and tradecredit tactics of enterprises. At last, this thesis compares the influence of four importantbankruptcy liquidation systems on bank credit tactics and trade credit tactics of enterprises.The four important bankruptcy liquidation systems include debt liquidation system inwhich the proportion is determined by the supplier itself or by negotiation between banksand suppliers, bank debt liquidation in first priority system (B system), supplier debtliquidation in first priority system (S system), and bank supplier debt liquidation system inwhich the debt is liquidated according to the proportion of bank and supplier’s debt (BSsystem). This thesis discusses the matching of market structure and bankruptcy liquidationsystems from the perspective of social efficiency.
Main innovations:
1. The operations of capital flow is introduced into research of supply chaincoordination, which extends the research approach of just considering material flow andinformation flow in the process of supply chain coordination. After considering theretailers leverage trade credit in the concretization of capital flow operations to delay thepayment, this thesis analyses the Stackelberg model in which the retailers leverage tradecredit to delay the payment, the condition under which the purchasing contract in whichthe retailer leverage trade credit to delay the payment is better than trade price contract,and precondition of supply chain coordination. This thesis explains the wide applicaton oftrade credit in supply chain coordination.
2. This thesis studies the issues of supply chain coordination in the case of retailerswith trade credit and assets, analyses the operation and trade credit decisions made byretailers and suppliers, and discusses the effect on the operation and trade credit decisionsdue to retailers' initial fund and registered fund. The conclusion comments on theprovisions regarding trade credit in "regulation on the stock trade between retailers andsuppliers" issued by Department of Commerce of China. This thesis considers that theprovisions and regulations regarding trade credit have important realistic directivesignificance in keeping the healthy operations of supply chain in retailing industry whichis expanding currently. However, the conclusion indicates the regulations regarding tradecredit should be made according to the scale, initial fund, and registered fund of retailersinstead of applying uniform criterion to all the retailers. Otherwise, it will cause negativeeffect on the overall performance of supply chain.
3. The time limit of trade credit is considered as decision variable, and then a newtype of supply chain contract is designed with a combination of limitations of orderquantity. It is found that contract with trade credit can motivate the behavior of supplychain members and reasonable setting of parameters in the contract can eliminate doublemarginalization completely, achieve supply chain coordination and the optimalperformance of supply chain. This thesis figures out the way to design coordinationcontract and set parameters, the range of parameters which represent the limitations oforder quantity with credit extension to promote the total profit of supply chain, and therange of parameters which represent the credit time limit in the contract in order toachieve the Pareto improvement of supply chain system. The efficiency of contract withtrade credit is evaluated and the range of contract efficiency is figured out. Additionally,This thesis evaluates the flexibility of contract with trade credit and studies the designingof contract with trade credit by adjusting the parameters in the contract so that profit canbe distributed in the supply chain flexibly.
4. Based on the research of supply chain coordination with trade credit, this thesisconsiders banks which provide credit loan to enterprises in the analysis model, andextends Fabbri and Menichini's motivation model in which enterprises are provided withtrade credit, and then considers the profit sharing motivation of suppliers that providetrade credit, and discusses the influence of four important bankruptcy liquidation systemson bank credit tactics and trade credit tactics of enterprises. The four important bankruptcyliquidation systems include debt liquidation system in which the proportion is determinedby the supplier itself or by negotiation between banks and suppliers, bank debt liquidationin first priority system, supplier debt liquidation in first priority system, and bank supplierdebt liquidation system in which the debt is liquidated according to the proportion of bankand supplier’s debt. In the meantime, this thesis analyses the issue of investment efficiencyof enterprises with these two sorts of credit, under different bankruptcy liquidation systemand comment on the bankruptcy liquidation regulations of "enterprise bankruptcy law" ofChina. The conclusion to some extent explains the existing issues of enterprises with thebank credit and trade credit, and point out a better set of bankruptcy liquidationregulations for enterprises.
引文
[1] Alderson W. Marketing behavior and executive action: a functionalist approach tomarketing theory [M]. Homewood:Irwin,1957
[2] Chen F. Salesforce incentives and inventory management [J]. Manufacturing andService Operations Management,2000,2(2):186-202
[3] Chen F. Salesforce incentives, market information, and production/inventoryplanning. Management Science,2005,51(1):60-75
[4] Chen F, Xiao W. On compensation schemes for sales agents with superior marketinformation. Columbia Business School, working paper,2008
[5] Chen F, Xiao W. Incentive contracts, information acquisition, and productionplanning. Columbia Business School, working paper,2008
[6] Dorfman R, Steiner P. Optimal advertising and optimal quality [J]. AmericanEconomic Review,1954,44:826-836
[7] Kaldor N. Economic aspects of advertising [J]. Review of EconomicStudies,1904,18:1-27
[8] Forrester J. Industrial dynamics: a major breakthrough for decision makers [J].Harvard Business Review,1958,38:37-66
[9] Lee H L, Padmanabhan V, Whang S. Information distortion in a supply chain: thebullwhip effect [J]. Management Science,1997,43:546-558
[10] Berry D, Naim M. Quantifying the relative improvements of redesign strategies [J].International Journal of Production Economecs,1996,46:181-196
[11] Clark A, Scarf H. Optimal policies for a multi-echelon inventory problem [J].Management Science,1960,6:475-490
[12] Clark A. An informal survey of multi-echelon inventory theory [J]. Naval ResearchLogistics Quarterly,1972,19:621-650
[13] Kouvelis P, Ding Q, Dong L. On the integration of production and financial hedgingdecisions in global markets [J]. Operations Research,2007,55(3):470-489
[14] Ganeshan S, Kapuscinskee R, Tayur S. Value of information in capacitated supplychains [M]. Quantitative Models for Supply Chain Management, Cambridge:Kluwer,1998
[15]陈冬，顾培亮.供应链管理若干问题研究与进展评述[J].系统工程理论与实践，2003，10：1-11
[16]吴军，李健，汪寿阳.供应链风险管理中的几个重要问题[J].管理科学学报，2006，9(6)：1-12
[17] Spengler J. Vertical restraints and antitrust policy [J]. Journal of Political Economy,1950,58:347-352
[18]泰勒尔.产业组织理论[M].北京：中国人民大学出版社，1997
[19] Armstrong M. Competitive price discrimination [J]. Rand Journal of Economics,2001,32(4):579-605
[20] Borger B. Optimal two-part tariffs in a model of discrete choice [J]. Journal of PubicEconomics,2000,76(1):127-150
[21] Yoskwitz W. Price dispersion and price discrimination: empirical evidence from aspot market for water [J]. Review of Industrial Organization,2002,20(3):283-289
[22] Lafontaine F. Agency theory and franchising: some empirical results [J]. RandJournal of Economics,1992,23(2):263-183
[23] Ingene A, Parry E. Channel coordination when retailers compete [J]. MarketingScience,1995,14(4):360-377
[24] Ingene A, Parry E. Is channel coordination all it is cracked up to be？[J]. Journal ofRetailing,2000,76(4):511-547
[25] Lariviere M, Porteus E. Selling to the newsvendor: An analysis of price-onlycontracts [J]. Manufacturing&Service Operations Management,2001,3:293–306
[26] Bresnahan T, Reiss P. Dealer and manufacturer margins [J]. Rand Journal ofEconomics,1985,16(2):253-268
[27] Cachon G P, Lariviere M A. Supply chain coordination with revenue sharingcontracts: strengths and limitations [J]. Management Science,2005,51(1):30-44
[28] Pasternack B A. Optimal pricing and returns policies for perishable commodities [J].Marketing Science,1985,4:166-176
[29] Padmanabhan V, Png IPL. Manufacturer’s returns policy and retail competition [J].Marketing Science,1997,16:81-94
[30] Emmons H，Gilbert S. Returns policies in pricing and inventory decisions forcatalogue goods [J]. Management Science,1998,44(2):276-83
[31] Taylor T. Coordination under channel rebates with sales effort effect [J].Management Science,2002,48(8):992-1007
[32] Donohue K. Efficient supply contracts for fashion goods with forecast updating andtwo production modes [J]. Management Science,2000,46(11):1397-1411
[33] Cachon G. P, Lariviere M A. Turning the supply chain into a revenue chain [J].Harvard Business Review,2001, March
[34] Mortimer J H. Vertical contracts in the video rental industry [J]. The Review ofEconomic Studies,2007,75(1):165-199
[35] Eppen G D, Iyer A V. Backup agreements in fashion buying-the value of upstreamflexibility [J]. Management Science,1997,43:1469-1484
[36] Tsay A, Lovejoy W S. Quantity-flexibility contracts and supply chain performance[J]. Manufacturing and Service Operations Management,1999,1(2):222-241
[37] Tsay A, Nahmias S, Agrawal N. Modeling supply chain contracts: a review [M].Norwell, MA: Kluwer,1998
[38] Kandel E. The right to return [J]. Journal of Law and Economics,1996,39:329-356
[39] Emmons H, Gilbert S. Returns policies in pricing and inventory decisions forcatalogue goods [J]. Management Science,1998,44(2):276-83
[40]张建军，霍佳震，赵晋.易逝品供应链回购激励机理研究[J].工业工程与管理，2007，12(5)：83-88
[41]姚忠.退货策略在单周期产品供应链管理中的作用[J].系统工程理论与实践，2003，6:69-73
[42] Anupindi R, Bassok Y. Analysis of supply contracts with total minimumcommitment and flexibility [C]. Proceedings of the2nd International Symposium inLogistics, University of Nottingham, UK,1995
[43] Barnes-Schuster D, Bassok Y, Anupindi R. Coordination and flexibility in supplycontracts with options [J]. Manufacturing and Services Operations Management，2002，4(3):171-207
[44] Tsay A. The quantity flexibility contract and supplier-customer incentives [J].Management Science,1999,45(10):1339-1358
[45] Monahan J P. A quantitative discount pricing model to increase vendor profits [J].Management Science,1984,30:720-726
[46] Lee H L, Rosenblatt M J. A generalized quantity discount pricing model to increasesupplier’s profits [J]. Management Science,1986,30:1179-1187
[47] Rosenblatt M J, Lee H L. Improving profitability with quantity discounts under fixeddemand [J]. IIE Transactions,1985,17(4):388-395
[48] Jeuland A P, Shugan S M. Managing channel profits [J]. Marketing Science,1993,2:239-272
[49] Weng Z K. Channel coordination and quantity discounts [J]. Management Science,1995,41:1509-1522
[50]覃毅延，郭崇慧.在弹性需求和物品易变质条件下数量折扣定价模型[J].管理学报，2007，4(2):163-168
[51] Corbett C J, Groote X de. A supplier's optimal quantity discount policy underasymmetric information [J]. Management Science,2000,(46)3:444-450
[52]高峻峻，王迎军，郭亚军等.弹性需求下供应链契约中的Pareto优化问题[J].系统工程理论方法应用，2002，11（1）：36-40
[53]关志民，徐慧，靳志宏等.联合协调下分销系统价格折扣问题研究[J].东北大学学报(自然科学版)，2004，25（4）：402-405
[54]边旭，田厚平，潘德惠.供应链中最优价格契约的制定[J].东北大学学报（自然科学版），2003，24（6）：606-609
[55]索寒生，金以慧.两阶段供需链企业间的博弈分析[J].计算机集成制造系统，2003，9(7)：546-550
[56]周永务，杨善林.基于不对称需求信息的供应链协调定价[J].系统工程学报，2006，21(6)：591-597
[57]汪峻萍，王圣东.非对称信息下以制造商为核心的供应链协调模型[J].系统工程学报，2008，23(1)：60-66
[58] Netessine S, Rudi N. Supply chain choice on the Internet [J]. Management Science,2006,52(6):844-864
[59] Wang Y, Gerchak Y. Supply chain coordination when demand is shelf-spacedependent [J]. Manufacturing and Service Operations Management,2001,3(1):82-87
[60] Chu W, Desai P. Channel coordination mechanisms for customer satisfaction [J].Marketing Science,1995,14(4):343-359
[61] Desiraju R, Moorthy S. Managing a distribution channel under asymmetricinformation with performance requirements [J]. ManagementScience,1997,43:1628-1644
[62] Gallini N, Lutz N. Dual distribution and royalty fees in franchising [J]. The Journalof Law, Economics and Organization,1992,8:471-501
[63] Lal R. Improving channel coordination through franchising [J]. Marketing Science,1990,9:299-318
[64] Lariviere M, Padmanabhan V. Slotting allowances and new product introductions [J].Marketing Science,1999,16:112-128
[65] Holmstr m B. Moral hazard and observation [J]. Bell Journal of Economics,1979,10:74-91
[66] Corbett C, Groote X de. Shared savings contracts in supply chains [J]. ManagementScience,2001,47:881-893
[67] Baiman S, Fischer P, Rajan M. Information, contracting and quality costs [J].Management Science,2000,46(6):776-789
[68]钟宝嵩，李悝，李宏余.基于供应链的合作促销与定价问题[J].中国管理科学，2004，12(3):70-74
[69]张龙，宋士吉，刘连臣等.带有供需双方促销努力的供需链合同问题研究[J].清华大学学报（自然科学版），2003，43（9）：1226-1229
[70]罗卫，张子刚，欧阳明德.基于一个博弈论方法的简单供应链合作广告模型[J].系统工程理论与实践，2004，2:31-36
[71] Telser L. Why should manufacturers want fair trade?[J]. Journal of Law andEconomics,1960,3:86-105
[72] Kreps D M, Scheinkman J A. Quantity precommitment and Bertrand competitionyield cournot outcomes [J]. Bell Journal of Economics,1983,14:326-337
[73] Lal R, Staelin R. An approach for developing an optimal discount pricing policy [J].Management Science,1984,30:1524-1539
[74] Crowther J. Rationale for quantity discounts [J]. Harvard Business Review,1964,42(2):121-127
[75] Joglekar P, Tharthare S. The individually responsible and rational decision approachto economic lot sizes for one vendor and many purchasers [J]. Decisions Science,1990,21:492-506
[76] Dolan R. Quantity discounts: managerial issues and research opportunities [J].Marketing Science,1987,6:1-23
[77] Boyaci T, Gallego G. Coordinating pricing and inventory replenishment policies forone wholesaler and one or more geographically dispersed retailers [J]. InternationalJournal of Production Economics,2002,77(2):95-111
[78] Cachon G P. Competitive supply chain inventory management [M]. QuantitativeModels for supply chain management, Norwell, MA:Kluwer,1998
[79] Lariviere M. Supply chain contracting and coordination with stochastic demand [M].Quantitative Models for supply chain management, Norwell, MA:Kluwer,1998
[80] Munson C, Rosenblatt M. Theories and realities of quantity discounts: anexploratory study [J]. Production Operation Management,1998,7:352-369
[81] O’Brien D P, Shaffer G.. Vertical control with bilateral contracts [J]. Rand Journal ofEconomics,1992,23(3):299-308
[82] McGuire T W, Staelin R. An industry equilibrium analysis of downstream verticalintegration [J]. Marketing Science,1983,2:161-191
[83] McAfee R, Schwartz M. Opportunism in multilateral vertical contracting:nondiscrimination, exclusivity, and uniformity [J]. The American Economic Review,1994,84:210-230
[84] Tyagi R. On the effects of downstream entry [J]. ManagementScience,1999,45:59-73
[85] Chen F, Federgruen A, Zheng Y. Coordination mechanisms for a distribution systemwith one supplier and multiple retailers [J]. Management Science,2001,47(5):693-708
[86] Pellegrini, Luca. Sale or return agreements vs outright sales [M]. Marketingchannels, Lexington:Lexington books,1986,59-72
[87] Anupindi R, Bassok Y, Zemel E. A general framework for the study of decentralizeddistribution systems [J]. Manufacturing&Service Operations Management,2001,3(4):349-368
[88] Dana J, Spier K. Revenue sharing and vertical control in the video rental market [J].The Journal of Industrial Economics,2003,49(3):223-245
[89] Gerchak Y, Wang Y. Revenue-sharing vs. wholesale-price contracts in assemblysystems with random demand [J]. Production&Operations Management Society,2004,13(1):23-33
[90] Gurnani H, Gerchak Y. Coordination in decentralized assembly systems withuncertain component yield [J]. European Journal of Operational Research,2007,176(3):1559-1576
[91]常良峰，黄小原，胡建忠.一类供应链订货的Stackelberg主从对策[J].东北大学学报(自然科学版)，2003，24（2）：174-177
[92]周良，徐国华.供应链中供应商—零售商之间的渠道协调机制的研究[J].工业工程与管理，2004，4：69-72
[93]赵泉午，熊榆，林娅等.多个零售商库存竞争下的易逝品回购合同研究[J].系统工程，2004，22(8)：39-42
[94]田厚平，郭亚军，杨耀东.分销系统中多委托人及委托人可能合作的委托代理问题[J].系统工程理论方法应用，2004，13(4)：361-366
[95]罗定提，仲伟俊，张晓琪等.分散式供应链中旁支付激励机制的研究[J].系统工程学报，2001，16（3）：236-240
[96]侯雅莉，田蓓艺，周德群.数量折扣契约对三阶层供应链的协调[J].工业工程，2008，11(2)：25-28
[97]程海芳，张子刚，宋悦林.基于集成供应的RS契约协调模型研究[J].管理学报，2006，3(3)：273-276
[98]胡劲松，王虹.三级供应链应对突发事件的价格折扣契约研究[J].中国管理科学，2007，15(3)：103-107
[99]侯雅莉，周德群.价格补贴契约对三阶层供应链的协调[J].系统工程，2006，24(4)：25-30
[100]叶飞.含风险规避者的供应链收益共享契约机制研究[J].工业工程与管理，2006，11(4)：50-53
[101]叶飞，李怡娜.具有风险规避者加盟的供应链协作回购契约机制研究[J].工业工程与管理，2006，11(2)：1-4
[102]张正祥，陈志伟，郑冰冰.两阶段供应链期权契约协调[J].工业工程，2007，10(6)：42-45
[103]陈祥锋，朱晨波.供应链采购管理中的期权合同价值研究[J].系统工程学报，2007，22(4)：401-406
[104]宁钟，林滨.供应链风险管理中的期权机制[J].系统工程学报，2007，22(2)：141-147
[105]郭琼，杨德礼，樊博.基于电子与契约市场的供应链协作的研究[J].中国管理科学，2006，14(6)：50-55
[106]杨德礼，郭琼，何勇等.供应链柔性批量订货契约研究[J].管理学报，2006，3(1):117-125
[107] Cachon G P. Supply chain coordination with contracts [M]. Steve Graves, Ton deKok, eds., Handbooks in Operations Research and Management Science: SupplyChain Management. North Holland: Kluwer,2004
[108] Babich V, Ritchken P H, Burnetas A N. Competition and Diversification Effects inSupply Chains with Supplier Default Risk [J]. Manufacturing and ServiceOperations Management,2007,9(2):123-146
[109] Barton D, Newell R, Wilson G. Dangerous markets: managing in financial crises [M].Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley&Sons Ltd,2003
[110] Swinney R, Netessine S. Long-term contracts under the threat of supplier failure.Stanford University, working paper,2007
[111]周艳菊，邱莞华，王宗润.供应链风险管理研究进展的综述与分析[J].系统工程，2006，24(3):1-7
[112]于辉，陈剑.需求依赖于价格的供应链应对突发事件[J].系统工程理论与实践，2007，27(3)：36-41
[113]于辉，陈剑，于刚.批发价契约下的供应链应对突发事件[J].系统工程理论与实践，2006，26(8)：33-41
[114]于瑞峰，任艳敏，王雨等.基于供应链的企业信贷风险评估研究[J].中国管理科学，2007，15(3)：85-92
[115] Rajan R, Zingales L. What do we know about capital structure? Some evidence frominternational data [J]. Journal of Finance,1995,50:1421-1460
[116] Petersen M A, Rajan R G.. Trade credit: theory and evidence [J]. The Review ofFinancial Studies,1997,10(3),661-691
[117] Smith J. Trade credit and informational asymmetry [J]. Journal of Finance,1987,42:863-869
[118] Mian S L, Smith C W. Extending trade credit and financing receivables [J]. Journalof Applied Corporate Finance,1994,7:75-84
[119] Pike R H, Cheng N S. Business trade credit management: experience of large UKfirms. University of Bradford, working paper,1996
[120] Summers B, Wilson N. Trade credit terms offered by small firms: survey evidenceand empirical analysis [J]. Journal of Business and Finance Accounting,2002,29:317-335
[121] George W B, Kirk V. The product differentiation hypothesis for corporate tradecredit [J]. Managerial and Decision Economics,2003,24:457-469
[122] Frank M Z, Maksimovic V. Trade credit, collateral and adverse selection. Universityof British Columbia, working paper,2004
[123] Bigus J. Benefits and costs of having bank and trade credit simultaneously.University of Osnabruck, working paper,2004
[124] Alphonse P, Ducret J, Severin E. When trade credit facilitates access to bank finance:evidence from US small business data. University of Lille, working paper,2006
[125] Uesugi I, Yamashiro G M. How trade credit differs from loans: evidence fromJapanese trading companies. Institute of Economic Research, HitotsubashiUniversity, working paper,2004
[126] Fabbri D, Menichini A M C. Asset diversion, input allocation and trade credit.University of Lausanne and FAME, working paper,2005
[127] Fisman R, Love I. Trade credit, financial intermediary development, and industrygrowth [J]. Journal of Finance,2003,58(1):353-374
[128] Burkart M, Ellingsen T. In-Kind Finance: A theory of Trade Credit [J]. AmericanEconomic Review,2004,94:569-590
[129] Asli D K, Maksimovic V. Firms as financial intermediaries: evidence from tradecredit data. World Bank,Working paper,2001
[130] Coleman S. Free and costly trade credit: a comparison of small firms. University ofHartford, working paper,2003
[131] Elliehausen G E, Wolken J D. The demand for trade credit: an investigation ofmotives for trade credit use by small businesses. Board of Governors of the FederalReserve System, working paper,1993
[132] Messmacher M. The relationship between trade credit and investment in Mexico:1998-2000. Banco de México, working paper,2001
[133] Isaksson A. Trade credit in KENYAN manufacturing-evidence from plant-level data.United Nations Industrial Development Organization, working paper,2002
[134] Vicente C. Trade credit: Suppliers as debt collectors and insurance providers.University of Pompeu Fabra, working paper,2005
[135]陈祥锋，朱道立，应雯珺.资金约束与供应链中的融资和运营综合决策研究[J].管理科学学报，2008，11(3)：70-77
[136]邱昊，梁樑，杨树.供应商给定延期付款和现金折扣策略下的零售商最优库存策略[J].系统工程，2006，24(9)：18-23
[137]邱昊，梁樑.延期支付条件下的最优付款时间确定：考虑现金折扣情形[J].管理学报，2007，4(2):191-194
[138] Goyal S K. Economic order quantity under conditions of permissible delay inpayments [J]. Journal of the Operational Research Society.1985,36:335–338
[139] Chand S K, Ward J. A note on “economic order quantity under conditions ofpermissible delay in payments”[J]. Journal of the Operational Research Society.1987,38:83–84
[140] Rachamadugu R. Effect of delayed payments (trade credit) on order quantities [J].Journal of the Operational Research Society.1989,40:805–813
[141] Chang C. An EOQ model with deteriorating items under inflation when suppliercredits linked to order quantity [J]. International Journal of Production Economics.2004,88:307–316
[142] Maddah B S, Jaber M Y, Abboud N E. Periodic review (s, S) inventory model withpermissible delay in payments [J]. Journal of the Operational Research Society2004,55:147–159
[143] Buzacott, J A, Zhang Q. Inventory management with asset-based financing [J].Management Science,2004,50:1274–1292
[144] Babich V, Sobel M J. Pre-IPO operational and financial decisions [J]. ManagementScience,2004,50:935–948
[145] Gupta D, Wang L. A Stochastic Inventory Model with Trade-Credit. University ofMinnesota, working paper,2005
[146]任建标，供应链与价值网创新企业案例[M].北京：中国财政经济出版社，2007，119-145
[147] Barnett W. What’s in a name? A brief overview of asset-based lending [J]. SecuredLender,1997,53(11-12):80-81
[148] Carner C H. Secured lending for high-growth retailers [J]. Secured Lender,1998,54(11-12):54-59
[149] Ferris J S. A transaction theory of trade credit use [J]. Quarterly Journal ofEconomics,1981,96:247-270
[150] Brennan M, Maksimovic V, Zechner J. Vendor financing [J]. Journal of Finance,1988,43(3):1127-1141
[151] Biais B, Gollier C. Trade credit and credit rationing [J]. Review of Financial Studies,1997,10(4):903-937
[152] Marotta G. Is trade credit more expensive than bank credit loans? Evidence fromItalian firm-level data. University’di Modena e Reggio Emilia, working paper,2001
[153] La Porta R, Lopez-de-Silanes F, Shleifer A et al. Law and finance [J]. Journal ofPolitical Economy,1998,106:1113-1155
[2] Chen F. Salesforce incentives and inventory management [J]. Manufacturing andService Operations Management,2000,2(2):186-202
[3] Chen F. Salesforce incentives, market information, and production/inventoryplanning. Management Science,2005,51(1):60-75
[4] Chen F, Xiao W. On compensation schemes for sales agents with superior marketinformation. Columbia Business School, working paper,2008
[5] Chen F, Xiao W. Incentive contracts, information acquisition, and productionplanning. Columbia Business School, working paper,2008
[6] Dorfman R, Steiner P. Optimal advertising and optimal quality [J]. AmericanEconomic Review,1954,44:826-836
[7] Kaldor N. Economic aspects of advertising [J]. Review of EconomicStudies,1904,18:1-27
[8] Forrester J. Industrial dynamics: a major breakthrough for decision makers [J].Harvard Business Review,1958,38:37-66
[9] Lee H L, Padmanabhan V, Whang S. Information distortion in a supply chain: thebullwhip effect [J]. Management Science,1997,43:546-558
[10] Berry D, Naim M. Quantifying the relative improvements of redesign strategies [J].International Journal of Production Economecs,1996,46:181-196
[11] Clark A, Scarf H. Optimal policies for a multi-echelon inventory problem [J].Management Science,1960,6:475-490
[12] Clark A. An informal survey of multi-echelon inventory theory [J]. Naval ResearchLogistics Quarterly,1972,19:621-650
[13] Kouvelis P, Ding Q, Dong L. On the integration of production and financial hedgingdecisions in global markets [J]. Operations Research,2007,55(3):470-489
[14] Ganeshan S, Kapuscinskee R, Tayur S. Value of information in capacitated supplychains [M]. Quantitative Models for Supply Chain Management, Cambridge:Kluwer,1998
[15]陈冬，顾培亮.供应链管理若干问题研究与进展评述[J].系统工程理论与实践，2003，10：1-11
[16]吴军，李健，汪寿阳.供应链风险管理中的几个重要问题[J].管理科学学报，2006，9(6)：1-12
[17] Spengler J. Vertical restraints and antitrust policy [J]. Journal of Political Economy,1950,58:347-352
[18]泰勒尔.产业组织理论[M].北京：中国人民大学出版社，1997
[19] Armstrong M. Competitive price discrimination [J]. Rand Journal of Economics,2001,32(4):579-605
[20] Borger B. Optimal two-part tariffs in a model of discrete choice [J]. Journal of PubicEconomics,2000,76(1):127-150
[21] Yoskwitz W. Price dispersion and price discrimination: empirical evidence from aspot market for water [J]. Review of Industrial Organization,2002,20(3):283-289
[22] Lafontaine F. Agency theory and franchising: some empirical results [J]. RandJournal of Economics,1992,23(2):263-183
[23] Ingene A, Parry E. Channel coordination when retailers compete [J]. MarketingScience,1995,14(4):360-377
[24] Ingene A, Parry E. Is channel coordination all it is cracked up to be？[J]. Journal ofRetailing,2000,76(4):511-547
[25] Lariviere M, Porteus E. Selling to the newsvendor: An analysis of price-onlycontracts [J]. Manufacturing&Service Operations Management,2001,3:293–306
[26] Bresnahan T, Reiss P. Dealer and manufacturer margins [J]. Rand Journal ofEconomics,1985,16(2):253-268
[27] Cachon G P, Lariviere M A. Supply chain coordination with revenue sharingcontracts: strengths and limitations [J]. Management Science,2005,51(1):30-44
[28] Pasternack B A. Optimal pricing and returns policies for perishable commodities [J].Marketing Science,1985,4:166-176
[29] Padmanabhan V, Png IPL. Manufacturer’s returns policy and retail competition [J].Marketing Science,1997,16:81-94
[30] Emmons H，Gilbert S. Returns policies in pricing and inventory decisions forcatalogue goods [J]. Management Science,1998,44(2):276-83
[31] Taylor T. Coordination under channel rebates with sales effort effect [J].Management Science,2002,48(8):992-1007
[32] Donohue K. Efficient supply contracts for fashion goods with forecast updating andtwo production modes [J]. Management Science,2000,46(11):1397-1411
[33] Cachon G. P, Lariviere M A. Turning the supply chain into a revenue chain [J].Harvard Business Review,2001, March
[34] Mortimer J H. Vertical contracts in the video rental industry [J]. The Review ofEconomic Studies,2007,75(1):165-199
[35] Eppen G D, Iyer A V. Backup agreements in fashion buying-the value of upstreamflexibility [J]. Management Science,1997,43:1469-1484
[36] Tsay A, Lovejoy W S. Quantity-flexibility contracts and supply chain performance[J]. Manufacturing and Service Operations Management,1999,1(2):222-241
[37] Tsay A, Nahmias S, Agrawal N. Modeling supply chain contracts: a review [M].Norwell, MA: Kluwer,1998
[38] Kandel E. The right to return [J]. Journal of Law and Economics,1996,39:329-356
[39] Emmons H, Gilbert S. Returns policies in pricing and inventory decisions forcatalogue goods [J]. Management Science,1998,44(2):276-83
[40]张建军，霍佳震，赵晋.易逝品供应链回购激励机理研究[J].工业工程与管理，2007，12(5)：83-88
[41]姚忠.退货策略在单周期产品供应链管理中的作用[J].系统工程理论与实践，2003，6:69-73
[42] Anupindi R, Bassok Y. Analysis of supply contracts with total minimumcommitment and flexibility [C]. Proceedings of the2nd International Symposium inLogistics, University of Nottingham, UK,1995
[43] Barnes-Schuster D, Bassok Y, Anupindi R. Coordination and flexibility in supplycontracts with options [J]. Manufacturing and Services Operations Management，2002，4(3):171-207
[44] Tsay A. The quantity flexibility contract and supplier-customer incentives [J].Management Science,1999,45(10):1339-1358
[45] Monahan J P. A quantitative discount pricing model to increase vendor profits [J].Management Science,1984,30:720-726
[46] Lee H L, Rosenblatt M J. A generalized quantity discount pricing model to increasesupplier’s profits [J]. Management Science,1986,30:1179-1187
[47] Rosenblatt M J, Lee H L. Improving profitability with quantity discounts under fixeddemand [J]. IIE Transactions,1985,17(4):388-395
[48] Jeuland A P, Shugan S M. Managing channel profits [J]. Marketing Science,1993,2:239-272
[49] Weng Z K. Channel coordination and quantity discounts [J]. Management Science,1995,41:1509-1522
[50]覃毅延，郭崇慧.在弹性需求和物品易变质条件下数量折扣定价模型[J].管理学报，2007，4(2):163-168
[51] Corbett C J, Groote X de. A supplier's optimal quantity discount policy underasymmetric information [J]. Management Science,2000,(46)3:444-450
[52]高峻峻，王迎军，郭亚军等.弹性需求下供应链契约中的Pareto优化问题[J].系统工程理论方法应用，2002，11（1）：36-40
[53]关志民，徐慧，靳志宏等.联合协调下分销系统价格折扣问题研究[J].东北大学学报(自然科学版)，2004，25（4）：402-405
[54]边旭，田厚平，潘德惠.供应链中最优价格契约的制定[J].东北大学学报（自然科学版），2003，24（6）：606-609
[55]索寒生，金以慧.两阶段供需链企业间的博弈分析[J].计算机集成制造系统，2003，9(7)：546-550
[56]周永务，杨善林.基于不对称需求信息的供应链协调定价[J].系统工程学报，2006，21(6)：591-597
[57]汪峻萍，王圣东.非对称信息下以制造商为核心的供应链协调模型[J].系统工程学报，2008，23(1)：60-66
[58] Netessine S, Rudi N. Supply chain choice on the Internet [J]. Management Science,2006,52(6):844-864
[59] Wang Y, Gerchak Y. Supply chain coordination when demand is shelf-spacedependent [J]. Manufacturing and Service Operations Management,2001,3(1):82-87
[60] Chu W, Desai P. Channel coordination mechanisms for customer satisfaction [J].Marketing Science,1995,14(4):343-359
[61] Desiraju R, Moorthy S. Managing a distribution channel under asymmetricinformation with performance requirements [J]. ManagementScience,1997,43:1628-1644
[62] Gallini N, Lutz N. Dual distribution and royalty fees in franchising [J]. The Journalof Law, Economics and Organization,1992,8:471-501
[63] Lal R. Improving channel coordination through franchising [J]. Marketing Science,1990,9:299-318
[64] Lariviere M, Padmanabhan V. Slotting allowances and new product introductions [J].Marketing Science,1999,16:112-128
[65] Holmstr m B. Moral hazard and observation [J]. Bell Journal of Economics,1979,10:74-91
[66] Corbett C, Groote X de. Shared savings contracts in supply chains [J]. ManagementScience,2001,47:881-893
[67] Baiman S, Fischer P, Rajan M. Information, contracting and quality costs [J].Management Science,2000,46(6):776-789
[68]钟宝嵩，李悝，李宏余.基于供应链的合作促销与定价问题[J].中国管理科学，2004，12(3):70-74
[69]张龙，宋士吉，刘连臣等.带有供需双方促销努力的供需链合同问题研究[J].清华大学学报（自然科学版），2003，43（9）：1226-1229
[70]罗卫，张子刚，欧阳明德.基于一个博弈论方法的简单供应链合作广告模型[J].系统工程理论与实践，2004，2:31-36
[71] Telser L. Why should manufacturers want fair trade?[J]. Journal of Law andEconomics,1960,3:86-105
[72] Kreps D M, Scheinkman J A. Quantity precommitment and Bertrand competitionyield cournot outcomes [J]. Bell Journal of Economics,1983,14:326-337
[73] Lal R, Staelin R. An approach for developing an optimal discount pricing policy [J].Management Science,1984,30:1524-1539
[74] Crowther J. Rationale for quantity discounts [J]. Harvard Business Review,1964,42(2):121-127
[75] Joglekar P, Tharthare S. The individually responsible and rational decision approachto economic lot sizes for one vendor and many purchasers [J]. Decisions Science,1990,21:492-506
[76] Dolan R. Quantity discounts: managerial issues and research opportunities [J].Marketing Science,1987,6:1-23
[77] Boyaci T, Gallego G. Coordinating pricing and inventory replenishment policies forone wholesaler and one or more geographically dispersed retailers [J]. InternationalJournal of Production Economics,2002,77(2):95-111
[78] Cachon G P. Competitive supply chain inventory management [M]. QuantitativeModels for supply chain management, Norwell, MA:Kluwer,1998
[79] Lariviere M. Supply chain contracting and coordination with stochastic demand [M].Quantitative Models for supply chain management, Norwell, MA:Kluwer,1998
[80] Munson C, Rosenblatt M. Theories and realities of quantity discounts: anexploratory study [J]. Production Operation Management,1998,7:352-369
[81] O’Brien D P, Shaffer G.. Vertical control with bilateral contracts [J]. Rand Journal ofEconomics,1992,23(3):299-308
[82] McGuire T W, Staelin R. An industry equilibrium analysis of downstream verticalintegration [J]. Marketing Science,1983,2:161-191
[83] McAfee R, Schwartz M. Opportunism in multilateral vertical contracting:nondiscrimination, exclusivity, and uniformity [J]. The American Economic Review,1994,84:210-230
[84] Tyagi R. On the effects of downstream entry [J]. ManagementScience,1999,45:59-73
[85] Chen F, Federgruen A, Zheng Y. Coordination mechanisms for a distribution systemwith one supplier and multiple retailers [J]. Management Science,2001,47(5):693-708
[86] Pellegrini, Luca. Sale or return agreements vs outright sales [M]. Marketingchannels, Lexington:Lexington books,1986,59-72
[87] Anupindi R, Bassok Y, Zemel E. A general framework for the study of decentralizeddistribution systems [J]. Manufacturing&Service Operations Management,2001,3(4):349-368
[88] Dana J, Spier K. Revenue sharing and vertical control in the video rental market [J].The Journal of Industrial Economics,2003,49(3):223-245
[89] Gerchak Y, Wang Y. Revenue-sharing vs. wholesale-price contracts in assemblysystems with random demand [J]. Production&Operations Management Society,2004,13(1):23-33
[90] Gurnani H, Gerchak Y. Coordination in decentralized assembly systems withuncertain component yield [J]. European Journal of Operational Research,2007,176(3):1559-1576
[91]常良峰，黄小原，胡建忠.一类供应链订货的Stackelberg主从对策[J].东北大学学报(自然科学版)，2003，24（2）：174-177
[92]周良，徐国华.供应链中供应商—零售商之间的渠道协调机制的研究[J].工业工程与管理，2004，4：69-72
[93]赵泉午，熊榆，林娅等.多个零售商库存竞争下的易逝品回购合同研究[J].系统工程，2004，22(8)：39-42
[94]田厚平，郭亚军，杨耀东.分销系统中多委托人及委托人可能合作的委托代理问题[J].系统工程理论方法应用，2004，13(4)：361-366
[95]罗定提，仲伟俊，张晓琪等.分散式供应链中旁支付激励机制的研究[J].系统工程学报，2001，16（3）：236-240
[96]侯雅莉，田蓓艺，周德群.数量折扣契约对三阶层供应链的协调[J].工业工程，2008，11(2)：25-28
[97]程海芳，张子刚，宋悦林.基于集成供应的RS契约协调模型研究[J].管理学报，2006，3(3)：273-276
[98]胡劲松，王虹.三级供应链应对突发事件的价格折扣契约研究[J].中国管理科学，2007，15(3)：103-107
[99]侯雅莉，周德群.价格补贴契约对三阶层供应链的协调[J].系统工程，2006，24(4)：25-30
[100]叶飞.含风险规避者的供应链收益共享契约机制研究[J].工业工程与管理，2006，11(4)：50-53
[101]叶飞，李怡娜.具有风险规避者加盟的供应链协作回购契约机制研究[J].工业工程与管理，2006，11(2)：1-4
[102]张正祥，陈志伟，郑冰冰.两阶段供应链期权契约协调[J].工业工程，2007，10(6)：42-45
[103]陈祥锋，朱晨波.供应链采购管理中的期权合同价值研究[J].系统工程学报，2007，22(4)：401-406
[104]宁钟，林滨.供应链风险管理中的期权机制[J].系统工程学报，2007，22(2)：141-147
[105]郭琼，杨德礼，樊博.基于电子与契约市场的供应链协作的研究[J].中国管理科学，2006，14(6)：50-55
[106]杨德礼，郭琼，何勇等.供应链柔性批量订货契约研究[J].管理学报，2006，3(1):117-125
[107] Cachon G P. Supply chain coordination with contracts [M]. Steve Graves, Ton deKok, eds., Handbooks in Operations Research and Management Science: SupplyChain Management. North Holland: Kluwer,2004
[108] Babich V, Ritchken P H, Burnetas A N. Competition and Diversification Effects inSupply Chains with Supplier Default Risk [J]. Manufacturing and ServiceOperations Management,2007,9(2):123-146
[109] Barton D, Newell R, Wilson G. Dangerous markets: managing in financial crises [M].Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley&Sons Ltd,2003
[110] Swinney R, Netessine S. Long-term contracts under the threat of supplier failure.Stanford University, working paper,2007
[111]周艳菊，邱莞华，王宗润.供应链风险管理研究进展的综述与分析[J].系统工程，2006，24(3):1-7
[112]于辉，陈剑.需求依赖于价格的供应链应对突发事件[J].系统工程理论与实践，2007，27(3)：36-41
[113]于辉，陈剑，于刚.批发价契约下的供应链应对突发事件[J].系统工程理论与实践，2006，26(8)：33-41
[114]于瑞峰，任艳敏，王雨等.基于供应链的企业信贷风险评估研究[J].中国管理科学，2007，15(3)：85-92
[115] Rajan R, Zingales L. What do we know about capital structure? Some evidence frominternational data [J]. Journal of Finance,1995,50:1421-1460
[116] Petersen M A, Rajan R G.. Trade credit: theory and evidence [J]. The Review ofFinancial Studies,1997,10(3),661-691
[117] Smith J. Trade credit and informational asymmetry [J]. Journal of Finance,1987,42:863-869
[118] Mian S L, Smith C W. Extending trade credit and financing receivables [J]. Journalof Applied Corporate Finance,1994,7:75-84
[119] Pike R H, Cheng N S. Business trade credit management: experience of large UKfirms. University of Bradford, working paper,1996
[120] Summers B, Wilson N. Trade credit terms offered by small firms: survey evidenceand empirical analysis [J]. Journal of Business and Finance Accounting,2002,29:317-335
[121] George W B, Kirk V. The product differentiation hypothesis for corporate tradecredit [J]. Managerial and Decision Economics,2003,24:457-469
[122] Frank M Z, Maksimovic V. Trade credit, collateral and adverse selection. Universityof British Columbia, working paper,2004
[123] Bigus J. Benefits and costs of having bank and trade credit simultaneously.University of Osnabruck, working paper,2004
[124] Alphonse P, Ducret J, Severin E. When trade credit facilitates access to bank finance:evidence from US small business data. University of Lille, working paper,2006
[125] Uesugi I, Yamashiro G M. How trade credit differs from loans: evidence fromJapanese trading companies. Institute of Economic Research, HitotsubashiUniversity, working paper,2004
[126] Fabbri D, Menichini A M C. Asset diversion, input allocation and trade credit.University of Lausanne and FAME, working paper,2005
[127] Fisman R, Love I. Trade credit, financial intermediary development, and industrygrowth [J]. Journal of Finance,2003,58(1):353-374
[128] Burkart M, Ellingsen T. In-Kind Finance: A theory of Trade Credit [J]. AmericanEconomic Review,2004,94:569-590
[129] Asli D K, Maksimovic V. Firms as financial intermediaries: evidence from tradecredit data. World Bank,Working paper,2001
[130] Coleman S. Free and costly trade credit: a comparison of small firms. University ofHartford, working paper,2003
[131] Elliehausen G E, Wolken J D. The demand for trade credit: an investigation ofmotives for trade credit use by small businesses. Board of Governors of the FederalReserve System, working paper,1993
[132] Messmacher M. The relationship between trade credit and investment in Mexico:1998-2000. Banco de México, working paper,2001
[133] Isaksson A. Trade credit in KENYAN manufacturing-evidence from plant-level data.United Nations Industrial Development Organization, working paper,2002
[134] Vicente C. Trade credit: Suppliers as debt collectors and insurance providers.University of Pompeu Fabra, working paper,2005
[135]陈祥锋，朱道立，应雯珺.资金约束与供应链中的融资和运营综合决策研究[J].管理科学学报，2008，11(3)：70-77
[136]邱昊，梁樑，杨树.供应商给定延期付款和现金折扣策略下的零售商最优库存策略[J].系统工程，2006，24(9)：18-23
[137]邱昊，梁樑.延期支付条件下的最优付款时间确定：考虑现金折扣情形[J].管理学报，2007，4(2):191-194
[138] Goyal S K. Economic order quantity under conditions of permissible delay inpayments [J]. Journal of the Operational Research Society.1985,36:335–338
[139] Chand S K, Ward J. A note on “economic order quantity under conditions ofpermissible delay in payments”[J]. Journal of the Operational Research Society.1987,38:83–84
[140] Rachamadugu R. Effect of delayed payments (trade credit) on order quantities [J].Journal of the Operational Research Society.1989,40:805–813
[141] Chang C. An EOQ model with deteriorating items under inflation when suppliercredits linked to order quantity [J]. International Journal of Production Economics.2004,88:307–316
[142] Maddah B S, Jaber M Y, Abboud N E. Periodic review (s, S) inventory model withpermissible delay in payments [J]. Journal of the Operational Research Society2004,55:147–159
[143] Buzacott, J A, Zhang Q. Inventory management with asset-based financing [J].Management Science,2004,50:1274–1292
[144] Babich V, Sobel M J. Pre-IPO operational and financial decisions [J]. ManagementScience,2004,50:935–948
[145] Gupta D, Wang L. A Stochastic Inventory Model with Trade-Credit. University ofMinnesota, working paper,2005
[146]任建标，供应链与价值网创新企业案例[M].北京：中国财政经济出版社，2007，119-145
[147] Barnett W. What’s in a name? A brief overview of asset-based lending [J]. SecuredLender,1997,53(11-12):80-81
[148] Carner C H. Secured lending for high-growth retailers [J]. Secured Lender,1998,54(11-12):54-59
[149] Ferris J S. A transaction theory of trade credit use [J]. Quarterly Journal ofEconomics,1981,96:247-270
[150] Brennan M, Maksimovic V, Zechner J. Vendor financing [J]. Journal of Finance,1988,43(3):1127-1141
[151] Biais B, Gollier C. Trade credit and credit rationing [J]. Review of Financial Studies,1997,10(4):903-937
[152] Marotta G. Is trade credit more expensive than bank credit loans? Evidence fromItalian firm-level data. University’di Modena e Reggio Emilia, working paper,2001
[153] La Porta R, Lopez-de-Silanes F, Shleifer A et al. Law and finance [J]. Journal ofPolitical Economy,1998,106:1113-1155
© 2004-2018 中国地质图书馆版权所有 京ICP备05064691号 京公网安备11010802017129号 地址：北京市海淀区学院路29号 邮编：100083 电话：办公室：(+86 10)66554848；文献借阅、咨询服务、科技查新：66554700 |