管理者背景特征对成本粘性的影响研究
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摘要
随着经济形势的不断变化,中国已从低成本时代,逐步进入高成本时代,而对于像中国这样的制造大国而言,成本几乎是企业的命脉。因此,企业要想生存下来并获得利润,就必须要对企业的成本进行有效控制。在对成本进行控制之前,首先要弄清楚的是什么因素影响着成本及怎样影响的。在传统成本性态理论中,认为成本根据其性态可以分为固定成本、变动成本及介于二者之间的混合成本。并认为成本总额与业务量之间基本保持着线性的关系。这种观点的形成是建立在一种理想的状态下,却没有考虑企业管理层等其他因素的影响。然而,在实际的生产中,企业的成本与其业务量之间并没有保持这种严格的线性关系。近年来大量学者对企业业务量与成本之间的关系进行研究时,发现了成本是具有粘性的,但对于其成因并没有统一的认识,而是从不同方面进行研究。
成本粘性是指当企业销售量下降时的成本减少比例要小于企业销售量上升时的成本增加比例,由此所形成的成本随销售量增加和减少幅度的非对称性。目前,国内外学者在进行实证研究的基础上都已认同了成本是具有粘性的,并认为各国之间都是有差异的。对于其成因,主要的理论解释有契约观、效率观及代理观,其中代理观是最为普遍接受的。但对于其影响因素,每个学者的研究是有所不同的,我国学者主要是从经济环境、行业差异、区域性差异、盈余管理动机以及公司治理结构如董事会结构、实际控制人及管理者监督和预期的角度对成本粘性的影响进行实证研究。虽然在公司治理层面上已经进行了一定的研究,但是关于管理者自身的特征对成本粘性的影响并未进行深入的分析研究,本文则认为管理者作为公司治理结构的主要组成部分,掌握着公司的最终决策权,对公司的生存和发展都起着至关重要的作用,其行为会对企业的成本粘性产生一定的影响。另外,由于国有企业与非国有企业在制度、产权性质等方面存在着一定的差异,因此,本文还将制造业上市公司区分为国有企业与非国有企业作为研究的一方面因素予以考虑。总体上来说,作为一种思路,本文试图通过实证与规范相结合的方法来研究制造业上市公司的管理者背景特征对成本粘性产生的影响,主要是通过在不同实际控制人背景条件下对管理者的性别、年龄、学历、任期与成本粘性之间关系进行探索研究。
本文的研究主要分为五个部分：第一部分为引言,主要介绍了本文的研究背景及意义,同时对国内外关于管理者背景特征及成本粘性的研究进行了梳理和总结；第二部分主要介绍了成本粘性的相关概念及研究管理者背景特征与成本粘性的理论基础；第三部分在理论分析的基础上进行现状的描述和作用机理的分析；第四部分利用实证分析的方法检验理论分析的结果,通过选取我国制造业上市公司2009-2011年数据,在对数线性模型进行修正的基础上增加了年龄、性别、学历、任期的变量,实证分析了在不同的实际控制人条件下管理者背景特征对成本粘性所产生的影响程度。实证结果表明：成本粘性是存在于上市公司的,并且在非国有企业中表现的比较显著,然而性别、年龄、任期与成本粘性之间负相关的关系是在对国有上市公司数据中研究发现的,管理者的学历与成本粘性之间并无显著关系；第五部分是论文的研究结论,并在此基础上提出本文的对策建议及研究展望。
本文的创新点在于：
1、论文视角创新。虽然国内外学者对成本粘性的存在性、经济环境、行业差异、公司治理结构等方面进行了一定的研究分析,但是却没有对管理者背景特征这个因素进行深入地分析。因此,本文选取的管理者背景特征为视角进行研究具有一定的新意。
2、实证内容创新。本文选取了2009-2011年制造业上市公司的年度财务报告数据进行分析,并在对数线性模型进行修正的基础上增加了年龄、性别、学历、任期的变量,实证分析了在不同实际控制人条件下管理者背景特征对成本粘性所产生的影响程度,增强了实证分析的说服力和可信性。
With the ever-changing economic situation, China has been from the time of low cost to the time of high cost, and for the manufacturing powerhouse like China, the cost has almost been the lifeblood of enterprises, so it is very important for an enterprise to control the costs if it wants to get profits and survive in this environment. Before to control the costs, we should make clear that what the factor and how it affects the cost. In the traditional cost behavior theory, it considers that the costs can be divided into fixed cost, variable cost and mixed cost. And it also considers that the total costs maintained the basic linear relationship with the volume of business. The formation of this viewpoint is built in an ideal state, without considering the impact of the corporate management and other factors. Under the study of the large numbers of scholar in recent years, it is found that the cost is sticky, and the influencing factors are variable.
The Cost Stickiness refers to the proportion that the enterprise's costs reduced while sales declined, and is less than cost increased while sales raised.thus formed by the cost of sales along with the increase and decrease amplitude asymmetry. At present, the domestic and overseas scholars have been accepted the concept that the cost is stickiness by the basis of empirical research. And they also think that there is some difference between the different countries. For its origin, the main theories interpret it are contract concept, efficiency concept and the concept of agent. The concept of agent is the most widely accepted, but for the influencing factor, each scholar has its own study. The scholars in our country have makes empirical study on the economic environment, industry differences, regional differences, impact angle motivation of earnings management and corporate governance structure such as the structure of the board of directors, actual controllers and managers supervise. Although it has carried on the research on the corporate governance level, the manager's own characteristics has not been a deep research and analysis, In this paper, it argues that the managers as the main part of the corporate governance structure, they hold the final decision of the company, plays an important role in the survival and development of the company, its behavior will have a certain impact on the enterprise's Cost Stickiness. In addition, by the difference between the state-owned enterprises and the non state-owned enterprises, this paper will divide the manufacture into state-owned enterprises and the non state-owned enterprises to consider. Above of all, as a kind of thought, this paper attempts to research on the relationship between the managerial background characteristics and the cost stickiness by using standardized research and empirical research, mainly through the study of manager's gender, age, degree and tenure under the different actual controller.
This paper is divided into five parties:the first part is the introduction, mainly introduced the background of the research and the significance of this paper, and summarized the study from the domestics and overseas about the characteristics and cost stickiness. The second part is about some concepts of cost stickiness and the basis theory. The third part is about some description of the cost stickiness and the analysis of the mechanism of action. The forth part is the result of the study. It analysis the cost stickiness under the different actual controller how does the management characteristics affects through the selection of China's manufacturing industry listing Corporation2009-2011data. The empirical result shows that:the cost stickiness in non state-owned enterprises is obvious. And the gender, age and tenure are negatively with the cost stickiness in state-owned enterprises. But the degree of the management has no obvious with the cost stickiness. The fifth part is the conclusion of the paper, and then put forward policy recommendations and research prospects on this basis.
The innovation of this paper lies in:
The first is approach innovation. Although domestic and oversea scholars have research the cost stickiness of existence, economic environment, industry difference, corporate governance structure, there is no in-depth analysis on the factors of the managerial background characteristics. Therefore, there are some new ideas for research perspective of this paper.
The second is sample innovation. This paper selects the annual financial data of2009-2011listing Corporation to analyze. And add the gender, age, degree and tenure to the log-linear models to analysis the relationship between management background characteristics and cost stickiness, strengthens the empirical analysis' convincing and credibility.
成本粘性是指当企业销售量下降时的成本减少比例要小于企业销售量上升时的成本增加比例,由此所形成的成本随销售量增加和减少幅度的非对称性。目前,国内外学者在进行实证研究的基础上都已认同了成本是具有粘性的,并认为各国之间都是有差异的。对于其成因,主要的理论解释有契约观、效率观及代理观,其中代理观是最为普遍接受的。但对于其影响因素,每个学者的研究是有所不同的,我国学者主要是从经济环境、行业差异、区域性差异、盈余管理动机以及公司治理结构如董事会结构、实际控制人及管理者监督和预期的角度对成本粘性的影响进行实证研究。虽然在公司治理层面上已经进行了一定的研究,但是关于管理者自身的特征对成本粘性的影响并未进行深入的分析研究,本文则认为管理者作为公司治理结构的主要组成部分,掌握着公司的最终决策权,对公司的生存和发展都起着至关重要的作用,其行为会对企业的成本粘性产生一定的影响。另外,由于国有企业与非国有企业在制度、产权性质等方面存在着一定的差异,因此,本文还将制造业上市公司区分为国有企业与非国有企业作为研究的一方面因素予以考虑。总体上来说,作为一种思路,本文试图通过实证与规范相结合的方法来研究制造业上市公司的管理者背景特征对成本粘性产生的影响,主要是通过在不同实际控制人背景条件下对管理者的性别、年龄、学历、任期与成本粘性之间关系进行探索研究。
本文的研究主要分为五个部分：第一部分为引言,主要介绍了本文的研究背景及意义,同时对国内外关于管理者背景特征及成本粘性的研究进行了梳理和总结；第二部分主要介绍了成本粘性的相关概念及研究管理者背景特征与成本粘性的理论基础；第三部分在理论分析的基础上进行现状的描述和作用机理的分析；第四部分利用实证分析的方法检验理论分析的结果,通过选取我国制造业上市公司2009-2011年数据,在对数线性模型进行修正的基础上增加了年龄、性别、学历、任期的变量,实证分析了在不同的实际控制人条件下管理者背景特征对成本粘性所产生的影响程度。实证结果表明：成本粘性是存在于上市公司的,并且在非国有企业中表现的比较显著,然而性别、年龄、任期与成本粘性之间负相关的关系是在对国有上市公司数据中研究发现的,管理者的学历与成本粘性之间并无显著关系；第五部分是论文的研究结论,并在此基础上提出本文的对策建议及研究展望。
本文的创新点在于：
1、论文视角创新。虽然国内外学者对成本粘性的存在性、经济环境、行业差异、公司治理结构等方面进行了一定的研究分析,但是却没有对管理者背景特征这个因素进行深入地分析。因此,本文选取的管理者背景特征为视角进行研究具有一定的新意。
2、实证内容创新。本文选取了2009-2011年制造业上市公司的年度财务报告数据进行分析,并在对数线性模型进行修正的基础上增加了年龄、性别、学历、任期的变量,实证分析了在不同实际控制人条件下管理者背景特征对成本粘性所产生的影响程度,增强了实证分析的说服力和可信性。
With the ever-changing economic situation, China has been from the time of low cost to the time of high cost, and for the manufacturing powerhouse like China, the cost has almost been the lifeblood of enterprises, so it is very important for an enterprise to control the costs if it wants to get profits and survive in this environment. Before to control the costs, we should make clear that what the factor and how it affects the cost. In the traditional cost behavior theory, it considers that the costs can be divided into fixed cost, variable cost and mixed cost. And it also considers that the total costs maintained the basic linear relationship with the volume of business. The formation of this viewpoint is built in an ideal state, without considering the impact of the corporate management and other factors. Under the study of the large numbers of scholar in recent years, it is found that the cost is sticky, and the influencing factors are variable.
The Cost Stickiness refers to the proportion that the enterprise's costs reduced while sales declined, and is less than cost increased while sales raised.thus formed by the cost of sales along with the increase and decrease amplitude asymmetry. At present, the domestic and overseas scholars have been accepted the concept that the cost is stickiness by the basis of empirical research. And they also think that there is some difference between the different countries. For its origin, the main theories interpret it are contract concept, efficiency concept and the concept of agent. The concept of agent is the most widely accepted, but for the influencing factor, each scholar has its own study. The scholars in our country have makes empirical study on the economic environment, industry differences, regional differences, impact angle motivation of earnings management and corporate governance structure such as the structure of the board of directors, actual controllers and managers supervise. Although it has carried on the research on the corporate governance level, the manager's own characteristics has not been a deep research and analysis, In this paper, it argues that the managers as the main part of the corporate governance structure, they hold the final decision of the company, plays an important role in the survival and development of the company, its behavior will have a certain impact on the enterprise's Cost Stickiness. In addition, by the difference between the state-owned enterprises and the non state-owned enterprises, this paper will divide the manufacture into state-owned enterprises and the non state-owned enterprises to consider. Above of all, as a kind of thought, this paper attempts to research on the relationship between the managerial background characteristics and the cost stickiness by using standardized research and empirical research, mainly through the study of manager's gender, age, degree and tenure under the different actual controller.
This paper is divided into five parties:the first part is the introduction, mainly introduced the background of the research and the significance of this paper, and summarized the study from the domestics and overseas about the characteristics and cost stickiness. The second part is about some concepts of cost stickiness and the basis theory. The third part is about some description of the cost stickiness and the analysis of the mechanism of action. The forth part is the result of the study. It analysis the cost stickiness under the different actual controller how does the management characteristics affects through the selection of China's manufacturing industry listing Corporation2009-2011data. The empirical result shows that:the cost stickiness in non state-owned enterprises is obvious. And the gender, age and tenure are negatively with the cost stickiness in state-owned enterprises. But the degree of the management has no obvious with the cost stickiness. The fifth part is the conclusion of the paper, and then put forward policy recommendations and research prospects on this basis.
The innovation of this paper lies in:
The first is approach innovation. Although domestic and oversea scholars have research the cost stickiness of existence, economic environment, industry difference, corporate governance structure, there is no in-depth analysis on the factors of the managerial background characteristics. Therefore, there are some new ideas for research perspective of this paper.
The second is sample innovation. This paper selects the annual financial data of2009-2011listing Corporation to analyze. And add the gender, age, degree and tenure to the log-linear models to analysis the relationship between management background characteristics and cost stickiness, strengthens the empirical analysis' convincing and credibility.
引文
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