上市公司再融资规模与市场效应研究
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摘要
融资是上市公司的主要目的,包括首次发行融资和再融资两种基本形式。上市公司的再融资包括配股、增发与可转换债券三种方式。从行为模式方面看,再融资是上市公司在首次发行股票后,通过上述三种方式来筹集资金以偿还到期债务或扩大投资规模的行为。国外资本市场一般不区分融资和再融资,因此,研究再融资以我国A股市场(沪深股市)作为考察样本对象是合适的选择。
我国上市公司再融资存在的问题主要有:一是融资方式单一,以股权融资为主;二是再融资金额超过了上市公司的实际需求,再融资的投向具有盲目性和不确定性;三是再融资的利用效率和经济绩效低下。因此,针对上述问题展开研究具有重要的理论价值和现实意义:①通过再融资的合理使用来优化证券市场的资源优化配置;②确定再融资的规模、结构和比例是提高再融资绩效的充分必要条件;③提高再融资的绩效有待于加深对其规律性的科学认识。
国内外对上市公司融资或再融资的研究较多地集中于股权结构与企业经营绩效的关系,但从上市公司再融资规模切入去研究再融资市场效应的却未见到相关的文献。由于我国上市公司再融资的动机和目的普遍是基于“筹资”而不是生产性投资规模,因而必然产生不规范的“用资”行为,最终导致企业盈利能力下降而使再融资绩效难以为正。与以往的文献不同,本文将再融资问题的研究范围扩展到再融资的规模及其市场效应。所谓上市公司再融资的“市场效应”,包括静态效应和动态效应两个方面,其中静态效应是指上市公司通过再融资所带来的公司绩效的反应,它又从两个层面来衡定:一是内延绩效(内部绩效),即再融资对资本结构的影响及其产出的效益,主要指再融资的规模收益效应和盈利能力效应;二是外延绩效(外部绩效或市场绩效),即指再融资三种方式下的市场交易效率,用以衡量上市公司能在多短时间内融通资金并带来相应收益,即上市公司再融资的最短时间效应和最大资金收益效应。动态效应是指上市公司再融资行为引起上市公司与证监部门、股民相互之间的动态反应,它也从两个层面来衡定:一是上市公司与股民间的进化博弈反应;二是上市公司与证监部门间的进化博弈反应。
根据上述定义,本文研究再融资市场效应的逻辑思路为:首先,从上市公司的角度分析再融资的静态市场效应形式之一——内延绩效,即辨识上市公司的资本存量规模和结构,进而分析其规模收益效应和盈利效应,并且对三种再融资方式的盈利能力做了比较分析。其次,从上市公司的角度分析再融资的静态市场效应形式之二——外延绩效,又称市场绩效,即衡定再融资三种方式下的市场交易效率,辨识上市公司能在多短的时间内融通资金并带来相应收益,进而揭示了上市公司再融资的基本偏好及其功能。再次,从市场角度来分析上市公司再融资的动态市场效应,即运用进化博弈方法揭示了上市公司再融资与投资者和监管机构之间的“三维博弈”关系,并据此分别剖析了各自的行为取向特征,重点提出了政府对上市公司再融资的监管和对证券监管部门的再监管策略,从过程上解释了三者的博弈行为及效应。
Financing which is the main purpose for listed companies includes two kinds of fundamental modes, namely first-time financing and refinancing. Refinancing of listed company consists of share allotment, seasoned equity offering and convertible bonds. From the perspective of behavior mode, refinancing is the behavior of repaying the due debts or expanding the scale of investment after IPO by raising funds through the above three ways. There are no differences between financing and refinancing in foreign capital markets. Therefore, Chinese A share market (Shanghai and Shenzhen stock market) is an appropriate sample for researching refinancing.
There are three main problems for the listed companies of China in refinancing. First, the way of financing is mainly equity financing, which is too single. Second, the capital amount of refinancing is larger than the amount that listed companies actually need, and the usage of refinancing capital is blind and uncertain. Lastly, the utilization efficiency of refinancing capital and its economic performance are too low. It is therefore of great theoretical value and realistic significance to do research on these problems. Reasonable usage of refinancing capital can optimize the allocation of resources of securities market. The determination of refinancing scale, structure and proportion is a sufficient and necessary condition for improving refinancing performance, which is based on scientific knowledge about the rule of refinancing performance.
Domestic and overseas research of financing or refinancing for the listed companies focuses mainly on the relationship between structure of stock right and enterprise operation performance. However, there is little research literature on the refinancing market effect, whose research starting with refinancing scale of the listed companies. The motives and objectives of the listed companies' refinancing are generally "raising capital" rather than the productive investment scale, hence the using of the capital is inevitably not normative, which eventually weakens the enterprises' ability to earn profits, therefore it is very difficult to make the refinancing performance become positive. Different form the research before, this paper extends the research area of refinancing issue into the scale and its market effect. The so-called market effect of the listed companies' refinancing includes static effect and dynamic effect. The static effect means the effect of the listed company's performance resulting from their refinancing. It is measured by two ways. One is internal performance, that is, the effect of refinancing on capital structure and its output profits. This effect mainly means the scale income effect and profitability effect of refinancing. The other is external performance or market performance, that is, the efficiency of the three refinancing modes. It measures the listed companies' financing and the relative income in a short period of time - the shortest time effect and the maximum capital income effect of the listed companies' refinancing. The dynamic effect means the dynamic response of listed companies, securities supervision authorities and the persons who buy and sell stocks. It is also measured in two aspects. One is the evolutionary game response of the listed companies and the persons buying and selling stocks; the other is the evolutionary game response of the listed companies and securities supervision authorities.
According to the definitions above, the logic train of thought of this paper on the market effect of refinancing has been concluded. First, from the perspective of listed companies, this paper analyzes one of the static market effect forms of refinancing - the internal performance, that is, to recognize capital deposit scale and structure of listed companies, and analyze its scale income effect and the profitability effect. Then the paper compares the profit-earning ability of the three kinds of refinancing. Secondly, the author further from the standpoint of listed companies analyzes the second form of the static market effect of refinancing - the external performance (also called market performance), that is, to measure the market trading efficiency in the three forms of refinancing, to identify that in how short a time listed companies can spend to raise capital and earn profits accordingly, thereby revealing the basic preferences of listed companies for refinancing and their functions. Lastly, from the viewpoint of market, the paper analyzes the dynamic market effect of the listed companies' refinancing, the author uses the evolutionary game methods to discuss the "three-dimensional game" relationship among refinancing of listed companies, investors and supervisory institutions, on this basis, the paper analyses respectively the characteristics of their behavior direction. The paper mainly puts forward the supervision strategies of the government over the refinancing of listed companies and the re-supervisory strategies over the securities supervisory departments, explains the game behavior and effect of the three parties from the process.
我国上市公司再融资存在的问题主要有:一是融资方式单一,以股权融资为主;二是再融资金额超过了上市公司的实际需求,再融资的投向具有盲目性和不确定性;三是再融资的利用效率和经济绩效低下。因此,针对上述问题展开研究具有重要的理论价值和现实意义:①通过再融资的合理使用来优化证券市场的资源优化配置;②确定再融资的规模、结构和比例是提高再融资绩效的充分必要条件;③提高再融资的绩效有待于加深对其规律性的科学认识。
国内外对上市公司融资或再融资的研究较多地集中于股权结构与企业经营绩效的关系,但从上市公司再融资规模切入去研究再融资市场效应的却未见到相关的文献。由于我国上市公司再融资的动机和目的普遍是基于“筹资”而不是生产性投资规模,因而必然产生不规范的“用资”行为,最终导致企业盈利能力下降而使再融资绩效难以为正。与以往的文献不同,本文将再融资问题的研究范围扩展到再融资的规模及其市场效应。所谓上市公司再融资的“市场效应”,包括静态效应和动态效应两个方面,其中静态效应是指上市公司通过再融资所带来的公司绩效的反应,它又从两个层面来衡定:一是内延绩效(内部绩效),即再融资对资本结构的影响及其产出的效益,主要指再融资的规模收益效应和盈利能力效应;二是外延绩效(外部绩效或市场绩效),即指再融资三种方式下的市场交易效率,用以衡量上市公司能在多短时间内融通资金并带来相应收益,即上市公司再融资的最短时间效应和最大资金收益效应。动态效应是指上市公司再融资行为引起上市公司与证监部门、股民相互之间的动态反应,它也从两个层面来衡定:一是上市公司与股民间的进化博弈反应;二是上市公司与证监部门间的进化博弈反应。
根据上述定义,本文研究再融资市场效应的逻辑思路为:首先,从上市公司的角度分析再融资的静态市场效应形式之一——内延绩效,即辨识上市公司的资本存量规模和结构,进而分析其规模收益效应和盈利效应,并且对三种再融资方式的盈利能力做了比较分析。其次,从上市公司的角度分析再融资的静态市场效应形式之二——外延绩效,又称市场绩效,即衡定再融资三种方式下的市场交易效率,辨识上市公司能在多短的时间内融通资金并带来相应收益,进而揭示了上市公司再融资的基本偏好及其功能。再次,从市场角度来分析上市公司再融资的动态市场效应,即运用进化博弈方法揭示了上市公司再融资与投资者和监管机构之间的“三维博弈”关系,并据此分别剖析了各自的行为取向特征,重点提出了政府对上市公司再融资的监管和对证券监管部门的再监管策略,从过程上解释了三者的博弈行为及效应。
Financing which is the main purpose for listed companies includes two kinds of fundamental modes, namely first-time financing and refinancing. Refinancing of listed company consists of share allotment, seasoned equity offering and convertible bonds. From the perspective of behavior mode, refinancing is the behavior of repaying the due debts or expanding the scale of investment after IPO by raising funds through the above three ways. There are no differences between financing and refinancing in foreign capital markets. Therefore, Chinese A share market (Shanghai and Shenzhen stock market) is an appropriate sample for researching refinancing.
There are three main problems for the listed companies of China in refinancing. First, the way of financing is mainly equity financing, which is too single. Second, the capital amount of refinancing is larger than the amount that listed companies actually need, and the usage of refinancing capital is blind and uncertain. Lastly, the utilization efficiency of refinancing capital and its economic performance are too low. It is therefore of great theoretical value and realistic significance to do research on these problems. Reasonable usage of refinancing capital can optimize the allocation of resources of securities market. The determination of refinancing scale, structure and proportion is a sufficient and necessary condition for improving refinancing performance, which is based on scientific knowledge about the rule of refinancing performance.
Domestic and overseas research of financing or refinancing for the listed companies focuses mainly on the relationship between structure of stock right and enterprise operation performance. However, there is little research literature on the refinancing market effect, whose research starting with refinancing scale of the listed companies. The motives and objectives of the listed companies' refinancing are generally "raising capital" rather than the productive investment scale, hence the using of the capital is inevitably not normative, which eventually weakens the enterprises' ability to earn profits, therefore it is very difficult to make the refinancing performance become positive. Different form the research before, this paper extends the research area of refinancing issue into the scale and its market effect. The so-called market effect of the listed companies' refinancing includes static effect and dynamic effect. The static effect means the effect of the listed company's performance resulting from their refinancing. It is measured by two ways. One is internal performance, that is, the effect of refinancing on capital structure and its output profits. This effect mainly means the scale income effect and profitability effect of refinancing. The other is external performance or market performance, that is, the efficiency of the three refinancing modes. It measures the listed companies' financing and the relative income in a short period of time - the shortest time effect and the maximum capital income effect of the listed companies' refinancing. The dynamic effect means the dynamic response of listed companies, securities supervision authorities and the persons who buy and sell stocks. It is also measured in two aspects. One is the evolutionary game response of the listed companies and the persons buying and selling stocks; the other is the evolutionary game response of the listed companies and securities supervision authorities.
According to the definitions above, the logic train of thought of this paper on the market effect of refinancing has been concluded. First, from the perspective of listed companies, this paper analyzes one of the static market effect forms of refinancing - the internal performance, that is, to recognize capital deposit scale and structure of listed companies, and analyze its scale income effect and the profitability effect. Then the paper compares the profit-earning ability of the three kinds of refinancing. Secondly, the author further from the standpoint of listed companies analyzes the second form of the static market effect of refinancing - the external performance (also called market performance), that is, to measure the market trading efficiency in the three forms of refinancing, to identify that in how short a time listed companies can spend to raise capital and earn profits accordingly, thereby revealing the basic preferences of listed companies for refinancing and their functions. Lastly, from the viewpoint of market, the paper analyzes the dynamic market effect of the listed companies' refinancing, the author uses the evolutionary game methods to discuss the "three-dimensional game" relationship among refinancing of listed companies, investors and supervisory institutions, on this basis, the paper analyses respectively the characteristics of their behavior direction. The paper mainly puts forward the supervision strategies of the government over the refinancing of listed companies and the re-supervisory strategies over the securities supervisory departments, explains the game behavior and effect of the three parties from the process.
引文
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