超市通道费收费机制及其社会福利研究
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摘要
随着买方市场的到来,传统制造业企业的竞争焦点发生了较大变化,尤其是对于门槛较低、技术含量不高的快速消费品行业而言,制造商不仅要比拼产品质量,更要抢占高效的销售渠道。产业实践表明,大型超市已经成为消费者购买快速消费品的主要场所,并成为制造业企业扩大市场销量、增加盈利的关键。基于此,大型超市在渠道中的地位不断提高,市场力量也不断增强。它们不仅可以直接面对制造商,通过采购量和对批发价的谈判影响上游企业的利润;还可以充分利用零售价制定权,通过不同的货架陈列方式和多样化的促销活动影响消费者决策以及最终福利。总之,大型连锁超市在快速消费品行业中已经占据了举足轻重的地位。与此同时,零售商和制造商之间的矛盾也在升级,其中最重要的争端在于大型超市向制造商收取通道费的合理性问题。2003年媒体爆出上海炒货业协会与家乐福因通道费引起工商关系紧张,更引起了舆论及学术界对此问题的关注与热议。有人认为通道费是众多商品竞争有限货架空间的结果,有利于效率改进;而有人则认为通道费是超市发挥市场力量的体现,通道费的收取会提高批发价以及最终的零售价,从而损害消费者福利。对此,各国政府态度也不尽相同。
事实上,通道费的产生和应用是有其客观原因和基础的,在产业实践中也有多种收费机制。不同的收费机制不仅会影响产品批发价、零售价,以及通道费与产品销售利润之间的协调关系,同时还会进一步影响通道费的存在条件、功能作用,以及参与主体的利益分配和福利效果。
本文基于问题导向的研究视角,以通道费的收费机制为核心,在把握超市市场结构和特征的基础上,利用规范的现代产业组织理论、拍卖理论和信息经济学,构建合理的数量模型,通过分析不同收费机制下通道费的存在条件、功能、影响因素和社会福利等,集中研究了两个方面的问题:一是超市收取通道费的合理性问题;二是哪些收费机制更能改进社会效率。
本文的主要研究工作可归纳如下:
(1)以市场环境的变化和超市的发展为背景,界定通道费的收费主体——大型超市,通过与百货店、专业店、一般超市和便利店等其他零售业态的比较,讨论大型超市的特征;从产业现实出发,初步分析通道费产生的客观原因和基础;对通道费的收费内容进行了分类,阐述和比较了几种常用的收费机制,为以后各章理论研究提供必要的前提和基础。
(2)引入网络效应和销售成本等因素,利用双重讨价还价模型,研究通道费存在的条件,并从渠道成员利润分配以及消费者福利的角度讨论了通道费的一般功能和影响;通过模型扩展,结合不同制造商的谈判能力和不同产品的销售成本,进一步分析通道费与谈判能力的关系,讨论通道费的具体作用;在销售成本对称的条件下,研究了因谈判能力不同而产生的制造商成本分担不均的问题。
(3)引入超市的销售努力和销售效率,研究事后返点的收费机制下返点比例对超市销售努力、市场价格、市场销量,以及各市场主体利益的影响;分析了返点机制下通道费的影响因素与一般功能;基于不同的定价主体讨论了返点比例的内生机制;通过比较不同收费机制下的市场均衡,分析了不同厂商对收费机制的选择。
(4)以货架对消费者效用的影响机制为基础,构建了相应的需求函数,分析了货架对零售价格、市场销量、厂商利润的影响;以谈判机制为基础,从制造商和超市的参与约束以及机会成本分担的角度出发,讨论通道费的可能性、存在的条件及其功能;在制造商成本和谈判能力不对称的情况下对模型进行了扩展,比较了收取通道费和不收取通道费时的货架分配结果,以及相应的消费者福利。
(5)以成本信息不对称为前提,从制造商竞争优质货架和超市合理分配货架的角度分析通道费的必要性与合理性;以优质货架对不同制造商的价值为基础,讨论二价拍卖的货架分配机制下各制造商的通道费报价,货架竞争结果及其有效性;在不完全信息条件下,分析了基于谈判机制的优质货架分配结果,并从有效性出发与货架拍卖机制进行比较。
(6)利用部分商品市场价格的变化初步检验了理论研究的部分结论。以两个典型案例为背景分析了通道费争端的焦点;比较了主要国家的通道费政策,并对政策本身和政策效果进行了评述;根据理论研究结论和产业实践,初步提出了通道费政策的前提、原则和一些具体建议。
本文的主要创新点有:
(1)以谈判机制为基础,引入网络效应和销售成本,构建双重讨价还价模型,研究了事前一次性收费机制下通道费的存在条件、功能与福利效应,得到了与传统市场力量理论不完全一致的观点:虽然通道费的应用是超市市场力量的体现,但是一次性收费机制下的通道费仅仅是制造商和超市之间的利润转移,对制造商而言相当于固定成本,不会影响价格和消费者福利。
(2)以返点机制为基础,引入超市销售努力与销售效率,构建返点比例的内生性模型,研究了事后返点收费机制下通道费的功能与福利效应,得到了与传统市场力量理论完全相反的结论:在返点机制下,通道费的应用可以激励超市付出更大的销售努力,因此即使是制造商主导定价,它也会主动提供一定的采购返点。而且随着超市销售效率的改进,返点比例提高,市场销量扩大,消费者剩余增加。
(3)以拍卖机制和谈判机制为基础,引入优质货架所产生的市场效应和竞争效应,构建不完全信息博弈模型,研究了谈判机制和拍卖机制对货架分配结果的影响及其福利效应,得到了与传统效率理论不完全一致的观点:在货架的竞争和分配中,谈判机制下的通道费并不能确保低成本制造商获得优质货架;相对而言,拍卖机制能够优化配置稀缺的货架资源,是更具社会效率的货架分配机制。
(4)通过对上述三种收费机制进行比较,本文得到了与传统研究结论不一致的观点:超市收取通道费的行为总体上并不会损害社会福利,有时甚至还能改进社会福利。但是从不同的收费机制来看,返点机制和货架拍卖机制相对谈判机制而言更具社会效率,即通道费的福利效果主要依赖于收费机制。这意味着实践中的主要问题不是通道费该不该收,而是如何收。
The key factor in competition for traditional manufacturing has changed with the arrival of buyer's market. Especially for the firms which are major in fast moving consumer goods industry, they must not only compete in product quality but also seize the efficient sales channels. Practice shows that today's large supermarkets have become the main sales channel of fast moving consumer goods and have played the essential role in market expansion and profitability increasing for manufacturers. So the status of supermarkets particularly the large supermarkets has been improved and their market forces are also growing in the entire channels. Furthermore, the supermarkets can also affect the purchasing desion and consumer surplus based on the retail price as well as different ways of display and promotions. In short, the large supermarket chains have occupied a key position in the fast moving consumer goods industry. At the same time, the development has also brought the upgrading conflict between the retailers and the manufacturers. The most important dispute lays on the rationality of slotting allowance. In 2003, Shanghai See & Nut Roasters Roasters Association was reported that had a tense relation with Carrefour because of slotting allowance, which attracted the concerns of media and academia. Some people think that it is a reasonable result of competing for the limited shelf space among large number of products, which is conducive to efficiency improvement. While others think that the slotting allowance reflects supermarkets’market forces, which causes the increase of wholesale and retail prices. Ultimately the consumers’welfare is harmed. For the dispute above, the different governments hold different attitudes.
In fact, there are objective reasons and economic foundation for slotting allowances. Industrial practice proves it has a variety of charging mechanisms. Besides the wholesales price, retail price, and the coordination between slotting allowance and traditional sales profit, the charging mechanism will also influence the existence conditions and functions of slotting allowances as well as benefits distribution and social welfare.
With the research perspective of problem-oriented, this dissertation is focus on the charging mechanism of slotting allowance. Based on the market structure and characteristics of supermarkets, it constructs some reasonable models by appling of standardized modern industrial organization theory, auction theory and information economics to analyze the existence conditions, functions, influencing factors, social welfare of slotting allowance in different charging mechanisms. All in all, this dissertation research two important issues: first is the rationality of slotting allowance; second is that which mechanisms can improve social efficiency.
The major work can be summarized as follows:
(1) With the changing of market environment and supermarkets’development, defining the charging principal of slotting allowance as large supermarkets; discussing the characteristics of large supermarket through the comparison with department stores, professional stores, general supermarkets and convenience stores; analyzing the reasons and basis of slotting allowance according the practice; classifying its contents, describing and comparing some common charging mechanisms so as to provide the necessary foundation for the subsequent chapters.
(2) Researching the existence conditions of slotting allowance through the dual-bargainning model which is based on the factors such as network effects and sales cost; discussing the function and influence from the perspective of profit distribution and consumers welfare; analyzing the relationship between slotting allowance and bargaining power with different bargaining power and sales cost; studying the problem of the manufactures’uneven cost-sharing due to different bargaining power.
(3) Researching the impact of rebate proportion on sales effort, price, demand and each market participant based on the sales effort and efficiency; analyzing the influence factors and general function of slotting allowance with rebate mechanism; discussing the endogenous of rebate proportion with different principals; analyzing the choice of charging mechanism for different firms with the comparison of market equilibrium.
(4) Analyzing the impact of high-quality shelf on retail price, demand, and profit with demand function which is based on the influence of shelf for consumers’utility; discussing the possibility, existence conditions and functions of slotting allowance in the perspective of the participation constraint as well as the sharing of opportunity cost; comparing the different results of the shelf allocation and its social welfare in charging or not charging slotting allowance through the model expansion.
(5) Analyzing the necessity and rationality of slotting allowance from the perspective of manufacturers and supermarket; calculating high-quality shelf’s value for different manufacturers to discuss the bid of the manufactures and the allocation results under second-price auction mechanism; comparing the effectiveness of allocation results between the bargaining mechanism and auction mechanism.
(6) Proving some findings with the price adjustment of some goods; exploring the slotting allowance dispute through two typical cases; comparing policies in major countries; commenting on the policies themselves and effectiveness; putting forward the premises, principles and some specific recommendations according to the previous conclusions and the existing policies.
The main innovations of this dissertation are:
(1) Based on bargaining mechanism, this dissertation constructs dual-bargaining model through introducing network effect and sales cost to research the existence conditions, functions and welfare effects of lump-sum charging, which brings the conclusion not fully consistent with the traditional market forces theory: the slotting allowance reflected the market force of supermarket, but lump-sum fee is only the profit-shifting among the channel members, which is similar to fix cost and will not affect the retail prices and consumer welfare.
(2) Based on rebate mechanism, this dissertation constructs endogenous model of rebate proportion through introducing markets’sales effort and efficiency to research the function and welfare effects of slotting allowance with rebate mechanism, which brings the conclusion against the traditional market forces theory: the slotting allowance can encourage supermarket to pay more sales effort with rebate mechanism, so the manufacturer is willing to pay the appropriate fee even when the rebate proportion is decided by itself. Furthermore, with the improvement of sales efficiency, the rebate proportion increases, which can enlarge the sales and increase consumer surplus.
(3) Based on the auction mechanism and bargaining mechanism, this dissertation constructs incomplete information game model through introducing market effects and competion effects of high-quality shelf, which brings the conclusion not fully consistent with the traditional efficiency theory: in the competition and allocation of shelf, the slotting allowance with bargarning mechanism can not ensure the low-cost manufactures access to high-quality shelf, while the auction mechanism can optimize the scarce resource which is more efficient in shelf allocation.
(4) On the basis of comparison among the three charging mechanisms mentioned above, this dissertation puts forward a view which is totally inconsistent with the traditional conclusions: Overall, the slotting allowance will not damage social welfare, to the opposite, it may improve social welfare sometimes. But the rebate mechasim and auction mechanism are more efficient compared with bargaining mechanism, which means that the welfare effect of slotting allowance is mainly decided by its charging mechanism. This finding tells us that the main problem in practice is not the rationality of slotting allowance, but how to charge.
事实上,通道费的产生和应用是有其客观原因和基础的,在产业实践中也有多种收费机制。不同的收费机制不仅会影响产品批发价、零售价,以及通道费与产品销售利润之间的协调关系,同时还会进一步影响通道费的存在条件、功能作用,以及参与主体的利益分配和福利效果。
本文基于问题导向的研究视角,以通道费的收费机制为核心,在把握超市市场结构和特征的基础上,利用规范的现代产业组织理论、拍卖理论和信息经济学,构建合理的数量模型,通过分析不同收费机制下通道费的存在条件、功能、影响因素和社会福利等,集中研究了两个方面的问题:一是超市收取通道费的合理性问题;二是哪些收费机制更能改进社会效率。
本文的主要研究工作可归纳如下:
(1)以市场环境的变化和超市的发展为背景,界定通道费的收费主体——大型超市,通过与百货店、专业店、一般超市和便利店等其他零售业态的比较,讨论大型超市的特征;从产业现实出发,初步分析通道费产生的客观原因和基础;对通道费的收费内容进行了分类,阐述和比较了几种常用的收费机制,为以后各章理论研究提供必要的前提和基础。
(2)引入网络效应和销售成本等因素,利用双重讨价还价模型,研究通道费存在的条件,并从渠道成员利润分配以及消费者福利的角度讨论了通道费的一般功能和影响;通过模型扩展,结合不同制造商的谈判能力和不同产品的销售成本,进一步分析通道费与谈判能力的关系,讨论通道费的具体作用;在销售成本对称的条件下,研究了因谈判能力不同而产生的制造商成本分担不均的问题。
(3)引入超市的销售努力和销售效率,研究事后返点的收费机制下返点比例对超市销售努力、市场价格、市场销量,以及各市场主体利益的影响;分析了返点机制下通道费的影响因素与一般功能;基于不同的定价主体讨论了返点比例的内生机制;通过比较不同收费机制下的市场均衡,分析了不同厂商对收费机制的选择。
(4)以货架对消费者效用的影响机制为基础,构建了相应的需求函数,分析了货架对零售价格、市场销量、厂商利润的影响;以谈判机制为基础,从制造商和超市的参与约束以及机会成本分担的角度出发,讨论通道费的可能性、存在的条件及其功能;在制造商成本和谈判能力不对称的情况下对模型进行了扩展,比较了收取通道费和不收取通道费时的货架分配结果,以及相应的消费者福利。
(5)以成本信息不对称为前提,从制造商竞争优质货架和超市合理分配货架的角度分析通道费的必要性与合理性;以优质货架对不同制造商的价值为基础,讨论二价拍卖的货架分配机制下各制造商的通道费报价,货架竞争结果及其有效性;在不完全信息条件下,分析了基于谈判机制的优质货架分配结果,并从有效性出发与货架拍卖机制进行比较。
(6)利用部分商品市场价格的变化初步检验了理论研究的部分结论。以两个典型案例为背景分析了通道费争端的焦点;比较了主要国家的通道费政策,并对政策本身和政策效果进行了评述;根据理论研究结论和产业实践,初步提出了通道费政策的前提、原则和一些具体建议。
本文的主要创新点有:
(1)以谈判机制为基础,引入网络效应和销售成本,构建双重讨价还价模型,研究了事前一次性收费机制下通道费的存在条件、功能与福利效应,得到了与传统市场力量理论不完全一致的观点:虽然通道费的应用是超市市场力量的体现,但是一次性收费机制下的通道费仅仅是制造商和超市之间的利润转移,对制造商而言相当于固定成本,不会影响价格和消费者福利。
(2)以返点机制为基础,引入超市销售努力与销售效率,构建返点比例的内生性模型,研究了事后返点收费机制下通道费的功能与福利效应,得到了与传统市场力量理论完全相反的结论:在返点机制下,通道费的应用可以激励超市付出更大的销售努力,因此即使是制造商主导定价,它也会主动提供一定的采购返点。而且随着超市销售效率的改进,返点比例提高,市场销量扩大,消费者剩余增加。
(3)以拍卖机制和谈判机制为基础,引入优质货架所产生的市场效应和竞争效应,构建不完全信息博弈模型,研究了谈判机制和拍卖机制对货架分配结果的影响及其福利效应,得到了与传统效率理论不完全一致的观点:在货架的竞争和分配中,谈判机制下的通道费并不能确保低成本制造商获得优质货架;相对而言,拍卖机制能够优化配置稀缺的货架资源,是更具社会效率的货架分配机制。
(4)通过对上述三种收费机制进行比较,本文得到了与传统研究结论不一致的观点:超市收取通道费的行为总体上并不会损害社会福利,有时甚至还能改进社会福利。但是从不同的收费机制来看,返点机制和货架拍卖机制相对谈判机制而言更具社会效率,即通道费的福利效果主要依赖于收费机制。这意味着实践中的主要问题不是通道费该不该收,而是如何收。
The key factor in competition for traditional manufacturing has changed with the arrival of buyer's market. Especially for the firms which are major in fast moving consumer goods industry, they must not only compete in product quality but also seize the efficient sales channels. Practice shows that today's large supermarkets have become the main sales channel of fast moving consumer goods and have played the essential role in market expansion and profitability increasing for manufacturers. So the status of supermarkets particularly the large supermarkets has been improved and their market forces are also growing in the entire channels. Furthermore, the supermarkets can also affect the purchasing desion and consumer surplus based on the retail price as well as different ways of display and promotions. In short, the large supermarket chains have occupied a key position in the fast moving consumer goods industry. At the same time, the development has also brought the upgrading conflict between the retailers and the manufacturers. The most important dispute lays on the rationality of slotting allowance. In 2003, Shanghai See & Nut Roasters Roasters Association was reported that had a tense relation with Carrefour because of slotting allowance, which attracted the concerns of media and academia. Some people think that it is a reasonable result of competing for the limited shelf space among large number of products, which is conducive to efficiency improvement. While others think that the slotting allowance reflects supermarkets’market forces, which causes the increase of wholesale and retail prices. Ultimately the consumers’welfare is harmed. For the dispute above, the different governments hold different attitudes.
In fact, there are objective reasons and economic foundation for slotting allowances. Industrial practice proves it has a variety of charging mechanisms. Besides the wholesales price, retail price, and the coordination between slotting allowance and traditional sales profit, the charging mechanism will also influence the existence conditions and functions of slotting allowances as well as benefits distribution and social welfare.
With the research perspective of problem-oriented, this dissertation is focus on the charging mechanism of slotting allowance. Based on the market structure and characteristics of supermarkets, it constructs some reasonable models by appling of standardized modern industrial organization theory, auction theory and information economics to analyze the existence conditions, functions, influencing factors, social welfare of slotting allowance in different charging mechanisms. All in all, this dissertation research two important issues: first is the rationality of slotting allowance; second is that which mechanisms can improve social efficiency.
The major work can be summarized as follows:
(1) With the changing of market environment and supermarkets’development, defining the charging principal of slotting allowance as large supermarkets; discussing the characteristics of large supermarket through the comparison with department stores, professional stores, general supermarkets and convenience stores; analyzing the reasons and basis of slotting allowance according the practice; classifying its contents, describing and comparing some common charging mechanisms so as to provide the necessary foundation for the subsequent chapters.
(2) Researching the existence conditions of slotting allowance through the dual-bargainning model which is based on the factors such as network effects and sales cost; discussing the function and influence from the perspective of profit distribution and consumers welfare; analyzing the relationship between slotting allowance and bargaining power with different bargaining power and sales cost; studying the problem of the manufactures’uneven cost-sharing due to different bargaining power.
(3) Researching the impact of rebate proportion on sales effort, price, demand and each market participant based on the sales effort and efficiency; analyzing the influence factors and general function of slotting allowance with rebate mechanism; discussing the endogenous of rebate proportion with different principals; analyzing the choice of charging mechanism for different firms with the comparison of market equilibrium.
(4) Analyzing the impact of high-quality shelf on retail price, demand, and profit with demand function which is based on the influence of shelf for consumers’utility; discussing the possibility, existence conditions and functions of slotting allowance in the perspective of the participation constraint as well as the sharing of opportunity cost; comparing the different results of the shelf allocation and its social welfare in charging or not charging slotting allowance through the model expansion.
(5) Analyzing the necessity and rationality of slotting allowance from the perspective of manufacturers and supermarket; calculating high-quality shelf’s value for different manufacturers to discuss the bid of the manufactures and the allocation results under second-price auction mechanism; comparing the effectiveness of allocation results between the bargaining mechanism and auction mechanism.
(6) Proving some findings with the price adjustment of some goods; exploring the slotting allowance dispute through two typical cases; comparing policies in major countries; commenting on the policies themselves and effectiveness; putting forward the premises, principles and some specific recommendations according to the previous conclusions and the existing policies.
The main innovations of this dissertation are:
(1) Based on bargaining mechanism, this dissertation constructs dual-bargaining model through introducing network effect and sales cost to research the existence conditions, functions and welfare effects of lump-sum charging, which brings the conclusion not fully consistent with the traditional market forces theory: the slotting allowance reflected the market force of supermarket, but lump-sum fee is only the profit-shifting among the channel members, which is similar to fix cost and will not affect the retail prices and consumer welfare.
(2) Based on rebate mechanism, this dissertation constructs endogenous model of rebate proportion through introducing markets’sales effort and efficiency to research the function and welfare effects of slotting allowance with rebate mechanism, which brings the conclusion against the traditional market forces theory: the slotting allowance can encourage supermarket to pay more sales effort with rebate mechanism, so the manufacturer is willing to pay the appropriate fee even when the rebate proportion is decided by itself. Furthermore, with the improvement of sales efficiency, the rebate proportion increases, which can enlarge the sales and increase consumer surplus.
(3) Based on the auction mechanism and bargaining mechanism, this dissertation constructs incomplete information game model through introducing market effects and competion effects of high-quality shelf, which brings the conclusion not fully consistent with the traditional efficiency theory: in the competition and allocation of shelf, the slotting allowance with bargarning mechanism can not ensure the low-cost manufactures access to high-quality shelf, while the auction mechanism can optimize the scarce resource which is more efficient in shelf allocation.
(4) On the basis of comparison among the three charging mechanisms mentioned above, this dissertation puts forward a view which is totally inconsistent with the traditional conclusions: Overall, the slotting allowance will not damage social welfare, to the opposite, it may improve social welfare sometimes. But the rebate mechasim and auction mechanism are more efficient compared with bargaining mechanism, which means that the welfare effect of slotting allowance is mainly decided by its charging mechanism. This finding tells us that the main problem in practice is not the rationality of slotting allowance, but how to charge.
引文
1. Aalbers, Judd. Slotting in the Retail Grocery Business: Does It Violate the Public Policy Goal of Protecting Businesses Against Price Discrimination? DePaul Law Review, 40: 397-416.
2. Aliavadi, Borin. Market Power and Performance: A Cross-Industry Analysis of Manufacturers and Retailers. Journal of Retailing, 1995, 03: 211-248.
3. Armstrong. The Theory of Access Pricing and Interconnection. Handbook of Telecommunications Economics: Volume 1, 2002.
4. Anderson, Renault. Pricing, Product Diversity, and Search Costs. The RAND Journal of Economics, 1999, 04: 719-735.
5. Bagwell, Garey Ramey. Coordination Economies, Advertising, and Search Behavior in Retail Markets. The American Economic Review, 1994, 03: 498-517.
6. Becker. A Note on Restaurant Pricing and Other Examples of Social Influences on Prices. Journal of industrial organization, 1990, 08: 1109-1116.
7. Benjamin, Joshua. The Economics of Slotting Contracts. The Journal of Law and Economics, 2007, 08: 421-454.
8. Bester. Bargaining, Search Costs and Equilibrium Price Distributions. The Review of Economic Studies, 1988, 02: 201-214.
9. Bloom, Perry. Retailer Power and Supplier Welfare: The Case of Wal-Mart. Journal of Retailing, 2001, 77: 379-396.
10. Bontems, Mechemache. Bargaining and slotting allowances in vertical contracting with externalities. Working paper, 2003, University of Toulouse.
11. Buzzell, Quelch. The Costly Bargain of Trade Promotion. Harvard Business Review, 1990,68: 141-149.
12. Cannon, Bloom. Slotting Allowances and Fees: Schools of Thought and the Views of Practicing Managers. Journal of Marketing, 2000, 02: 92-108.
13. Chen. Oligopoly price discrimination and resale price maintenance. The RAND Journal of Economics, 1999, 03: 441-455.
14. Chen. Dominant Retailers and Countervailing-Power Hypothesis. The RAND Journal of Economics, 2003, 04: 612-625.
15. Choi. Price Competition in a Channel Structure with a Common Retailer. Marketing Science, 1991,04: 271-296.
16. Choi. Price Competition in a Duopoly Common Retailer Channel. Journal of Retailing, 1996,02: 117-134.
17. Chu. Demand Signalling and Screening in Channels of Distribution. Marketing Science, 1992, 04: 327-347.
18. Chu, Messinger. Product Proliferation, Slotting Allowances, and Information: Sources of Retailer Clout. Working paper, 1993, University of Alberta, Edmonton, Alberta, Canada.
19. Chu, Srinivasan. Demand signaling under unobservable effort in franchising: Linear and nonlinear price contracts. Management Science, 10: 1608-1623.
20. Chu, Wujin. Demand Signaling and Screening in Channels of Distribution, Marketing Science, 1992, 04: 327-347.
21. Dagnoli, Freeman. Marketers Seek Slotting Fee Truce: New Promotions Would Help Retailer. Advertising Age, 1988, 12: 68.
22. David. New Product Distribution: An Analysis of Supermarket Buyer Decisions. Journal of Market Research, 1975, 12: 255-264.
23. Deloitte&Touche. Managing the Process of Introducing and Deleting Products in theGrocery and Drug Industry, Washington, D.C.: Grocery Manufacturers of America, 1990.
24. Desai. Multiple Messages to Retain Retailers: Signaling New product Demand. Marketing Science, 2000, 04: 381-389.
25. Desiraju. New Product Introductions, Slotting Allowances, and Retailer Discretion. Journal of Retailing, 2001, 77: 335-358.
26. Economides, Katsamakas. Two-Sided Competition of Proprietary vs Open Source Technology Platforms and the Implications for the Software Industry. Management Science, 2006, 52: 1057-1071.
27. Erdem, Harrison-Walker. Managing Channel Relationships: Toward an Identification of Effective Promotional Strategies in Vertical Marketing Systems. Journal of Marketing Theory and Practice, 1997, 05: 80-87.
28. Federal Trade Commission Guides. Guides for Advertising Allowances and Other Merchandising Payments and Services. Washington, DC: Federal Trade Commission, 1990.
29. Federal Trade Commission. Report on the Federal Trade Commission Workshop on Slotting Allowances and Other Marketing Practices in the Grocery Industry, 2001.
30. Fisher, Franklin. Games Economists Play: A Non-cooperative View. RAND Journal of Economics, 1989, 20: 113-129.
31. Foros, Kind. Do Slotting Allowance Harm Retail Competition? Working paper, 2006, CESifo.
32. Foros, Kind. Slotting Allowances and Manufacturers’Retail Sales Effort. Working paper, 2008, CESifo.
33. Frazier, Lassar. Determinants of Distribution Intensity. Journal of Marketing, 1996, 04: 39-51.
34. Freeman. Paying for Retail Shelf Space. Advertising Age, 1986, 02.
35. Freeman, Myers. Grocery Fee Hampers New Product Launches. Advertising Age, 1987, 24: 01.
36. Gabrielsen. Slotting Allowance and Buy-Back Clauses. Working Paper, 2005, Institute for Research in Economics and Business Administration Bergen.
37. Gaski. The Theory of Power and Conflict in Channels of Distribution. Journal of Marketing, 1984, 03: 09-29.
38. Gerstner, Hess. Pull Promotions and Channel Coordination. Marketing Science, 1995, 01: 43-60.
39. Griffith, Krampf. Emerging Trends in US Retailing. Long Range Planning, 1997, 30: 847-852.
40. Hall. For New Food Products, Entry Fee is High. NY Times, 1988, 01.
41. Hamilton. Slotting Allowances as a Facilitating Practice by Food Processors in Wholesales Grocery Markets: Profitability and Welfare Effects. American Journal of Agricultural Economics,2006, 85: 797-813.
42. Harps, Hansen, Thayer. FTC is Investigating Exclusive Dealing. Frozen Food Age, 1997, 10: 68-78.
43. Innes, Hamilton. Naked Slotting Fees for Vertical Control of Multi-Product Retail Markets. Internatioal Journal of Industrial Organization, 2006, 24: 303-318.
44. Isaac, Lawrence. The Derived Demand for Advertising: A Theoretical and Empirical Investigation. American Economic Review, 1988, 72: 366-388.
45. Jennifer. A Simple Model of Equilibrium Price Dispersion. The Journal of Political Economy, 1979, 04: 851-858.
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50. Kuksov, Pazgal. The Effects of Costs and Competition on Slotting Allowances. Working paper, 2005, Washington University.
51. Lal. Improving Channel Coordination through Franchising. Marketing Science, 1990, 04: 299-318.
52. Lariviere, Martin, Padmanabhan. Slotting Allowances and New Product Introductions. Marketing Science, 1997, 02: 112-128.
53. Lee, Staelin. Vertical Strategic Interaction: Implications for Channel Pricing Strategy. Marketing Science, 1997, 03: 185-207.
54. Lucas, Allison. Shelf Wars. Sales &Marketing Management, 1996, 03: 121.
55. MacAvoy, Christopher. Antitrust Treatment of Slotting Allowances. Paper presented at ABA Section of Antitrust Law, Washington, DC
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57. Marx, Shaffer. Upfront payments and exclusion in downstream markets. The RAND Journal of Economics, 2007, 03: 823-843.
58. McCabe, Harry. Slotting Allowances, Past and Future: A Panel Discussion. Paper presented at 1996 Marketing and Public Policy Conference, 1996.
59. McLaughlin, Rao. The Strategic Role of Supermarket Buyer Intermediaries in New Product Selection: Implications for Systemwide Efficiency. American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 1990, 02: 358-370.
60. Messinger, Naresimhan. Has Power Shifted in the Grocery Channel? Marketing Science, 1995, 14: 189-223.
61. Myerson, Roger. Optimal Auction Design. Mathematics of Operations Research, 1981, 01: 58-73.
62. Navon, Shy. Product Differentiation in the Presence of Positive and Negative Network Effects. Working paper, 1995, Center for Economic Policy Research.
63. Patterson M. and Richards J. Produce Marketing and Retail Buying Practices. Review of Agricultural Economics, 2000,01: 160-171.
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65. Rao, Hall. Are Slotting Allowances Efficiency-Enhancing or Anti-Competitive? Working paper, 2005, Yale School of Management
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67. Redman, Russell. FTC Hearing News Program Focus on Slotting Allowance. Supermarket News, 1995, 45: 04.
68. Reinganum. A Simple Model of Equilibrium Price Dispersion. The Journal of Political Economy, 1979, 04: 851-858.
69. Richard. Supermarkets Demand Food Firms’Payments Just to Get on the shelf. Wall St J, 1988, 08.
70. Richards, Patterson. Slotting Allowances as Real Options: An Alternative Explanation. Journal of Business, 2004, 77: 675-696.
71. Riley, John, Samuelson.1981. Optimal Auctions. American Economic Review, 1981, 03: 381-392.
72. Rochet, Tirole. Two-Sided Markets: A Process Report. Working paper, 2005, IDEI University of Toulouse.
73. Rochet, Tirole. Platform Competition in Two-Sided Markets. Journal of European Economics Association, 2003, 01: 990-1029.
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2. Aliavadi, Borin. Market Power and Performance: A Cross-Industry Analysis of Manufacturers and Retailers. Journal of Retailing, 1995, 03: 211-248.
3. Armstrong. The Theory of Access Pricing and Interconnection. Handbook of Telecommunications Economics: Volume 1, 2002.
4. Anderson, Renault. Pricing, Product Diversity, and Search Costs. The RAND Journal of Economics, 1999, 04: 719-735.
5. Bagwell, Garey Ramey. Coordination Economies, Advertising, and Search Behavior in Retail Markets. The American Economic Review, 1994, 03: 498-517.
6. Becker. A Note on Restaurant Pricing and Other Examples of Social Influences on Prices. Journal of industrial organization, 1990, 08: 1109-1116.
7. Benjamin, Joshua. The Economics of Slotting Contracts. The Journal of Law and Economics, 2007, 08: 421-454.
8. Bester. Bargaining, Search Costs and Equilibrium Price Distributions. The Review of Economic Studies, 1988, 02: 201-214.
9. Bloom, Perry. Retailer Power and Supplier Welfare: The Case of Wal-Mart. Journal of Retailing, 2001, 77: 379-396.
10. Bontems, Mechemache. Bargaining and slotting allowances in vertical contracting with externalities. Working paper, 2003, University of Toulouse.
11. Buzzell, Quelch. The Costly Bargain of Trade Promotion. Harvard Business Review, 1990,68: 141-149.
12. Cannon, Bloom. Slotting Allowances and Fees: Schools of Thought and the Views of Practicing Managers. Journal of Marketing, 2000, 02: 92-108.
13. Chen. Oligopoly price discrimination and resale price maintenance. The RAND Journal of Economics, 1999, 03: 441-455.
14. Chen. Dominant Retailers and Countervailing-Power Hypothesis. The RAND Journal of Economics, 2003, 04: 612-625.
15. Choi. Price Competition in a Channel Structure with a Common Retailer. Marketing Science, 1991,04: 271-296.
16. Choi. Price Competition in a Duopoly Common Retailer Channel. Journal of Retailing, 1996,02: 117-134.
17. Chu. Demand Signalling and Screening in Channels of Distribution. Marketing Science, 1992, 04: 327-347.
18. Chu, Messinger. Product Proliferation, Slotting Allowances, and Information: Sources of Retailer Clout. Working paper, 1993, University of Alberta, Edmonton, Alberta, Canada.
19. Chu, Srinivasan. Demand signaling under unobservable effort in franchising: Linear and nonlinear price contracts. Management Science, 10: 1608-1623.
20. Chu, Wujin. Demand Signaling and Screening in Channels of Distribution, Marketing Science, 1992, 04: 327-347.
21. Dagnoli, Freeman. Marketers Seek Slotting Fee Truce: New Promotions Would Help Retailer. Advertising Age, 1988, 12: 68.
22. David. New Product Distribution: An Analysis of Supermarket Buyer Decisions. Journal of Market Research, 1975, 12: 255-264.
23. Deloitte&Touche. Managing the Process of Introducing and Deleting Products in theGrocery and Drug Industry, Washington, D.C.: Grocery Manufacturers of America, 1990.
24. Desai. Multiple Messages to Retain Retailers: Signaling New product Demand. Marketing Science, 2000, 04: 381-389.
25. Desiraju. New Product Introductions, Slotting Allowances, and Retailer Discretion. Journal of Retailing, 2001, 77: 335-358.
26. Economides, Katsamakas. Two-Sided Competition of Proprietary vs Open Source Technology Platforms and the Implications for the Software Industry. Management Science, 2006, 52: 1057-1071.
27. Erdem, Harrison-Walker. Managing Channel Relationships: Toward an Identification of Effective Promotional Strategies in Vertical Marketing Systems. Journal of Marketing Theory and Practice, 1997, 05: 80-87.
28. Federal Trade Commission Guides. Guides for Advertising Allowances and Other Merchandising Payments and Services. Washington, DC: Federal Trade Commission, 1990.
29. Federal Trade Commission. Report on the Federal Trade Commission Workshop on Slotting Allowances and Other Marketing Practices in the Grocery Industry, 2001.
30. Fisher, Franklin. Games Economists Play: A Non-cooperative View. RAND Journal of Economics, 1989, 20: 113-129.
31. Foros, Kind. Do Slotting Allowance Harm Retail Competition? Working paper, 2006, CESifo.
32. Foros, Kind. Slotting Allowances and Manufacturers’Retail Sales Effort. Working paper, 2008, CESifo.
33. Frazier, Lassar. Determinants of Distribution Intensity. Journal of Marketing, 1996, 04: 39-51.
34. Freeman. Paying for Retail Shelf Space. Advertising Age, 1986, 02.
35. Freeman, Myers. Grocery Fee Hampers New Product Launches. Advertising Age, 1987, 24: 01.
36. Gabrielsen. Slotting Allowance and Buy-Back Clauses. Working Paper, 2005, Institute for Research in Economics and Business Administration Bergen.
37. Gaski. The Theory of Power and Conflict in Channels of Distribution. Journal of Marketing, 1984, 03: 09-29.
38. Gerstner, Hess. Pull Promotions and Channel Coordination. Marketing Science, 1995, 01: 43-60.
39. Griffith, Krampf. Emerging Trends in US Retailing. Long Range Planning, 1997, 30: 847-852.
40. Hall. For New Food Products, Entry Fee is High. NY Times, 1988, 01.
41. Hamilton. Slotting Allowances as a Facilitating Practice by Food Processors in Wholesales Grocery Markets: Profitability and Welfare Effects. American Journal of Agricultural Economics,2006, 85: 797-813.
42. Harps, Hansen, Thayer. FTC is Investigating Exclusive Dealing. Frozen Food Age, 1997, 10: 68-78.
43. Innes, Hamilton. Naked Slotting Fees for Vertical Control of Multi-Product Retail Markets. Internatioal Journal of Industrial Organization, 2006, 24: 303-318.
44. Isaac, Lawrence. The Derived Demand for Advertising: A Theoretical and Empirical Investigation. American Economic Review, 1988, 72: 366-388.
45. Jennifer. A Simple Model of Equilibrium Price Dispersion. The Journal of Political Economy, 1979, 04: 851-858.
46. Kalwani, Narayandas. Long-term Manufacturer-Supplier Relationships: Do They Pay Off for Supplier Firms? Journal of Marketing, 1995, 59: 01-16.
47. Kelly, Kenneth. The Antitrust Analysis of Grocery Slotting Allowances: The Procompetitive Case. Journal of public Policy&Marketing, 01: 187-198.
48. Kim, Staelin. Retail Power: Is it an Illusion? An Analytic Modeling Approach. Working paper, 1996, Fuqua School of Business, Duke University.
49. Kirmani, Rao. No Pain, No Gain: A Critical Review of the Literature on Signaling Unobservable Product Quality. The Journal of Marketing, 02: 66-79.
50. Kuksov, Pazgal. The Effects of Costs and Competition on Slotting Allowances. Working paper, 2005, Washington University.
51. Lal. Improving Channel Coordination through Franchising. Marketing Science, 1990, 04: 299-318.
52. Lariviere, Martin, Padmanabhan. Slotting Allowances and New Product Introductions. Marketing Science, 1997, 02: 112-128.
53. Lee, Staelin. Vertical Strategic Interaction: Implications for Channel Pricing Strategy. Marketing Science, 1997, 03: 185-207.
54. Lucas, Allison. Shelf Wars. Sales &Marketing Management, 1996, 03: 121.
55. MacAvoy, Christopher. Antitrust Treatment of Slotting Allowances. Paper presented at ABA Section of Antitrust Law, Washington, DC
56. Macleod, Malcomson. Contract Bargaining with Symmetric Information. Canadian Journal of Economics, 1995, 28: 336-367.
57. Marx, Shaffer. Upfront payments and exclusion in downstream markets. The RAND Journal of Economics, 2007, 03: 823-843.
58. McCabe, Harry. Slotting Allowances, Past and Future: A Panel Discussion. Paper presented at 1996 Marketing and Public Policy Conference, 1996.
59. McLaughlin, Rao. The Strategic Role of Supermarket Buyer Intermediaries in New Product Selection: Implications for Systemwide Efficiency. American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 1990, 02: 358-370.
60. Messinger, Naresimhan. Has Power Shifted in the Grocery Channel? Marketing Science, 1995, 14: 189-223.
61. Myerson, Roger. Optimal Auction Design. Mathematics of Operations Research, 1981, 01: 58-73.
62. Navon, Shy. Product Differentiation in the Presence of Positive and Negative Network Effects. Working paper, 1995, Center for Economic Policy Research.
63. Patterson M. and Richards J. Produce Marketing and Retail Buying Practices. Review of Agricultural Economics, 2000,01: 160-171.
64. Prevor. Dictates from retailers. Produce Business, 2000, 08.
65. Rao, Hall. Are Slotting Allowances Efficiency-Enhancing or Anti-Competitive? Working paper, 2005, Yale School of Management
66. Rao, Mahi. The price of Launching a New Product: Empirical Evidence on Factors Affecting the Relative Magnitude of Slotting Allowances. Marketing Science, 2003, 22: 1-23.
67. Redman, Russell. FTC Hearing News Program Focus on Slotting Allowance. Supermarket News, 1995, 45: 04.
68. Reinganum. A Simple Model of Equilibrium Price Dispersion. The Journal of Political Economy, 1979, 04: 851-858.
69. Richard. Supermarkets Demand Food Firms’Payments Just to Get on the shelf. Wall St J, 1988, 08.
70. Richards, Patterson. Slotting Allowances as Real Options: An Alternative Explanation. Journal of Business, 2004, 77: 675-696.
71. Riley, John, Samuelson.1981. Optimal Auctions. American Economic Review, 1981, 03: 381-392.
72. Rochet, Tirole. Two-Sided Markets: A Process Report. Working paper, 2005, IDEI University of Toulouse.
73. Rochet, Tirole. Platform Competition in Two-Sided Markets. Journal of European Economics Association, 2003, 01: 990-1029.
74. Shaffer. Slotting Allowances and Retail Price Maintenance: A Comparison of Facilitating Practice. RAND Journal of Economics, 1991, 01: 120-135.
75. Shaffer. Slotting Allowances and Optimal Product Variety. Working paper, 2005, Advances in Economic Analysis & Policy, Berkeley Electronic Press.
76. in Economic Analysis & Policy, Berkeley Electronic Press.
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