我国民营银行准入—退出机制研究
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摘要
本文将产业经济学中的产业组织理论应用到民营银行的研究中,从民营银行的市场准入与退出壁垒入手,通过定性和定量分析相结合的方式,探究我国银行业监管在民营银行准入-退出监管中存在的不足,继而对完善我国市场化的民营银行市场准入-退出机制提出构想。
首先,利用结构法中SCP范式研究我国银行业结构,按照贝恩的市场结构分类,发现我国2000-2009这10年间市场结构从垄断竞争Ⅲ型发展到垄断竞争Ⅳ,竞争程度明显增强,进而提高银行业整体绩效水平。其次,利用结构法中PR模型对我国银行业竞争程度进行考察,并分别对国有银行和股份制银行进行回归分析,得出结论:民营资本进入银行业会带来行业整体竞争度的提高,进而带来市场绩效的增强。最后,提出完善我国民营银行准入-退出机制,引导民营资本进入银行业的现实选择是现有金融机构的存量改革,对民营银行实行分级牌照管理。另外,还需要建立健全相关法律,完善最后贷款人制度,建设存款准备金制度,推进利率市场化等。
Private banks have been a hot topic in financial circles, problems associated with definition of private bank, real path, access time, exit mechanism and other related issues have been much heated discussed. With the development of private economy in China, solving the bottleneck of private economy financing and optimizing financing structures have become an important issue to maintain the sustainable development of our country's economy; at the same time, accumulation of private enterprise overflow year by year has infiltrated to the private sector lending activities. As a response to the incompetent channels of formal financing, the underground financial activities are developing rapidly. But because it has been beyond the country's regulatory regime for a very long time, during which it was accompanied with loan-sharking and illegal activities, a good clear channel is in urgent need. After the accession to the WTO, China committed the full liberalization of financial industry. As to obtain the same national treatment with foreign investment, private capital tried to enter the banking industry, using their own advantages, to join the development with the state-owned banks and foreign banks. In this situation, strengthening competition in China's banking system, constructing diversify ownership structure of banking system, at the same time, preventing the occurrence and spread of financial crisis, perfecting the access - exit mechanism of private banking market is on the agenda. It is worthy of further study and discussion about what is a private bank, the reasons of developing private banks, the selection of practical path of developing private banks, and how to improve the access-exit mechanism of private banking market.
This paper uses the industrial organization theory of industry economics, starting from the private banking market access and exit barriers, to investigate the deficiencies in access-exit banking supervision of private banks, through the combined method of qualitative and quantitative analysis, with reference to successful experience in foreign countries, proposes a concept of construction in access - exit mechanism of private bank. This dissertation is divided into seven chapters.
The first chapter is an introduction part, by studying the relevant literature, break through the limitations of studies before, this chapter starts from the nature of fame and wealth from the private capital proceeding, it believes that the fundamental purpose that private capital entering into banking industry is the monopoly profits of monopoly industries. Considering the particularity of banking industry, it is needed to set an access - exit barriers regulation, so that the private capital cannot freely go in and out, and excessive competition and risk externalities can be avoided. Whether to lead into private banks, it’s needed to specially analyze the structure of banking and the level of overall profitability the banking sector before solving the problem of how to build up private banks, and then discuss the access - exit mechanisms of private banking market in the following sections.
The second chapter is paper’s related concepts and theories. Firstly, it defines the scope of application of the private banks, industry economics, the concept of entry and exit barriers The definition of private banks mostly stresses“owned by people”, which means, the most important part is the component of property rights .The rights such as operate and income right, which are brought by property rights, are attributed to non-governmental and private, and oppose to state-owned, government-run. Thus, private banks are wholly-owned by non-state-owned capital or holdings, while management rights and beneficial interests and other property shall be owned by commercial banks of the capital owners. At the mean time, private banks, which are in the framework of "The Enterprise Law of People's Republic of China " and "The Commercial Banks Law of The People's Republic of China", should accept the supervision of relevant financial regulatory authorities. The private banking mentioned in this article is discussed following this definition.
According to Baume’s definition, remove the differentiation factors of economies and products in structural barriers of entry and the fixed species in absolute cost advantages, then bring in the institutional barriers. From the perspective of private banks in China, as potential entrants to the market, economies of scale and absolute cost advantages as the incumbent state-owned commercial banks, the efficiency of the rent exists. Reality in our country is that the institutional barriers of entry factors bring significant effects. Therefore, this study focused primarily on the use of Baume’s definition of entry barriers.
The third chapter empirically tests banking market concentration and market competition of China, using the structure of law SCP paradigm and non-institutional methods of PR model. According to econometric methods, from the perspective of the concentration, the article examines the market structure using the seller concentration ratio (CRn). Test results show that in 2000-2009 10 years, according to Bain's classification of market structure, banking market structure developed from monopolistic competition typeⅢto typeⅣ. Shareholding reformation in state-owned banks, opening up markets for foreign banks, and establishment of joint-stock banks believed to significantly reduce concentration of banking market in China. The structure of state-owned monopoly didn’t bring high yield. The establishment of joint-stock banks and foreign bank entry, the development of monopolistic competition, strengthen bank sector’s competition mechanism, increase management level. Continually using the conclusions of SCP theory, market structure’s impact on market performance can be in the way of reducing entry - exit mechanism, thus adjust the market structure, strengthen the market competition, and then increase profitability and operational efficiency.
In addition to market structure, other factors also affect competition, such as market contestability. Empirically test the 10 years banking competition level by using non-structural method PR model, concluds that, H-statistics range of China's banking sector is in monopolistic competition markets area. And then regression analysis of state-owned banks and joint-stock banks, it shows there is significant increases in banking competition, and this increases of state-owned bank is greater than in joint-stock banks, concluding that: private capital in banking industry can improve competition degree, while product and areas differentiation can reduce the possibility of over-competition.
Through comprehensive analysis of private banking market development, non-structural and structure method come to the same conclusion. In the 10-year period of 2000-2009, with the decline in market concentration, market competition rised, increasing the banking performance level. Market type was monopolistic competition, and competition was constantly increasing. Therefore, it further improved China's banking industry competition and reduced banking industry market concentration which helped increase banking performance level continually. Access mechanism of private banks would benefit the diversion of deposits and loans, reduce market concentration, enhance the banking competition, thus enhance the performance of the banking industry.
ChapterⅣis policy system changes of private bank accessing market. Since private capital first entered into the banking sector till currently pilot process of private bank, found that dominant politic barriers to private banks are gradually reduced, at the current period; private capital entering banking area is strongly encouraged
However, compared with the dominant politic barriers, there is a recessive politic barrier that is even more serious, which is mainly reflected in the concepts and systems. In the state-owned monopoly industry such as bank industry, state-owned enterprises grasp the huge vested interests, private capital, although lower access threshold, but the "glass door" phenomenon also need to be broken. In addition, private capital, as who want to enter the banking industry, need to approval, resist, obtain permit. During the specific activities, it needs to prevent from government setting up opportunities for rent, to avoid the recessive barriers under the political system loopholes.
Chapter V analyses bank’s withdrawal market practice through cases. Large state-owned commercial banks do not apply the market exit, in other practices of bank mergers, closing, dissolution and bankruptcy; reveal some problems of banking market withdrawal mechanism in China. Based on these we found the shortage of bank market withdrawal mechanism: firstly, lack of legal basis. There are no specific details of implementation. Related legal provisions are so dispersed that there is no legal system to be the basic formation; Secondly, government intervention in too deep during the withdrawal procedure. Government does not have functions to solve credit and debt, lack of the market awareness to organize banks’market withdraw ling. Risk cannot be reduced or distributed, and will pass onto the hosting companies. Thirdly, since most are passive market withdrawal caused by irregular operations or debt crisis, we should enhance national competitiveness of the financial sector, develop active market withdrawal which can enhance the competitive strength and growth potential, and expand market share. Fourthly, it is lack of cushioning and stability mechanism, which inhibits financial panic in a short term to refinance by the central bank, local governments and other political means. But for long-term view, we need deposit insurance system to diversify and buffer financial risk.
Chapter VI is learning from successful experience of foreign countries. Analyzed the banking market access mechanisms of the United States, Britain, Germany and Japan, we found that, first of all, there are universal and long-term existences of market access barriers, whose strength and institutional arrangements depend on economic development stage of a country. Secondly, adjustment of bank access mechanism should be put forward by financial needs, resulting in a natural development, rather than top-down directed regulators. An appropriate access mechanism comes from a result of natural games between banks and regulation governments. Finally, strengthen withdrawal mechanism go with reduction of access barriers. The reduction of banks’withdrawal goes with increase in access barriers. It needs continuously strengthen to lower the banking market access barriers in the banking market’s gradually open-up stage.
Study on problem bank’s market exit mechanism, we found that, firstly, there is a sound legal system to guarantee banking market exit mechanism’s legal basis. Secondly, authorize specialized organizations to implement banking supervision within the legal framework. Thirdly, a wide range of exit means. Fourthly, market-based deposit insurance system; deposit insurance system’s mainly meanings of Private Banking are: in certain economic conditions, to protect the interests of depositors and guard the public banks confidence, and strengthen supervision of banks. Fifthly, there is a right and ultimate goal of market withdrawal. Through a number of deposit insurance guarantees and incentives, developed market economic countries attract better-run financial institutions bid on the exit bank merger, reorganize poorly managed banks, enhance the operation strengths, expand market share, and then improve the operational efficiency as an overall objective.
Chapter VII is conception of access - withdrawal mechanism of private banking in China. It proposed that location selection of private banks should be in developed areas, positioning should be near a particular client groups within the community. The reality of market access path selection is guiding private capital to help stock reform of banking sector, take a gradual reform model, develop outside the system without touching the original premise of the economic system, avoid the loss of support resources in the system, keep the economy steady growth and maintain a smooth transition. Develop traffic building for the urge demand economic regions. Specific measures are as follows, firstly, for a relatively good conditions of local city commercial banks and rural credit cooperatives, absorb its private capital to transform and improve corporate governance and internal control mechanisms. Secondly, for most poor management of financial institutions which have values to be saved, modeled on the reform of state-owned banks, consider stripping a part of non-performing assets by the designated authorities of commitment and resolving by the central bank and local governments. Attract private capital to participate in the financial institutions reform by using of tax breaks, interest-free or low-interest loans and other measures. Encourage private investors to take over the problem institutions, injection of capital to operate again when it fits to regulatory standards later. Finally, for the urban credit cooperatives and rural credit cooperatives, which have a serious problem and too high cost to save, can take the market exit bankruptcy. If the local economic development needs, consider to establish new private banks.
Considering the frame design of access mechanism of private banks in China, it is thought that the timing depends on the government’s grasping of the macro-economic forms and the realization of total goals of economic. We should take a cautious attitude to control the speed of market access: On one side, remain cautious on the opening sequence of private banks; on the other side, promote some pilot of private banks. In addition, put the multi-level license system into practice to control the access concessions of the private banks. On the requirements of the main body of private banks market access, besides regulating the minimum capital, we should also use the present corporate governance structure to control the ratio of single equity, to prevent internal controlled association with loan risks.
On the design of exit mechanism of private banks, it needs to establish and improve relevant laws to authorize the executed department, perfect the system of last lender, construct the reserve system, and improve the system of bankruptcy liquidation. In addition, develop the related measures of private market access– exit mechanism, first of all, improve the supervision of legal system; Secondly, establish a risk warning system; Finally, promote interest rates market.
首先,利用结构法中SCP范式研究我国银行业结构,按照贝恩的市场结构分类,发现我国2000-2009这10年间市场结构从垄断竞争Ⅲ型发展到垄断竞争Ⅳ,竞争程度明显增强,进而提高银行业整体绩效水平。其次,利用结构法中PR模型对我国银行业竞争程度进行考察,并分别对国有银行和股份制银行进行回归分析,得出结论:民营资本进入银行业会带来行业整体竞争度的提高,进而带来市场绩效的增强。最后,提出完善我国民营银行准入-退出机制,引导民营资本进入银行业的现实选择是现有金融机构的存量改革,对民营银行实行分级牌照管理。另外,还需要建立健全相关法律,完善最后贷款人制度,建设存款准备金制度,推进利率市场化等。
Private banks have been a hot topic in financial circles, problems associated with definition of private bank, real path, access time, exit mechanism and other related issues have been much heated discussed. With the development of private economy in China, solving the bottleneck of private economy financing and optimizing financing structures have become an important issue to maintain the sustainable development of our country's economy; at the same time, accumulation of private enterprise overflow year by year has infiltrated to the private sector lending activities. As a response to the incompetent channels of formal financing, the underground financial activities are developing rapidly. But because it has been beyond the country's regulatory regime for a very long time, during which it was accompanied with loan-sharking and illegal activities, a good clear channel is in urgent need. After the accession to the WTO, China committed the full liberalization of financial industry. As to obtain the same national treatment with foreign investment, private capital tried to enter the banking industry, using their own advantages, to join the development with the state-owned banks and foreign banks. In this situation, strengthening competition in China's banking system, constructing diversify ownership structure of banking system, at the same time, preventing the occurrence and spread of financial crisis, perfecting the access - exit mechanism of private banking market is on the agenda. It is worthy of further study and discussion about what is a private bank, the reasons of developing private banks, the selection of practical path of developing private banks, and how to improve the access-exit mechanism of private banking market.
This paper uses the industrial organization theory of industry economics, starting from the private banking market access and exit barriers, to investigate the deficiencies in access-exit banking supervision of private banks, through the combined method of qualitative and quantitative analysis, with reference to successful experience in foreign countries, proposes a concept of construction in access - exit mechanism of private bank. This dissertation is divided into seven chapters.
The first chapter is an introduction part, by studying the relevant literature, break through the limitations of studies before, this chapter starts from the nature of fame and wealth from the private capital proceeding, it believes that the fundamental purpose that private capital entering into banking industry is the monopoly profits of monopoly industries. Considering the particularity of banking industry, it is needed to set an access - exit barriers regulation, so that the private capital cannot freely go in and out, and excessive competition and risk externalities can be avoided. Whether to lead into private banks, it’s needed to specially analyze the structure of banking and the level of overall profitability the banking sector before solving the problem of how to build up private banks, and then discuss the access - exit mechanisms of private banking market in the following sections.
The second chapter is paper’s related concepts and theories. Firstly, it defines the scope of application of the private banks, industry economics, the concept of entry and exit barriers The definition of private banks mostly stresses“owned by people”, which means, the most important part is the component of property rights .The rights such as operate and income right, which are brought by property rights, are attributed to non-governmental and private, and oppose to state-owned, government-run. Thus, private banks are wholly-owned by non-state-owned capital or holdings, while management rights and beneficial interests and other property shall be owned by commercial banks of the capital owners. At the mean time, private banks, which are in the framework of "The Enterprise Law of People's Republic of China " and "The Commercial Banks Law of The People's Republic of China", should accept the supervision of relevant financial regulatory authorities. The private banking mentioned in this article is discussed following this definition.
According to Baume’s definition, remove the differentiation factors of economies and products in structural barriers of entry and the fixed species in absolute cost advantages, then bring in the institutional barriers. From the perspective of private banks in China, as potential entrants to the market, economies of scale and absolute cost advantages as the incumbent state-owned commercial banks, the efficiency of the rent exists. Reality in our country is that the institutional barriers of entry factors bring significant effects. Therefore, this study focused primarily on the use of Baume’s definition of entry barriers.
The third chapter empirically tests banking market concentration and market competition of China, using the structure of law SCP paradigm and non-institutional methods of PR model. According to econometric methods, from the perspective of the concentration, the article examines the market structure using the seller concentration ratio (CRn). Test results show that in 2000-2009 10 years, according to Bain's classification of market structure, banking market structure developed from monopolistic competition typeⅢto typeⅣ. Shareholding reformation in state-owned banks, opening up markets for foreign banks, and establishment of joint-stock banks believed to significantly reduce concentration of banking market in China. The structure of state-owned monopoly didn’t bring high yield. The establishment of joint-stock banks and foreign bank entry, the development of monopolistic competition, strengthen bank sector’s competition mechanism, increase management level. Continually using the conclusions of SCP theory, market structure’s impact on market performance can be in the way of reducing entry - exit mechanism, thus adjust the market structure, strengthen the market competition, and then increase profitability and operational efficiency.
In addition to market structure, other factors also affect competition, such as market contestability. Empirically test the 10 years banking competition level by using non-structural method PR model, concluds that, H-statistics range of China's banking sector is in monopolistic competition markets area. And then regression analysis of state-owned banks and joint-stock banks, it shows there is significant increases in banking competition, and this increases of state-owned bank is greater than in joint-stock banks, concluding that: private capital in banking industry can improve competition degree, while product and areas differentiation can reduce the possibility of over-competition.
Through comprehensive analysis of private banking market development, non-structural and structure method come to the same conclusion. In the 10-year period of 2000-2009, with the decline in market concentration, market competition rised, increasing the banking performance level. Market type was monopolistic competition, and competition was constantly increasing. Therefore, it further improved China's banking industry competition and reduced banking industry market concentration which helped increase banking performance level continually. Access mechanism of private banks would benefit the diversion of deposits and loans, reduce market concentration, enhance the banking competition, thus enhance the performance of the banking industry.
ChapterⅣis policy system changes of private bank accessing market. Since private capital first entered into the banking sector till currently pilot process of private bank, found that dominant politic barriers to private banks are gradually reduced, at the current period; private capital entering banking area is strongly encouraged
However, compared with the dominant politic barriers, there is a recessive politic barrier that is even more serious, which is mainly reflected in the concepts and systems. In the state-owned monopoly industry such as bank industry, state-owned enterprises grasp the huge vested interests, private capital, although lower access threshold, but the "glass door" phenomenon also need to be broken. In addition, private capital, as who want to enter the banking industry, need to approval, resist, obtain permit. During the specific activities, it needs to prevent from government setting up opportunities for rent, to avoid the recessive barriers under the political system loopholes.
Chapter V analyses bank’s withdrawal market practice through cases. Large state-owned commercial banks do not apply the market exit, in other practices of bank mergers, closing, dissolution and bankruptcy; reveal some problems of banking market withdrawal mechanism in China. Based on these we found the shortage of bank market withdrawal mechanism: firstly, lack of legal basis. There are no specific details of implementation. Related legal provisions are so dispersed that there is no legal system to be the basic formation; Secondly, government intervention in too deep during the withdrawal procedure. Government does not have functions to solve credit and debt, lack of the market awareness to organize banks’market withdraw ling. Risk cannot be reduced or distributed, and will pass onto the hosting companies. Thirdly, since most are passive market withdrawal caused by irregular operations or debt crisis, we should enhance national competitiveness of the financial sector, develop active market withdrawal which can enhance the competitive strength and growth potential, and expand market share. Fourthly, it is lack of cushioning and stability mechanism, which inhibits financial panic in a short term to refinance by the central bank, local governments and other political means. But for long-term view, we need deposit insurance system to diversify and buffer financial risk.
Chapter VI is learning from successful experience of foreign countries. Analyzed the banking market access mechanisms of the United States, Britain, Germany and Japan, we found that, first of all, there are universal and long-term existences of market access barriers, whose strength and institutional arrangements depend on economic development stage of a country. Secondly, adjustment of bank access mechanism should be put forward by financial needs, resulting in a natural development, rather than top-down directed regulators. An appropriate access mechanism comes from a result of natural games between banks and regulation governments. Finally, strengthen withdrawal mechanism go with reduction of access barriers. The reduction of banks’withdrawal goes with increase in access barriers. It needs continuously strengthen to lower the banking market access barriers in the banking market’s gradually open-up stage.
Study on problem bank’s market exit mechanism, we found that, firstly, there is a sound legal system to guarantee banking market exit mechanism’s legal basis. Secondly, authorize specialized organizations to implement banking supervision within the legal framework. Thirdly, a wide range of exit means. Fourthly, market-based deposit insurance system; deposit insurance system’s mainly meanings of Private Banking are: in certain economic conditions, to protect the interests of depositors and guard the public banks confidence, and strengthen supervision of banks. Fifthly, there is a right and ultimate goal of market withdrawal. Through a number of deposit insurance guarantees and incentives, developed market economic countries attract better-run financial institutions bid on the exit bank merger, reorganize poorly managed banks, enhance the operation strengths, expand market share, and then improve the operational efficiency as an overall objective.
Chapter VII is conception of access - withdrawal mechanism of private banking in China. It proposed that location selection of private banks should be in developed areas, positioning should be near a particular client groups within the community. The reality of market access path selection is guiding private capital to help stock reform of banking sector, take a gradual reform model, develop outside the system without touching the original premise of the economic system, avoid the loss of support resources in the system, keep the economy steady growth and maintain a smooth transition. Develop traffic building for the urge demand economic regions. Specific measures are as follows, firstly, for a relatively good conditions of local city commercial banks and rural credit cooperatives, absorb its private capital to transform and improve corporate governance and internal control mechanisms. Secondly, for most poor management of financial institutions which have values to be saved, modeled on the reform of state-owned banks, consider stripping a part of non-performing assets by the designated authorities of commitment and resolving by the central bank and local governments. Attract private capital to participate in the financial institutions reform by using of tax breaks, interest-free or low-interest loans and other measures. Encourage private investors to take over the problem institutions, injection of capital to operate again when it fits to regulatory standards later. Finally, for the urban credit cooperatives and rural credit cooperatives, which have a serious problem and too high cost to save, can take the market exit bankruptcy. If the local economic development needs, consider to establish new private banks.
Considering the frame design of access mechanism of private banks in China, it is thought that the timing depends on the government’s grasping of the macro-economic forms and the realization of total goals of economic. We should take a cautious attitude to control the speed of market access: On one side, remain cautious on the opening sequence of private banks; on the other side, promote some pilot of private banks. In addition, put the multi-level license system into practice to control the access concessions of the private banks. On the requirements of the main body of private banks market access, besides regulating the minimum capital, we should also use the present corporate governance structure to control the ratio of single equity, to prevent internal controlled association with loan risks.
On the design of exit mechanism of private banks, it needs to establish and improve relevant laws to authorize the executed department, perfect the system of last lender, construct the reserve system, and improve the system of bankruptcy liquidation. In addition, develop the related measures of private market access– exit mechanism, first of all, improve the supervision of legal system; Secondly, establish a risk warning system; Finally, promote interest rates market.
引文
①1982年《中华人民共和国宪法》中指出:在法律规定范围内的城乡劳动者个体经济,是社会主义公有制经济的补充。国家保护个体经济的合法权利和利益。
②1988年4月12日第七节全国人民代表大会第一次会议通过的《中华人民共和国宪法修正案》中指出:国家允许私营企业经济在法律规定的范围内存在和发展。国家保护私营经济的合法权利和发展。对私营经济实行引导、监督和管理。
③1997年党的十五届全国人民代表大会上明确指出:非公有制经济是我国社会主义市场经济的重要组成部分。对个体、私营等非公有制经济要继续鼓励引导,使之健康发展。
④全国工商联研究室.中国民营经济发展形势分析报告2009年度[R]. 2010.1.28
⑤民间投资进入垄断业须破透明天花板[DB/OL]. http://finance.sina.com. 2010.3.26
①中央财经大学.中国地下金融调查[R]. 2009.1.5
②王宇,姚均芳.我国已有小额贷款公司逾1300家[N].中国信息报, 2010.3.29
③银监会.小额贷款公司改制设立村镇银行暂行规定[S]. 2009.6.9
④人民银行网站[DB/OL]. http://www.pbc.gov.cn.
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1.中华人民共和国中国人民银行法(2004年修订)
2.中华人民共和国商业银行法(2004年修订)
3.中华人民共和国公司法
4.金融机构高级管理人员任职资格管理办法
5.中华人民共和国外资金融机构管理条例
6.中华人民共和国外资金融机构管理条例事实细节
7.农村商业银行管理暂行规定
8.农村合作银行管理暂行规定
9.商业银行建立同城营业网点管理办法
10.商业银行资本充足率管理办法
11.股份制商业银行风险评级体系(暂行)
12.金融许可证管理办法
13.中国银行业监督管理委员会行政许可证可实施程序规定
14.中国银行业监督管理委员会中资商业银行行政许可事项实施办法
15.中国银行业监督管理委员会合作金融机构行政许可事项实施办法
16.中国银行业监督管理委员会外资金融机构行政许可事项实施办法
广东民营经济信息网. http://www.gdcei.com
中国中小企业研究http://www.sme2000.com.cn.
中国人民银行http://www.pbc.gov.cn
中华人民共和国统计局. http://www.stats.gov.cn
中国银行业监督管理委员会网站. http://www.cbrc.gov.cn
金融界网站. http://www.jrj.com
FDIC网站. www.fdic.gov
谷歌学术搜索http://scholar.google.cn
②1988年4月12日第七节全国人民代表大会第一次会议通过的《中华人民共和国宪法修正案》中指出:国家允许私营企业经济在法律规定的范围内存在和发展。国家保护私营经济的合法权利和发展。对私营经济实行引导、监督和管理。
③1997年党的十五届全国人民代表大会上明确指出:非公有制经济是我国社会主义市场经济的重要组成部分。对个体、私营等非公有制经济要继续鼓励引导,使之健康发展。
④全国工商联研究室.中国民营经济发展形势分析报告2009年度[R]. 2010.1.28
⑤民间投资进入垄断业须破透明天花板[DB/OL]. http://finance.sina.com. 2010.3.26
①中央财经大学.中国地下金融调查[R]. 2009.1.5
②王宇,姚均芳.我国已有小额贷款公司逾1300家[N].中国信息报, 2010.3.29
③银监会.小额贷款公司改制设立村镇银行暂行规定[S]. 2009.6.9
④人民银行网站[DB/OL]. http://www.pbc.gov.cn.
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②核心资本充足率=(核心资本-核心资本扣除项)/ (风险加权资产+12.5倍市场风险资本)
③银监会.前9月中国境内商业银行不良贷款率5.49%[DB/OL]. news.cctv.com/financial/20081027/106766.shtml. 2008.10.27.
④流动性比例=流动性资产/流动性负债×100%
①The New Basel Capital Accord, BaselⅡ,CP3.(337). 2003
②银行业人士:无需担忧中国银行业压力测试.[DB/OL]. http://news.xinhuanet.com. 2009.5.6
①中国人民银行网站. http://pbc.gov.cn.2008.12.22
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1.中华人民共和国中国人民银行法(2004年修订)
2.中华人民共和国商业银行法(2004年修订)
3.中华人民共和国公司法
4.金融机构高级管理人员任职资格管理办法
5.中华人民共和国外资金融机构管理条例
6.中华人民共和国外资金融机构管理条例事实细节
7.农村商业银行管理暂行规定
8.农村合作银行管理暂行规定
9.商业银行建立同城营业网点管理办法
10.商业银行资本充足率管理办法
11.股份制商业银行风险评级体系(暂行)
12.金融许可证管理办法
13.中国银行业监督管理委员会行政许可证可实施程序规定
14.中国银行业监督管理委员会中资商业银行行政许可事项实施办法
15.中国银行业监督管理委员会合作金融机构行政许可事项实施办法
16.中国银行业监督管理委员会外资金融机构行政许可事项实施办法
广东民营经济信息网. http://www.gdcei.com
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中国人民银行http://www.pbc.gov.cn
中华人民共和国统计局. http://www.stats.gov.cn
中国银行业监督管理委员会网站. http://www.cbrc.gov.cn
金融界网站. http://www.jrj.com
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