公司治理、关联交易与企业价值
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摘要
关联交易在我国上市公司的日常经营中非常普遍。交易费用理论认为,关联交易将市场交易转变为公司集团内部的交易,可以节约交易成本,提升企业价值。但是,代理理论认为,关联方对上市公司往往拥有控制权或重大影响力,通过关联交易可以转移上市公司的利益,进而损害企业价值。
本文以上海和深圳证券交易所的上市公司为样本,将关联交易划分为商品交易、劳务交易、资金占用、担保抵押、资产重组和其它交易六类,对公司治理、关联交易与企业价值之间的关系进行了实证研究,结论如下:
(1)公司治理水平影响上市公司的异常关联交易,其中,高管薪酬、高管持股比例、董事长是否兼任总经理、和是否境外上市等变量与某些类型的异常关联交易负相关;Z指数、Herfindahl5指数、董事会规模、独立董事比例、监事会规模、实际控制人类别)均与上市公司某些类型的异常关联交易显著正相关;但持股监事比例与异常关联交易没有显著关系。
(2)关联商品交易和关联担保显著降低企业价值,从而支持代理理论;
(3)关联商品交易和关联担保显著增加上市公司的代理成本,从而使得企业价值下降。
本文的结论表明,由于公司治理不完善,关联方通过关联商品交易和关联担保抵押从上市公司转移利益。因此,遏制关联方从上市公司转移利益应该进一步完善上市公司的内部治理机制,同时应完善外部治理环境,加强对上市公司的外部监管。
Related party transactions are prevalent in China's listed firms. Transaction cost theory postulates that related party transactions can reduce transaction costs and increase firm value by transforming the transactions from market to company inside. But agency theory states that the related parties may have controlling rights or great influences on the listed company, and transfer the firms' resources via related party transactions, resulting in a negative impact on firm value.
The related party transactions from a sample of listed firms in Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange are classified into six types: goods transactions, service transactions, guarantees, asset restructurings and others. The conclusions from the empirical analysis on the relationships between corporation governance, related party transactions and firm value are as follows.
1. Corporation governance has an effect on abnormal related party transactions. Executive compensation, the percentage of shares held by the top executives, the CEO being the chairman of the board of directors, issuing shares to foreign investors have negative effects on some types of abnormal related party transactions. On the contrast, Z index, Herfindahl5 index, director board size, the ratio of independent directors, supervisory board size, de facto controller being the government are significantly and positively related to some types of abnormal related party transactions. But the percentage of supervisors who hold the shares in the supervisory board has no significant effect on abnormal related party transactions.
2. Goods transactions and guarantees reduce firm value significantly, which substantiates the hypothesis of agency theory.
3. Goods transactions and guarantees increase the agency costs of listed firms significantly, thus reduce firm value.
In summary, because of the faultiness of corporation governance mechanics, related parties have more opportunities to transfer the firms' resources via goods transactions and guarantees. To regulate the abnormal related party transactions, some suggestions are put forward on perfecting internal corporate governance, improving external governance environment and strengthening external supervision of listed firms.
本文以上海和深圳证券交易所的上市公司为样本,将关联交易划分为商品交易、劳务交易、资金占用、担保抵押、资产重组和其它交易六类,对公司治理、关联交易与企业价值之间的关系进行了实证研究,结论如下:
(1)公司治理水平影响上市公司的异常关联交易,其中,高管薪酬、高管持股比例、董事长是否兼任总经理、和是否境外上市等变量与某些类型的异常关联交易负相关;Z指数、Herfindahl5指数、董事会规模、独立董事比例、监事会规模、实际控制人类别)均与上市公司某些类型的异常关联交易显著正相关;但持股监事比例与异常关联交易没有显著关系。
(2)关联商品交易和关联担保显著降低企业价值,从而支持代理理论;
(3)关联商品交易和关联担保显著增加上市公司的代理成本,从而使得企业价值下降。
本文的结论表明,由于公司治理不完善,关联方通过关联商品交易和关联担保抵押从上市公司转移利益。因此,遏制关联方从上市公司转移利益应该进一步完善上市公司的内部治理机制,同时应完善外部治理环境,加强对上市公司的外部监管。
Related party transactions are prevalent in China's listed firms. Transaction cost theory postulates that related party transactions can reduce transaction costs and increase firm value by transforming the transactions from market to company inside. But agency theory states that the related parties may have controlling rights or great influences on the listed company, and transfer the firms' resources via related party transactions, resulting in a negative impact on firm value.
The related party transactions from a sample of listed firms in Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange are classified into six types: goods transactions, service transactions, guarantees, asset restructurings and others. The conclusions from the empirical analysis on the relationships between corporation governance, related party transactions and firm value are as follows.
1. Corporation governance has an effect on abnormal related party transactions. Executive compensation, the percentage of shares held by the top executives, the CEO being the chairman of the board of directors, issuing shares to foreign investors have negative effects on some types of abnormal related party transactions. On the contrast, Z index, Herfindahl5 index, director board size, the ratio of independent directors, supervisory board size, de facto controller being the government are significantly and positively related to some types of abnormal related party transactions. But the percentage of supervisors who hold the shares in the supervisory board has no significant effect on abnormal related party transactions.
2. Goods transactions and guarantees reduce firm value significantly, which substantiates the hypothesis of agency theory.
3. Goods transactions and guarantees increase the agency costs of listed firms significantly, thus reduce firm value.
In summary, because of the faultiness of corporation governance mechanics, related parties have more opportunities to transfer the firms' resources via goods transactions and guarantees. To regulate the abnormal related party transactions, some suggestions are put forward on perfecting internal corporate governance, improving external governance environment and strengthening external supervision of listed firms.
引文
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