准公共物品私人供给研究
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摘要
公共物品理论是公共经济学的经典主题,也是公共选择理论的基石。20世纪70年代西方市场经济国家出现的大量公共物品市场提供模式为我国公共物品的市场化提供了借鉴。准公共物品既可以通过市场来提供,也可以通过政府引导促使私人自愿提供。国内在市场化提供方面已经有了较多的研究,本文重点对私人供给、特别是私人自愿供给进行分析。
本文从传统的政府单一供给方式的不足:公共物品供给过少或过度入手,比较了传统政府供给方式与私人供给方式的效率,从私人产权与公共产权,私人企业与公有企业的角度对二者的效率差异进行解释,并以西方国家的实践进行了实证分析,得出了准公共物品私人供给的必要性结论。然后从理论上对私人供给的可能性进行梳理,分析了私人供给的可行性。但准公共物品由私人供给也会导致公共物品供给不足,本文分析了私人供给公共物品不足的原因,提出了一些弥补机制,对于供给公共物品中搭便车的问题,从集体行动逻辑的角度进行了分析。私人供给可以发挥市场效率的优势,通过设计合理的机制以及借助集体行动,可以减少私人供给中因搭便车导致的供给不足问题。
与多数学者观点不同的是,本人认为私人供给不足问题的解决,政府也可以起到重要的作用。这在国内也是鲜见的提法。文章较严格地分析了政府通过建立良好的社会风尚和个人信誉制度、运用经济补贴和收入再分配等间接手段促进私人供给公共物品的机制。
文章的最后,结合我国私人自愿供给的两个案例――彩票融资与私人慈善捐赠进行分析,运用比较翔实的资料阐述了这两种融资方式在我国发展的现状。文章对这两种供给方式相差悬殊的原因作了分析。研究发现政府在彩票融资中起到了显著的作用,从而促进了彩票事业的发展,而我国政府在慈善捐赠中没有很好定位,相关的政策方面也做得不够。针对目前我国慈善事业发展不理想的现状,本人认为政府需要在慈善意识宣传、税收优惠激励、政府职能转变等方面进行改革,以恰当发挥政府的作用,促进慈善事业发展;从理论角度对比了彩票融资与私人慈善捐赠两种融资方式,说明了彩票融资的奖金激励方式具有促进私人自愿供给的激励相容性,而慈善捐助方式并不具有该特点。借鉴彩票融资中奖金激励模式,在慈善捐赠中适当引入形式多样的激励回报机制,不失为促进慈善融资的有效手段。
全文安排如下:
引论,阐述了本文选题的理论和实践意义,对国内外公共物品供给方面的文献进行了回顾。针对我国公共物品私人供给方面的研究不足,提出自己的研究思路,阐述了文章的结构。
第一章,对准公共物品及其相关概念进行界定,包括准公共物品、公共物品与外部性、公共提供的产品、自然垄断产品、有益品等概念。
第二章,以一个仁慈的、完全信息型政府供给公共物品的效率标准模型为基准,研究了传统模式下政府直接提供公共物品面临的问题、政府供给公共物品的范围,比较了不同预算约束下经济人假设情况下政府供给的效率。在不同预算约束情况下,得出了现实中政府不能供给最优公共物品水平的结论。以国外公私供给准公共物品实践的效果作了实证分析。并从公私产权、公共企业与私有企业角度进行了对比分析,对二者的效率差异进行了解释,得出私人供给准公共物品必要性与实践上可行性的结论。
第三章,对准公共物品私人供给的不同情况系统地从理论上给以分析。从完全信息与不完全信息、静态与动态、不同成员人数角度探讨了私人供给准公共物品中出现不足及其程度问题。针对私人供给中的不足提出了一些弥补机制,并从集体行动逻辑的角度分析了集体供给公共物品中如何克服搭便车的问题。
第四章,分析促进私人供给公共物品中政府的作用,分别从政府在意识形态、经济补贴与再分配功能方面对促进私人供给的作用给以理论上的分析。
第五章,结合我国的实际案例,分析了两种有潜力的私人自愿供给方式:彩票融资与慈善捐赠。运用翔实的数据阐述了这两种融资方式在我国的发展现状:这两种融资方式在我国的发展都比较晚,但发展的效果却明显不同。实证地研究了政府在促进彩票融资中发挥的重要作用;针对我国慈善事业发展较慢的现实,从理论和实践角度给以解释,并提出针对性的政策建议。最后从理论角度对比两种融资方式效果不同的内在机理,发现彩票融资中奖金激励方式具有优势,在我国慈善捐赠中适当引入形式多样的激励回报机制,将不失为一个促进慈善事业的发展的可行手段。
结束语部分认为必须重新认识和界定政府职能,采取灵活多样的准公共物品供给方式,重视私人供给的作用。除了对私人供给进行产品质量等方面的监管外,政府还有必要运用舆论导向、经济手段、再分配的职能,为促进私人供给公共物品发挥作用。将发行彩票与特定的公共物品供给联系起来能够有效地解决公共物品的供给结构问题。借鉴彩票融资中奖金激励模式,在慈善捐赠中适当引入激励回报机制,以发展我国慈善等福利事业。最后提出了有待进一步研究的问题。
本文的创新之处:
准公共物品私人供给问题在我国实践方面已经不为大家陌生,有关私人供给准公共物品的文章也有不少,但系统深入地从理论角度给以解释在国内还是鲜见的。
首先,本文对传统政府供给模式提出质疑,认为传统供给模式下,不论是政府软预算约束还是硬预算约束的情况,都不能恰当数量地提供公共物品:在经济人政府假设下,不论软预算约束还是硬预算约束情况下,政府提供公共物品都存在效率问题:会出现过多和过少的供给,从而产生公共物品的供给浪费或不足。从政府与私人供给效率比较的角度分析了公、私提供公共物品效率差异的原因。其次,研究方法上,运用了比较的分析方法(政府与私人供给的比较与两种融资方式的比较),分析的结论是建立在较为严格的推理基础之上。第三,重点研究了私人供给公共物品不足问题中政府的促进作用。提出发挥政府在私人供给中的作用,以促进私人供给、弥补供给不足的观点。通过政府舆论导向建立良好的社会规范、经济补贴、再分配等方面促进私人供给进行了论述。第四,在对我国私人自愿供给两个案例的比较分析与理论上对两种融资方式内在激励不同考察的基础上,提出在目前我国慈善事业发展尚不理想的现状下,引入适当的激励回报机制的建议。
The theory of public goods is the classic theme and the corestone of public choice theory economics. In the 1970s, 20century in westen countries, there incurred many market supply modes of quasi-public goods which give us some useful experience for reference : it can be supplied by market, and also can be provided by the government’s guide to promote private voluntary provision or contribution. Since it has been studied in market provision, so in this thesis I will pay more attention to private provision, especially on private vountary provision.
Government behavior depends on its targets.If government maximize its own benefits but not social welfare just as many facts,there will cause some defects in public goods provision.In the thesis I analyse the traditional government supplies mode’s decificiency and conclued that it evitablely cause some defects: its supply insufficiently or excessively. Comparing with the traditional way, the private supply way is more efficient, to give this reason I analyze private and public property right and the efficiency of private and public enterprise, and alse positively analyse it by the western country’s practice. By the fact I draw the conclusion that private supply mode is necessary to compensate the traditional mode of government supply directly.
Then I comb out the possibilities of private supply theorily, and analyse the insufficiency of private supply public goods and the feasibility of private supply feasibility. But private provision may be insufficient in quantity. I theoretically analyse the personal supplies feasibility firstly, then propose some mechanisms to cope with it, and analyze how to reduce the free-rider problem from the collective action logic angle. The private provision way may play a best role of the market efficiency, by the mechanism of the reasonable design and with the help of the collective action,it may reduce the insufficient supply problem.
Different from most scholars, I think government also may take a very important role in solving the shortage of private supplies, which is a rear propose in domestic economic fields. This thesis analyze the mechanism of improving the supply of private public goods by way of establishing good social norm and personal prestige system and using subsidy and redistribution of income policies to improve private provision.
At the end of the thesis I combine with the two cases of private voluntary supply modes: lottery financing and benovelant contribution, then I use particular data to expatiate the developing actuality of the two financing manners in china. Both the two cases are private volutary supply modes, but the development of the two cases differs a lot. According to the author's research, the government influence is great and speeds the development of the lottery projects. But in benovelant contribution the government roll lacks this character.Aiming at the situation of the poor development of charity project in china today, our goverment needs to do some innovations in aspects of lottery consciousness propaganda, prompting favored revenue, changing governmental functions etc. in order to exert governmental functions and promote the development of the bevenvlent project. Then the author compared the private-supply features of these two financing modes from theory, it indicated that the bonus-inspiring style of lottery-finacing made incentive compatibility on promoting private-supply but benevolent contribution had no this feature. Use the bonus-prompting style of lottery-finacing for reference, I advise importing redounding-system in almsdeed donation properly. Because at present most Chinese people have low almsdeed-will, this method is surely effective on promoting almsdeed-finacing.
Taking the intrinsic logic into consideration, I arrange the thesis as follows:
In the introduction, I stated the theoritical and practical meanings of this thesis, and made retrospection about the supply of public goods. In view of the insufficiency of researches on personal supplication of public goods in our country, I proposed personal ideas and described the general structure of the thesis.
Chapter one, defining quasi-public goods and then making the standard of classification and making a disctinction between the correlative conceptions.
Chapter two, providing an efficiency standard model in which a merciful, complete-information government supply public goods directly, then based on this model, the problem of government's providing public goods directly in traditional model would be studied, as well as the range in which the public goods should be supplied. And efficiencies of government's providing be compared with economic man assumptions in different budget constraint situations. Practically, in different conditions of budget constraints, governments are unable to make optimal level of public goods. By analysing and explaining the public and private property rights and enterprises, I get the conclusion of necessary and praciticality on private public goods provision according to the foreign private supplies examples.
Chapter three, under the different conditions of private provision of public goods, I provide a systematical and theoritical analysis; and discuss the inefficiency and other problems on private supply of public goods in the views of static and dynamic, complete and incomplete information and the different numbers in private provision. And proposed some mechanisms to deal with the problems of private supplies.What’s more, I analysis how to cope with the problem in the collective supply of public goods at the collective action logic angle.
Chapter four, analyzation of governments' roles in promoting private provision. Retrospecting economists' analyzation of governments' roles in promoting private supply. Then giving strict theoretical analyzation of promoting private supply from governments' functions in ideology, economic subsidy and redistribution of income.
Chapter five, Combining the actual cases of our country, I analyze two kinds of the voluntary provision potention modes: Lotteryticket financing and charitable donation. Both of these two financing ways have developed lately in our country, but the effects differ distinctively. I positively study the development presentsituation of these two financing ways in our country. I find the vital role of government in promotion lottery ticket financing. I give the explanation and put forward the pointed policy proposals aiming at a slower reality in view of our country philanthropy from theoretically and the realistic angle. Finally contrasting two different intrinsic mechanisms from theory angle, I discover that the lottery ticket financing mode has superiority than philanthropy contrubution. Introducing the incentive mechanism in the charitable donation will be a feasible suggestion to promote the development of philanthropy.
Last part is a conclusion that it is necessary to define the role of government, to take various and flexible provision modes as contended, and pays more attention to private provision. Government uses its guidance superiority, propaganda, subsidy and redistribution policies in order to promote private provision public goods.Combing lottery ticket circulation with special public goods provision mode would effectively solve public goods provision structure.In order to develop our country’s welfare of services, we should make use of market mechanism and bring incentive repayment method to promote the private provision. In the end put forword some problems for further study about this field.
The problem of private provision about public goods is familiar with us, There are many papers about it, but it is rarely studied in systematic and deepgoing comprehention from the theoritical perspective.There are several important innovations of this dissertation.
Firstly, the research angle is from the relationship of government and private supply to cut-in. and I question tradictional direct-supply mode. Supposing governmen is the economic man I theoretically analyze that what in soever soft or hard budget constraint, the inefficiency problem still exists for government supply public goods. It will occur supply too much or too little, consequently leading to public goods supply waste or lack. Secondly, the analysis which carries on is thorough; The union comparison analysis method (government and private supplies comparison with two kind of financing way comparison) gives the careful proof, the analysis conclusion is the establishment above the stricter inference foundation. Thirdly, the focus of study is the role of government promoting private supplies, specifically in guidance of public opinion, economical subsidy, redistribution etc. which is made a stricter proof in this thesis. At last, I introduces the suggestion of suitable incentive repayment mechanism to promote private supplies at the present in our country based on two cases comparative analysis foundations.
本文从传统的政府单一供给方式的不足:公共物品供给过少或过度入手,比较了传统政府供给方式与私人供给方式的效率,从私人产权与公共产权,私人企业与公有企业的角度对二者的效率差异进行解释,并以西方国家的实践进行了实证分析,得出了准公共物品私人供给的必要性结论。然后从理论上对私人供给的可能性进行梳理,分析了私人供给的可行性。但准公共物品由私人供给也会导致公共物品供给不足,本文分析了私人供给公共物品不足的原因,提出了一些弥补机制,对于供给公共物品中搭便车的问题,从集体行动逻辑的角度进行了分析。私人供给可以发挥市场效率的优势,通过设计合理的机制以及借助集体行动,可以减少私人供给中因搭便车导致的供给不足问题。
与多数学者观点不同的是,本人认为私人供给不足问题的解决,政府也可以起到重要的作用。这在国内也是鲜见的提法。文章较严格地分析了政府通过建立良好的社会风尚和个人信誉制度、运用经济补贴和收入再分配等间接手段促进私人供给公共物品的机制。
文章的最后,结合我国私人自愿供给的两个案例――彩票融资与私人慈善捐赠进行分析,运用比较翔实的资料阐述了这两种融资方式在我国发展的现状。文章对这两种供给方式相差悬殊的原因作了分析。研究发现政府在彩票融资中起到了显著的作用,从而促进了彩票事业的发展,而我国政府在慈善捐赠中没有很好定位,相关的政策方面也做得不够。针对目前我国慈善事业发展不理想的现状,本人认为政府需要在慈善意识宣传、税收优惠激励、政府职能转变等方面进行改革,以恰当发挥政府的作用,促进慈善事业发展;从理论角度对比了彩票融资与私人慈善捐赠两种融资方式,说明了彩票融资的奖金激励方式具有促进私人自愿供给的激励相容性,而慈善捐助方式并不具有该特点。借鉴彩票融资中奖金激励模式,在慈善捐赠中适当引入形式多样的激励回报机制,不失为促进慈善融资的有效手段。
全文安排如下:
引论,阐述了本文选题的理论和实践意义,对国内外公共物品供给方面的文献进行了回顾。针对我国公共物品私人供给方面的研究不足,提出自己的研究思路,阐述了文章的结构。
第一章,对准公共物品及其相关概念进行界定,包括准公共物品、公共物品与外部性、公共提供的产品、自然垄断产品、有益品等概念。
第二章,以一个仁慈的、完全信息型政府供给公共物品的效率标准模型为基准,研究了传统模式下政府直接提供公共物品面临的问题、政府供给公共物品的范围,比较了不同预算约束下经济人假设情况下政府供给的效率。在不同预算约束情况下,得出了现实中政府不能供给最优公共物品水平的结论。以国外公私供给准公共物品实践的效果作了实证分析。并从公私产权、公共企业与私有企业角度进行了对比分析,对二者的效率差异进行了解释,得出私人供给准公共物品必要性与实践上可行性的结论。
第三章,对准公共物品私人供给的不同情况系统地从理论上给以分析。从完全信息与不完全信息、静态与动态、不同成员人数角度探讨了私人供给准公共物品中出现不足及其程度问题。针对私人供给中的不足提出了一些弥补机制,并从集体行动逻辑的角度分析了集体供给公共物品中如何克服搭便车的问题。
第四章,分析促进私人供给公共物品中政府的作用,分别从政府在意识形态、经济补贴与再分配功能方面对促进私人供给的作用给以理论上的分析。
第五章,结合我国的实际案例,分析了两种有潜力的私人自愿供给方式:彩票融资与慈善捐赠。运用翔实的数据阐述了这两种融资方式在我国的发展现状:这两种融资方式在我国的发展都比较晚,但发展的效果却明显不同。实证地研究了政府在促进彩票融资中发挥的重要作用;针对我国慈善事业发展较慢的现实,从理论和实践角度给以解释,并提出针对性的政策建议。最后从理论角度对比两种融资方式效果不同的内在机理,发现彩票融资中奖金激励方式具有优势,在我国慈善捐赠中适当引入形式多样的激励回报机制,将不失为一个促进慈善事业的发展的可行手段。
结束语部分认为必须重新认识和界定政府职能,采取灵活多样的准公共物品供给方式,重视私人供给的作用。除了对私人供给进行产品质量等方面的监管外,政府还有必要运用舆论导向、经济手段、再分配的职能,为促进私人供给公共物品发挥作用。将发行彩票与特定的公共物品供给联系起来能够有效地解决公共物品的供给结构问题。借鉴彩票融资中奖金激励模式,在慈善捐赠中适当引入激励回报机制,以发展我国慈善等福利事业。最后提出了有待进一步研究的问题。
本文的创新之处:
准公共物品私人供给问题在我国实践方面已经不为大家陌生,有关私人供给准公共物品的文章也有不少,但系统深入地从理论角度给以解释在国内还是鲜见的。
首先,本文对传统政府供给模式提出质疑,认为传统供给模式下,不论是政府软预算约束还是硬预算约束的情况,都不能恰当数量地提供公共物品:在经济人政府假设下,不论软预算约束还是硬预算约束情况下,政府提供公共物品都存在效率问题:会出现过多和过少的供给,从而产生公共物品的供给浪费或不足。从政府与私人供给效率比较的角度分析了公、私提供公共物品效率差异的原因。其次,研究方法上,运用了比较的分析方法(政府与私人供给的比较与两种融资方式的比较),分析的结论是建立在较为严格的推理基础之上。第三,重点研究了私人供给公共物品不足问题中政府的促进作用。提出发挥政府在私人供给中的作用,以促进私人供给、弥补供给不足的观点。通过政府舆论导向建立良好的社会规范、经济补贴、再分配等方面促进私人供给进行了论述。第四,在对我国私人自愿供给两个案例的比较分析与理论上对两种融资方式内在激励不同考察的基础上,提出在目前我国慈善事业发展尚不理想的现状下,引入适当的激励回报机制的建议。
The theory of public goods is the classic theme and the corestone of public choice theory economics. In the 1970s, 20century in westen countries, there incurred many market supply modes of quasi-public goods which give us some useful experience for reference : it can be supplied by market, and also can be provided by the government’s guide to promote private voluntary provision or contribution. Since it has been studied in market provision, so in this thesis I will pay more attention to private provision, especially on private vountary provision.
Government behavior depends on its targets.If government maximize its own benefits but not social welfare just as many facts,there will cause some defects in public goods provision.In the thesis I analyse the traditional government supplies mode’s decificiency and conclued that it evitablely cause some defects: its supply insufficiently or excessively. Comparing with the traditional way, the private supply way is more efficient, to give this reason I analyze private and public property right and the efficiency of private and public enterprise, and alse positively analyse it by the western country’s practice. By the fact I draw the conclusion that private supply mode is necessary to compensate the traditional mode of government supply directly.
Then I comb out the possibilities of private supply theorily, and analyse the insufficiency of private supply public goods and the feasibility of private supply feasibility. But private provision may be insufficient in quantity. I theoretically analyse the personal supplies feasibility firstly, then propose some mechanisms to cope with it, and analyze how to reduce the free-rider problem from the collective action logic angle. The private provision way may play a best role of the market efficiency, by the mechanism of the reasonable design and with the help of the collective action,it may reduce the insufficient supply problem.
Different from most scholars, I think government also may take a very important role in solving the shortage of private supplies, which is a rear propose in domestic economic fields. This thesis analyze the mechanism of improving the supply of private public goods by way of establishing good social norm and personal prestige system and using subsidy and redistribution of income policies to improve private provision.
At the end of the thesis I combine with the two cases of private voluntary supply modes: lottery financing and benovelant contribution, then I use particular data to expatiate the developing actuality of the two financing manners in china. Both the two cases are private volutary supply modes, but the development of the two cases differs a lot. According to the author's research, the government influence is great and speeds the development of the lottery projects. But in benovelant contribution the government roll lacks this character.Aiming at the situation of the poor development of charity project in china today, our goverment needs to do some innovations in aspects of lottery consciousness propaganda, prompting favored revenue, changing governmental functions etc. in order to exert governmental functions and promote the development of the bevenvlent project. Then the author compared the private-supply features of these two financing modes from theory, it indicated that the bonus-inspiring style of lottery-finacing made incentive compatibility on promoting private-supply but benevolent contribution had no this feature. Use the bonus-prompting style of lottery-finacing for reference, I advise importing redounding-system in almsdeed donation properly. Because at present most Chinese people have low almsdeed-will, this method is surely effective on promoting almsdeed-finacing.
Taking the intrinsic logic into consideration, I arrange the thesis as follows:
In the introduction, I stated the theoritical and practical meanings of this thesis, and made retrospection about the supply of public goods. In view of the insufficiency of researches on personal supplication of public goods in our country, I proposed personal ideas and described the general structure of the thesis.
Chapter one, defining quasi-public goods and then making the standard of classification and making a disctinction between the correlative conceptions.
Chapter two, providing an efficiency standard model in which a merciful, complete-information government supply public goods directly, then based on this model, the problem of government's providing public goods directly in traditional model would be studied, as well as the range in which the public goods should be supplied. And efficiencies of government's providing be compared with economic man assumptions in different budget constraint situations. Practically, in different conditions of budget constraints, governments are unable to make optimal level of public goods. By analysing and explaining the public and private property rights and enterprises, I get the conclusion of necessary and praciticality on private public goods provision according to the foreign private supplies examples.
Chapter three, under the different conditions of private provision of public goods, I provide a systematical and theoritical analysis; and discuss the inefficiency and other problems on private supply of public goods in the views of static and dynamic, complete and incomplete information and the different numbers in private provision. And proposed some mechanisms to deal with the problems of private supplies.What’s more, I analysis how to cope with the problem in the collective supply of public goods at the collective action logic angle.
Chapter four, analyzation of governments' roles in promoting private provision. Retrospecting economists' analyzation of governments' roles in promoting private supply. Then giving strict theoretical analyzation of promoting private supply from governments' functions in ideology, economic subsidy and redistribution of income.
Chapter five, Combining the actual cases of our country, I analyze two kinds of the voluntary provision potention modes: Lotteryticket financing and charitable donation. Both of these two financing ways have developed lately in our country, but the effects differ distinctively. I positively study the development presentsituation of these two financing ways in our country. I find the vital role of government in promotion lottery ticket financing. I give the explanation and put forward the pointed policy proposals aiming at a slower reality in view of our country philanthropy from theoretically and the realistic angle. Finally contrasting two different intrinsic mechanisms from theory angle, I discover that the lottery ticket financing mode has superiority than philanthropy contrubution. Introducing the incentive mechanism in the charitable donation will be a feasible suggestion to promote the development of philanthropy.
Last part is a conclusion that it is necessary to define the role of government, to take various and flexible provision modes as contended, and pays more attention to private provision. Government uses its guidance superiority, propaganda, subsidy and redistribution policies in order to promote private provision public goods.Combing lottery ticket circulation with special public goods provision mode would effectively solve public goods provision structure.In order to develop our country’s welfare of services, we should make use of market mechanism and bring incentive repayment method to promote the private provision. In the end put forword some problems for further study about this field.
The problem of private provision about public goods is familiar with us, There are many papers about it, but it is rarely studied in systematic and deepgoing comprehention from the theoritical perspective.There are several important innovations of this dissertation.
Firstly, the research angle is from the relationship of government and private supply to cut-in. and I question tradictional direct-supply mode. Supposing governmen is the economic man I theoretically analyze that what in soever soft or hard budget constraint, the inefficiency problem still exists for government supply public goods. It will occur supply too much or too little, consequently leading to public goods supply waste or lack. Secondly, the analysis which carries on is thorough; The union comparison analysis method (government and private supplies comparison with two kind of financing way comparison) gives the careful proof, the analysis conclusion is the establishment above the stricter inference foundation. Thirdly, the focus of study is the role of government promoting private supplies, specifically in guidance of public opinion, economical subsidy, redistribution etc. which is made a stricter proof in this thesis. At last, I introduces the suggestion of suitable incentive repayment mechanism to promote private supplies at the present in our country based on two cases comparative analysis foundations.
引文
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② 作为经济学研究的对象,最起码的特征就是稀缺性,所以象阳光、空气和水这样没有稀缺性的物品,不属于经济学研究的公共物品。
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