基于公平偏好评估的研究型大学教师激励契约设计
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摘要
在一般性大学里,教师或许应以教学为主要工作,其激励机制的设计相对简单,而在研究型大学里,教师须将有限的精力分配在教学和科研工作中,其激励机制的设计相对复杂。基于这种差异性,本论文把研究型大学教师这个重要群体作为研究对象,利用量表、问卷实验剖析其心理偏好和偏差的特征,探究这些心理偏好对其激励契约设计的影响。这对激发研究型大学教师创新知识、创造价值的积极性,提高其人力资源利用效率有重要的作用。同时论文采取融合我国文化特征、教师性格测试等心理学和问卷实验等方法来识别和评价教师公平偏好演化规律和衰变路径,该方法将来也可以分析如何将组织行为学研究的程序公平、信息公平和人际公平等融入行为经济学中强调行为动机对等的公平偏好中,从而开辟非盈利性组织激励问题研究的新途径。
论文采取规范分析、问卷调查、问卷实验及模型化方法相结合的方式,基于研究型大学教师的需求偏好,特别是研究型大学教师的公平偏好特征,针对研究型大学教师激励契约效率和优化展开研究：首先利用组织行为学的量表和问卷实验相结合的方法对研究型大学教师的公平偏好进行揭示,其后利用实验经济学问卷实验的方法对研究型大学教师的公平偏好特征进行实验揭示,从而突破了组织行为学和实验经济学对公平理论研究方法的单一性。然后,通过模型化方法把以上两种方法揭示的公平偏好融入到效用函数中；最后,以该效用函数为基础,重构了研究型大学与教师委托代理模型,并具体分析了公平偏好对教师岗位绩效工资合约和多任务激励合约的影响机理,取得了以下的研究成果：
1.通过系统分析研究型大学教师的劳动、需要、人力资本及工作任务特征后,发现研究型大学教师的产出水平很难度量,而且研究型大学教师的努力不可监督,这样导致了岗位绩效工资制应用的局限性和难度；而对研究型大学教师的需求及心理偏差分析,得出了目前研究型大学教师激励合约效率不高的主要原因是忽视了非盈利性研究型大学个体的心理需求和偏差,从而论证了研究型大学教师合约设计必须考虑教师的心理需求和心理偏差。
2.我国研究型大学教师这一特殊群体的公平偏好心理特征在同情偏好和嫉妒偏好两方面表现出不同的衰变路径,即对于同情偏好衰变路径表现出敏感性递减特征,而对于嫉妒偏好,衰变路径则表现出敏感性递增的特征。而且,研究发现我国研究型大学教师这一特殊群体对自己处于劣势的非公平更加介意和敏感。
3.在研究公平偏好对岗位绩效合约的影响时,发现：在公平偏好条件下当绩效系数超过某一临界值时,给予更少的货币报酬不一定就会降低教师努力水平,如在绩效系数β满足1>β>1/2条件时,绩效工资的减少也会导致努力水平的提高e**>β/τe=e*；而在β满足0＜β<1/2条件时,绩效工资的增加也会导致教师努力水平的降低e**<β/τe=e*。
4.在研究公平偏好对多任务激励合约影响时发现：结论为与Holmstrom&Milgrom研究相异的推论：①考虑到教师的公平偏好,对科研的激励强度并不一定随着教学任务度量难度的增加而降低,它们的具体关系取决于教学和科研的度量难度和教师公平偏好程度的关系。②若考虑到教师公平偏好程度,提高科研的激励强度,并不一定会降低对教学的激励。因为教师对没有提高激励强度的教学存在更大的公平偏好程度,这种公平偏好心理促使教师对教学提供更大努力。③若考虑到教师的公平偏好心理偏好,科研无法度量时,最优的激励契约仍然对教学可以提供激励,这与现实中观察到的结果相一致。
In the general universities, teachers should take teaching as their central work, the design of its incentive mechanism is relatively simple, while in research universities, the teachers should allocate the limited energy to teaching and research work, the design of its incentive mechanism is relatively complex. Based on this difference, the paper hold the teachers of the research universities as research objects, use scales,questionnaire experiments to analyze the characteristics of psychological preferences and bias, then to explore these psychological preferences' influence on the design of its incentive contract. This plays an important role in stimulating and releasing the teachers'innovative knowledge, create value and improving the efficiency of its human resource utilization. At the same time,the paper integrates our cultural identity, teachers'personality test and questionnaire experiments methods to identify and evaluate teachers in a fair preference evolution and decay paths, the method can be used to analyze how to take the organizational behavior studies'procedural fairness, the information fairness and interpersonal fairness into the behavioral economics in the future, thus opening up new ways for the study on incentive problems of non-profit organizations.
The paper adopts measures of normative analysis, surveys, questionnaires and models, based on the need preferences and psychological bias of research universities, especially the teachers' characteristics of fair preference, to study the efficiency of incentive contract and Optimization of teachers. First, we make use of organizational behavior'scales and the questionnaires to reveal teachers' fair preferences; then we use the experimental economics-questionnaire experiment method to reveal the research university teachers'fair preferences characteristics; thus breaking through the unity of research method of the organizational behavior and experimental economics on fair theory. Finally, by modeling ways to take fair preferences revealed by the above two methods into an utility function; Then, based on the utility function, reconstruct the principal-agent model of the research universities and teachers, and detailedly analyze the impact of fairness preferences on teacher' job pay contracts and multi-tasking incentive contracts, and make the following findings:
(1) Through the system analysis of labor, needs, human capital and work task characters of teachers in research university, we find that it is very difficult to measure the output level of teachers in research university and their efforts can't be supervised. This result leads to the limitations of the application of job performance-based pay system. And the analysis of needs and psychological biases of teachers in research university conclusion that the efficiency of incentive contracts of teachers in research university is not high at present, mainly due to neglecting the individual psychological needs and biases in non-profit research university, which demonstrates that the psychological needs and biases of teachers must be considered in the teachers'contract design.
(2) The equity preference of the special group of teachers in our country's research university has shown different disintegration paths in sympathy preference and jealousy preference, namely, the disintegration path shown the feature of diminishing sensitivity in sympathy preference but the feature of increasing sensitivity in jealousy preference. Moreover, the study found that this special group of teachers in our country's research university have more mind and sensitive to their inequity that at a disadvantage.
(3) In the study of the influence of equity preference on the impact of job performance contract,we found that:under the conditions of equity preference, if the preference exceedsβover certain critical value, given less rewards to teacher does not necessarily lead to the lower level of efforts; if 1>β> 1/2, the decrease of rewards will lead to the increase of efforts e**>β/τe= e*; and if 0<β<1/2, the increase of rewards will lead to decrease the of efforts e**<β/τe= e*
(4) In the study of the influence of equity preference on the impact of multitask incentive contracts we found that the inferences are different from conclusion of Holmstrom&Milgrom'study:①Taking the equity preference of teacher into account, the incentive of research does not necessarily reduce with the increase of the measure difficulty of teaching task. The specific relationship of them depends on the measure difficulty of research and the equity preference level of teacher.②Taking the equity preference of teacher into account, increase of research incentive does not necessarily reduce the incentive of teaching. Because there is a greater equity preference level of teacher when incentive level of teaching have not increased, such equity preference promote greater efforts have to be provided by teacher.③Taking the equity preference of teacher into account, the optimal incentive contract still provide incentive to teaching while research can not be measured. It is consistent with the results in reality.
论文采取规范分析、问卷调查、问卷实验及模型化方法相结合的方式,基于研究型大学教师的需求偏好,特别是研究型大学教师的公平偏好特征,针对研究型大学教师激励契约效率和优化展开研究：首先利用组织行为学的量表和问卷实验相结合的方法对研究型大学教师的公平偏好进行揭示,其后利用实验经济学问卷实验的方法对研究型大学教师的公平偏好特征进行实验揭示,从而突破了组织行为学和实验经济学对公平理论研究方法的单一性。然后,通过模型化方法把以上两种方法揭示的公平偏好融入到效用函数中；最后,以该效用函数为基础,重构了研究型大学与教师委托代理模型,并具体分析了公平偏好对教师岗位绩效工资合约和多任务激励合约的影响机理,取得了以下的研究成果：
1.通过系统分析研究型大学教师的劳动、需要、人力资本及工作任务特征后,发现研究型大学教师的产出水平很难度量,而且研究型大学教师的努力不可监督,这样导致了岗位绩效工资制应用的局限性和难度；而对研究型大学教师的需求及心理偏差分析,得出了目前研究型大学教师激励合约效率不高的主要原因是忽视了非盈利性研究型大学个体的心理需求和偏差,从而论证了研究型大学教师合约设计必须考虑教师的心理需求和心理偏差。
2.我国研究型大学教师这一特殊群体的公平偏好心理特征在同情偏好和嫉妒偏好两方面表现出不同的衰变路径,即对于同情偏好衰变路径表现出敏感性递减特征,而对于嫉妒偏好,衰变路径则表现出敏感性递增的特征。而且,研究发现我国研究型大学教师这一特殊群体对自己处于劣势的非公平更加介意和敏感。
3.在研究公平偏好对岗位绩效合约的影响时,发现：在公平偏好条件下当绩效系数超过某一临界值时,给予更少的货币报酬不一定就会降低教师努力水平,如在绩效系数β满足1>β>1/2条件时,绩效工资的减少也会导致努力水平的提高e**>β/τe=e*；而在β满足0＜β<1/2条件时,绩效工资的增加也会导致教师努力水平的降低e**<β/τe=e*。
4.在研究公平偏好对多任务激励合约影响时发现：结论为与Holmstrom&Milgrom研究相异的推论：①考虑到教师的公平偏好,对科研的激励强度并不一定随着教学任务度量难度的增加而降低,它们的具体关系取决于教学和科研的度量难度和教师公平偏好程度的关系。②若考虑到教师公平偏好程度,提高科研的激励强度,并不一定会降低对教学的激励。因为教师对没有提高激励强度的教学存在更大的公平偏好程度,这种公平偏好心理促使教师对教学提供更大努力。③若考虑到教师的公平偏好心理偏好,科研无法度量时,最优的激励契约仍然对教学可以提供激励,这与现实中观察到的结果相一致。
In the general universities, teachers should take teaching as their central work, the design of its incentive mechanism is relatively simple, while in research universities, the teachers should allocate the limited energy to teaching and research work, the design of its incentive mechanism is relatively complex. Based on this difference, the paper hold the teachers of the research universities as research objects, use scales,questionnaire experiments to analyze the characteristics of psychological preferences and bias, then to explore these psychological preferences' influence on the design of its incentive contract. This plays an important role in stimulating and releasing the teachers'innovative knowledge, create value and improving the efficiency of its human resource utilization. At the same time,the paper integrates our cultural identity, teachers'personality test and questionnaire experiments methods to identify and evaluate teachers in a fair preference evolution and decay paths, the method can be used to analyze how to take the organizational behavior studies'procedural fairness, the information fairness and interpersonal fairness into the behavioral economics in the future, thus opening up new ways for the study on incentive problems of non-profit organizations.
The paper adopts measures of normative analysis, surveys, questionnaires and models, based on the need preferences and psychological bias of research universities, especially the teachers' characteristics of fair preference, to study the efficiency of incentive contract and Optimization of teachers. First, we make use of organizational behavior'scales and the questionnaires to reveal teachers' fair preferences; then we use the experimental economics-questionnaire experiment method to reveal the research university teachers'fair preferences characteristics; thus breaking through the unity of research method of the organizational behavior and experimental economics on fair theory. Finally, by modeling ways to take fair preferences revealed by the above two methods into an utility function; Then, based on the utility function, reconstruct the principal-agent model of the research universities and teachers, and detailedly analyze the impact of fairness preferences on teacher' job pay contracts and multi-tasking incentive contracts, and make the following findings:
(1) Through the system analysis of labor, needs, human capital and work task characters of teachers in research university, we find that it is very difficult to measure the output level of teachers in research university and their efforts can't be supervised. This result leads to the limitations of the application of job performance-based pay system. And the analysis of needs and psychological biases of teachers in research university conclusion that the efficiency of incentive contracts of teachers in research university is not high at present, mainly due to neglecting the individual psychological needs and biases in non-profit research university, which demonstrates that the psychological needs and biases of teachers must be considered in the teachers'contract design.
(2) The equity preference of the special group of teachers in our country's research university has shown different disintegration paths in sympathy preference and jealousy preference, namely, the disintegration path shown the feature of diminishing sensitivity in sympathy preference but the feature of increasing sensitivity in jealousy preference. Moreover, the study found that this special group of teachers in our country's research university have more mind and sensitive to their inequity that at a disadvantage.
(3) In the study of the influence of equity preference on the impact of job performance contract,we found that:under the conditions of equity preference, if the preference exceedsβover certain critical value, given less rewards to teacher does not necessarily lead to the lower level of efforts; if 1>β> 1/2, the decrease of rewards will lead to the increase of efforts e**>β/τe= e*; and if 0<β<1/2, the increase of rewards will lead to decrease the of efforts e**<β/τe= e*
(4) In the study of the influence of equity preference on the impact of multitask incentive contracts we found that the inferences are different from conclusion of Holmstrom&Milgrom'study:①Taking the equity preference of teacher into account, the incentive of research does not necessarily reduce with the increase of the measure difficulty of teaching task. The specific relationship of them depends on the measure difficulty of research and the equity preference level of teacher.②Taking the equity preference of teacher into account, increase of research incentive does not necessarily reduce the incentive of teaching. Because there is a greater equity preference level of teacher when incentive level of teaching have not increased, such equity preference promote greater efforts have to be provided by teacher.③Taking the equity preference of teacher into account, the optimal incentive contract still provide incentive to teaching while research can not be measured. It is consistent with the results in reality.
引文
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