财务困境上市公司的股权结构与其困境变化趋势关系研究
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摘要
自20世纪90年代,中国的资本市场由于财务恶化被列为ST或*ST的公司屡见不鲜。公司陷入财务困境之后至财务困境恶化或财务困境好转之前,是财务困境公司至关重要的时期,所以本文将此阶段作为研究重点。准确分析财务困境上市公司的困境程度和财务困境变化趋势,对管理层改善经营管理、投资者分散风险、银行贷款授信、政府完善监管都有重要的意义。本研究的主要内容包括三个方面：财务困境变化趋势及其影响因素分析、股权结构与财务困境程度之间的关系,以及财务困境公司的控股股东的股权结构与行为之间的关系。围绕这三个方面,本摘要从研究内容、研究方法、研究结论三个角度做如下概述。
首先,在财务困境变化趋势及其影响因素分析中,本研究将财务困境上市公司分为两类——财务困境好转的公司和财务困境恶化的公司。在理论分析基础上,本研究依据可测性、全面性和可比性原则,选取了股权结构和财务分析指标,采用Logistic分析法和SPSS11.5统计软件,建立财务困境变化趋势模型。研究发现：股权结构变量的引入,有利于提高财务困境变化趋势模型的判别精度；股权集中有利于财务困境公司摆脱困境步入正常；国有股比率高有利于财务困境公司摆脱困境步入正常、法人股比率高有利于财务困境公司摆脱困境步入正常；两权(控制权与现金流权)分离度高不利于财务困境公司摆脱困境步入正常；息税摊销前利润与债务比、营运资金比率、营业收入增长率、全面摊薄每股收益、流动资产周转率、现金流量利息保障倍数、每股现金净流量、每股净资产、全部资产现金回收率高有利于财务困境公司摆脱困境步入正常。资产负债率、负债与权益市价比率、账面市值比高不利于财务困境公司摆脱困境步入正常。本研究还采用了案例分析法,对研究结论加以验证。
其次,在股权结构与财务困境程度之间的关系分析中,本研究首先采用因子分析法,综合考虑了财务困境公司的偿债能力、成长能力、获利能力、营运能力和获取现金流量能力,全面衡量了财务困境公司的困境程度。这是对以往采用单一指标衡量公司经营成果的深入。在综合衡量财务困境上市公司的困境程度基础上,本研究采用面板数据分析法,利用Eviews软件系统分析了财务困境公司的股权结构与财务困境程度之间关系。研究发现：国有控股财务困境公司的困境程度要高于非国有法人控股公司；国有股比率与财务困境程度呈正相关关系；流通股比率与财务困境程度呈正相关关系；法人股比率与财务困境程度呈负相关关系。股权集中度与财务困境程度呈负相关关系。两权(控制权与现金流权)的分离度与财务困境程度呈正相关关系。
再次,本研究分析了财务困境公司控股股东的股权结构与其行为之间的关系。依据委托代理理论、监督假说理论、掠夺假说理论和支持假说理论,本研究构建了控股股东利益输送理论框架。该理论框架的构成要素及其对控股股东行为的影响主要体现在：两权分离是控股股东利益输送的前提；关联交易是控股股东利益输送的方式：获取长期控制权收益是控股股东利益输送的目的。在控股股东利益输送的理论框架分析的基础上,本研究还采用了数理分析法探讨了对控股股东行为产生影响的因素,提出研究假设。在实证分析中,本研究采用面板数据分析法和Eviews软件系统分析了财务困境公司的控股股东的股权与行为之间的关系。研究发现：国有控股上市公司控股股东的支持度要高于非国有控股公司；控股股东的两权(控制权和现金流权)分离度与支持度呈现负相关关系；股权集中度与控股股东的支持度呈现正相关关系。
本研究的创新之处主要体现在：以往文献对财务困境的研究主要是依据财务状况把上市公司分为财务正常公司和财务困境公司,没有对已经陷入财务困境上市公司进行再分类,本研究将财务困境视为一个动态过程,依据财务困境变化趋势,将财务困境公司分成两类——财务困境恶化公司和财务困境好转公司。以往文献对财务困境的研究主要集中在通过比较正常企业和困境企业的相关财务指标,从财务角度分析公司由财务正常陷入财务困境的财务原因,建立和优化财务困境预警模型,而从股权结构角度对已经陷入财务困境公司的困境程度和变化趋势研究较少,本研究综合考虑了财务困境公司的偿债能力、发展能力、抵抗风险能力、股东获利能力、营运能力和获取现金流量能力,在对财务困境企业的困境程度进行综合衡量的基础上,系统分析了财务困境上市公司的股权结构与财务困境变化趋势之间的关系。以往研究对财务困境变化趋势背后的股东行为研究较少,本研究构建了财务困境公司控股股东利益输送行为的理论分析框架。综合考虑以往研究存在的不足,本研究系统分析了股权结构对财务困境变化趋势是否产生影响(即股权结构与财务困境变化趋势关系研究)、股权结构对财务困境产生多大程度的影响(即股权结构与财务困境程度关系研究)的基础上,从股东行为选择角度,分析了股权结构对财务困境变化趋势产生影响的内在路径。股权结构影响股东行为选择,股东行为选择进一步影响财务困境程度和变化趋势。
Since the 1990s, many companies have been listed as ST or * ST because of deteriorated managements. It is a very critical period from falling into financial distress to terminating liquidation (or getting rid of distress) for the company in financial distress. And the future of the company is uncertain. How to analyze the financial distress degree of listed companies and accurately forecast their future trend is of importance because it is useful for the manager to improve management, for investors to decrease risk, for the bank to loan, for the government to supervise the capital market.
This study mainly consists of three parts:ownership structure and financial distress trend and ownership structure and financial distress degree, the controlling shareholders'shareholding structure and their behaviors.Focus on these three parts, this abstract summarizes the research content, methodology, conclusion of this dissertation as follows:
Firstly, in order to investigate the relationship between ownership structure and financial distress trend, companies which are in financial distress are categorized into two types:one turns better and the other deteriorates. According to principles of testability, inclusiveness and comparability, this study select indicator of ownership structure and financial factor, and establish the financial distress model by using Logistic analysis and the software of SPSS11.5. This study also introduces case analysis to test conclusions. And these conclusions as follows: the introduction of ownership structure variables is helpful to improve the accuracy of the financial distress trend model based on just financial variables. The increase of ownership concentration, state-owned shares, corporate shares is helpful for companies to get out of financial distress, and A high degree of the separation of control right and cash flow right is not helpful to improve the financial distress situation; a high degree in the ratio of earnings before interest and tax and debt, the ratio of working capital, growth rate of operating income, diluted earnings per share, turnover ratio of current assets, cash flow interest protection units, per share cash flow, cash recovery rate of total assets and net debt rate tangible is good to improve the bad situation of the companies; a high degree in the assets-liabilities ratio,the ratio of debt and equity market value, the ratio of net asset and book value is bad for the companies to get out of trouble.
Secondly, in order to investigate the relationship between ownership structure and the degree of financial distress, this study comprehensively estimated the degree of financial distress by the method of factor analysis. And this method comprehensively considerate the solvency, growth, profitability, operational capability and the ability of earning cash flow of the company, so this study further the previous research, which measure companies' performance by one singe financial ratio. After comprehensively measured the degree of the company's financial distress, this study analyzes the data of ownership structure and financial distress degree by the method of Panel data analysis and Eviews software to investigate the relationship between ownership structure and financial distress degree. The study find some results as follows:the financial distress degree of state-owned company is more serious than non-national companies; the ratio of state share and circulation ratio have a positive correlation with financial distress degree; corporate share has a negative correlation with financial distress level; ownership concentration and financial distress have a negative correlation.
Thirdly, the study analyzes the relationship between controlling stakeholders' ownership structure and their behaviors. Based on agent theory, the hypothesis of monitoring, tunneling hypothesis and propping hypothesis, this study constructs controlling shareholders' interests conveying theoretical framework by using qualitative and quantitive analysis method. And the theoretical framework systematically analyzes the following aspects:for controlling shareholders, the separation of control right and cash flow equity is the prerequisites of the interests conveying; long-term gain is the object of the interests conveying; related transactions is the way of the interests conveying. The study improves FRI model through mathematical analysis method. By combining the theory analysis and mathematical analysis, the study systematically analyzed the factors that influence behaviors of controlling shareholders, and proposed related assumptions. The study comes to conclusions by establishing a panel data regression model. The study also tests conclusions by case analysis. And results of this study are as follows:the support from controlling shareholders in state-owned companies is stronger than non-state-owned companies; the separation degree of control right and cash flow equity of large shareholders has negative correlation with their support, ownership concentration has a positive relationship with shareholder' propping behaviors.
The innovations of the study are as follows. Previous studies only categorized listed companies into companies in financial distress and normal companies, they did not subdivide listed companies in financial distress, the study considers financial distress as a dynamic process and subdivided them into two classes—the one turns worse and the other turns better, then compared companies of the two types. The previous researches on financial distress mainly concentrated on setting up and optimizing financial distress model by comparing relevant financial indicators of normal companies and companies in financial distress, while the research on measuring the degree of financial distress is very few. This study proposes an indicator of financial distress by integrating multiple financial measures. The previous researches focused on financial indicators while overlooking ownership structure features, so this study examines the shareholder structure characteristics and relationship between ownership structure and the distress trend. The previous researches seldom touched upon the shareholders' behavior behind financial distress trend. This study constructs a theoretical framework of the interest conveying of the controlling shareholders, and further explore an inherence way by which the ownership structure of company influences the financial distress trend, namely, shareholder' behavior choice. The ownership structure of shareholders decides shareholders' behavior choice, and the behavior choice further influences the degree and the change trend of financial distress.
首先,在财务困境变化趋势及其影响因素分析中,本研究将财务困境上市公司分为两类——财务困境好转的公司和财务困境恶化的公司。在理论分析基础上,本研究依据可测性、全面性和可比性原则,选取了股权结构和财务分析指标,采用Logistic分析法和SPSS11.5统计软件,建立财务困境变化趋势模型。研究发现：股权结构变量的引入,有利于提高财务困境变化趋势模型的判别精度；股权集中有利于财务困境公司摆脱困境步入正常；国有股比率高有利于财务困境公司摆脱困境步入正常、法人股比率高有利于财务困境公司摆脱困境步入正常；两权(控制权与现金流权)分离度高不利于财务困境公司摆脱困境步入正常；息税摊销前利润与债务比、营运资金比率、营业收入增长率、全面摊薄每股收益、流动资产周转率、现金流量利息保障倍数、每股现金净流量、每股净资产、全部资产现金回收率高有利于财务困境公司摆脱困境步入正常。资产负债率、负债与权益市价比率、账面市值比高不利于财务困境公司摆脱困境步入正常。本研究还采用了案例分析法,对研究结论加以验证。
其次,在股权结构与财务困境程度之间的关系分析中,本研究首先采用因子分析法,综合考虑了财务困境公司的偿债能力、成长能力、获利能力、营运能力和获取现金流量能力,全面衡量了财务困境公司的困境程度。这是对以往采用单一指标衡量公司经营成果的深入。在综合衡量财务困境上市公司的困境程度基础上,本研究采用面板数据分析法,利用Eviews软件系统分析了财务困境公司的股权结构与财务困境程度之间关系。研究发现：国有控股财务困境公司的困境程度要高于非国有法人控股公司；国有股比率与财务困境程度呈正相关关系；流通股比率与财务困境程度呈正相关关系；法人股比率与财务困境程度呈负相关关系。股权集中度与财务困境程度呈负相关关系。两权(控制权与现金流权)的分离度与财务困境程度呈正相关关系。
再次,本研究分析了财务困境公司控股股东的股权结构与其行为之间的关系。依据委托代理理论、监督假说理论、掠夺假说理论和支持假说理论,本研究构建了控股股东利益输送理论框架。该理论框架的构成要素及其对控股股东行为的影响主要体现在：两权分离是控股股东利益输送的前提；关联交易是控股股东利益输送的方式：获取长期控制权收益是控股股东利益输送的目的。在控股股东利益输送的理论框架分析的基础上,本研究还采用了数理分析法探讨了对控股股东行为产生影响的因素,提出研究假设。在实证分析中,本研究采用面板数据分析法和Eviews软件系统分析了财务困境公司的控股股东的股权与行为之间的关系。研究发现：国有控股上市公司控股股东的支持度要高于非国有控股公司；控股股东的两权(控制权和现金流权)分离度与支持度呈现负相关关系；股权集中度与控股股东的支持度呈现正相关关系。
本研究的创新之处主要体现在：以往文献对财务困境的研究主要是依据财务状况把上市公司分为财务正常公司和财务困境公司,没有对已经陷入财务困境上市公司进行再分类,本研究将财务困境视为一个动态过程,依据财务困境变化趋势,将财务困境公司分成两类——财务困境恶化公司和财务困境好转公司。以往文献对财务困境的研究主要集中在通过比较正常企业和困境企业的相关财务指标,从财务角度分析公司由财务正常陷入财务困境的财务原因,建立和优化财务困境预警模型,而从股权结构角度对已经陷入财务困境公司的困境程度和变化趋势研究较少,本研究综合考虑了财务困境公司的偿债能力、发展能力、抵抗风险能力、股东获利能力、营运能力和获取现金流量能力,在对财务困境企业的困境程度进行综合衡量的基础上,系统分析了财务困境上市公司的股权结构与财务困境变化趋势之间的关系。以往研究对财务困境变化趋势背后的股东行为研究较少,本研究构建了财务困境公司控股股东利益输送行为的理论分析框架。综合考虑以往研究存在的不足,本研究系统分析了股权结构对财务困境变化趋势是否产生影响(即股权结构与财务困境变化趋势关系研究)、股权结构对财务困境产生多大程度的影响(即股权结构与财务困境程度关系研究)的基础上,从股东行为选择角度,分析了股权结构对财务困境变化趋势产生影响的内在路径。股权结构影响股东行为选择,股东行为选择进一步影响财务困境程度和变化趋势。
Since the 1990s, many companies have been listed as ST or * ST because of deteriorated managements. It is a very critical period from falling into financial distress to terminating liquidation (or getting rid of distress) for the company in financial distress. And the future of the company is uncertain. How to analyze the financial distress degree of listed companies and accurately forecast their future trend is of importance because it is useful for the manager to improve management, for investors to decrease risk, for the bank to loan, for the government to supervise the capital market.
This study mainly consists of three parts:ownership structure and financial distress trend and ownership structure and financial distress degree, the controlling shareholders'shareholding structure and their behaviors.Focus on these three parts, this abstract summarizes the research content, methodology, conclusion of this dissertation as follows:
Firstly, in order to investigate the relationship between ownership structure and financial distress trend, companies which are in financial distress are categorized into two types:one turns better and the other deteriorates. According to principles of testability, inclusiveness and comparability, this study select indicator of ownership structure and financial factor, and establish the financial distress model by using Logistic analysis and the software of SPSS11.5. This study also introduces case analysis to test conclusions. And these conclusions as follows: the introduction of ownership structure variables is helpful to improve the accuracy of the financial distress trend model based on just financial variables. The increase of ownership concentration, state-owned shares, corporate shares is helpful for companies to get out of financial distress, and A high degree of the separation of control right and cash flow right is not helpful to improve the financial distress situation; a high degree in the ratio of earnings before interest and tax and debt, the ratio of working capital, growth rate of operating income, diluted earnings per share, turnover ratio of current assets, cash flow interest protection units, per share cash flow, cash recovery rate of total assets and net debt rate tangible is good to improve the bad situation of the companies; a high degree in the assets-liabilities ratio,the ratio of debt and equity market value, the ratio of net asset and book value is bad for the companies to get out of trouble.
Secondly, in order to investigate the relationship between ownership structure and the degree of financial distress, this study comprehensively estimated the degree of financial distress by the method of factor analysis. And this method comprehensively considerate the solvency, growth, profitability, operational capability and the ability of earning cash flow of the company, so this study further the previous research, which measure companies' performance by one singe financial ratio. After comprehensively measured the degree of the company's financial distress, this study analyzes the data of ownership structure and financial distress degree by the method of Panel data analysis and Eviews software to investigate the relationship between ownership structure and financial distress degree. The study find some results as follows:the financial distress degree of state-owned company is more serious than non-national companies; the ratio of state share and circulation ratio have a positive correlation with financial distress degree; corporate share has a negative correlation with financial distress level; ownership concentration and financial distress have a negative correlation.
Thirdly, the study analyzes the relationship between controlling stakeholders' ownership structure and their behaviors. Based on agent theory, the hypothesis of monitoring, tunneling hypothesis and propping hypothesis, this study constructs controlling shareholders' interests conveying theoretical framework by using qualitative and quantitive analysis method. And the theoretical framework systematically analyzes the following aspects:for controlling shareholders, the separation of control right and cash flow equity is the prerequisites of the interests conveying; long-term gain is the object of the interests conveying; related transactions is the way of the interests conveying. The study improves FRI model through mathematical analysis method. By combining the theory analysis and mathematical analysis, the study systematically analyzed the factors that influence behaviors of controlling shareholders, and proposed related assumptions. The study comes to conclusions by establishing a panel data regression model. The study also tests conclusions by case analysis. And results of this study are as follows:the support from controlling shareholders in state-owned companies is stronger than non-state-owned companies; the separation degree of control right and cash flow equity of large shareholders has negative correlation with their support, ownership concentration has a positive relationship with shareholder' propping behaviors.
The innovations of the study are as follows. Previous studies only categorized listed companies into companies in financial distress and normal companies, they did not subdivide listed companies in financial distress, the study considers financial distress as a dynamic process and subdivided them into two classes—the one turns worse and the other turns better, then compared companies of the two types. The previous researches on financial distress mainly concentrated on setting up and optimizing financial distress model by comparing relevant financial indicators of normal companies and companies in financial distress, while the research on measuring the degree of financial distress is very few. This study proposes an indicator of financial distress by integrating multiple financial measures. The previous researches focused on financial indicators while overlooking ownership structure features, so this study examines the shareholder structure characteristics and relationship between ownership structure and the distress trend. The previous researches seldom touched upon the shareholders' behavior behind financial distress trend. This study constructs a theoretical framework of the interest conveying of the controlling shareholders, and further explore an inherence way by which the ownership structure of company influences the financial distress trend, namely, shareholder' behavior choice. The ownership structure of shareholders decides shareholders' behavior choice, and the behavior choice further influences the degree and the change trend of financial distress.
引文
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