我国上市公司股利政策研究
|
摘要
股利政策作为公司三大财务决策之一,由于它是公司在利润再投资与回报投资者两者之间的一种权衡,关系到股东的现期收益与公司的未来发展,关系到不同股东群体之间的利益均衡,进而关系到上市公司和证券市场的健康发展。因而,作为财务经济学的一个重要分支,股利政策的研究一直是国内外理论研究者和实际工作者关注的焦点,各种理论层出不穷。但从国内外目前的研究情况来看,尽管关于股利政策的理论研究和实证分析的成果比较多,但是关于公司为什么发放股利,至今尚没有取得一致的结果。近年来,我国资本市场的股利政策实践表明,上市公司的股利分配行为存在很多非理性行为,为此,有关监管部门出台了一系列政策,但效果并不明显。比如,尽管2000年以来,我国监管部门将再融资政策与现金分红相联系,使得进行派现的公司比例有了明显增加,但不分配现象依然严重,而且在派现公司中存在“象征性派现”和“超能力派现”两种完全不同的股利分配行为,这些现象似乎难以单纯用监管层的政策驱动来合理解释。那么,是什么因素影响了我国上市公司的股利分配意愿?现金分红中的“象征性派现”和“超能力派现”的深层次动机是什么?在我国独特的资本市场制度背景下,公司治理对上市公司的股利政策是否会产生影响?影响程度如何?本文试图在借鉴前人研究成果的基础上,为这些问题找到较满意的答案。通过对上述问题的深入研究,对于优化我国上市公司的股利政策,改善上市公司治理以及进一步完善法律保护体系和外部监管都将具有重要的借鉴意义。
全文由绪论和正文六章组成,约11万字。
绪论部分阐述了论文的选题背景和研究意义;论文的主要研究方法;论文的研究内容和逻辑结构。
第1章股利政策理论及实证研究综述。本章分别沿着传统股利政策理论和现代股利政策理论的发展轨迹,对各种理论的主要观点、演变脉络以及他们之间的关系进行介绍和评述,为本文的研究奠定了理论基础;最后,本文对主流股利政策理论的一些国内外重要实证研究文献进行回顾和评述,为本文相关实证研究奠定基础。
第2章我国上市公司股利分配政策的现状分析。本章首先对美国、日本等一些主要西方国家的股利分配政策特点进行介绍;其次,为了较为准确地把握我国上市公司股利政策的基本特征,以十多年来的股利实践为研究对象,从总体上对我国股利政策的历史变迁和基本特点进行考察;最后,本章对造成当前股利政策现状的上市公司制度背景进行分析。
第3章我国上市公司股利分配政策的特征分析。本章分别从产业特征层面和公司特征层面对当前我国上市公司的股利政策特征进行分析。
第4章公司治理与股利分配意愿:理论与实证。本章选取公司“派现与否”作为股利分配意愿的代理变量,通过构造Logistic回归模型,分别从股权结构、管理层激励、董事会安排等公司治理机制考察其对公司股利分配意愿的影响。
第5章公司治理与股利支付水平:理论与实证。本章根据收集到的2003-2004年沪、深两市进行派现的715家上市公司为样本,分别采用单因素分析法和构建多元回归模型对公司治理与现金股利支付水平间的关系进行实证分析。
第6章主要研究结论、政策建议与研究局限性。本章首先总结全文的主要研究结论;其次,在理论与实证研究结果的基础上,结合我国上市公司的制度背景,提出优化股利分配行为、完善公司治理的相关政策建议;最后,针对本文研究的局限性,提出本文的后续研究设想。
论文吸收和借鉴了国内外学术界现有的研究成果,从一般到特殊,从理论到实践,将当前的股利实践同我国特有的资本市场制度背景结合起来进行考察,具有一定的特色和创新,主要体现在以下几方面:
1.系统分析了我国股利政策的现状及其产生的特殊制度背景。根据我国股利政策的历史变迁,本文总结了股利政策实践的三个基本特征:第一,股利分配形式多样化,不分配现象比较突出;第二,股利分配政策不稳定,逐年结构性变化较明显;第三,现金股利分配中存在“异常低派现”和“超能力派现”并存的现象。本文指出,股权结构、管理层激励、董事会安排等内部治理机制和市场监管、公司外部治理机制等外部约束机制的不健全是造成当前股利政策现状的制度性根源。
2.研究并证实我国上市公司股利政策具有显著的行业特征。国内还没有对股利政策行业差异的专门研究,针对这一不足,本文对我国上市公司的现金股利政策的行业特征进行了全面地实证检验,并取得如下研究发现:第一,不管是在行业门类之间,还是在制造业次类之间,我国上市公司的现金股利支付水平都存在明显的行业差异,参数和非参数检验结果表明,现金股利政策的行业差异在统计上显著;第二,总体上,受管制的一些行业,如电力、交通运输和信息技术业对现金股利支付具有显著的正向影响,象批发零售这种行业竞争程度很高的行业,现金股利的支付水平比较低,实证分析表明,4.60%的派现水平变异可以由行业特征加以解释。
3.系统地考察并识别出影响我国上市公司股利政策的主要公司特征因素。根据本文的具体划分,就我国股利分配现状而言,股利政策在内涵上至少包括两个层面——股利分配意愿和股利支付水平,尽管国内一些实证文献也对该问题进行了考察,但往往只对其中一个层面的内容进行研究。针对国内研究的这一不足,在国内外研究文献基础上,本文选取了公司规模、成长性机会、盈利能力、流通股规模、负债水平和企业自由现金流水平等反映公司特征的六个方面,分别对上市公司的股利分配意愿和现金股利支付水平的影响机理和影响程度进行研究。研究结果表明,公司特征因素不仅会影响上市公司的股利分配意愿,同时这些公司特征因素也在不同程度上对上市公司的派现水平产生影响。
4.从公司治理层面证实了公司治理对股利分配意愿地影响。近年来,国内不少学者从公司治理视角,针对现金股利支付水平的影响因素或股利政策效应进行了实证分析,但很少有学者从公司治理角度出发,对上市公司的股利分配意愿进行实证考察。基于公司治理影响股利分配政策的理论阐释,本文以公司治理为研究视角,选取公司“派现与否”作为股利分配意愿的代理变量,通过构造Logistic回归模型,对我国上市公司股利分配意愿的影响因素进行了实证考察。得出的主要结论有:第一,第一大股东持股状况显著影响公司的股利分配意愿,其中,第一大股东持股比例越高,公司分派股利的意愿越强;第一大股东达到绝对控股后更倾向于分配股利;第一大股东为国有性质时,其派现意愿也越强。第二,内部职工持股比例、董事会规模以及董事长与总经理两职合一状况同股利分配意愿显著正相关。第三,其他大股东持股状况、管理层持股比例、独立董事规模与股利分配意愿的关系不明显。
5.采用单因素和多因素分析方法对上市公司现金股利支付水平的影响因素进行了系统地分析。本文在企业代理理论和相关实证研究成果基础上,重点从公司治理视角探讨了上市公司现金股利支付水平的影响因素。通过对公司特征变量、时间特征以及产业特征进行控制,实证分析结果显示,公司治理特征确实显著影响了我国上市公司的现金股利支付水平。其中,第一大股东持股状况对派现水平的影响最为显著,第一大股东持股比例同公司派现水平呈显著的“U”形关系,而且国有性质上市公司倾向于派发更多现金股利;在董事会安排上,实证发现,董事会规模越大,公司派现水平越高。另外,本文没有发现管理层持股、内部职工持股、独立董事规模等公司治理特征与派现水平的相关证据。
需要指出的是,由于作者的时间、精力和资料收集的难度所限,本文的研究也存在一些较为明显的局限和不足,尚待今后进一步深入研究,主要表现在:第一,为了保证样本数据期间政策的相对稳定性,本文选取的数据均为股权分置改革前数据,因此,在后股权分置时代,我国上市公司股利政策的特点及主要影响因素是否发生根本性变化,还需今后进一步研究;第二,在现金股利政策的实证研究中,本文侧重于使用每股股利这一绝对数指标,仅在稳健性检验中考虑了股利支付率指标,在一定程度上影响了回归结果的可靠性;第三,本文仅从公司内部治理机制(如股权结构、董事会安排等)如何影响股利政策进行探讨,受研究侧重点和资料收集难度的限制,没有对公司外部治理机制对股利分配行为的影响进行考察,有待今后进一步研究。
As the main branches of Financial Economics, dividend policy was always the focus of foreign theory researchers and practice workers. Thinking about the global theory study and empirical research, we found no simulation result on the reasons of dividend distribution.In recent years, the dividend policy practice of China capital market showed many non-rational arrear behaviours of China Listed Companies. The regulation and government department issued a series of regulationg policy with no obvious effect. For example, since 2000, the China regulation and government department combined the refinance policy with cash dividend, made a dramatic increase of the proportion on companied with cash dividend. But non-distribute phenomenon of listed companies was still serious with the conflict facts of nominal Cash Dividends and ultra-ability Cash Dividends. The policy driving of regulation can’t give a reasonable explanation. Then what on earth influences the intention of Dividend Distribution of China Listed Company? What’s the deep motivation of nominal Cash Dividends and ultra-ability Cash Dividends? With the unique system background of the China Stock market, will Corporate Governance affect the dividend policy of China Listed Companies? How? The thesis tried to find a satisfied answer on the former researchers’excellent disquisitions. The study of the above questions will show important theory significance and practical application value to optimize dividend policy, improve Corporate Governance, perfect law system and extra regulation of China Listed Companies.
The dissertation contains the introduction part and six chapters amounting to about 110,000 charatctes.
The thesis analysized the status and background of China Listed Companies based on the reviews of the empirical study literature on modern dividend policy theory and therefore primarily discussed the effect mechanism and degree of the major influential factors considering industry characterstics and corporate characterstics. Furthermore, some empirical study on the intention of dividend distribution of Listed Company and the influencing factors of the cash dividends level was made from the view point of Company Governance based on model of econometrics by controlling the related variables. Finally, according to the theory and empirical study results, some advice was given on establishing scientific dividend policy and designing better corporate governance.
The thesis absorbed the existent research results from the domestic and abroad academics. The special features and innovations are as following:
First, the status and the special institutional background of China dividend policy were systematicly analysized. The thesis summarized the basic features of the practices of dividend policy and pointed out that internal governance mechanism such as ownership structure, top-management incentive, institutional arrangement of Board of Directors and external governance mechanism such as market surpervision were the Systemic Origins considering the progression of dividend policy History.
Second, the dividend policy of the China Listed Companies has prominent industrial characteristic was studied and approved. The thesis made thorough empirical test on the industrial characteristics of China Listed Companies’dividend policy for no special relative research now. The results showed that the cash dividend level of the China Listed Companies has prominent industrial characteristic. As a whole, the cash dividend level of industries with serious government control is higher than those with serious industries competition. The empirical results also showed that about 4.60% of the differences between industrial characteristic and the cash dividends level can be explained by industries.
Third, the main enterprise character factors affecting dividend policy of China Listed Companies were systemeticly analysized and identified. The thesis respectively studied the effect mechanism and degree of the intention of dividend arrear and the level of cash dividend considering firm size, growth opportunities, profitability, current shares, debt size and free cash flow of firms based on existent research results from the domestic and abroad academics. The results showed that enterprise character factors affected not only the intention of dividend distribution, but also the level of cash dividend to some extent.
Fourth, it was proved that corporate governance would affect the intention of dividend distribution. The thesis empirically researched the factors affecting the intention of dividend distribution of China Listed Companies by designing a Logistic regression model with the agent variable“pay-out or not”from the view point of company governance based on the theory explanation that corporate governance affected dividend policy.
Fifthly, the influencing factors of the cash dividends level of China Listed Companies were syntheticly analysized using single and multiple factor analysis methods.The thesis mainly discussed the influencing factors of the cash dividends level of China Listed Companies viewing from corporate governance on the basis of agency theory and relative results of empirical studies.The result of the empirical study showed that the cash dividend level of China Listed Companies was assuredly affected by the features of Corporate Governance through controlling the Enterprise Character Variable, timer Character Variable and Industry Character Variable.
However, there still remained quite a few shortcomings in the dissertation, resulting from the limited ability of the author and the difficulty of files collecting. First, the thesis selected the datas before the reform of non-tradable shares in order to keep the data stable during research period. So, in Post Non-tradabe share Reform Era, whether fundamental changes of the characteristics and the main influencing factors of the dividend policy of China Listed Companies have happened need further study. Second, on the empirical study of cash dividend policy, the thesis mainly used the absolute index Dividend per Share. Dividend payout ratio index was used only in robust statistics. The reliability of the regression results may be affected in certain extent. Third, the thesis only discussed how internal governance mechanism such as ownership structure and board composition effect dividend policy. Limited by the emphases of research and the difficulty of data collecting, further study should be made about how external governance mechanism effect dividend policy.
全文由绪论和正文六章组成,约11万字。
绪论部分阐述了论文的选题背景和研究意义;论文的主要研究方法;论文的研究内容和逻辑结构。
第1章股利政策理论及实证研究综述。本章分别沿着传统股利政策理论和现代股利政策理论的发展轨迹,对各种理论的主要观点、演变脉络以及他们之间的关系进行介绍和评述,为本文的研究奠定了理论基础;最后,本文对主流股利政策理论的一些国内外重要实证研究文献进行回顾和评述,为本文相关实证研究奠定基础。
第2章我国上市公司股利分配政策的现状分析。本章首先对美国、日本等一些主要西方国家的股利分配政策特点进行介绍;其次,为了较为准确地把握我国上市公司股利政策的基本特征,以十多年来的股利实践为研究对象,从总体上对我国股利政策的历史变迁和基本特点进行考察;最后,本章对造成当前股利政策现状的上市公司制度背景进行分析。
第3章我国上市公司股利分配政策的特征分析。本章分别从产业特征层面和公司特征层面对当前我国上市公司的股利政策特征进行分析。
第4章公司治理与股利分配意愿:理论与实证。本章选取公司“派现与否”作为股利分配意愿的代理变量,通过构造Logistic回归模型,分别从股权结构、管理层激励、董事会安排等公司治理机制考察其对公司股利分配意愿的影响。
第5章公司治理与股利支付水平:理论与实证。本章根据收集到的2003-2004年沪、深两市进行派现的715家上市公司为样本,分别采用单因素分析法和构建多元回归模型对公司治理与现金股利支付水平间的关系进行实证分析。
第6章主要研究结论、政策建议与研究局限性。本章首先总结全文的主要研究结论;其次,在理论与实证研究结果的基础上,结合我国上市公司的制度背景,提出优化股利分配行为、完善公司治理的相关政策建议;最后,针对本文研究的局限性,提出本文的后续研究设想。
论文吸收和借鉴了国内外学术界现有的研究成果,从一般到特殊,从理论到实践,将当前的股利实践同我国特有的资本市场制度背景结合起来进行考察,具有一定的特色和创新,主要体现在以下几方面:
1.系统分析了我国股利政策的现状及其产生的特殊制度背景。根据我国股利政策的历史变迁,本文总结了股利政策实践的三个基本特征:第一,股利分配形式多样化,不分配现象比较突出;第二,股利分配政策不稳定,逐年结构性变化较明显;第三,现金股利分配中存在“异常低派现”和“超能力派现”并存的现象。本文指出,股权结构、管理层激励、董事会安排等内部治理机制和市场监管、公司外部治理机制等外部约束机制的不健全是造成当前股利政策现状的制度性根源。
2.研究并证实我国上市公司股利政策具有显著的行业特征。国内还没有对股利政策行业差异的专门研究,针对这一不足,本文对我国上市公司的现金股利政策的行业特征进行了全面地实证检验,并取得如下研究发现:第一,不管是在行业门类之间,还是在制造业次类之间,我国上市公司的现金股利支付水平都存在明显的行业差异,参数和非参数检验结果表明,现金股利政策的行业差异在统计上显著;第二,总体上,受管制的一些行业,如电力、交通运输和信息技术业对现金股利支付具有显著的正向影响,象批发零售这种行业竞争程度很高的行业,现金股利的支付水平比较低,实证分析表明,4.60%的派现水平变异可以由行业特征加以解释。
3.系统地考察并识别出影响我国上市公司股利政策的主要公司特征因素。根据本文的具体划分,就我国股利分配现状而言,股利政策在内涵上至少包括两个层面——股利分配意愿和股利支付水平,尽管国内一些实证文献也对该问题进行了考察,但往往只对其中一个层面的内容进行研究。针对国内研究的这一不足,在国内外研究文献基础上,本文选取了公司规模、成长性机会、盈利能力、流通股规模、负债水平和企业自由现金流水平等反映公司特征的六个方面,分别对上市公司的股利分配意愿和现金股利支付水平的影响机理和影响程度进行研究。研究结果表明,公司特征因素不仅会影响上市公司的股利分配意愿,同时这些公司特征因素也在不同程度上对上市公司的派现水平产生影响。
4.从公司治理层面证实了公司治理对股利分配意愿地影响。近年来,国内不少学者从公司治理视角,针对现金股利支付水平的影响因素或股利政策效应进行了实证分析,但很少有学者从公司治理角度出发,对上市公司的股利分配意愿进行实证考察。基于公司治理影响股利分配政策的理论阐释,本文以公司治理为研究视角,选取公司“派现与否”作为股利分配意愿的代理变量,通过构造Logistic回归模型,对我国上市公司股利分配意愿的影响因素进行了实证考察。得出的主要结论有:第一,第一大股东持股状况显著影响公司的股利分配意愿,其中,第一大股东持股比例越高,公司分派股利的意愿越强;第一大股东达到绝对控股后更倾向于分配股利;第一大股东为国有性质时,其派现意愿也越强。第二,内部职工持股比例、董事会规模以及董事长与总经理两职合一状况同股利分配意愿显著正相关。第三,其他大股东持股状况、管理层持股比例、独立董事规模与股利分配意愿的关系不明显。
5.采用单因素和多因素分析方法对上市公司现金股利支付水平的影响因素进行了系统地分析。本文在企业代理理论和相关实证研究成果基础上,重点从公司治理视角探讨了上市公司现金股利支付水平的影响因素。通过对公司特征变量、时间特征以及产业特征进行控制,实证分析结果显示,公司治理特征确实显著影响了我国上市公司的现金股利支付水平。其中,第一大股东持股状况对派现水平的影响最为显著,第一大股东持股比例同公司派现水平呈显著的“U”形关系,而且国有性质上市公司倾向于派发更多现金股利;在董事会安排上,实证发现,董事会规模越大,公司派现水平越高。另外,本文没有发现管理层持股、内部职工持股、独立董事规模等公司治理特征与派现水平的相关证据。
需要指出的是,由于作者的时间、精力和资料收集的难度所限,本文的研究也存在一些较为明显的局限和不足,尚待今后进一步深入研究,主要表现在:第一,为了保证样本数据期间政策的相对稳定性,本文选取的数据均为股权分置改革前数据,因此,在后股权分置时代,我国上市公司股利政策的特点及主要影响因素是否发生根本性变化,还需今后进一步研究;第二,在现金股利政策的实证研究中,本文侧重于使用每股股利这一绝对数指标,仅在稳健性检验中考虑了股利支付率指标,在一定程度上影响了回归结果的可靠性;第三,本文仅从公司内部治理机制(如股权结构、董事会安排等)如何影响股利政策进行探讨,受研究侧重点和资料收集难度的限制,没有对公司外部治理机制对股利分配行为的影响进行考察,有待今后进一步研究。
As the main branches of Financial Economics, dividend policy was always the focus of foreign theory researchers and practice workers. Thinking about the global theory study and empirical research, we found no simulation result on the reasons of dividend distribution.In recent years, the dividend policy practice of China capital market showed many non-rational arrear behaviours of China Listed Companies. The regulation and government department issued a series of regulationg policy with no obvious effect. For example, since 2000, the China regulation and government department combined the refinance policy with cash dividend, made a dramatic increase of the proportion on companied with cash dividend. But non-distribute phenomenon of listed companies was still serious with the conflict facts of nominal Cash Dividends and ultra-ability Cash Dividends. The policy driving of regulation can’t give a reasonable explanation. Then what on earth influences the intention of Dividend Distribution of China Listed Company? What’s the deep motivation of nominal Cash Dividends and ultra-ability Cash Dividends? With the unique system background of the China Stock market, will Corporate Governance affect the dividend policy of China Listed Companies? How? The thesis tried to find a satisfied answer on the former researchers’excellent disquisitions. The study of the above questions will show important theory significance and practical application value to optimize dividend policy, improve Corporate Governance, perfect law system and extra regulation of China Listed Companies.
The dissertation contains the introduction part and six chapters amounting to about 110,000 charatctes.
The thesis analysized the status and background of China Listed Companies based on the reviews of the empirical study literature on modern dividend policy theory and therefore primarily discussed the effect mechanism and degree of the major influential factors considering industry characterstics and corporate characterstics. Furthermore, some empirical study on the intention of dividend distribution of Listed Company and the influencing factors of the cash dividends level was made from the view point of Company Governance based on model of econometrics by controlling the related variables. Finally, according to the theory and empirical study results, some advice was given on establishing scientific dividend policy and designing better corporate governance.
The thesis absorbed the existent research results from the domestic and abroad academics. The special features and innovations are as following:
First, the status and the special institutional background of China dividend policy were systematicly analysized. The thesis summarized the basic features of the practices of dividend policy and pointed out that internal governance mechanism such as ownership structure, top-management incentive, institutional arrangement of Board of Directors and external governance mechanism such as market surpervision were the Systemic Origins considering the progression of dividend policy History.
Second, the dividend policy of the China Listed Companies has prominent industrial characteristic was studied and approved. The thesis made thorough empirical test on the industrial characteristics of China Listed Companies’dividend policy for no special relative research now. The results showed that the cash dividend level of the China Listed Companies has prominent industrial characteristic. As a whole, the cash dividend level of industries with serious government control is higher than those with serious industries competition. The empirical results also showed that about 4.60% of the differences between industrial characteristic and the cash dividends level can be explained by industries.
Third, the main enterprise character factors affecting dividend policy of China Listed Companies were systemeticly analysized and identified. The thesis respectively studied the effect mechanism and degree of the intention of dividend arrear and the level of cash dividend considering firm size, growth opportunities, profitability, current shares, debt size and free cash flow of firms based on existent research results from the domestic and abroad academics. The results showed that enterprise character factors affected not only the intention of dividend distribution, but also the level of cash dividend to some extent.
Fourth, it was proved that corporate governance would affect the intention of dividend distribution. The thesis empirically researched the factors affecting the intention of dividend distribution of China Listed Companies by designing a Logistic regression model with the agent variable“pay-out or not”from the view point of company governance based on the theory explanation that corporate governance affected dividend policy.
Fifthly, the influencing factors of the cash dividends level of China Listed Companies were syntheticly analysized using single and multiple factor analysis methods.The thesis mainly discussed the influencing factors of the cash dividends level of China Listed Companies viewing from corporate governance on the basis of agency theory and relative results of empirical studies.The result of the empirical study showed that the cash dividend level of China Listed Companies was assuredly affected by the features of Corporate Governance through controlling the Enterprise Character Variable, timer Character Variable and Industry Character Variable.
However, there still remained quite a few shortcomings in the dissertation, resulting from the limited ability of the author and the difficulty of files collecting. First, the thesis selected the datas before the reform of non-tradable shares in order to keep the data stable during research period. So, in Post Non-tradabe share Reform Era, whether fundamental changes of the characteristics and the main influencing factors of the dividend policy of China Listed Companies have happened need further study. Second, on the empirical study of cash dividend policy, the thesis mainly used the absolute index Dividend per Share. Dividend payout ratio index was used only in robust statistics. The reliability of the regression results may be affected in certain extent. Third, the thesis only discussed how internal governance mechanism such as ownership structure and board composition effect dividend policy. Limited by the emphases of research and the difficulty of data collecting, further study should be made about how external governance mechanism effect dividend policy.
引文
①Fischer Black.The Dividend Puzzle.Journal of Portfolio Management,Winter 1976:5—8.
①李常青:《股利政策理论与实证研究》,中国人民大学出版社,2001年,第17页。
①李常青:《股利政策理论与实证研究》,中国人民大学出版社,2001年,第28页。
①李常青:《股利政策理论与实证研究》,中国人民大学出版社,2001年,第34页。
②徐明圣,刘丽巍:《现代股利政策理论的演变及其评价》,见《当代财经》,2003年,第1期,第53-56页。
①Miller, M.H. and Modigliani F.,“Dividend Policy, Growth, and the Valuation of Shares”, The Journal of Business, No4, October 1961, p432-433.
②Black, F. and M. Scholes, M.s.,“The Effects of Dividend Yield and Dividend Policy on Common Stock Prices and Returns”, Journal of Financial Economics, 1(1), May 1974,p1-22
③Lewellen, W., K. Stanley, R. Lease, and G. Schlarbaum, "Some Direct Evidence on the Dividend Clientele Phenomenon", Journal of Finance , December1978, p1385-1399.
①Kalay, A.,“The Ex-Dividend Day Behavior of Stock Prices: A Re-Examination of the Clientele Effect”, Journal of Finance, No4, September1982, p1059-1082.
②Bhattacharya, S.,“Imperfect Information, Dividend Policy, and the‘bird in the hand’fallacy”, Bell Journal of Economics, Spring 1979, p259-270.
①净股利是指期末时,股利减去负债和新股收入后的值。净股利为正值,表示所发股利来源于公司真正的盈利;而如果净股利为负值,则表示公司并没有足够的现金来发放股利,股利部分或全部靠外部融资来支付。
②Miller M. and Rock, K., "Dividend Policy under Asymmetric Information", Journal of Finance, September1985,p 1031-1051.
③John, K., and Williams, J.,“Dividends, Dilution, and Taxes: A Signaling Equilibrium”, Journal of Finance,No4, September1985, p1053-1070.
④李常青:《股利政策理论与实证研究》,中国人民大学出版社,2001年,第74页。
②陈郁:《所有权、控制权与激励》,上海三联书店,上海人民出版社,1998年,第6页。
①袁振兴、杨淑娥和王冬年:《从代理成本理论到利益侵占假说的演变》,见《经济问题》2007年,第2期,第11页。
①A. Kalay, "Stockholder-Bondholder Conflict and Dividend Constraints", Journal of Financial Economics, 10, 1982, p211-233.
②直接股利约束(direct dividend constraint)是指在债务合约条款中,以显性形式规定的股利约束条件,如公司的股利支付不得超过某一限额等。
③间接股利约束(indirect dividend constraint)是指在债务合约条款中,以隐性形式规定的股利约束条件,如通过规定公司应维持最低的营运成本、流动比率和净资产等来控制股利的发放。
④Easterbrook F.H.,“Two Agency-Cost Explanations of Dividends”, American Economic Review, 74, September 1984, p650-659.
①李常青:《股利政策理论与实证研究》,中国人民大学出版社,2001年,第86页。
②Baker, M. and Wurgler, J.,“A Catering Theory of Dividends”, the Journal of Finance, No3, 2004, p1125~1165.
①李常青:《股利政策理论与实证研究》,中国人民大学出版社,2001年,第87页。
②参见Baker, H.K. and Powell, G.E., "How Corporate Managers View Dividend Policy", Quarterly Journal of Business and Economics, Spring1999, pp.17-35.
③刘星:《股利决策新论》,重庆大学出版社,1999年,第4页。
①Beaver, W.H: Financial Reporting, An Accounting Revolution. 3rd Edition, Prentice Hall International, Inc, 2001.
①伍利娜等:《中国上市公司“异常高派现”影响因素研究》,见《经济科学》,2003年,第1期,第32页。
②胡蓉:《从“用友现象”看中国股利分配》,见《经济与社会发展》,2003年,第1期。
①王战强:《上市公司高管人员持股状况研究及政策建议》,见《证券市场导报》,1998年,第1期。
①俞鸿琳:《国有上市公司管理者股权激励效应的实证检验》,见《经济科学》,2006年,第1期,第108-109页。
①崔学刚:《公司治理机制对公司透明度的影响》,见《会计研究》,2004年,第8期,第74页。
①魏刚:《高级管理层激励与公司经营绩效》,见《经济研究》,2000年,第3期,第38页。
①全样本公司中两职合一比例为89.3%。
[1] Agrawal, A. and Jayaraman, N.,“The Dividend Policies of All-Equity Firms: A Direct Test of Free Cash Flow Theory”, Managerial Decision Economics, 15, 1994, PP.139-148.
[2] Aharony, J. and LSwary,“Quarterly Dividend and Earnings Announcements and Stockholder Returns: An Empirical Analysis”, Journal of Finance, 35, 1980, PP.1-11.
[3] Almeida, H. and Wolfenzon, D.,“A Theory of Pyramidal Ownership and Family Business Groups”, NBER Working Paper, 2005, PP.1-49.
[4] Ang, J., Cole, R. and Lin, J.,“Agency Costs and Ownership Structure”, Journal of Finance, 55, 2000, PP.81-106.
[5] Baek, J., Kang, J. and Park K.,“Corporate Governance and Firm Value: Evidence from the Korean Financial Crisis”, Journal of Financial Economics, 71, 2004,PP.265-313.
[6] Baker, H. and Powell, G.,“How Corporate Managers View Dividend Policy”, Quarterly Journal of Business and Economics, 38, 1999, PP.17-35.
[7] Baker, H. and Gary E.,“Determinants of Corporate Dividend Policy: A Survey of NYSE Firms”, Financial Practice and Education, 10, 2000, PP.29-40.
[8] Baker, H. and Gary E.,“Managerial Perspectives on Dividend Policy”, Journal of Ewnomia and Finance, 26, 2002, PP.267-282.
[9] Baker, H. and Wurgler, J.,“A Catering Theory of Dividends”, Journal of Finance, 3, 2004, PP.1125~1165.
[10]Barclay, M. and Holderness, C.,“Private Benefits from Control of Public Corporations”, Journal of Financial Economics, 25, 1989, PP.371-395.
[11]Bebchuk, L., Kraakman, R. and Triantis, G.,“Stock Pyramids, Cross-Ownership, and Dual Class Equity: The Creation and Agency Costs of Separation Control from Cash Flow Rights”, NBER Working Paper, 1999.
[12]Bennedsen, M. and Wolfenzon, D.,“The Balance of Power in Closely Held Corporations”, Journal of Financial Economics, 58, 2000, PP. 113-139.
[13]Berly, A. and Means, G.,“The Modern Corporation and Private Property”, Macmillan, New York, 1932.
[14]Bhattacharya, S.,“Imperfect Information, Dividend Policy, and the‘Bird in the Hand’Fallacy”, Bell Journal of Economics, 10, 1979, PP.259-270.
[15]Black, B., Jang, H. and Woochan, K.,“Does Corporate Governance Affect Firm Value? Evidence from Korea”, NBER Working Paper, 2002.
[16]Black F.,“The Dividend Puzzle”, Journal of Portfolio Management, 2, 1976, PP.5-8.
[17]Black, F. and Scholes, M.,“The Effects of Dividend Yield and Dividend Policy on Common Stock Prices and Returns”, Journal of Financial Economics, 1, 1974, PP.1-22.
[18]Benartzi, S., Michaely, R., and T'haler, R.,“Do Changes in Dividends Signal the Future or the Past?”, Journal of Finance, 52, 1997, PP.1007-1034.
[19]Bennedsen M. and Wolfenzon D.,“The Balance of Power in Closely Held Corporations”, Journal of Financial Economics, 58, 2000, PP.113-139.
[20]Bertrand M., Mehta, P., and Mullainathan, S.,“Ferreting Out Tunneling: An Application to Indian Business Groups”, T'he Quarterly Journal of Economics, 17, 2002, PP.121-148.
[21]Bhattacharya, S.,“Imperfect Information, Dividend Policy and the `Bird in the Hand' Fallacy”, Bell Journal ofEconomics, 10, 1979, PP.259-270.
[22] Claessens, S., Djankov, S. and Lang, L.,“The Separation of Ownership and Control in East Asian Corporations”, Journal of Financial Economics, 58, 2000, PP.81-112.
[23] Claessens, S., Djankov, S. and Lang, L.,“Disentangling the I Incentive and Entrenchment Effects of Large Shareholdings”, Journal of Finance, 57, 2002, PP.2741-2771.
[24]Demsetz, H. and Lehn, K.,“The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes and Consequences”, Journal of Political Economy, 93, 1985, PP.1155-1177.
[25]DeAngelo, H., DeAngelo, L. and Douglas J.,“Reversal of Fortune: Dividend Signaling and the Disappearence of Sustained Earnings Growth”,Journal of Financial Economics, 40, 1996, PP.341-371.
[26]Denis, D. and McConnell, J.,“International Corporate Governance”, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 38, 2003, PP.1-36.
[27] Doron, N. and Amir, Z.,“Dividend Changes and Future Profitability”, Journal of Finance, 6, 2001, PP.2111-2133.
[28]Easterbrook F.,“Two Agency Cost Explanations of Dividends”, American Economic Review, 74, 1984, PP.650-659.
[29]Elton E. and Griber, M.,“Marginal Stockholders, Taxes and the Clientele Effect”, Review of Economics and Statistics, 52, 1970, PP.68-74.
[30]Faccio, M., Lang, L. and Young, L.,“Dividend and Expropriation”, American Economic Review, 91, 2001, PP.54-78.
[31]Faccio, M., Lang, L. and Young, L.,“Dividends and Expropriation”, American Economic Review, 91, 2001, PP.54-78.
[32]Fama, E.,“The Empirical Relationship Between the Dividend and Investment Decisions of Firms”, American Economic Review, 64, 1974, PP.304-318.
[33]Fama, E.,“Agency Problems and Theory of the Firm”, Journal of Political Economy, 88 ,1980, PP.288-307.
[34]Fama, E., and Jensen, M.,“Agency Problem and Residual Claims”, Journal of Law and Economics, 26, 1983, PP.327-349.
[35]Grossman, S. and Hart, O.,“The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration”, Journal of Political Economy, 94, 1986, PP.691-719.
[36]Grossman, S. and Hart, O.,“Takeover Bids, the Free Rider Problem, and the Theory of the Corporation”, Bell Journal of Economics, 1, 11, PP.42-69.
[37]Gugler, K. and Yurtoglu, B.,“Corporate Governance and Dividend Pay-out Policy in Germany”, European Economic Review, 4, 47, PP.731-758.
[38]Hart, O.,“The Market Mechanism as an Incentive Scheme”, Bell Journal of Economics, 14, 1983, PP.366-689.
[39]Healy, P. and Krishna, G.,“Earnings Information Conveyed by Dividend Initiations and Omissions”, Journal of Financial Economics, 21, 1988, PP.149-176.
[40]Jensen, M., and Meckling, W.,“Theory of The Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure”, Journal of Financial Economics, 3, 1976, PP.305-360.
[41]Jensen, M.,“Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance and Takeovers”, American Economic Review, 76, 1986, PP.323-329.
[42]Jensen M, and Murphy K.,“Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentive”, Journal of Political Economy, 98, 1990, PP.225-256.
[43]Jensen M.,“The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control Systems”, Journal of Finance, 48, 1993, PP.831-880.
[44]Jian, M. and Wong, T.,“Tunneling and Earnings Management through Related Party Transactions: Evidence from Chinese Corporate Groups”, HKUST Working Paper, 2003.
[45]John, K., and Williams, J.,“Dividends, Dilution, and Taxes: A Signaling Equilibrium”, Journal of Finance, 4, 1985, PP.1053-1070.
[46]Johnson, S., LaPorta, R., Lopez-de-Salines F. and Shleifer, A.,“Tunnelling”, American Economic Review, 90, 2000, PP.22-27.
[47]Kalay, A.,“The Ex-Dividend Day Behavior of Stock Prices: A Re-Examination of the Clientele Effect”, Journal of Finance, 37, 1982, PP.1059-1082.
[48]Kalay, A.,“Stockholder-Bondholder Conflict and Dividend Constraints”, Journal of Financial Economics, 10, 1982, PP.211-233.
[49] Khanna T.,“Business Groups and Social Welfare In Emerging Market: Existing Evidence and Unanswered Questions”, European Economic Review, 44, 2000. PP.748-761.
[50]Kathryn, L. and Warther, V.,“Dividend, Asymmetric Information and Agency Conflicts: Evidence from a Comparision of the Dividend Policies of Japanese and U.S. Firms”, Journal of Finance, 3,1998, PP.879-903.
[512]Klaus, G. and Yurtoglu, B.,“Corporate Governance and Dividend Pay-out Policy in Germany”, European Economic Review, 47, 2003, PP.731-758.
[52]Kwan, C.,“Difficient Market Tests of the Informational Content of Dividend Announcements: Critique and Extensions”, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 16, 1981, PP.193-220.
[53] La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., and Vishny, R.,“Legal Determinants of External Finance”, Journal of Finance, 52, 1997, PP.1131-I 150.
[54]La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., and Vishny, R.,“Law and Finance”, Journal of Political Economy, 106, 1998, PP.1113-1155.
[55]La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., and Vishny, R.,“Corporate Ownership around the World”, Journal of Finance, 54, 1999, PP.471-517.
[56]La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., and Vishny, R.,“Agency Problems and Dividend Policies around the World”, Journal of Finance, 55, 2000, PP.1-34.
[57]La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., and Vishny, R.,“Investor Protection and Corporate Valuation”, Journal of Finance, 57, 2002, PP.1147-1170.
[58]Lang H. and Litzenberger, R.,“Dividend Announcements: Cash Flow Signalling vs. Free Cash Flow Hypotheses”, Journal of Financial Economics, 24, 1989, PP.181-191.
[59]Lewellen, W., Stanley, K., Lease, R. and Schlarbaum, G., "Some Direct Evidence on the Dividend Clientele Phenomenon", Journal of Finance, 33, 1978, PP.1385-1399.
[60]Lies K.,“Equity Ownership and Firm Value in Emerging Markets”, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 38, 2003, PP.159-184.
[61]Lintner, J.,“Distribution of Incomes of Corporations Among Dividends, Retained Earnings and Taxes”, American Economics Review, 46, 1956, PP.97-113.
[62]Maury, C., and Pajuste, A.,“Controlling Shareholders, Agency Problems and Dividend Policy in Finland”, NBER Workingpaper, 2002.
[63]Mcconnell, J. and Servas, H.,“Equity Ownership and the Two Faces of Debt”, Journal of Economics, 39, 1995, PP.131-157.
[64]Morck, R., Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R.,“Management Ownership and Market Valuation: an Empirical Analysis”, Journal of Financial Economics, 20, 1988, PP.293-315.
[65] Miller, M. and Modigliani, F.,“Dividend Policy, Growth, and the Valuation of Shares”, Journal of Business, 4, 1961, PP.432-433.
[66] Miller M. and Rock, K.,“Dividend Policy under Asymmetric Information”, Journal of Finance, 40, 1985, PP.1031-1051.
[67]Nenova, T.,“The Value of Corporate Voting Rights and Control: A Cross-country Analysis”, Journal of Financial Economics, 68, 2003, PP.325-351.
[68]Ross S.,“The Determination of Financial Structures: The Incentive-signalling Approach”, Bell Journal of Economics, 8, 1977, PP.23-40.
[69]Rozeff, S.,“Growth, Bets and Agency Costs as Determinants of Dividend Payout Ratios”, Journal of Financial Research, 5, 1982, PP.249-258.
[70]Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R.,“Large Shareholders and Corporate Control”, Journal ofPolitical Economy, 94, 1986, PP.461-488.
[71]Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R.,“A Survey of Corporate Governance”, Journal of Finance, 52, 1997, PP.737-783.
[72]Shivdasani, D. and Yermack, D.,“CEO Involvement in the Selection of New Board Members: An Empirical Analysis”, Journal of Finance, 54, 1999, PP.1829-1853.
[73]Shefrin H. and Statman, M.,“Explaining Investor Preference for Cash Dividends”, Journal of Financial Economics, 13, 1984, PP.253-282.
[74]Stulz, R.,“Managerial Discretion and Optimal Financial Policies”, Journal of Financial Economics, 26, 1990, PP.3-27.
[75]Sun, Q., and Tong, W.,“China Issue Privatization: The Extent of Its Success”, Journal of Financial Economics, 70, 2003, PP.183-222.
[76]Wang, K. and Wong, T.,“Change of Large Shareholders and Performance Improvement: Is it Real Improvement or Accounting Manipulation?”HKUST Working Paper, 2003.
[77]Xu, X. and Wang, Y.,“Ownership Structure and Corporate Governance in Chinese Stock Companies”, China Economic Review, 10, 1999, PP.75-98. (二)中文部分
[1]陈浪南、姚正春:《我国股利政策信号传递作用的实证研究》,《金融研究》,2000年,第10期。
[2]陈晓、陈小悦、倪凡:《我国上市公司首次股利信号传递效应的实证研究》,《经济科学》,1998年,第5期。
[3]陈炜、孔翔、许年行:《我国的法律制度能有效保护中小投资者的利益吗?》,深圳证券交易所报告,2005年。
[4]陈郁:《所有权、控制权与激励》,上海人民出版社,1998年。
[5]陈信元、陈冬华、时旭:《公司治理与现金股利:基于佛山照明的案例研究》,《管理世界》,2003年,第8期。
[6]陈小悦、徐晓东:《股权结构、企业业绩与投资者利益保护》,《经济研究》,2001年,第11期。
[7]李常青:《股利政策理论与实证研究》,中国人民大学出版社,2001年。
[8]邓建平、曾勇:《上市公司控制权结构与股利决策研究》,《金融学季刊》,2005年,第1期。
[9]邓建平、曾勇:《上市公司家族控制与股利决策研究》,《管理世界》,2005年,第7期。
[10]何涛、陈晓:《现金股利能否提高企业的市场价值》,《金融研究》,2002年,第8期。
[11]胡旭阳、吴秋瑾:《基金持股与公司股利政策—来自中国股票市场的经验证据》,《中国会计与财务研究》,2004年,第3期。
[12]黄志忠:《股权比例、大股东掏空策略与全流通》,《南开管理评论》,2006年,第1期。
[13]江伟:《上市公司控制性股东掏空与支持行为的实证分析》,《经济科学》,2005年,第2期。
[14]李常青:《股利政策理论与实证研究》,中国人民大学出版社,2001年。
[15]李增泉、孙铮、任强:《所有权安排与现金股利政策—来自我国上市公司的经验证据》,《中国会计与财务研究》,2004年,第4期。
[16]李增泉、孙铮、王志伟:《“掏空”与所有权安排——来自我国上市公司大股东资金占用的经验证据》,《会计研究》,2004年,第12期。
[17]李增泉、余谦、王晓坤:《掏空、支持与并购重组——来自我国上市公司的经验证据》,《经济研究》,2005年,第1期。
[18]李婉丽和贾钢:《派现行为下的控股股东利益转移问题研究》,《当代经济科学》,2006年,第4期。
[19]廖理、方芳:《管理层持股、股利政策与上市公司代理成本》,《统计研究》,2004年,第12期。
[20]廖理、方芳:《股利政策代理理论的实证检验》,《南开管理评论》,2005年,第5期。
[21]刘峰、贺建刚:《股权结构与大股东利益实现方式的选择》,《中国第二界实证会计国际会议论文集》,2003年。
[22]刘淑莲、胡燕鸿:《中国上市公司现金分红实证分析》,《会计研究》,2003年,第4期。
[23]刘星、李豫湘、杨秀苔:《影响我国股份公司股利决策的因素分析》,《管理工程学报》,1997年,第1期。
[24]刘星:《股利决策新论》,重庆大学出版社,1999年。
[25]陆挺、刘小玄:《企业改制模式和改制绩效》,《经济研究》,2005年,第5期。
[26]吕长江、王克敏:《上市公司股利政策的实证分析》,《经济研究》,1999年,第12期。
[27]吕长江、韩慧博:《上市公司资本结构特点的实证分析》,《南开管理评论》,2001年,第5期。
[28]吕长江、周县华:《公司治理结构与股利分配动机》,《南开管理评论》,2005年,第3期。
[29]马曙光、黄志忠、薛云奎:《股权分置、资金侵占与公司现金股利政策》,《会计研究》,2005年,第9期。
[30]孙铮、刘凤委、汪辉:《债务、公司治理与会计稳健性》,《中国会计与财务研究》,2005年,第6期。
[31]唐清泉,罗党论,王莉:《大股东的隧道挖掘与制衡力量——来自中国市场的经验证据》,《中国会计评论》,2005年,第1期。
[32]田利辉:《国有股权对上市公司绩效影响的U型曲线和政府股东两手论》,《经济研究》,2005年,第10期。
[33]夏立军,方轶强:《政府控制、治理环境与公司价值——来自中国证券市场的经验证据》,《经济研究》,2005年,第5期。
[34]谢军:《股利政策、第一大股东和公司成长性:自由现金流理论还是掏空理论》,《会计研究》,2006年,第4期。
[35]肖珉:《自由现金流量、利益输送与现金股利》,《经济科学》,2005年,第2期。
[36]徐晓东、陈小悦:《第一大股东对公司治理、企业业绩的影响分析》,《经济研究》,2003年,第2期。
[37]徐莉萍、辛宇和陈工孟:《股权集中度和股权制衡及其对公司经营绩效的影响》,《经济研究》,2006年,第1期。
[38]杨熠、沈艺峰:《现金股利:传递信号还是起监督治理作用》,《中国会计评论》,2004年,第1期。
[39]应展宇:《股权分裂、激励问题与股利政策》,《管理世界》,2004年,第7期。
[40]俞乔、程澄:《我国公司红利政策与股市波动》,《经济研究》,2001年,第4期。
[41]俞鸿琳:《国有上市公司管理者股权激励效应的实证检验》,《经济科学》,2006年,第1期。
[42]余明桂、夏新平:《控股股东、代理问题与股利政策——来自中国上市公司的经验证据》,《中国金融学》,2004年,第1期。
[43]原红旗:《中国上市公司股利政策分析》,中国财经出版社,2004。
[44]阎大颖:《中国上市公司首次股票股利信号传递有效性的实证研究》,《财贸研究》,2005年,第4期。
[45]袁振兴、杨淑娥和王冬年:《从代理成本理论到利益侵占假说的演变》,《经济问题》2007年,第2期,第11页。
[46]赵景文、于增彪:《股权制衡与公司经营业绩》,《会计研究》,2005年,第12期。
[47]张翼、李习、许德音:《代理问题、股权结构与公司多元化》,《经济科学》,2005年,第3期。
[48]周建波、孙菊生:《经营者股权激励的治理效应》,《经济研究》,2003年,第5期。
[49]汪辉:《上市公司债务融资、公司治理与市场价值》,《经济研究》,2003年,第8期。
[50]王信:《从代理理论看上市公司的派现行为》,《金融研究》,2002年,第9期。
[51]王克敏、陈井勇:《股权结构、投资者保护与公司绩效》,《管理世界》,2004年,第7期。
[52]王战强:《上市公司高管人员持股状况研究及政策建议》,《证券市场导报》,1998年,第1期。
[53]魏刚:《股利的信息含量—来自中国的经验证据》,《中国会计与财务研究》,1999年,第2期。
[54]魏刚:《非对称信息下的股利政策》,《经济科学》,2000年,第2期。
[55]魏刚:《高级管理层激励与公司经营绩效》,《经济研究》,2000年,第3期。
[56]魏刚:《中国上市公司股利分配问题研究》,东北财经大学出版社,2001年。
[57]伍利娜,高强,彭燕:《中国上市公司“异常高派现”影响因素研究》,《经济科学》,2003年,第1期。
[58]周立:《自由现金流代理问题的验证》,《中国软科学》,2002年,第8期。
①李常青:《股利政策理论与实证研究》,中国人民大学出版社,2001年,第17页。
①李常青:《股利政策理论与实证研究》,中国人民大学出版社,2001年,第28页。
①李常青:《股利政策理论与实证研究》,中国人民大学出版社,2001年,第34页。
②徐明圣,刘丽巍:《现代股利政策理论的演变及其评价》,见《当代财经》,2003年,第1期,第53-56页。
①Miller, M.H. and Modigliani F.,“Dividend Policy, Growth, and the Valuation of Shares”, The Journal of Business, No4, October 1961, p432-433.
②Black, F. and M. Scholes, M.s.,“The Effects of Dividend Yield and Dividend Policy on Common Stock Prices and Returns”, Journal of Financial Economics, 1(1), May 1974,p1-22
③Lewellen, W., K. Stanley, R. Lease, and G. Schlarbaum, "Some Direct Evidence on the Dividend Clientele Phenomenon", Journal of Finance , December1978, p1385-1399.
①Kalay, A.,“The Ex-Dividend Day Behavior of Stock Prices: A Re-Examination of the Clientele Effect”, Journal of Finance, No4, September1982, p1059-1082.
②Bhattacharya, S.,“Imperfect Information, Dividend Policy, and the‘bird in the hand’fallacy”, Bell Journal of Economics, Spring 1979, p259-270.
①净股利是指期末时,股利减去负债和新股收入后的值。净股利为正值,表示所发股利来源于公司真正的盈利;而如果净股利为负值,则表示公司并没有足够的现金来发放股利,股利部分或全部靠外部融资来支付。
②Miller M. and Rock, K., "Dividend Policy under Asymmetric Information", Journal of Finance, September1985,p 1031-1051.
③John, K., and Williams, J.,“Dividends, Dilution, and Taxes: A Signaling Equilibrium”, Journal of Finance,No4, September1985, p1053-1070.
④李常青:《股利政策理论与实证研究》,中国人民大学出版社,2001年,第74页。
②陈郁:《所有权、控制权与激励》,上海三联书店,上海人民出版社,1998年,第6页。
①袁振兴、杨淑娥和王冬年:《从代理成本理论到利益侵占假说的演变》,见《经济问题》2007年,第2期,第11页。
①A. Kalay, "Stockholder-Bondholder Conflict and Dividend Constraints", Journal of Financial Economics, 10, 1982, p211-233.
②直接股利约束(direct dividend constraint)是指在债务合约条款中,以显性形式规定的股利约束条件,如公司的股利支付不得超过某一限额等。
③间接股利约束(indirect dividend constraint)是指在债务合约条款中,以隐性形式规定的股利约束条件,如通过规定公司应维持最低的营运成本、流动比率和净资产等来控制股利的发放。
④Easterbrook F.H.,“Two Agency-Cost Explanations of Dividends”, American Economic Review, 74, September 1984, p650-659.
①李常青:《股利政策理论与实证研究》,中国人民大学出版社,2001年,第86页。
②Baker, M. and Wurgler, J.,“A Catering Theory of Dividends”, the Journal of Finance, No3, 2004, p1125~1165.
①李常青:《股利政策理论与实证研究》,中国人民大学出版社,2001年,第87页。
②参见Baker, H.K. and Powell, G.E., "How Corporate Managers View Dividend Policy", Quarterly Journal of Business and Economics, Spring1999, pp.17-35.
③刘星:《股利决策新论》,重庆大学出版社,1999年,第4页。
①Beaver, W.H: Financial Reporting, An Accounting Revolution. 3rd Edition, Prentice Hall International, Inc, 2001.
①伍利娜等:《中国上市公司“异常高派现”影响因素研究》,见《经济科学》,2003年,第1期,第32页。
②胡蓉:《从“用友现象”看中国股利分配》,见《经济与社会发展》,2003年,第1期。
①王战强:《上市公司高管人员持股状况研究及政策建议》,见《证券市场导报》,1998年,第1期。
①俞鸿琳:《国有上市公司管理者股权激励效应的实证检验》,见《经济科学》,2006年,第1期,第108-109页。
①崔学刚:《公司治理机制对公司透明度的影响》,见《会计研究》,2004年,第8期,第74页。
①魏刚:《高级管理层激励与公司经营绩效》,见《经济研究》,2000年,第3期,第38页。
①全样本公司中两职合一比例为89.3%。
[1] Agrawal, A. and Jayaraman, N.,“The Dividend Policies of All-Equity Firms: A Direct Test of Free Cash Flow Theory”, Managerial Decision Economics, 15, 1994, PP.139-148.
[2] Aharony, J. and LSwary,“Quarterly Dividend and Earnings Announcements and Stockholder Returns: An Empirical Analysis”, Journal of Finance, 35, 1980, PP.1-11.
[3] Almeida, H. and Wolfenzon, D.,“A Theory of Pyramidal Ownership and Family Business Groups”, NBER Working Paper, 2005, PP.1-49.
[4] Ang, J., Cole, R. and Lin, J.,“Agency Costs and Ownership Structure”, Journal of Finance, 55, 2000, PP.81-106.
[5] Baek, J., Kang, J. and Park K.,“Corporate Governance and Firm Value: Evidence from the Korean Financial Crisis”, Journal of Financial Economics, 71, 2004,PP.265-313.
[6] Baker, H. and Powell, G.,“How Corporate Managers View Dividend Policy”, Quarterly Journal of Business and Economics, 38, 1999, PP.17-35.
[7] Baker, H. and Gary E.,“Determinants of Corporate Dividend Policy: A Survey of NYSE Firms”, Financial Practice and Education, 10, 2000, PP.29-40.
[8] Baker, H. and Gary E.,“Managerial Perspectives on Dividend Policy”, Journal of Ewnomia and Finance, 26, 2002, PP.267-282.
[9] Baker, H. and Wurgler, J.,“A Catering Theory of Dividends”, Journal of Finance, 3, 2004, PP.1125~1165.
[10]Barclay, M. and Holderness, C.,“Private Benefits from Control of Public Corporations”, Journal of Financial Economics, 25, 1989, PP.371-395.
[11]Bebchuk, L., Kraakman, R. and Triantis, G.,“Stock Pyramids, Cross-Ownership, and Dual Class Equity: The Creation and Agency Costs of Separation Control from Cash Flow Rights”, NBER Working Paper, 1999.
[12]Bennedsen, M. and Wolfenzon, D.,“The Balance of Power in Closely Held Corporations”, Journal of Financial Economics, 58, 2000, PP. 113-139.
[13]Berly, A. and Means, G.,“The Modern Corporation and Private Property”, Macmillan, New York, 1932.
[14]Bhattacharya, S.,“Imperfect Information, Dividend Policy, and the‘Bird in the Hand’Fallacy”, Bell Journal of Economics, 10, 1979, PP.259-270.
[15]Black, B., Jang, H. and Woochan, K.,“Does Corporate Governance Affect Firm Value? Evidence from Korea”, NBER Working Paper, 2002.
[16]Black F.,“The Dividend Puzzle”, Journal of Portfolio Management, 2, 1976, PP.5-8.
[17]Black, F. and Scholes, M.,“The Effects of Dividend Yield and Dividend Policy on Common Stock Prices and Returns”, Journal of Financial Economics, 1, 1974, PP.1-22.
[18]Benartzi, S., Michaely, R., and T'haler, R.,“Do Changes in Dividends Signal the Future or the Past?”, Journal of Finance, 52, 1997, PP.1007-1034.
[19]Bennedsen M. and Wolfenzon D.,“The Balance of Power in Closely Held Corporations”, Journal of Financial Economics, 58, 2000, PP.113-139.
[20]Bertrand M., Mehta, P., and Mullainathan, S.,“Ferreting Out Tunneling: An Application to Indian Business Groups”, T'he Quarterly Journal of Economics, 17, 2002, PP.121-148.
[21]Bhattacharya, S.,“Imperfect Information, Dividend Policy and the `Bird in the Hand' Fallacy”, Bell Journal ofEconomics, 10, 1979, PP.259-270.
[22] Claessens, S., Djankov, S. and Lang, L.,“The Separation of Ownership and Control in East Asian Corporations”, Journal of Financial Economics, 58, 2000, PP.81-112.
[23] Claessens, S., Djankov, S. and Lang, L.,“Disentangling the I Incentive and Entrenchment Effects of Large Shareholdings”, Journal of Finance, 57, 2002, PP.2741-2771.
[24]Demsetz, H. and Lehn, K.,“The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes and Consequences”, Journal of Political Economy, 93, 1985, PP.1155-1177.
[25]DeAngelo, H., DeAngelo, L. and Douglas J.,“Reversal of Fortune: Dividend Signaling and the Disappearence of Sustained Earnings Growth”,Journal of Financial Economics, 40, 1996, PP.341-371.
[26]Denis, D. and McConnell, J.,“International Corporate Governance”, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 38, 2003, PP.1-36.
[27] Doron, N. and Amir, Z.,“Dividend Changes and Future Profitability”, Journal of Finance, 6, 2001, PP.2111-2133.
[28]Easterbrook F.,“Two Agency Cost Explanations of Dividends”, American Economic Review, 74, 1984, PP.650-659.
[29]Elton E. and Griber, M.,“Marginal Stockholders, Taxes and the Clientele Effect”, Review of Economics and Statistics, 52, 1970, PP.68-74.
[30]Faccio, M., Lang, L. and Young, L.,“Dividend and Expropriation”, American Economic Review, 91, 2001, PP.54-78.
[31]Faccio, M., Lang, L. and Young, L.,“Dividends and Expropriation”, American Economic Review, 91, 2001, PP.54-78.
[32]Fama, E.,“The Empirical Relationship Between the Dividend and Investment Decisions of Firms”, American Economic Review, 64, 1974, PP.304-318.
[33]Fama, E.,“Agency Problems and Theory of the Firm”, Journal of Political Economy, 88 ,1980, PP.288-307.
[34]Fama, E., and Jensen, M.,“Agency Problem and Residual Claims”, Journal of Law and Economics, 26, 1983, PP.327-349.
[35]Grossman, S. and Hart, O.,“The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration”, Journal of Political Economy, 94, 1986, PP.691-719.
[36]Grossman, S. and Hart, O.,“Takeover Bids, the Free Rider Problem, and the Theory of the Corporation”, Bell Journal of Economics, 1, 11, PP.42-69.
[37]Gugler, K. and Yurtoglu, B.,“Corporate Governance and Dividend Pay-out Policy in Germany”, European Economic Review, 4, 47, PP.731-758.
[38]Hart, O.,“The Market Mechanism as an Incentive Scheme”, Bell Journal of Economics, 14, 1983, PP.366-689.
[39]Healy, P. and Krishna, G.,“Earnings Information Conveyed by Dividend Initiations and Omissions”, Journal of Financial Economics, 21, 1988, PP.149-176.
[40]Jensen, M., and Meckling, W.,“Theory of The Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure”, Journal of Financial Economics, 3, 1976, PP.305-360.
[41]Jensen, M.,“Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance and Takeovers”, American Economic Review, 76, 1986, PP.323-329.
[42]Jensen M, and Murphy K.,“Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentive”, Journal of Political Economy, 98, 1990, PP.225-256.
[43]Jensen M.,“The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control Systems”, Journal of Finance, 48, 1993, PP.831-880.
[44]Jian, M. and Wong, T.,“Tunneling and Earnings Management through Related Party Transactions: Evidence from Chinese Corporate Groups”, HKUST Working Paper, 2003.
[45]John, K., and Williams, J.,“Dividends, Dilution, and Taxes: A Signaling Equilibrium”, Journal of Finance, 4, 1985, PP.1053-1070.
[46]Johnson, S., LaPorta, R., Lopez-de-Salines F. and Shleifer, A.,“Tunnelling”, American Economic Review, 90, 2000, PP.22-27.
[47]Kalay, A.,“The Ex-Dividend Day Behavior of Stock Prices: A Re-Examination of the Clientele Effect”, Journal of Finance, 37, 1982, PP.1059-1082.
[48]Kalay, A.,“Stockholder-Bondholder Conflict and Dividend Constraints”, Journal of Financial Economics, 10, 1982, PP.211-233.
[49] Khanna T.,“Business Groups and Social Welfare In Emerging Market: Existing Evidence and Unanswered Questions”, European Economic Review, 44, 2000. PP.748-761.
[50]Kathryn, L. and Warther, V.,“Dividend, Asymmetric Information and Agency Conflicts: Evidence from a Comparision of the Dividend Policies of Japanese and U.S. Firms”, Journal of Finance, 3,1998, PP.879-903.
[512]Klaus, G. and Yurtoglu, B.,“Corporate Governance and Dividend Pay-out Policy in Germany”, European Economic Review, 47, 2003, PP.731-758.
[52]Kwan, C.,“Difficient Market Tests of the Informational Content of Dividend Announcements: Critique and Extensions”, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 16, 1981, PP.193-220.
[53] La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., and Vishny, R.,“Legal Determinants of External Finance”, Journal of Finance, 52, 1997, PP.1131-I 150.
[54]La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., and Vishny, R.,“Law and Finance”, Journal of Political Economy, 106, 1998, PP.1113-1155.
[55]La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., and Vishny, R.,“Corporate Ownership around the World”, Journal of Finance, 54, 1999, PP.471-517.
[56]La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., and Vishny, R.,“Agency Problems and Dividend Policies around the World”, Journal of Finance, 55, 2000, PP.1-34.
[57]La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., and Vishny, R.,“Investor Protection and Corporate Valuation”, Journal of Finance, 57, 2002, PP.1147-1170.
[58]Lang H. and Litzenberger, R.,“Dividend Announcements: Cash Flow Signalling vs. Free Cash Flow Hypotheses”, Journal of Financial Economics, 24, 1989, PP.181-191.
[59]Lewellen, W., Stanley, K., Lease, R. and Schlarbaum, G., "Some Direct Evidence on the Dividend Clientele Phenomenon", Journal of Finance, 33, 1978, PP.1385-1399.
[60]Lies K.,“Equity Ownership and Firm Value in Emerging Markets”, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 38, 2003, PP.159-184.
[61]Lintner, J.,“Distribution of Incomes of Corporations Among Dividends, Retained Earnings and Taxes”, American Economics Review, 46, 1956, PP.97-113.
[62]Maury, C., and Pajuste, A.,“Controlling Shareholders, Agency Problems and Dividend Policy in Finland”, NBER Workingpaper, 2002.
[63]Mcconnell, J. and Servas, H.,“Equity Ownership and the Two Faces of Debt”, Journal of Economics, 39, 1995, PP.131-157.
[64]Morck, R., Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R.,“Management Ownership and Market Valuation: an Empirical Analysis”, Journal of Financial Economics, 20, 1988, PP.293-315.
[65] Miller, M. and Modigliani, F.,“Dividend Policy, Growth, and the Valuation of Shares”, Journal of Business, 4, 1961, PP.432-433.
[66] Miller M. and Rock, K.,“Dividend Policy under Asymmetric Information”, Journal of Finance, 40, 1985, PP.1031-1051.
[67]Nenova, T.,“The Value of Corporate Voting Rights and Control: A Cross-country Analysis”, Journal of Financial Economics, 68, 2003, PP.325-351.
[68]Ross S.,“The Determination of Financial Structures: The Incentive-signalling Approach”, Bell Journal of Economics, 8, 1977, PP.23-40.
[69]Rozeff, S.,“Growth, Bets and Agency Costs as Determinants of Dividend Payout Ratios”, Journal of Financial Research, 5, 1982, PP.249-258.
[70]Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R.,“Large Shareholders and Corporate Control”, Journal ofPolitical Economy, 94, 1986, PP.461-488.
[71]Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R.,“A Survey of Corporate Governance”, Journal of Finance, 52, 1997, PP.737-783.
[72]Shivdasani, D. and Yermack, D.,“CEO Involvement in the Selection of New Board Members: An Empirical Analysis”, Journal of Finance, 54, 1999, PP.1829-1853.
[73]Shefrin H. and Statman, M.,“Explaining Investor Preference for Cash Dividends”, Journal of Financial Economics, 13, 1984, PP.253-282.
[74]Stulz, R.,“Managerial Discretion and Optimal Financial Policies”, Journal of Financial Economics, 26, 1990, PP.3-27.
[75]Sun, Q., and Tong, W.,“China Issue Privatization: The Extent of Its Success”, Journal of Financial Economics, 70, 2003, PP.183-222.
[76]Wang, K. and Wong, T.,“Change of Large Shareholders and Performance Improvement: Is it Real Improvement or Accounting Manipulation?”HKUST Working Paper, 2003.
[77]Xu, X. and Wang, Y.,“Ownership Structure and Corporate Governance in Chinese Stock Companies”, China Economic Review, 10, 1999, PP.75-98. (二)中文部分
[1]陈浪南、姚正春:《我国股利政策信号传递作用的实证研究》,《金融研究》,2000年,第10期。
[2]陈晓、陈小悦、倪凡:《我国上市公司首次股利信号传递效应的实证研究》,《经济科学》,1998年,第5期。
[3]陈炜、孔翔、许年行:《我国的法律制度能有效保护中小投资者的利益吗?》,深圳证券交易所报告,2005年。
[4]陈郁:《所有权、控制权与激励》,上海人民出版社,1998年。
[5]陈信元、陈冬华、时旭:《公司治理与现金股利:基于佛山照明的案例研究》,《管理世界》,2003年,第8期。
[6]陈小悦、徐晓东:《股权结构、企业业绩与投资者利益保护》,《经济研究》,2001年,第11期。
[7]李常青:《股利政策理论与实证研究》,中国人民大学出版社,2001年。
[8]邓建平、曾勇:《上市公司控制权结构与股利决策研究》,《金融学季刊》,2005年,第1期。
[9]邓建平、曾勇:《上市公司家族控制与股利决策研究》,《管理世界》,2005年,第7期。
[10]何涛、陈晓:《现金股利能否提高企业的市场价值》,《金融研究》,2002年,第8期。
[11]胡旭阳、吴秋瑾:《基金持股与公司股利政策—来自中国股票市场的经验证据》,《中国会计与财务研究》,2004年,第3期。
[12]黄志忠:《股权比例、大股东掏空策略与全流通》,《南开管理评论》,2006年,第1期。
[13]江伟:《上市公司控制性股东掏空与支持行为的实证分析》,《经济科学》,2005年,第2期。
[14]李常青:《股利政策理论与实证研究》,中国人民大学出版社,2001年。
[15]李增泉、孙铮、任强:《所有权安排与现金股利政策—来自我国上市公司的经验证据》,《中国会计与财务研究》,2004年,第4期。
[16]李增泉、孙铮、王志伟:《“掏空”与所有权安排——来自我国上市公司大股东资金占用的经验证据》,《会计研究》,2004年,第12期。
[17]李增泉、余谦、王晓坤:《掏空、支持与并购重组——来自我国上市公司的经验证据》,《经济研究》,2005年,第1期。
[18]李婉丽和贾钢:《派现行为下的控股股东利益转移问题研究》,《当代经济科学》,2006年,第4期。
[19]廖理、方芳:《管理层持股、股利政策与上市公司代理成本》,《统计研究》,2004年,第12期。
[20]廖理、方芳:《股利政策代理理论的实证检验》,《南开管理评论》,2005年,第5期。
[21]刘峰、贺建刚:《股权结构与大股东利益实现方式的选择》,《中国第二界实证会计国际会议论文集》,2003年。
[22]刘淑莲、胡燕鸿:《中国上市公司现金分红实证分析》,《会计研究》,2003年,第4期。
[23]刘星、李豫湘、杨秀苔:《影响我国股份公司股利决策的因素分析》,《管理工程学报》,1997年,第1期。
[24]刘星:《股利决策新论》,重庆大学出版社,1999年。
[25]陆挺、刘小玄:《企业改制模式和改制绩效》,《经济研究》,2005年,第5期。
[26]吕长江、王克敏:《上市公司股利政策的实证分析》,《经济研究》,1999年,第12期。
[27]吕长江、韩慧博:《上市公司资本结构特点的实证分析》,《南开管理评论》,2001年,第5期。
[28]吕长江、周县华:《公司治理结构与股利分配动机》,《南开管理评论》,2005年,第3期。
[29]马曙光、黄志忠、薛云奎:《股权分置、资金侵占与公司现金股利政策》,《会计研究》,2005年,第9期。
[30]孙铮、刘凤委、汪辉:《债务、公司治理与会计稳健性》,《中国会计与财务研究》,2005年,第6期。
[31]唐清泉,罗党论,王莉:《大股东的隧道挖掘与制衡力量——来自中国市场的经验证据》,《中国会计评论》,2005年,第1期。
[32]田利辉:《国有股权对上市公司绩效影响的U型曲线和政府股东两手论》,《经济研究》,2005年,第10期。
[33]夏立军,方轶强:《政府控制、治理环境与公司价值——来自中国证券市场的经验证据》,《经济研究》,2005年,第5期。
[34]谢军:《股利政策、第一大股东和公司成长性:自由现金流理论还是掏空理论》,《会计研究》,2006年,第4期。
[35]肖珉:《自由现金流量、利益输送与现金股利》,《经济科学》,2005年,第2期。
[36]徐晓东、陈小悦:《第一大股东对公司治理、企业业绩的影响分析》,《经济研究》,2003年,第2期。
[37]徐莉萍、辛宇和陈工孟:《股权集中度和股权制衡及其对公司经营绩效的影响》,《经济研究》,2006年,第1期。
[38]杨熠、沈艺峰:《现金股利:传递信号还是起监督治理作用》,《中国会计评论》,2004年,第1期。
[39]应展宇:《股权分裂、激励问题与股利政策》,《管理世界》,2004年,第7期。
[40]俞乔、程澄:《我国公司红利政策与股市波动》,《经济研究》,2001年,第4期。
[41]俞鸿琳:《国有上市公司管理者股权激励效应的实证检验》,《经济科学》,2006年,第1期。
[42]余明桂、夏新平:《控股股东、代理问题与股利政策——来自中国上市公司的经验证据》,《中国金融学》,2004年,第1期。
[43]原红旗:《中国上市公司股利政策分析》,中国财经出版社,2004。
[44]阎大颖:《中国上市公司首次股票股利信号传递有效性的实证研究》,《财贸研究》,2005年,第4期。
[45]袁振兴、杨淑娥和王冬年:《从代理成本理论到利益侵占假说的演变》,《经济问题》2007年,第2期,第11页。
[46]赵景文、于增彪:《股权制衡与公司经营业绩》,《会计研究》,2005年,第12期。
[47]张翼、李习、许德音:《代理问题、股权结构与公司多元化》,《经济科学》,2005年,第3期。
[48]周建波、孙菊生:《经营者股权激励的治理效应》,《经济研究》,2003年,第5期。
[49]汪辉:《上市公司债务融资、公司治理与市场价值》,《经济研究》,2003年,第8期。
[50]王信:《从代理理论看上市公司的派现行为》,《金融研究》,2002年,第9期。
[51]王克敏、陈井勇:《股权结构、投资者保护与公司绩效》,《管理世界》,2004年,第7期。
[52]王战强:《上市公司高管人员持股状况研究及政策建议》,《证券市场导报》,1998年,第1期。
[53]魏刚:《股利的信息含量—来自中国的经验证据》,《中国会计与财务研究》,1999年,第2期。
[54]魏刚:《非对称信息下的股利政策》,《经济科学》,2000年,第2期。
[55]魏刚:《高级管理层激励与公司经营绩效》,《经济研究》,2000年,第3期。
[56]魏刚:《中国上市公司股利分配问题研究》,东北财经大学出版社,2001年。
[57]伍利娜,高强,彭燕:《中国上市公司“异常高派现”影响因素研究》,《经济科学》,2003年,第1期。
[58]周立:《自由现金流代理问题的验证》,《中国软科学》,2002年,第8期。