控股股东的代理问题对公司持续成长的影响
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摘要
吴敬琏(2001)指出,股权结构决定了公司控制权的分布,也决定了委托代理关系的性质。由此可知,股权结构会影响公司治理的有效性,进而影响公司价值。股权结构是现代公司治理中的一个重要问题,其与公司价值的关系更是学术界关注的焦点,而中国资本市场则赋予了股权结构超越公司治理的更多的内涵。作为稀缺资源的支配者,上市公司必须先做到最有效的运用资源,只有如此才能促进公司和宏观经济的协同发展。这就要求上市公司有较高的生产效率和持续成长性,股权结构也应该服务于这一点。因此,我们在分析上市公司的股权结构问题时,不应该仅仅考虑其对于资本市场完善、投资者保护的效用,更要判断特定股权结构能否提高公司的生产效率和持续成长性。
具体而言,关于股权集中度的研究,实际上经历了从Berle and Means(1932)范式到LLSV(La,Lopez and Shleifer,1999:La,Lopez,Shleifer andVishny,2000,2002)范式的演变过程,研究的焦点从股东与经理人之间的传统代理问题转化到控股股东与中小股东之间的代理问题,有了代理问题就会通过代理行为发生代理成本,进而对公司的持续成长也就发生了影响。另一方面,公司内部治理结构受不同控股股东特性的影响下,也会产生一定的变化,而治理结构恰是影响公司持续成长的重要因素之一。
所以本研究先从控股股东的两个特性一股权集中度及控股股东的性质,对公司持续成长的影响进行详细的研究;另外当控股股东的代理问题出现时,也会影响公司的投融资决策行为、财务政策、创收能力和获利能力,这些因子进而会影响公司的持续成长。不同的控股股东特性对公司代理行为产生不同的影响。本文进一步分别对投融资决策(投资支出)、财务政策(负债比例及股利政策)、创收能力(主营业务成长率)和获利能力(净资产报酬率)等可能出现代理问题并影响公司持续成长的因子,去检验这些因子对公司持续成长所产生的影响。最后,进一步考察董事会组成、独立董事的比例及董事会的管理特征等这些重要的内部治理结构对上述可能出现代理问题并影响公司持续成长的因子的影响。
由于控股股东的代理行为所引发的效果可能不会在短期内的财务报表中显现,若采用传统的衡量公司价值的方法,就无法得知此代理现象是否是真的长期对公司不利,所以本文采用公司持续成长能力作为公司的真实价值,不但重视公司在量的增长,更主要是在质的飞跃。本文在考虑公司持续成长性时,分别以经济附加值(EVA)及Tobin's Q作为公司持续成长的衡量标准。采用这两个指标作为衡量公司持续成长的主要原因是EVA通过专门的会计调整,能尽量剔除会计失真的影响,并把经营业绩与企业决策联系在一起:使用Tobin's Q的原因最主要是它考虑了时间价值,也比原先使用的会计报酬率有较低的平均误差。
本文基于资本市场的数据,以2000-2006年七年间的2185个观察值为样本,考察了控股股东的特性及其可能出现代理问题并影响公司持续成长的因子,以及在现有的公司内部治理结构下,对公司持续成长所造成的影响。
本文建立六个待检验的假说,实证结果支持其中四项,主要结论分别是:(一)股权集中度可以显著降低公司的代理成本,使公司持续成长,所以股权集中度对公司持续成长的影响是正面的。(二)控股股东的性质对公司的代理问题因子影响显著,但对公司持续成长的影响并不显著。(三)以净资产报酬率衡量代理成本时,公司内部治理结构的改善可以有助于降低代理成本。(四)公司的代理问题因子影响公司Tobin's Q的效果显著。
控股股东的集中度及治理结构的变化将通过降低代理成本,对公司持续成长做出贡献。但另一方面,公司治理结构的改善并不能完全解释控股股东的性质,治理结构变化的收益,因此整合新的理论视角,会更有利于公司改革后发掘可能对公司成长和绩效有显著贡献的因素。
Ownership structure influences the effect of corporate governance, and the firm value further. Ownership structure is one of the most important issues of modern corporate governance. The relationship with ownership structure and firm value has been discussed and studied widely by all sectors. Ownership structure of Chinese listed companies have some unique characteristics, for instance highly concentrated ownership and a lot of non-tradable shares, so it seems that researches on this field pay more attention to ownership structure than corporate governance. Be a dominator of rare resources in China, listed companies are not only to make profit but also determine the sustainable growth ability of firms. When we analyze the ownership structure or corporate governance, we have to considerate how to use these to increase the firm value.
LLSV Showed evidence that some extent ownership structure around the world is concentrated, therefore, the agent problem between controlling shareholder and minority shareholder has become the focus of researches. How to understand the actions of controlling shareholder and how this problem affects the value of firm? On the other hand, the characteristics and actions of controlling shareholder will affect the corporate governance mechanism to the firm value.
My study aimed at the relation between controlling shareholder, corporate governance and firm value by using the agency behavior which is influencing by agency problem. This research intends to discuss, what the relation between the characteristics of controlling shareholders, including the percentage of shares, state own or non-state own, and the firm value is, what the relation between the influencing factors constructed in this research evaluates the actions of controlling shareholder in five levels: investment decision, financing policy, dividend policy, growth of revenue, and profitability, and the firm value. I try to connect the effect of internal governance, including the size of BOD, the percentage of independent directors, pluralistic directors from dominative shareholder, and the firm value. In this research, I used the Economic Value Added (EVA) and Tobin's Q as the firm value for sustainable growth. There are few manipulations in EVA than tranditional accounting index and it involves time value in calculating Tobin's Q.
Empirically, taking 2185 observes of Chinese listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen Security Exchange Market as a sample, through making an empirical study on the relationship between ownership structure, corporate governance and firm value of listed companies in China, the thesis probes the following results: Firstly, the concentration ownership will increase the firm value, including Tobin's Q and EVA. Secondly, there is few influences between the controlling shareholder is state-own or not and sustainable growth of firm. Third, the improvement of corporate governance is good for reducing agent cost by using ROE as an index. Finally, it is significant that the agent problems affect Tobin's Q.
The concentration of shares and the change of governance structure will make contribution to the sustainable growth of firm by reducing agent cost. But it cannot explain how the characteristics of shareholders and corporate governance factors to affect firm value. We need to integrate the different angle of view to enrich this area of researches.
具体而言,关于股权集中度的研究,实际上经历了从Berle and Means(1932)范式到LLSV(La,Lopez and Shleifer,1999:La,Lopez,Shleifer andVishny,2000,2002)范式的演变过程,研究的焦点从股东与经理人之间的传统代理问题转化到控股股东与中小股东之间的代理问题,有了代理问题就会通过代理行为发生代理成本,进而对公司的持续成长也就发生了影响。另一方面,公司内部治理结构受不同控股股东特性的影响下,也会产生一定的变化,而治理结构恰是影响公司持续成长的重要因素之一。
所以本研究先从控股股东的两个特性一股权集中度及控股股东的性质,对公司持续成长的影响进行详细的研究;另外当控股股东的代理问题出现时,也会影响公司的投融资决策行为、财务政策、创收能力和获利能力,这些因子进而会影响公司的持续成长。不同的控股股东特性对公司代理行为产生不同的影响。本文进一步分别对投融资决策(投资支出)、财务政策(负债比例及股利政策)、创收能力(主营业务成长率)和获利能力(净资产报酬率)等可能出现代理问题并影响公司持续成长的因子,去检验这些因子对公司持续成长所产生的影响。最后,进一步考察董事会组成、独立董事的比例及董事会的管理特征等这些重要的内部治理结构对上述可能出现代理问题并影响公司持续成长的因子的影响。
由于控股股东的代理行为所引发的效果可能不会在短期内的财务报表中显现,若采用传统的衡量公司价值的方法,就无法得知此代理现象是否是真的长期对公司不利,所以本文采用公司持续成长能力作为公司的真实价值,不但重视公司在量的增长,更主要是在质的飞跃。本文在考虑公司持续成长性时,分别以经济附加值(EVA)及Tobin's Q作为公司持续成长的衡量标准。采用这两个指标作为衡量公司持续成长的主要原因是EVA通过专门的会计调整,能尽量剔除会计失真的影响,并把经营业绩与企业决策联系在一起:使用Tobin's Q的原因最主要是它考虑了时间价值,也比原先使用的会计报酬率有较低的平均误差。
本文基于资本市场的数据,以2000-2006年七年间的2185个观察值为样本,考察了控股股东的特性及其可能出现代理问题并影响公司持续成长的因子,以及在现有的公司内部治理结构下,对公司持续成长所造成的影响。
本文建立六个待检验的假说,实证结果支持其中四项,主要结论分别是:(一)股权集中度可以显著降低公司的代理成本,使公司持续成长,所以股权集中度对公司持续成长的影响是正面的。(二)控股股东的性质对公司的代理问题因子影响显著,但对公司持续成长的影响并不显著。(三)以净资产报酬率衡量代理成本时,公司内部治理结构的改善可以有助于降低代理成本。(四)公司的代理问题因子影响公司Tobin's Q的效果显著。
控股股东的集中度及治理结构的变化将通过降低代理成本,对公司持续成长做出贡献。但另一方面,公司治理结构的改善并不能完全解释控股股东的性质,治理结构变化的收益,因此整合新的理论视角,会更有利于公司改革后发掘可能对公司成长和绩效有显著贡献的因素。
Ownership structure influences the effect of corporate governance, and the firm value further. Ownership structure is one of the most important issues of modern corporate governance. The relationship with ownership structure and firm value has been discussed and studied widely by all sectors. Ownership structure of Chinese listed companies have some unique characteristics, for instance highly concentrated ownership and a lot of non-tradable shares, so it seems that researches on this field pay more attention to ownership structure than corporate governance. Be a dominator of rare resources in China, listed companies are not only to make profit but also determine the sustainable growth ability of firms. When we analyze the ownership structure or corporate governance, we have to considerate how to use these to increase the firm value.
LLSV Showed evidence that some extent ownership structure around the world is concentrated, therefore, the agent problem between controlling shareholder and minority shareholder has become the focus of researches. How to understand the actions of controlling shareholder and how this problem affects the value of firm? On the other hand, the characteristics and actions of controlling shareholder will affect the corporate governance mechanism to the firm value.
My study aimed at the relation between controlling shareholder, corporate governance and firm value by using the agency behavior which is influencing by agency problem. This research intends to discuss, what the relation between the characteristics of controlling shareholders, including the percentage of shares, state own or non-state own, and the firm value is, what the relation between the influencing factors constructed in this research evaluates the actions of controlling shareholder in five levels: investment decision, financing policy, dividend policy, growth of revenue, and profitability, and the firm value. I try to connect the effect of internal governance, including the size of BOD, the percentage of independent directors, pluralistic directors from dominative shareholder, and the firm value. In this research, I used the Economic Value Added (EVA) and Tobin's Q as the firm value for sustainable growth. There are few manipulations in EVA than tranditional accounting index and it involves time value in calculating Tobin's Q.
Empirically, taking 2185 observes of Chinese listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen Security Exchange Market as a sample, through making an empirical study on the relationship between ownership structure, corporate governance and firm value of listed companies in China, the thesis probes the following results: Firstly, the concentration ownership will increase the firm value, including Tobin's Q and EVA. Secondly, there is few influences between the controlling shareholder is state-own or not and sustainable growth of firm. Third, the improvement of corporate governance is good for reducing agent cost by using ROE as an index. Finally, it is significant that the agent problems affect Tobin's Q.
The concentration of shares and the change of governance structure will make contribution to the sustainable growth of firm by reducing agent cost. But it cannot explain how the characteristics of shareholders and corporate governance factors to affect firm value. We need to integrate the different angle of view to enrich this area of researches.
引文
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